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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
International corporate income tax rules have been in the eye of the storm for the last decades 
mainly due to the outcomes they produce. In particular, these rules have come under harsh 
criticism for giving rise to an evident misalignment between the territories where companies carry 
out their economic activities and the territories where they ultimately report the profits 
generated by them for tax purposes. Throughout the present thesis, this phenomenon will be 
referred to as “profit shifting”. 
In view of this, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched in 
2013 the ambitious Base Erosion and Profit shifting project (hereinafter BEPS) aimed precisely at 
analyzing the magnitude of the problem1, identifying its causes2 and finally providing remedies for 
it by means of domestic and international instruments3. 
As we read the BEPS Action Plan, we soon realized that the scope of the project was unduly narrow 
and thus intrinsically limited to perform the aforementioned tasks satisfactorily4. Hence, we 
decided to embark on a path parallel to that of the OECD by means of the present thesis with the 
intention of conducting an alternative research study irrespective of political constraints and as 
free as possible of prejudices.  
1.2. HYPOTHESIS 
The immediate feeling of dissatisfaction that arose in us after reading the first papers published 
in the course of the BEPS project was due to the intuition that the diagnosis of the causes allowing 
this phenomenon to happen was probably correct but surely not complete. 
We instinctively assumed that tax connecting factors necessarily had to play a predominant role 
in the profit shifting phenomenon. Tax connecting factors are the rules that identify the taxpayers 
that become subject to a State´s tax jurisdiction, hence linking either the relevant person or an 
                                                          
1 OECD (2013): Addressing base erosion and profit shifting (hereinafter, BEPS report), p. 15-24. The report provides a 
general overview on the data and studies regarding the existence and magnitude of the problem. See BEPS report, p. 
15: “there are several studies and data indicating that there is increased segregation between the location where actual 
business activities and investment take place and the location where profits are reported for tax purposes”. 
Subsequently, the OECD committed itself to establish methodologies to collect and analyze further data on the matter 
by means of Action 11 of the Action Plan, see OECD (2013): Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting (hereinafter 
BEPS Action Plan). The result of this course of action is the OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 11 – Measuring 
and monitoring BEPS. 
2 The breakdown of identified causes along with their respective brief description can be consulted in the BEPS Action 
Plan.  
3 This was in fact the first and foremost objective of the whole project, see BEPS report, p. 21: “the main purpose of 
that plan would be to provide countries with instruments, domestic and international, aiming at better aligning rights 
to tax with real economic activity” and BEPS Action Plan, p. 13 and 18. 
4 ESCRIBANO, E. (2017). 
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item of income to a certain territory. There are four main sets of rules that can arguably fall into 
this category in the context of corporate income taxation5: rules governing the 
corporate/shareholder relation for tax purposes, the tax treatment of related parties within a 
corporate group, corporate tax residence and source. 
Companies are not real persons but mere legal fictions to which domestic legislations confer a 
legal status analogous to that enjoyed by natural persons. While the fiction was originally 
conceived for private law purposes, the impact it should have in the fiscal sphere is to say the 
least dubious. Therefore, the first question that needs to be addressed is how States should treat 
companies for income tax purposes. In this context, States may treat the company either as a 
separate taxpayer -distinct from its shareholders- whose income becomes taxable in its own 
hands at the time it is perceived by means of a corporate income tax (hereinafter CIT) or else, as 
a fiscally transparent vehicle whose profits would ultimately flow to their shareholders and 
become taxable in the hands of the latter.  
Once States choose to remain faithful to the legal fiction for income tax purposes and thus impose 
a CIT at the level of the company, the second question that arises is how States should treat those 
integrated in groups. In this context, they may recognize the corporate group as a whole, thus 
ignoring the transactions carried out between its members and merely looking at its overall 
outcomes, or else regard the group members as separate taxpayers. In this latter case, States 
should be prepared to address the transfer pricing risks that the adoption of this approach would 
entail. For example, by adjusting the conditions of intra-group transactions in a way that the tax 
base of the entity concerned includes the profits it would have obtained if the transaction had 
occurred with an unrelated entity by virtue of the arm´s length standard. 
The third question that needs to be answered concerns the way States confer the tax residence 
status to companies for the purposes of their respective CITs. Indeed, CITs borrowed from 
personal income taxes (hereinafter PITs) the ability of the taxpayer to reside in a certain 
jurisdiction, so States had to conceive corporate residence tests revealing a relation between the 
company and the State analogous to that of individuals and their residence State. They addressed 
the challenge of defining such nexus individually at the domestic level and the matter was never 
brought to any international forum to be discussed. As a result, we find today a great number of 
heterogeneous corporate residence tests of distinct nature and pursuing diverse goals. 
In parallel, States tend to establish the thresholds and/or requirements according to which a non-
resident company would become subject to tax in their territories. In this context, the permanent 
establishment (hereinafter PE) concept merits a special mention. Although the clause finds its 
roots in the Prussian domestic tax legislation of the 19th century, it soon made its way in the 
discussion forum of the League of Nations and subsequently, in its first model tax convention. 
Since then, it has succeeded to become the most characteristic threshold allowing source taxation 
of business profits by antonomasia and is present in the vast majority of tax treaties worldwide. 
                                                          
5 VANN, R.J. (2010), p. 293. According to Vann, these rules allocate rights among countries over international business 
income derived from corporations. 
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The way States respond to the aforementioned questions in their respective domestic tax 
legislations ultimately determine the territory where the profits obtained by a company will be 
ascribed for tax purposes. In this context, it has become a widespread tendency to impose CITs 
and further regard companies as opaque tax subjects, separate and autonomous from both their 
own shareholders and the related parties belonging to its group. In addition, States tend to confer 
the tax residence status mostly to companies incorporated in accordance with its domestic 
legislations or else managed from their territory and further rely on the PE threshold to determine 
the circumstances under which the profits of a non-resident company would be subject to tax 
therein.  
There are various reasons that led us to suspect, at first glance, that the configuration of this sort 
of rules may largely explain the misalignment between that location where economic activities 
take place and that where profits are booked for tax purposes. 
Firstly, the very nature of these rules makes them prone to potentially generate the perceived 
misalignment. In particular, when they do not seem to rely on factors revealing the presence of a 
substantial economic activity in the territory concerned, as it is clearly the case of corporate 
residence tests. 
Secondly, we have reasons to believe that the responses made by the States to the 
aforementioned questions were not the result of a process of conscientious reflection on the 
meaning6 and the policy goals of each decision but were rather made either by inertia or by merely 
following the lead of neighboring States or extrapolating principles from other fields (e.g. PITs or, 
worse still, private international law)7. 
Thirdly, States began to take a position on these matters between the 19th and the beginning of 
the 20th centuries and have barely deviated from their original positions ever since8. This is in spite 
of the fact that the global political, economic and business context has undergone an infinite 
number of far-reaching changes over the course of these decades9. In the face of this, States have 
                                                          
6 SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 692: “division of income among source and residence was not based on an economic reason, 
i.e. economic allegiance, but rather on a practical solution where imbalances were foreseen and expected to be corrected 
through a (hardly verifiable) equilibrium of investment flows among countries”. 
7 BIRD, R. (2002). 
8 TANZI, V. (1998), p. 338-339: “traditional national policies or institutions, to a large extent, still reflect the closed 
economy environment and thinking that existed when they were first developed” 
9 McLure makes a very illustrative comparison between the context where these principles arose and today´s in 
MCLURE, C.E. (Jr.) (2001), p. 333-334. For example, the international trade prevailing in the first half of the 20th century 
consisted primarily on tangible products and occurred mostly between unrelated parties, communications were 
relatively slow, capital was relatively immobile, intangible assets were relatively unimportant and the United States was 
the undisputed leader in terms of politics and economics. By contrast, today´s trade increasingly consists of services 
and digitized goods or services, while 60% of the global transactions are intra-group (BURKE, J. (2011), p. 614). Further, 
the 21st century economy can be broadly characterized by the great advances in transports and communications, the 
key role played by intangible assets and a distinct political scene where power is increasingly spread, mostly between 
the United States, the European Union and the emerging economies.  
 
14 
 
traditionally reacted by adhering to the main pillars of their respective CITs10 and then proceeding 
to describe how a modem transaction or problem might be shoehorned into that regime11. 
In conclusion, it may be inferred from the aforementioned that the perpetuation of paradigms 
originated in a radically different context and whose inception was not based on a profound 
reflection is thus likely to be a source of endless problems. In particular, we believe these 
paradigms play a key role in the perceived phenomenon of segregation between the location of 
economic activities and that where profits are ultimately reported for tax purposes.  
 
1.3. OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The main objectives we wish to pursue by means of the present thesis are described below: 
o Demonstrate the phenomenon of profit shifting through the example of a real 
multinational company, understand the real extent of the problem and identify the main 
rules that have presumably contributed to the final outcome in this specific case. 
o Examine the origins and rationale behind three paradigms commonly underlying 
corporate income taxation (the separate-entity approach along with the arm´s length 
standard, corporate tax residence and the PE threshold) and further demonstrate the 
essential role they play in the existence of the aforementioned phenomenon. 
o Explore the possibility of either abandoning these paradigms or altering their content 
bearing in mind the current economic, business and technological context; the 
implications of Public international law and a set of policy principles we intend to use as 
guidelines. 
To this end, the present thesis will be divided into four substantive chapters, thus excluding those 
concerning the introduction, general conclusions and bibliography.  
Chapter 2 intends to demonstrate the existence of the profit shifting phenomenon (i.e. the 
increasing ability of companies to shift their taxable profits out of the jurisdictions where the 
income-producing activities take place and instead book them in the jurisdictions of their choice) 
by means of a real life case: the multinational company Apple. To this effect, we will provide a 
comprehensive and detailed overview on the economic presence of Apple throughout the world. 
In particular, we will seek to identify Apple´s shareholders, directors and managers, activities 
concerning research and development (hereinafter R&D) and manufacturing, employees and final 
customers; and further locate them, to the extent possible, on a map. Subsequently, we will cross-
reference this information with the location of the group´s tax bases so as to illustrate the profit 
                                                          
10 See TILLINGHAST, D.R. (1996), p. 524: “the existing body of international tax rules, as reflected both in national law 
and in treaties, is based in large part on the supposition that international trade consists of the physical shipment of 
tangible goods or the physical movement of persons to perform services at different locations. The challenge posed by 
the development of the Internet and related means of communication is that in many cases that is simply no longer 
true”, and GRAETZ, M.J. (2001), p. 262: “many of the core concepts used to implement that structure—concepts such as 
permanent establishment, corporate residence, and arm's length pricing-date from a time when airplanes were first 
becoming a regular means of travel, and when the "wireless" was a relatively new instrument of communication“. 
11 GRAETZ, M.J. (2001), p. 264 and 270.  
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shifting phenomenon in a sole graphic. Once this is done, we will try to identify and break down 
the different rules and strategies that have contributed to this outcome in the case of Apple. This 
will allow us to assess and measure the specific impact that rules (mostly US domestic rules) other 
than the paradigms under review here have in this regard before embarking on the analysis of 
Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 seeks to evidence the ultimate responsibility of three paradigms that have been 
underlying corporate income taxation since its origin for the profit shifting phenomenon. We are 
referring to the separate-entity approach and the arm´s length standard (hereinafter ALS), 
corporate tax residence and the PE threshold. To this end, we will: i) reflect on their genesis and 
originary meaning and purposes; ii) briefly describe how they tend to be translated into legal 
provisions by analyzing common patterns followed by States; and iii) identify the specific profit 
shifting risks they are prone to pose. This exercise will not only enable us to test our hypothesis 
but also to reach further conclusions that may be useful when the time comes to reconsider the 
objective, scope and/or legal configuration of these paradigms. 
The confirmation of our hypothesis in Chapter 3 will lead us to advocate for a number of 
amendments so as to mitigate the perceived misalignment between the location where the actual 
business activities take place and the location where the profits are eventually reported for tax 
purposes. This task will however be preceded by a previous analysis in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 4, we plan to start by a profound reflection on matters of a fundamental nature relating 
to the own existence and raison d´être of CITs. Subsequently, we will reflect on the principle(s) 
that should ideally underlie their content so as to determine whether the misalignment evidenced 
in Chapter 2 (and perceived as a threat by the BEPS project) constitutes indeed a problem that 
needs to be overcome. As the answer will be positive, the discussion will further help us lay down 
the policy guidelines that should inspire the amendments we intend to put forward in the 
following chapter. Lastly, we will review the implications that the preexisting legal framework (i.e. 
Public International Law) may pose (if any) for the exercise we intend to conduct later in Chapter 
5. 
Once the foundations for the reform have been defined and outlined in Chapter 4, the question 
arises as to whether it is possible to conceive clear and manageable legal provisions that are 
consistent with such foundations while at the same time providing a sufficient degree of legal 
certainty.  
In this context, Chapter 5 will first make a preliminary evaluation of the scope and objectives of 
the BEPS project in the light of these policy guidelines. Subsequently, we will assess whether the 
proposals resulting from this project can be regarded as adequate and sufficient in this respect. 
We will also submit a few proposals de lege ferenda concerning the three paradigms here under 
review departing from the policy guidelines defined in Chapter 4. This will not preclude us from 
making a few suggestions on the basis of the conclusions reached in Chapter 3 that go beyond the 
main purpose of the thesis. 
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1.4. BRIEF NOTES ON THE METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in the research varies between chapters.  
In Chapter 2, we limit ourselves to collect, locate and present information concerning the Apple 
group on three different levels: the economic (value-adding activities and other relevant 
economic factors), the corporate (corporate structure of the group) and the tax level (allocation 
of the group´s taxable bases). To do so, we will mostly rely on a number of comprehensive and 
trustworthy reports and memoranda resulting from the investigation carried out by the US Senate 
on the group´s tax planning strategy back in 2011. For a greater consistency, we will use the fiscal 
year 2011 as a common benchmark so that we only cross-reference relevant data pertaining to 
the same year. 
For its part, the objective of Chapter 3 is to identify common patterns on how States typically draft 
tax connecting factors in the context of corporate income taxation. To this end, we will make use 
of a number of comparative studies, along with academic publications, legislation and case law 
relating to a variety of domestic tax regimes of an undetermined number of States. The sample of 
States is thus not limited, so we shall be free to make reference to the laws of any State insofar it 
is relevant for the purposes of our research. Throughout this chapter, we will frequently refer to 
Model Conventions of the OECD, the UN and the US (hereinafter the MCs) so as to get an idea on 
the variety of clauses that may be present in the actual tax treaties in the global network. In 
particular, we will allude to the 2014, 2011 and 2006 versions respectively, thus omitting the 
amendments implemented after the advent of the BEPS project. We do this on purpose: our 
intention is to study the situation prior to the implementation of the BEPS proposals in Chapters 
2 and 3 so as to better assess their impact in Chapter 5.  
The first two parts of Chapter 4 relate to policy considerations and the arguments provided 
therein will mostly rely on academic publications, while the latest section of Chapter 4 (that 
concerning Public international law) and will largely be based on academic doctrine and 
judgements of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ). 
Lastly, we intend to provide a set of policy proposals in Chapter 5. To this effect, will make 
reference to the domestic tax rules of some States we believe serve as a useful example, as well 
as proposals put forward by either scholars or international organizations, with a particular 
emphasis on those made by the OECD within the BEPS project. 
Before concluding the present section, we believe it is appropriate to make a brief comment on 
the citation style we will use to ensure a better understanding of the references. Those used in 
the footnotes introduced throughout the document will be solely comprised by the author´s last 
name in capital letters, the initial of his/her first name, the year of the publication and the number 
of the page or page rank where the idea or quotation may be found. Complete information on the 
publication concerned (including its title, editorial, etc.) will be provided in Chapter 7 
(bibliography). 
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2. THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC 
AND THE TAX PRESENCE OF COMPANIES 
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AS EVIDENCED BY THE 
APPLE CASE 
 
The present chapter intends to demonstrate the phenomenon of profit shifting. That is, the 
increasing ability of companies to shift their taxable profits out of the jurisdictions where the 
income-producing activities take place and instead book them in the jurisdictions of their choice.  
We intend to demonstrate this phenomenon by means of real life cases. We believe profit shifting 
opportunities are available for almost every sort of company, from the small to the multinational 
ones12. However, it is undeniable that the risks of profit shifting are considerably higher in the 
context of multinational companies (hereinafter MNCs), particularly those that better embody 
the features that characterize the 21st business models. 
These are the main reasons why we will primarily focus on a worldwide renowned MNC, Apple, 
although this shall not preclude us from resorting to others as examples. Even though Apple is 
primarily dedicated to the design, manufacturing and sale of tangible goods (a conventional 
business model), it heavily relies on Intellectual Property (hereinafter IP) and manages to 
satisfactorily exploit the opportunities offered by technology in order to reach new clients and 
interact with them. The increasing importance of IP as a value-driver and the use of technology 
are considered the fundamental features of today´s business environment13.  
Once section 2.1 has provided a complete overview of the economic, corporate and tax presence 
of Apple throughout the word and has thus evidenced the existence and extent of the profit 
shifting phenomenon, section 2.2 will subsequently describe in detail some of the rules and 
strategies that have contributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to this outcome in the particular 
case of Apple. This will further allow chapter 3 to leave these factors out of the equation and focus 
instead on the role played by other paradigms in this disintegration between the economic and 
the tax presence of companies throughout the world.  
 
                                                          
12 Chapter 3 will later demonstrate that the configuration of certain paradigms underlying CITs give rise to profit shifting 
risks that may easily be exploited by small and medium-sized companies (hereinafter SMCs) too.  
13 BEPS report, p. 47. 
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2.1. THE COMPLETE PICTURE OF APPLE´S ECONOMIC, 
CORPORATE AND TAX PRESENCE THROUGHOUT THE 
WORLD  
 
This section seeks to provide the most complete and accurate image possible of the global 
situation of Apple from three different perspectives. Firstly, we will see how its value-adding 
activities and other relevant economic factors are geographically distributed across the world. 
Secondly, we will provide an overview of the corporate structure of the group, including the 
geographical location of its most relevant subsidiaries and their respective roles within the group. 
Finally, we will see where the taxable profits of Apple end up allocated and the burden of the CITs 
imposed on them. The objective of this section is to verify whether there is some correlation 
between the economic and the tax presence of the group in the world and, if so, to what extent. 
For a greater consistency, we will use the fiscal year 2011 as a common benchmark, although 
references on data corresponding to more recent fiscal years, when available, will also be 
provided. 
 
2.1.1. THE ECONOMIC PICTURE OF APPLE: ITS GLOBAL VALUE 
CHAIN AND MARKETS  
 
Apple was incorporated in 1977 in Cupertino (California, United States) by its founders, Steve Jobs 
and Steve Wozniak. According to its own Annual Report, Apple is primarily engaged in the design, 
manufacturing and sale of goods (electronic devices, software applications) and the provision of 
technological services14. Apple currently coordinates a successful global value chain that covers 
the manufacture and assembly of its products, while it focuses its efforts on management, R&D, 
marketing and distribution from the United States.  
The next subsections will cover a number of factors relating to the ownership, direction, value 
chain and market of the group. The choice of these factors is far from random. We believe they 
are all relevant for the purposes of this research, as they usually play a role when it comes to the 
discussion of whether or not a company is (or should be) liable to tax or not in a particularly 
territory. On one hand, current tax connecting factors make a direct reference to the presence of 
some of them within the territory concerned. Let us take for instance the shareholders (residence 
tests based on ownership or limitation on benefits – LOB- clauses), the company direction 
(residence tests based on effective management), R&D activities (transfer pricing assessment), 
manufacturing activities (PE concept and transfer pricing assessment) and sales (PE concept). On 
the other hand, some other factors (in particular the workforce and the market) are expected to 
                                                          
14 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 1. 
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play soon a more significant role after the reconfiguration of the tax connecting factors as a result 
of the BEPS project15 or the proposals put forward by the EU (e.g. the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base, hereinafter CCCTB)16 or the academia. 
 
2.1.1.1. Shareholders 
 
Before proceeding with the analysis of Apple´s global value chain as such, we will examine the 
shareholding composition of Apple. We will do so because the nationality of the owners of MNCs 
has become part of some of the discussions over how MNCs should be taxed and, as it was rightly 
pointed out by Sanchirico, we cannot simply presume that the so-called “US” MNCs are in fact 
entirely (or almost entirely) owned by US investors17. Therefore, we will do our utmost to disclose 
the identity and nationality of Apple´s shareholders, although the access to the relevant data has 
proven to be particularly troublesome. 
Apple is a publicly-traded company since 198018 and is listed in NASDAQ (National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation), an American stock exchange, the second-largest in the 
world by market capitalization, only behind the New York Stock Exchange. NASDAQ´s website 
provides very little information on the ownership of Apple, being such information confined to 
institutional ownership, which accounts for 62,43 % of the total ownership (a total sum of 2611 
holders)19.  
Its top 10 institutional shareholders, which jointly account for approximately 27% of Apple´s entire 
shareholding20, are all US-incorporated.  Being Apple incorporated in the United States, one may 
think it is only natural that the vast majority of its investors are equally US-based21. This conclusion 
is based on a long-held belief, the so-called “home country bias”, that is, the fact that investors 
                                                          
15 For example, the BEPS project has reinvigorated the “market factor” as an element that, on its own, should trigger 
taxing rights in favor of the Market State. See ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 11: “The market, a historically despised factor, 
seems to come back to life. The first thing that strikes us is precisely the constant references to the market jurisdiction 
is both the draft and the final report, a fact that seems to reflect the desire of many OECD member countries to bring 
the source threshold closer to where the customers are”.  
16 For example, the CCCTB would distribute the taxable profits derived by a corporate group among the territories 
where it has its assets, workforce and sales. See EU Commission (2011): Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), p. 14 and 49. 
17 SANCHIRICO, C.W. (2015). 
18 http://investor.apple.com/faq.cfm 
19 http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/aapl/ownership-summary  
20 Vanguard Group Inc., State Street Corp, Fidelity Management and Research Company, Blackrock Fund Advisors, 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Price T Rowe Associates, Northern Trust Corp, State Street Global Advisors, Geode Capital 
Management and Capital World Investors. See http://investors.morningstar.com/ownership/shareholders-
major.html?t=AAPL 
21 It would be feasible to go through all 2611 holders and check, one by one, its nationality. In principle, this would 
enable us to know the nationality of institutional shareholders representing 58% of Apple´s equity.  However, as Chris 
Sanchirico notes, this method is not fully reliable due to two factors: reporting gaps (e.g. the 13(f) reports on which this 
information is based only cover 60% of Apple´s equity) and intermediary opacity as between those who report and 
those who own (the 13(f) reports do not reveal the nationality of final owners, so the nationality of the investor(s) 
within each fund or account remains unknown). See SANCHIRICO, C.W. (2015), p. 242 et seq.  
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tend to hold a disproportionate share of their equity portfolio in home country stocks22. This 
tendency is partly explained by rational factors such us tax advantages, transactions costs, 
governance issues, information asymmetry and foreign exchange risk. Furthermore, scholars also 
justifies such bias by reference to the sense of “familiarity” and the way it presumably leads to an 
irrational overconfidence in domestic stocks for the sole reason that the name and business of 
the domestic company would ring a bell to the potential investor23. 
More recently, the literature has pointed out that the aforementioned factors have been losing 
relevance over time24 so it could be presumed that the “home country bias” effect may have 
weakened in recent years. In fact, numbers seem to support this assumption. Data collected by 
the Treasury International Capital (TIC) system on portfolio holdings (less than 10%) show that the 
percentage of US equity held by foreigners have climbed from 3,8 % in 1974 to 14,5 % in 2014.  
Table 1 - Evolution in the percentage of foreign-owned long-term US equities (1978-2014)25 
 
 
Notwithstanding the above, there are reasons to believe that the 14,5% average foreign 
ownership share of US equity may not be representative of the foreign ownership share of large 
US multinationals like Apple26. On the contrary, this percentage will tend to be higher in these 
cases. The reason is that, of all the relevant factors contributing to the so-called “home country 
bias”, the only ones that seem to remain current (namely governance issues, information 
                                                          
22 SANCHIRICO, C.W. (2015), p. 217 et seq. The author refers to various investigations (most notably the one conducted 
by Kenneth French and James Poterba in 1991), which empirically prove this bias. 
23 SANCHIRICO, C.W. (2015), p. 222. 
24 SANCHIRICO, C.W. (2015), p. 222 et seq. The author cites the most prominent papers that intend to demonstrate the 
diminishing importance of these elements in today´s financial markets.  
25 US Department of the Treasury (2015): Foreign portfolio holdings of US securities and SANCHIRICO, C.W. (2015), p. 
232 et seq. It should be borne in mind that the TIC surveys only provide the numerator of the ratio, while the 
denominator (total US equity) is based on estimates taken from the US Federal Reserve Statistical Release (2015): Z.1: 
Financial Accounts of the United States: Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts.  
26 This conclusion is shared by Sanchirico. See SANCHIRICO, C.W. (2015), p. 274. 
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asymmetry or the “familiarity” bias) do not have a significant impact on the case of world-
renowned multinationals.  
Regarding the first factor (governance issues), it should be noted that US multinationals are 
usually publicly-listed companies in US stock exchanges and, as such, they are subject to extensive 
disclosure requirements and minority-protecting corporate laws27. Accordingly, opacity and some 
other risks commonly faced by foreign investors do not play a key role in the case of 
multinationals. In relation to the latter two (information asymmetry and “familiarity” bias), 
multinationals are so named precisely because they spread their commercial presence all over 
the world, as the next sections will intend to demonstrate in the particular case of Apple. As a 
consequence, the wide geographical expansion of these kinds of companies leads to the 
perception of familiarity by potential foreign investors.  
In the absence of trustworthy and accurate data on Apple´s ownership28 that may help us either 
corroborate or refute the validity of the “home country bias” in this case, both the arguments and 
the data provided strongly indicate that we can no longer assume that virtually all Apple´s 
shareholders are US-based. On the contrary, globalization has enabled foreign potential investors 
to get familiar with the brand and business of successful US multinationals like Apple and has lead 
them to invest in them. As a consequence, it is reasonable to assume that more than 20% of 
Apple´s equity is likely to be owned by investors based in countries other than the US.  
 
2.1.1.2. Direction and management 
 
Most direction and managerial activities are concentrated in the United States, perhaps due to 
the fact that it was originally incorporated and also keeps its principal executive offices in 
Cupertino (California, United States)29. According to the company´s by-laws, its board of directors 
shall be comprised by eight people30, who regularly meet in Cupertino31, at least four times a year, 
for the strategic direction and management of the company. Although there seem to be distinct 
management layers for each of the operating segments to better adapt to the specificities of each 
                                                          
27 SANCHIRICO, C.W. (2015), p. 225. 
28 In fact, it seems that companies themselves do not even know their foreign ownership share. See SANCHIRICO, C.W. 
(2015), p. 272 et seq. 
29 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), front page and p. 18. The principal executive offices are located in 1 
Infinite Loop, Cupertino, California.  
30 Article 2.2 Apple Inc.’s by-laws. Available at:  
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AAPL/1213606195x0x733772/D1EA258E-113E-4574-80A1-
D418B34A8275/Amended_Bylaws.pdf The directors, as of June 2017, are Tim Cook (CEO), Arthur Levinson (Chairman), 
James Bell, Al Gore, Robert Iger, Andrea Jung, Ronald Sugar and Susan Wagner. This information should be up to date 
in: http://investor.apple.com/corporate-governance.cfm  
31 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.) submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 30. 
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market32, the company is ultimately run from the United States33. For example, most of the 
members of the board of directors of Apple Operations International, a holding company 
incorporated in Ireland which holds shares in many Apple´s subsidiaries, are US-based Apple Inc.´s 
employees and consequently hold their board meetings in the United States34. 
 
2.1.1.3. Research and development 
As in other industrial fields, though with greater intensity in the technological one, the success or 
failure of a company is narrowly linked to its capability to offer innovative products or services 
that are capable of attracting customers. Thus, the competitive position of Apple will largely 
depend on its ability to invest wisely in R&D. The following chart demonstrates the increasing 
need for investment in this field and its correlation to greater earnings (earnings before interest 
and tax, hereinafter EBT)35. 
Table 2 - Correlation between Apple´s annual expense on R&D and its EBT (2011-2015) 
Amounts expressed in billion dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 2. The operating segments are described in p. 66: Americas (both 
North and South America), EMEA (Europe, India, Middle East and Africa), Greater China (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan), 
Japan and Rest of Asia Pacific (Australia and those Asian countries not included in the previous segments). 
33 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.) submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 30: “Apple´s offshore affiliates operate as one worldwide enterprise, 
following a coordinated business plan directed by Apple Inc.” 
34 Testimony of Apple Inc., p. 12 and Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple 
Inc.), p. 21, both submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The latter states that 
AOI´s board of directors held 33 meetings from May 2006 to the end of 2012, 32 of which took place in Cupertino, 
California. 
35 Apple Inc.´s 2013 and 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 6, 22 and 77. Information also available in the Apple´s 
profile of Nasdaq website (http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/aapl/financials?query=income-statement) 
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The investment in R&D may be direct, by financing its own R&D activities that eventually result in 
innovations that may be registered for greater protection. The investment may also be indirect, 
in cases where Apple disburses fees to third parties in exchange for licenses to use or 
commercially exploit their IP36, or cases where Apple directly acquires the technology developed 
by others. As a result, the company currently holds a significant number of patents and copyrights, 
and has registered or applied to register other numerous patents, trademarks and services 
marks37. In the particular case of the iPod, for example, its software was developed in-house and, 
therefore, Apple does not have to pay any license or royalty fee on each unit sold38. 
There is no accurate official data regarding the location of Apple´s R&D activities. However, 
several official sources suggest that the vast majority of R&D activities take place within US soil. 
Firstly, Apple´s head of Tax Operations revealed in the course of the US Senate investigation on 
the company´s tax planning in 2011 that around 95% of Apple´s R&D was conducted in the United 
States, mostly by Apple Inc.´s in-house engineers in California39. Secondly, the company revealed 
it owns facilities in San José and Cupertino that are specifically dedicated to R&D40. And lastly, 
according to the estimations, all of the 700 engineers working in the development of iPod in 2006 
were located in the United States41. On the other hand, Apple admitted that 1% of Apple´s R&D 
was conducted in Ireland by the company´s local subsidiaries42. A surprisingly low percentage 
considering that the Irish subsidiaries own around the 60% of Apple´s IP economic rights since the 
1980s by virtue of the cost-sharing agreements that will be covered in depth below in Section 
2.2.2. This ultimately reveals that these arrangements did not result in a genuine transfer of R&D 
activities to Ireland.  
The lack of comprehensive information on the location of the company´s R&D activities obliges us 
to make an estimation. A closer look into the US Patent and Trademark Office website reveals the 
existence of several trademarks and 1839 registered patents under Apple Inc.´s name43 while the 
European Patent Office has 4952 registered patents where the applicant is Apple Inc.44. A quick 
                                                          
36 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 12. 
37 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 8. 
38 DEDRICK, J., KRAEMER, K.L., LINDEN, G. (2009), p. 87-88.  
39 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p.28. 
40 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 18. 
41 DEDRICK, J., KRAEMER, K.L., LINDEN, G. (2011b), p. 228.  
42 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 28. 
43 US Patent and Trademark Office website: http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-
bool.html&r=0&f=S&l=50&co1=AND&d=PTXT&s1=%22apple+inc%22.AANM.&Page=Prev&OS=AANM/%22apple+inc%
22&RS=AANM/%22apple+inc%22 A non-exhaustive list of Apple´s trademarks is provided in its website : 
http://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-property/trademark/appletmlist.html, although they can also be found in  
the US Patent and Trademark Office website: 
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=searchss&state=4801:xk755t.1.1 
44 European Patent Office website: 
https://register.epo.org/advancedSearch?searchMode=advanced&pn=&ap=&pr=&fd=&pd=&prd=&grd=&pa=apple+i
nc&in=&re=&op=&ic=&ti=&apl=&recent=1 
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glance at a random sample of 40 registered patents45 is enough to realize that the vast majority 
of its inventors (96%) are in fact based in the United States, while only 4% of them were located 
elsewhere (Israel, United Kingdom and China in the sample). Out of the total of 171 inventors 
based in the United States, 99% were based in the State of California while only 1% worked from 
other states (Florida), thus corroborating the numbers provided by Phillip Bullock.  
Table 3 - Location of the inventors of a random sample of 40 Apple´s registered patents  
 
 
2.1.1.4. Manufacturing and assembly of products 
 
Back in the 1980s and 1990s, Apple used to manufacture its own products in-house, both in 
California and Cork (Ireland). However, in response to the severe financial difficulties it 
experienced in 1996 and 1997, the company restructured its operations and internationalized its 
global value chain46. Nowadays, Apple outsources most of its manufacturing and logistics activities 
to third party enterprises all over the world, primarily in Asia but also in Europe and the United 
States, being many of them sole-sourced suppliers47. The company only keeps limited 
manufacturing activities in-house, maintaining facilities for this purpose in the US and Ireland 
(Cork)48. 
                                                          
45 The sample is comprised by 40 patents that were randomly chosen from the US Patent and Trademark Office (20 
patents) and the European Patent Office (20 patents). The analysis of the sample was conducted in January 2016.   
46 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 18. 
47 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 6 and 11. In p. 32 of the 10-K form it is stated that, as of September 
2015, Apple had off-balance sheet third-party manufacturing commitments and component purchase commitments of 
29.5 billion $. 
48 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 6 and 18. According to the report, some Mac computers are still 
manufactured by Apple in the US and Ireland. In addition, the A5 series of microprocessors, used for iPhones and iPads, 
42%
32%
6%
4% 96%
Cupertino (CA) San Francisco (CA) San Jose (CA) Sunnyvale (CA)
Los Altos (CA) Palo Alto (CA) Woodside (CA) Mountain View (CA)
Santa Clara (CA) Los Gatos (CA) Millbrae (CA) Santa Cruz (CA)
Saratoga (CA) Menlo Park (CA) Windermere (FL) Non US
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Every year, Apple provides an official supplier list which comprises its top annual suppliers, who 
represent the 97% of expenditures for materials, manufacturing and assembly of Apple´s 
products49. 
Table 4 - Apple´s top suppliers throughout the world (2015) 
 
Once the components are manufactured, they are assembled in the facilities specifically intended 
for this purpose. 
Table 5 - Location of facilities where Apple´s products are assembled50. 
 
 
                                                          
are built in Austin, Texas (US), according to the memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 
(Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 30. 
49 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Supplier List. Available at: https://www.apple.com/supplier-
responsibility/pdf/Apple_Supplier_List_2015.pdf 
50 Apple Inc.’s website: https://www.apple.com/supplier-responsibility/our-suppliers/ 
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2.1.1.5. Workforce 
The group itself reveals annually the total amount of full-time equivalent employees as of the 
month of September in its 10-K Annual Report. The following table shows the rapid growth in the 
number of Apple employees worldwide. Unfortunately, the 10-K does not disaggregate the 
amounts by jurisdiction. During the investigation conducted in the US Senate during 2013, the 
group revealed that, out of its 80.000 employees, 52.000 were in the United States51 while 2452 
were in Ireland52. The extrapolation of the 65% proportion of US employees and the 3% 
proportion of Irish employees to previous and subsequent years enables the estimation set in the 
following table. This estimation will be of relevance when the time comes to draw the conclusions 
of Section 2.1.4.  
Table 6 - Number of full-time equivalent Apple employees and estimated number of employees working in the US 
and Ireland (2005-2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
51 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.) submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 17-18. 
52 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.) submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 25, footnote 103. 
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32000 34300
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60400
72800
80300
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14040
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30290
39260
47320
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Table 7 - Number of Apple employees per jurisdiction in the EU out of a total of 22.00053 
 
 
2.1.1.6. Sales channels and after-sale services 
The company markets its products and services through its own channels (retail and online stores) 
and through indirect distribution channels (including cellular network carriers, wholesalers, 
retailers and value-added resellers), each representing, respectively, around 25-30% and 70-
75%54. 
Focusing on the direct distribution channels, the following distinctions should be drawn: 
a) Retail stores. Apple owns or leases a total of 5.3 million square feet related to retail 
stores55.  
Table 8 - Location of Apple Stores across the world (2016) 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 https://www.apple.com/uk/job-creation/ (data as of February 2016) 
54 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p.4.  
55 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p.18. 
56 http://www.apple.com/retail/storelist/ (data as of 2016, out of a total of 473 stores worldwide) and Apple Inc.´s 2015 
Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 32. 
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b) Online stores. Apple also resorts to different digital channels to promote and sell its 
products: 
 
b.1) Online platforms. Apple sells digital content through various platforms: App 
Store, Mac App Store (both for software applications), iTunes Store, iBooks Store, 
Apple Music and a few others. These platforms are used to purchase, organize and 
play digital content, such as music, movies, TV Shows, podcasts or books. As the 
following chart demonstrates, net sales through these channels have significantly 
increased in the last few years.  
 
Table 9 - Net sales carried out through Apple´s online platforms and the percentage over Apple´s total 
net sales per year57 
Amounts expressed in billion dollars 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b.2.) Online store. The company also markets its electronic devices (Mac, iPod, 
iPhone, iPad and Apple Watch) through its website, which is currently available in 39 
countries58 and usually offers the free shipment of the product. Unfortunately, there 
is no official and reliable data on the proportion of sales carried out through the 
website to total net sales. The only available data is provided by the Wall Street 
Journal, according to which Apple reached $ 18,3 billion in online sales in 2013, 
resulting from the combination of sales from its digital platforms and the online sale 
of Apple´s devices59. If this were true, the latter alone would have amounted to $ 2,3 
billion in 2013 (once $ 16 billion from digital platforms are deducted). However, there 
are compelling reasons to mistrust this result. Primarily because Greater China´s 25% 
market share could be hardly explained in the absence of a successful digital store, 
                                                          
57 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report, p. 26. According to this report, growth in sales is driven by an increased number of 
Apple devices and the expanded offering of “apps” (in fact, App Store alone reached $ 10 billion in 2013). This growth 
was partially offset by a decline in sales of digital music. Strangely, the percentage declared in the hearing before the 
US Senate was lower (5% of sales corresponding to software and related media and 95% to computers, telephones and 
other personal goods). See Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” 
submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 17. 
58 http://www.apple.com/shop/browse/open/country_selector : 4 in America, 11 in Asia Pacific  and 24 in EMEA. 
59 The Wall Street Journal: “Apple jumps to second place in online retail”, May 6th 2014. 
9,3
12,8
16
18
19,9
2011 (9%) 2012 (8%) 2013 (9%) 2014 (10%) 2015 (9%)
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considering only 6% of Apple retail stores (a total amount of 30) are located in this 
region, which occupies an area of more than 9 million square kilometers60. 
 
For its part, the after-sale customer service is provided from, at least, three different facilities 
located in Cork (Ireland), Elk Grove, California (US) and Austin, Texas (US)61. 
 
2.1.1.7. Customers 
 
Apple´s market is comprised of final customers, SMEs and government and educational entities, 
and no single customer accounted for more than 10% of net sales neither in 2013, 2014 nor 
201562. 
Apple has managed to win a very competitive position in the global market as an undisputable 
leader in technology and innovation in the last decades. The increasing popularity and success of 
its products has enabled it to progressively gain new customers worldwide.  
Table 10 - Growth in net sales in operating segments other than Americas63 
Amounts expressed in billion dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the next table demonstrates, the Chinese market has experienced an explosive growth in 2015, 
at the expense of America, EMEA, Japan and Asia Pacific, whose relative market shares have 
declined.  
 
 
 
                                                          
60 See the correlation on table 13. 
61 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 18. 
62 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p.4.  
63 Apple Inc.´s 1999-2015 Annual Reports (form 10-K). 
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Table 11 - The development of Apple´s market share between per operating segment (2013-2015)64 
 
Interestingly, the growth of the Chinese market share is not accompanied by an increased number 
of Apple Stores in its territory. In fact, there seems to be no direct correlation between the 
number of Apple retail stores and the relative weight of each one of the operating segments. As 
the following table demonstrates, the network of stores seems to be oversized in America and 
undersized in the rest of the operating segments, particularly in Greater China. The gap between 
relative market share and number of stores in this latter case may be due to either the 
quantitative importance of third party retailers or the online store.   
 
Table 12 - Correlation between sales and number of Apple stores (2015) 65 
 
 
                                                          
64 Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 24, 26 et seq and 67. 
65 Distribution between operating segments is taken from Apple Inc.´s 2015 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 66 and 
Apple´s website. 
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2.1.2. THE CORPORATE PICTURE OF APPLE: ITS CORPORATE 
STRUCTURE 
 
Apple Inc. was incorporated in Cupertino, California, in 1976 by Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak and 
Ronald Wayne. In addition to being the parent company of the group, Apple Inc. is nowadays 
responsible for coordinating sales for the Americas operating segment.  
In summer 1980, as part of the company´s strategy to expand into new markets, Apple established 
a number of subsidiaries in Ireland. There are currently at least 8 companies registered in the Irish 
Companies Registration Office which are linked to the Apple group66. All of them have their 
registered address in Cork, Ireland.  
Table 13 - Apple´s offshore organization structure indicating country of incorporation and tax residence respectively 
(2013) 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66 Information available in the Irish Companies Registration Office (CRO) website: www.cro.ie/. In chronological order: 
a) Apple Operations Europe (AOE). Registered in August 5th 1980.  
b) Apple Operations International (AOI). Registered in August 6th 1980. 
c) Apple Sales Ireland. Registered in December 17th 1981. 
d) Apple Sales International (ASI). Registered in April 4th 1990. 
e) Apple Distribution International (ADI). Registered in May 11th 2005. 
f) Apple Retail Europe Holding. Registered in December 11th 2003. 
g) Apple Operations. Registered in December 8th 2010. 
h) Apple Data Services Ireland. Registered in December 19th 2014. 
67 Prepared by the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on the basis of information directly provided 
by Apple Inc. in May 2013. See Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” 
submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 20.  
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However, not all these companies play a significant role for the purposes of this research; 
emphasis will be placed on some of them: 
- Apple Operations International (AOI)68. The first tier of the corporate structure is 
comprised by AOI, a holding company incorporated in Ireland in 1980. As of 2013, Apple 
Inc. held 100% of AOI shares, 97% directly and the remaining 3% indirectly through Apple 
UK and Baldwin Holdings Unlimited. For its part, as the chart shows, AOI is the ultimate 
owner of most Apple´s offshore entities. As of 2013, whilst sharing the same address as 
the other subsidiaries, it lacked any kind of physical presence, neither offices nor 
employees69. Its board meetings were held in Cupertino (California)70, its general ledger 
was located in Austin (Texas) and its assets were held in bank accounts in New York and 
managed from one Apple Inc.’s subsidiary located in Nevada.  
- Apple Operations Europe (AOE)71. AOE is one of AOI´s subsidiaries, 99,9% of its equity is 
owned by this company. It is mainly responsible for the manufacturing and assembly of a 
specialized range of computer products at its facilities in Ireland, including iMac desktops, 
MacBook laptops and other computer accessories, all of which are manufacture for the 
EMEA region72. In addition, it also provides intra-group services to other members of the 
group with regard to finance (accounting, payroll and accounts payable services), 
information systems and technology and human resources73. Furthermore, as a result the 
cost-sharing agreements (which will be addressed in depth in section 2.2.2) that AOE and 
ASI have been jointly signing with Apple Inc. since 1980, both would own the economic 
rights to Apple´s IP in respect of the sales conducted in operating segments other than 
the American while Apple Inc. would still be the sole owner of the legal rights74 in 
exchange of a shared contribution to Apple´s R&D. As it was exposed in Section 2.1.1.3, 
this agreement did not lead to an actual transfer of R&D activity, since AOE and ASI barely 
conducts 1% of it. Prior to Apple´s 2012 restructuring, AOE had all Apple´s 2452 Irish 
employees on its payroll. As of 2013, AOE only kept 36375, which run the manufacturing 
facility in Cork. 
                                                          
68 First-hand information directly provided by Apple Inc. in 2013. See Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the 
US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 21-
24. 
69 TING, A. (2014), p. 44. As of May 2012 AOI did not have any employees according to the Exhibits used in the hearing 
on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), p. 63. 
70 This point will be discussed in detail below in section 2.2.1. 
71 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 25 et seq. 
72 European Commission Decision on State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple (30th August 2016), p. 11- 12: “the 
main activities of AOE´s Irish branch involve the ongoing execution of the processes required for the manufacture of 
products, process design and new products setups. Key functions within AOE Irish branch include: production planning 
and scheduling; process engineering; production and operations; quality assurance and quality control; and refurbishing 
operations”. 
73 European Commission Decision on State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple (30th August 2016), p. 12. 
74 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 19.  
75 See the Exhibits used in the hearing on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), p. 63. 
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- Apple Sales International (ASI)76. AOE owns 99,9% of ASI. ASI is responsible for the 
execution of procurement, sales and distribution activities associated with the sale of 
Apple products to related parties and third-party customers in operating segments other 
than the American77. As such, it contracts with third-party manufacturers to provide and 
assemble the components integrating Apple´s devices, acting as the “initial buyer” of the 
products. Thereafter, ASI resells the finished goods to the distribution companies (ADI for 
sales in EMEA and AS for Asia Pacific, etc.). As in the case of AOI, its board of directors is 
comprised by Apple Inc. employees residing in California. Surprisingly, its economic 
substance was equal to zero before 2012, when 250 former AOE employees were 
assigned to ASI in order to manage Apple´s other manufacturing activities as well as its 
product-line sales78. Apart from this, ASI itself does not conduct any of the manufacturing 
to the finished Apple products, and yet book a substantial profit in Ireland as it will be 
discussed below79. 
- Distribution affiliates80. Apple Distribution International (ADI)81 buys the finished products 
from ASI and then manages the sales in EMEA (Europe, India, Middle East and Africa) and 
China. The same applies to Apple Singapore (AS) in respect to the regions of Japan and 
Asia Pacific. As recognized by Cathy Kearney, ADI employee, in the hearing before the US 
Senate in 2013, the finished products are transferred directly from the third party 
manufacturers in charge of the assembly of the products (mostly in China) to the eventual 
country of sale. Section 2.2.4 will delve deeper into the way the distribution of Apple´s 
products works.  
- Apple Retail Holding Europe82. It owns the entities that operate Apple´s retail stores 
throughout Europe. 
- Retail subsidiaries83. There are at least 8 registered companies in Europe in charge of the 
Apple retail stores: Apple Retail UK, Apple Retail France, Apple Retail Germany, Apple 
                                                          
76 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 24 et seq. 
77 European Commission Decision on State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple (30th August 2016), p. 10-11. “Key 
functions within ASI´s Irish branch include: procurement of Apple finished goods from third-party and related-party 
manufacturers; distribution activities associated with the sale of products to related parties in the EMEIA and APAC 
regions; sales support and distribution activities associated with the sale of products to third party customers across 
EMEIA; activities of the selling and distribution teams, online sales; logistics operations; and operating AppleCare after-
sales customer support business, which includes responsibility for warranty, managing the repair programs and repair 
network including telephone support” 
78 Interview of Cathy Kearny in 2013, see Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple 
Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 25 and Exhibits used in the 
hearing on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), p. 63. 
79 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 33. 
80 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 27. 
81 As of May 2012, ADI was the Irish subsidiary with more employees. See the Exhibits used in the hearing on “Offshore 
profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), p. 63.  
82 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 21. 
83 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 35. 
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Retail Italy, Apple Retail Switzerland, Apple Retail Spain, Apple Retail Netherlands and 
Apple Retail Belgium.  
- Itunes. Itunes S.à r.l. was incorporated in Luxembourg back in 200484 for the purpose of 
distributing music, audio books, audio-visual products and other related products and 
services via the internet and other electronic and communication networks85. As of 2012, 
Itunes employed an average of 15,7 staff during 2011 (the average in 2010 was 11,9)86 
and its presence was limited to a letterbox87.  
 
2.1.3. THE TAX PICTURE OF APPLE: THE GEOGRAPHICAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF ITS WORLDWIDE TAXABLE PROFITS AND THE 
TAX BURDEN IMPOSED ON THEM 
 
The previous sections intended to draw an image as faithful to the reality as possible regarding 
the economic presence of the Apple group throughout the globe and the way the group is legally 
structured from a commercial point of view. For its part, this section seeks to provide a global 
map showing the jurisdictions in which Apple´s earnings end up allocated for tax purposes as a 
result of the group structure and its tax planning techniques, which will be addressed below in 
section 2.2. Additionally, when possible, the data will include the CIT paid in each one of the 
jurisdictions where Apple reports profits.  
In view of the difficulty of accessing accurate and reliable data from primary sources (e.g. the 
annual accounts of the corresponding subsidiary) we have decided to use data for the year 2011, 
since the hearing of Apple before the US Senate in 2013 and its enclosed documentation provide 
very comprehensive information regarding such tax period, while the updated data remains 
largely beyond our reach.  
Before entering into the detailed analysis, it should be noted that the earnings before interests, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (hereinafter EBITDA) (reported in the annual accounts by 
the respective subsidiaries in their respective jurisdictions will be used as benchmark. With 
respect to the CIT paid by each of the subsidiaries, the final amount paid in the 2011 period is 
provided when possible. Otherwise, the 2011 provision for CITs is supplied instead.  
                                                          
84 See the website of the Registre de Commerce et des Sociétés (www.rcsl.lu) . Its annual accounts are available upon 
previous registration and payment of a fee. 
85 The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists website (www.icij.org) provides a database containing 548 
leaked tax rulings approved by Luxembourg officials. Among them we find one related to Itunes S.à. r.l. which contains 
its 2011 annual accounts (p. 4 et seq) and some general information on the company (p. 20 et seq). 
86 See the leaked tax ruling, p. 22.  
87 New York Times: “How Apple sidesteps billions in taxes”, April 28th 2012. 
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The total amount of EBITDA obtained by the Apple group within the fiscal year 2011 reached $ 
34,2 billion88, of which 30% were reported in the United States ($ 10,2 billion)89 while 70% were 
reported abroad ($ 24 billion). Oddly enough, 64% of the global EBITDA earned by Apple was 
reported in Ireland ($ 22 billion)90, representing 92% of the EBITDA reported out of the United 
States, a very significant proportion particularly when compared with other significant 
jurisdictions, for example, the 0,6% reported in Japan and UK ($ 150 and 155 million 
respectively)91, the 0,29% of Luxembourg ($ 70 million)92 and the 0,002% of Spain ($ 0,4 million)93.  
Table 14 - Apple´s distribution of EBITDA reported within and out the United States and distribution of EBITDA in 
jurisdictions outside the US 
 
 
                                                          
88 Testimony of Prof. Shay on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.) submitted before the 
US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 8, Apple Inc.´s 2011 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 62 and 
SULLIVAN, M. (2012), p. 777. 
89 Please note that this quantity, for unknown reasons, differs in the Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the 
US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 29, 
according to which the EBITDA reported in the United States in 2011 amounted to $ 11 billion. 
90 See Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US 
Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. It reveals that most of which were reported by Apple Sales 
International (ASI) (p. 21 and 25 –footnote 102). This quantity kept growing to $ 36 billion in 2012 according to p. 29. 
Page 40 reveals that 84% of Apple´s non-US operating income in 2011 was booked in ASI. For its part, AOI, the holding 
company, received $ 6,4 billion in dividends from its low-tier affiliates according to p. 36. For a more comprehensive 
overview of ASI and AOE´s financial information from 2003 to 2014 see European Commission Decision on State Aid 
implemented by Ireland to Apple (30th August 2016), p. 24-25. 
91 See Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US 
Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 34 (Japan) and 40 (UK). Further information on the UK affiliates 
(Apple Retail UK Limited and Apple UK Limited) may also be found in the official UK Registry of Companies: 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04996702/filing-history and 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/01591116 
92 Please note the 2011 EBITDA of the Luxembourgish subsidiary (Itunes S.à.r.l.) could not be found. Instead, we use its 
2011 EBT (profit/loss of the company according to its commercial balance sheet) after its conversion to US dollars. See 
the leaked tax ruling by Luxembourg Administration regarding the aforementioned company on p. 7, available at 
www.icij.org Its net turnover, however, exceeds $ 1 billion (see the leaked tax ruling on p. 19). 
93 El País: “La declaración de impuestos le sale a Apple a devolver en España”, May 20th 2015. The Spanish subsidiary, 
Apple Retail Spain, had a negative EBITDA the following year (-22 million €) and a positive one (3 million €) in 2013. See 
http://www.texeda.com/apple-retail-spain-sl 
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It is equally interesting to assess the final CIT burden that these jurisdictions imposed over the 
earnings of their respective resident companies. Unfortunately, in this case we cannot depart 
from the official consolidated amount of CIT paid globally in 2011 by the Apple group since this 
quantity remains unknown. What is in fact public is the provision the Apple group stipulated for 
income taxes in the 2011 fiscal year: a total amount of $ 8,2 billion94. However, there are reasons 
to believe that the amount of the provision may be quite far from the total amount actually paid. 
Firstly, because The New York Times, albeit omitting its sources, quantified the total CIT paid by 
the Apple group in 2011 at $ 3,3 billion95. And secondly and more important, because a gap of 45-
70% is commonly appreciated between the tax provisions made by Apple and the total amount 
of taxes paid in the country96. Hence, it does not seem unreasonable to conclude that the actual 
total amount may be closer to $ 3,3 billion than to $ 8,2 billion. 
The next question that immediately arises is: in which jurisdictions did the group actually pay CIT? 
According to the aforementioned provision for 2011 income taxes, out of the total $ 8,2 billion, 
6,9 referred to federal income taxes (i.e. US CIT) while 0,6 referred to foreign taxes. With respect 
to the United States, Apple filed with the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter IRS) a tax return 
which quantified the total US tax paid in 2011 at $ 2,5 billion97. However, as regards the CIT burden 
on subsidiaries belonging to the group in jurisdictions other than the United States, the difficulties 
in gaining access to the data significantly increase. Although the provision for foreign taxes 
anticipated in the 2011 10-K Form was equal to $ 600 million, the data collected suggests the 
amount may be significantly lower. For example, Apple paid a total amount of $ 20,2 million in 
UK98 and $ 13 million of CIT in Ireland99, while paying zero in Germany, France100 and Spain101 for 
the 2011 fiscal year. For its part, the Luxembourgish subsidiary, iTunes s.à.r.l. estimated a total 
CIT charge of $ 22 million for 2011102. Once again, the reliability of the provision is at best doubtful. 
                                                          
94 Apple Inc.´s 2011 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 62. 
95 New York Times: “How Apple sidesteps billions in taxes”, April 28th 2012. 
96 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 39. The table depicts how Apple reports much higher provisions for 
US federal tax on its annual report than the tax that eventually pays. The gap was 47% in 2009, 69% in 2010 and 64% in 
2011.  
97 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 39. 
98 See https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04996702/filing-history (for Apple Retail UK Limited), 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/01591116 (for Apple UK Limited) and www.duedil.com for both. While 
the annual accounts of the former indicates it paid £ 8,8 million of CIT in 2011, the accounts of the latter states it paid 
£ 5,5 million. Once converted to US dollars, the sum of both makes $ 20,2 million.  
99 In 2011 Apple Sales International (ASI) paid a total amount of $ 10 million, while Apple Operations Europe paid $ 3 
million and Apple Operations International (AOI) did not pay any CIT to any national government at least in the period 
2008-2013. See Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before 
the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 21 and 23, Testimony of Prof. Harvey Jr on “Offshore 
profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.) submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, p. 4 and European Commission Decision on State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple (30th August 
2016), p. 24-25. 
100 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 40. 
101 Although Apple Retail Spain multiplied its sales in Spain by 14 (from 5 million to 76 million), the company carried 
forward losses from previous years and got a refund from the Spanish Tax Treasury. See El País: “La declaración de 
impuestos le sale a Apple a devolver en España”, May 20th 2015.  
102 See the leaked tax ruling by Luxembourg Administration regarding the aforementioned company on p. 3, available 
at www.icij.org The estimated CIT is 19.867.165 €.  
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Table 15 - Relationship between EBITDA and CIT paid globally, in the United States, out of the United States and in a 
sample of jurisdictions 
EBITDA is represented in blue and CIT in green. In cases where there is no information of the CIT 
actually paid, the estimation or provision is provided in italics. All amounts are expressed in million 
dollars and refer to the 2011 fiscal year. 
 
 
2.1.4. CONCLUSION: LACK OF CORRELATION BETWEEN THE 
ECONOMIC AND THE TAX PRESENCE 
 
In the light of the full picture provided in the previous sections concerning the economic, 
corporate and tax presence of Apple across the globe, this section intends to superimpose the 
data so as to analyze whether there is some sort of correlation between the economic and the tax 
presence of the multinational around the world.  
We believe the indicators used in the next two charts adequately represent some of the most 
relevant factors of the company´s daily life and value chain, from central management and 
innovation to distribution and final consumption of its products and services. The nine indicators 
used in the charts are listed below together with the source of the data and its corresponding year 
(whenever possible, we tried to use data for the same fiscal period -2011- for a greater 
consistency): 
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9,6 % 24,5% 2,5% 0,06% 13,3% 27,1% 0% 
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- The first two indicators correspond to the direction and management of the company, 
both at the level of the shareholders and the executive board. They point out where the 
corporate shareholders are103 and where the key management and strategic decisions are 
made104.  
- The following four indicators represent some of the key stages in the value creation 
process of its products and services. The first of them identifies the location of the R&D 
activities105, probably the most decisive activities in the supply chain of technology 
companies like Apple, since they are the ones that can make the difference with 
competitors. The second indicator refers to the origin of Apple´s principal component 
suppliers106, while the third one shows where the assembly of the components takes 
place107. Lastly, the fourth one intends to show the worldwide distribution of the firm´s 
employees108.  
- The next two indicators represent the final stages of the process: distribution and 
insertion of the products on the market. The seventh one shows the distribution of the 
firm´s own retail stores throughout the world (the “Apple Stores”)109, while the eighth one 
indicates the market share in each given geographical area on the basis of the revenue 
obtained therein from the sale of hardware, software, digital content and applications, 
peripherals, and service/support contracts110.  
                                                          
103 Data provided in the following charts concerning the location of the shareholders are mere estimates based on the 
analysis conducted in section 2.1.1.1. 
104 Percentages related to central management are estimates (corresponding to year 2006) provided by DEDRICK, J., 
KRAEMER, K.L., LINDEN, G. (2011b), p. 228 (for more information see section 2.1.1.2).  
105 The information provided is based on the analysis of a sample of 40 Apple´s registered patents that was conducted 
by the author of the thesis in January 2016 (see section 2.1.1.3).  
106 Information taken from the official Apple´s supplier list (2015) as published in its own website: 
https://www.apple.com/supplier-responsibility/pdf/Apple_Supplier_List_2015.pdf  See Section 2.1.1.4.  
107 Information provided by Apple in its website: https://www.apple.com/supplier-responsibility/our-suppliers/. See 
Section 2.1.1.4. 
108 Complete information regarding the geographical distribution of Apple´s employees is not available. However, the 
Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” in its pages 17, 18 and 25 (footnote 
103) reveals the total amount of employees in 2013 and the breakdown between those located in the United States 
and those located in Ireland. The estimates calculated in section 2.1.1.5 will be used for the purposes of this analysis. 
Furthermore, the information on Apple´s workforce in EMEA is the result of the extrapolation of the 20% proportion of 
Apple employees in Europe in 2016 (22.000 Apple employees in the European Union according to Apple´s website - 
https://www.apple.com/uk/job-creation/- out of a total number of 110.000 worldwide). 
109 The complete list of 473 Apple Stores with their respective addresses is available in the company´s website. 
http://www.apple.com/retail/storelist/ See Section 2.1.1.6.  
110 The disaggregated data of net sales per operating segment is provided in Apple Inc.´s 2011 Annual Report (form 10-
K), p. 30. Its page 27 specifies that the expression “net sales” in the 10-K form covers the revenue from the sale of 
hardware, software, digital content and applications, peripherals and service/support contracts. See Section 2.1.1.6. 
However, we found a couple of problems, as Apple´s 2011 10-K did not use the same operating segments as now. For 
example, the Asia-Pacific segment included Greater China at that time, and there was a separate Retail segment. In 
order to get the data corresponding to current operating segments as displayed in the first chart we preceded as 
follows. As information on the net sales conducted solely in China in 2011 was provided in Apple´s 2011 Annual Report, 
p. 74 ($ 12,4 billion), we subtracted that amount from the total net sales conducted in Asia-Pacific ($ 22,59 billion). 
Therefore, the Chinese segment ended up with $ 12,4 billion while the Asia-Pacific segment kept $ 10,12 billion. Finally, 
as there was a separate Retail segment with $ 14,13 billion, we apportioned this amount among the different operating 
segments based on the number of Apple stores located in each one of them.  
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- The last indicator pinpoints the regions where Apple´s global earnings are attributed for 
tax purposes, thus identifying the regions which in principle would be entitled to tax 
them111.  
Table 16 - Distribution of relevant economic data among the operating segments 
Americas (both North and South America), EMEA (Europe, India, Middle East and Africa), Greater 
China (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan), Japan and Rest of Asia Pacific (Australia and those Asian 
countries not included in the previous segments). 
 
 
 
The chart graphically displays the contribution of each one of the separating segments to Apple´s 
global value chain in its different stages. The American segment enjoys a greater prominence in 
the stages of management and R&D while it keeps the vast majority of Apple´s employees and 
retail stores within its domain. For its part, it may be easily observed that the Chinese segment 
plays a critical role in the production stages, since it provides the majority of the components for 
Apple´s devices and is in charge of its final assembly. Its market share in 2011 was still modest 
although, as anticipated in section 2.1.1.7, it doubled from 2011 to 2015. The EMEA region hardly 
contributes to the innovation and production stages but appears to be a significant market for 
                                                          
111 Information on the location of Apple´s EBITDA for the fiscal year 2011 is provided in the Testimony of Prof. Shay on 
“Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.) submitted before the US Senate - Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 8, in Apple Inc.´s 2011 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 62 and in the Memorandum 
on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 21 and 25 (footnote 102). See also Section 2.1.3.  
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Apple in terms of retail stores and volume of net sales. Nonetheless, two-thirds of Apple´s 
worldwide taxable profits ended up in this region. Finally, Japan and Asia Pacific share a similar 
profile, as each one supplies around 15-20% of components and keeps a modest market share 
around 5-10%.  
However, this chart cannot be properly understood in the absence of the following one. On this 
occasion we displayed separately the information concerning just two jurisdictions: United States 
and Ireland.  
 
Table 17 - Distribution of relevant economic data broken down into two jurisdictions: United States and Ireland112 
 
 
 
This last chart confirms that the United States, the country where the group was born and it is still 
headquartered, represents the greater relative weight within the American segment, which was 
discussed above. Ireland, for its part, does not contribute whatsoever to the management of the 
                                                          
112 The sources of the information concerning the US and Ireland coincide with those already noted above. Information 
on the market share of these countries is available in the Testimony of Prof. Shay on “Offshore profit shifting and the 
US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 8 
and Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US 
Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 8.  
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multinational group nor its R&D activities113 and barely contributes to the production process with 
a small manufacturing facility in Cork (in charge of a line of specialty Mac computers for sale in 
Europe)114 and a couple of component providers out of a total of 760. The insertion of Apple 
products in the Irish market is very modest, since there are no Apple stores in its territory and its 
market share scarcely represents 1%. In this context, it is surprising to see how this jurisdiction 
could capture nothing less than 64% of the group´s global EBITDA in 2011: a total amount of $ 22 
billion. As Shay noted, this would mean that each one of Apple´s Irish workers would be generating 
$ 9 million per year compared to the average of $ 576.000115. On the other hand, jurisdictions 
other than the United States and Ireland only captured 6% of the group´s global EBITDA despite 
greatly contributing to the value creation process (they manufactured 90% of the components 
and assembled 83% of the products) and representing a substantial share of its market (43% of 
Apple stores and 60% of the market share).  
In view of these facts, Ting concluded that such outcome defies common sense since “the 
locations of real economic activities—such as R&D and sales—are detached from the locations of 
profits” with the result that “a disproportional amount of income was booked in the Irish 
subsidiaries that have relatively few employees and activities”116.   
The case of Apple is certainly not unique. What we are rather facing is a widespread phenomenon 
that is commonly referred as “profit shifting”, which is the ability of shifting profits out of high-tax 
jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions where there is little or no genuine activity. In 2013 the OECD 
sought to raise public awareness of this problem in its influential report on base erosion and profit 
shifting: “there are a number of studies and data indicating that there is increased segregation 
between the location where actual business activities and investment take place and the location 
where profits are reported for tax purposes”117. In order to ascertain whether there were business 
activities in a particular jurisdiction the report used indicators similar to ours (sales, workforce, 
payroll and fixed assets) and reached the conclusion that profits were indeed reported in 
jurisdictions where such activities were scanty or simply nonexistent118.  
This fact has been corroborated by numerous economic studies carried out in the United States 
over the last decade. Despite using different methodologies they all arrive at the same conclusion. 
In 2008 the US Government Accountability Office issued a report which demonstrated that the 
top leading foreign locations of activities of US based businesses (in terms of sales, value added, 
employment, compensation, physical assets and net income) - UK, Canada and Germany- booked 
                                                          
113 According to the information supplied by Apple, employees of ASI and AOE conducted “less than 1%” of Apple´s R%D 
in 2013. As the information is neither accurate nor reliable we decided to trust our own estimations, derived by the 
study of the sample conducted in section 2.1.1.3.  
 in Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 28 
114 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 25. 
115 Testimony of Prof. Shay on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the 
US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 8 and 9. The first amount is the result of dividing the EBITDA 
allocated in Ireland ($ 22 billion) by the number of employees working in this jurisdiction (2452) in 2011. The second 
amount is the result of dividing the global EBITDA obtained by Apple in 2011 ($ 34,2 billion) between the total number 
of employees worldwide (59.000).  
116 TING, A. (2014), p. 45.  
117 BEPS report, p. 20. 
118 BEPS report, p. 20. 
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scarce taxable profits119. In 2011, Clausing found a large discrepancy between the physical 
operations of US MNCs´ affiliates abroad and the locations in which they reported their income. 
She identified the top ten locations in terms of affiliate employment in 2008 (in order: UK, Canada, 
Mexico, China, Germany, France, Brazil, India, Japan and Australia) and realized that such list 
barely matched the list of top ten locations in terms of affiliate gross profits (in order: the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Canada, Bermuda, Switzerland, Singapore, Germany, Norway 
and Australia)120. In 2013, the economist Mark Keightley compared the profits reported by 
American firms abroad with measures of real economic activity in those locations, concluding that 
significant shares of profits were being reported in “tax preferred” or “tax haven” countries and 
that such shares were disproportionate to the location of the firm´s business activities (where the 
firm hired workers and made investments). In addition, he was able to demonstrate that the 
discrepancy between the location of profits and the location of business activities has increased 
over time121.  
Having noted that this phenomenon is not only visible in the case of Apple but is presumably very 
widespread, the next step will be to dissect the different causes that make it possible. In the first 
place we will focus on the concrete rules and strategies that have enabled Apple to effectively 
separate the locations where profits were reported from the locations of business activities 
(section 2.2). Subsequently, we will analyze the causes of a more structural nature that contribute 
to this phenomenon, making a diagnosis of a more fundamental nature (chapter 3).  
 
2.2. THE SPECIFIC RULES AND STRATEGIES THAT ALLOW 
APPLE TO SHIFT TAXABLE PROFITS TO JURISDICTIONS 
WHERE ITS ECONOMIC PRESENCE IS VIRTUALLY 
NONEXISTENT 
 
The aim of this section is to shed some light on the tax planning strategy followed by Apple. We 
are doing so with the purpose of exploring the concrete rules and maneuvers that have helped 
Apple to shift their profits from high-tax jurisdictions where business activities were carried out 
to low-tax jurisdictions where such activities were scarce or simply nonexistent. This analysis will 
enable us to dissect the different causes that contribute to the phenomenon of “profit shifting” 
and will allow us to better understand the problem with a view to suggest better solutions later 
on.  
The analysis will cover the legislation and strategies that were in place in 2011, the fiscal year 
under review, although references will be made to subsequent amendments in the legislation that 
may have altered Apple´s tax position up to the present day. 
                                                          
119 US Government Accountability Office (2008), p. 1. 
120 CLAUSING, K. (2011), p. 1580-1581. 
121 KEIGHTLEY, M.P. (2013). 
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For a greater clarity, the tax planning strategy pursued by Apple will be explained by reference to 
four pillars122: the existence of stateless companies, the use of cost-sharing agreements, the 
avoidance of the controlled foreign corporation (hereinafter CFC) regime and the commissionaire 
arrangements. While the first one succeeds in avoiding taxation at both the parent and the 
intermediary jurisdictions, the second and the third do likewise in respect of the parent 
jurisdiction. For its part, the fourth one prevents taxation at the market jurisdiction. Lastly, the 
findings and conclusions of this section will be presented. 
 
2.2.1. THE EXISTENCE OF STATELESS COMPANIES DUE TO A 
MISMATCH IN THE DEFINITION OF CORPORATE RESIDENCE  
 
Before 2013, three subsidiaries belonging to the Apple group, Apple Operations International 
(AOI), Apple Sales International (ASI) and Apple Operations Europe (AOE) were stateless 
companies. In other words, they did not exist anywhere for tax purposes123 as they were not 
resident and thus not subject to unlimited taxation in any jurisdiction. The following is an 
explanation of how such outcome was achieved. 
AOI, ASI and AOE were incorporated in Ireland between 1980 and 1990124 but their presence in 
that country was virtually limited to this fact, since they were all controlled and managed de facto 
from the United States125: 
- AOI126. Its board of directors was composed in 2011 by 3 members: Mr. Levoff, Mr. Wipfler 
(both resident in the US and employees of Apple Inc.) and Mrs. Kearney (resident in 
Ireland and employee of ADI)127. From May 2006 to August 2012 AOI held 33 board of 
directors’ meetings, 32 of which took place in Cupertino, California. The Irish-resident 
director just participated in 7 of those meetings, 6 of which by telephone. Mr. Levoff was 
in charge of taking notes during the board meetings and sending them to a counsel of AOI 
in Ireland who prepared the formal minutes. AOI´s assets were managed by employees of 
                                                          
122 As the analysis of Apple´s tax planning strategies is not the main objective of this research, emphasis will be placed 
only on its principal characteristics, thus deliberately leaving aside other ones. For example, the consideration of the 
tax rulings signed by ASI/AOE and the Irish tax authorities as illegal state aid under EU Law (European Commission 
Decision on State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple (30th August 2016). 
123 Testimony of Prof. Shay on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.) submitted before the 
US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 9 and the chart exhibited in the Memorandum on “Offshore 
profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations, p. 20. More recently, see European Commission Decision on State Aid implemented by Ireland to 
Apple (30th August 2016), p. 9-10. 
124 See www.cro.ie and previous section 2.1.2. 
125 See Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US 
Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 21-25. 
126 Information taken from interviews with the directors of AOI and included in the Memorandum on “Offshore profit 
shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, p. 21-24. 
127 Annual return filed by AOI for the financial year 2011 in June 26th 2012. Available at www.duedil.com under 
subscription. 
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Braeburn Capital, an Apple Inc.’s subsidiary located in Nevada. Philip Bullock, Apple´s tax 
director, came to recognize the obvious: “AOI´s functions were managed and controlled 
in the United States”128.  
- ASI. It also had a US-based board of directors, as the majority of its members were Apple 
Inc. employees residing in California, with the only exception of Mrs. Kearny, resident in 
Cork (Ireland)129. In fact, all 33 ASI board meetings from May 2006 to March 2012 took 
place in Cupertino (California)130. 
- AOE131. This company shared the directors with AOI in 2011: Mr. Levoff, Mr. Wipfler (both 
US resident) and Mrs. Kearney (Irish resident)132. Furthermore, the cost-sharing 
agreement signed in 2008 between Apple Inc., ASI and AOE reveals that Mr. Wipfler, Mr. 
Oppenheimer and Mr. Cook were members of the AOE board of directors, being all of 
them resident in the US and employees of Apple Inc. (Treasurer, Chief Financial Officer 
and Chief Operating Officer respectively). This being the case, the management of AOE 
was most probably conducted from the United States, although the hearing before the 
US Senate in 2013 did not provide specific information on the location of the AOE board 
meetings. 
These three companies enjoyed the status of stateless for tax purposes during the fiscal year 2011 
due to the exploitation of a mismatch between the CIT regulations of Ireland, its country of 
incorporation, and the United States, the country from which they were controlled, since Ireland 
used a management and control test to determine the tax residence133 while the United States 
employed the place of incorporation (hereinafter POI) test134. The result becomes apparent: as 
                                                          
128 Subcommittee interview of Philip Bullock (28th November 2012), see Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and 
the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 
22. 
129 Annual return filed by ASI for the financial year 2011 in June 26th 2012. Available at www.duedil.com under 
subscription. The board was composed by Mr. Levoff, Mrs. Rafael and Mr. Stevens (all US residents) and Mrs. Kearney 
(Irish resident). See also the Exhibits used in the hearing on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple 
Inc.), p. 63. 
130 Information taken from interviews with the directors of AOI and included in the Memorandum on “Offshore profit 
shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, p. 24-25. 
131 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 31, footnote 127. 
132 Annual return filed by AOE for the financial year 2011 in June 27th 2012. Available at www.duedil.com under 
subscription.  
133 Ireland has traditionally considered as resident companies those ones whose central management and control was 
located within the Irish territory. This rule is not envisaged in the Irish legislation but rather in its case law. See the 
judgment by the Irish High Court, 1947, “WJ Tipping (Inspector of Taxes) V. Louis Jeancard” which confirmed the 
doctrine established by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom in the cases “De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. V. 
Howe (Surveyor of Taxes) (1905), “Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. Ltd. V, Todd (Inspector of Taxes)” (1928) 
and, “Unit Construction Co. Ltd V. Bullock (Inspector of Taxes)” (1959). These decisions evaluated factors such as the 
location of the superior or directing authority, the place where the important questions of company policy were 
determined, the residence of the majority of the directors, the place where the negotiations of major contracts were 
undertaken, the place where the meetings of the board of directors were held and the location of the company´s head 
office. For an in-depth analysis of the Irish tax residence rules see OECD (2015): Ireland- Information on residency for 
tax purposes and the Tax Manual on this issue provided by the Irish Tax and Customs in its website: 
http://www.revenue.ie/en/about/foi/s16/income-tax-capital-gains-tax-corporation-tax/part-02/02-02-03.pdf 
134 According to Section 11 of the Internal Revenue Code, worldwide taxation will be imposed to all corporations except 
for foreign ones, whose tax liability is constrained by section 882 of the IRC. Section 7701 (a)(5) of the IRC states: “the 
term “foreign” when applied to a corporation or partnership means a corporation or partnership which is not domestic” 
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they did not fulfill the tax residence requirements of either the United States or Ireland they were 
not subject to full tax liability in any of these States regardless their evident economic and/or 
commercial ties with them. Strangely, neither Ireland nor the United States attempted to make 
use of their respective existing rules to counteract the avoidance of the residence status. In the 
case of Ireland, for example, section 23A of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, as drafted by 
2011135, envisaged various statutory anti-abuse provisions that supplemented the “central 
management and control” test. One of these rules provided that a company incorporated in 
Ireland would be regarded as resident in Ireland as long as neither such company nor any other 
related to it were carrying on a trade within the Irish territory136. The Irish Tax Authorities, 
however, did not try to use this provision against Apple´s stateless companies, despite the 
business they conducted in Ireland was, to say the least, dubious137. In the case of United States, 
the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter IRS) was allowed to disregard shell entities incorporated 
in foreign jurisdictions to the extent such entities were controlled by a US-based parent to such a 
degree that the shell entity was nothing more than an instrumentality of its parent138. Once again, 
the tax authorities refrained from exercising such prerogative.   
As a consequence of the aforementioned mismatch, the Irish-incorporated Apple companies paid 
virtually no taxes in any jurisdiction. AOI, for example, did not pay any CIT to any national 
government at least during the period 2007-2011, besides the taxes paid as a non-resident in 
France139. As regards ASI, despite not being a tax resident in Ireland, it filed tax returns during the 
period 2009-2013 (at least) as an operating company therein, paying $ 10 million in 2011140. This 
                                                          
while subparagraph (4) states that “the term “domestic” when applied to a corporation or partnership means created 
or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any State unless, in the case of a partnership, 
the Secretary provides otherwise by regulations”. For a more comprehensive insight on how the US tax residence rules 
work see BRAUNER, Y. (2009), p. 865 et seq. and OECD (2015): United States: Information on residency for tax purposes. 
135 These provisions were incorporated in 1999 by the Finance Act and will remain in effect until 2020 as part of the 
transitional regime established by the amendment introduced by the 2014 Finance Act for companies incorporated 
before January 1st 2015. See Irish Tax and Customs (2015): Tax & Duty manual on Company Residence in the State, p. 
3-4, and Irish Tax and Customs (2015): Notes for Guidance on the Taxes Consolidation Act – Sections 12-31, p. 17 et 
seq.  
136 The rule did not apply in cases where the tax treaty would result in the company being considered resident in the 
other treaty-country and not in Ireland. However, tax treaties are not always unambiguous in this respect. For example, 
article 4.4 of the current tax treaty signed by Ireland and the United States does not establish any tie-breaker rule to 
resolve double residence issues but instead appeals to the Contracting States to resolve the issue by mutual agreement.  
See Irish Tax and Customs (2015): Notes for Guidance on the Taxes Consolidation Act – Sections 12-31, p. 22.  
137 Ting questions the effectiveness of this anti-avoidance rule and also condemns the attitude of the Irish tax authorities 
for maintaining a low “carry on trade” threshold (“a newspaper kiosk or hot dog stand operated in Ireland would be 
sufficient”). He reaches the conclusion that this rule “was designed to allow many Irish-incorporated companies, 
specially subsidiaries of MNEs, to remain as non-residents of Ireland”. See TING, A. (2014b), p. 240 and CUNNINGHAM, 
W. (1999), p. 477.  
138 Such possibility is contemplated in Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple 
Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 23. The report, in its p. 24, points 
out that the IRS should assess whether AOI is an instrument of Apple Inc. and thus its income may be attributed to it. 
However, the concrete legal foundation for such possibility remains unclear. 
139 AOI paid income taxes in France for the income derived by a building of its property that was located therein (both 
the rental income and the capital gain derived by its sale in 2007). See the Exhibits used in the hearing on “Offshore 
profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), p. 84. 
140 See footnote 101 of the Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” 
submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 24, which contains a statement made 
by Apple in 2013: “From 2009 to present, ASI has not meet the tax residency requirements in Ireland. However, ASI is an 
operating company that files an Irish corporate tax return and pays Irish corporate income tax as required by Ireland. 
As we indicated in our response to Question 8 of our July 6, 2012 submission, ASI´s location of tax purposes is Ireland 
because ASI files a corporate tax return in Ireland”.  
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amount is, however, extremely low as compared to the total income perceived by the company 
($ 22 billion). The report submitted before the US Senate in 2013 had the suspicion that ASI may 
have been declaring only the income that was connected to sales to Irish customers141. Similarly, 
AOE only paid taxes on the income derived by the sales conducted in Ireland142 and the total 
amount of tax paid in 2011 barely reached $ 3 million143. None of them, therefore, was subject to 
tax for the income sourced in jurisdictions other than Ireland144.  
In order to mitigate this issue, the Irish legislation has recently been amended twice while still 
retaining the “central management and control” test. In the first place, section 39 of the Finance 
Act 2013 introduced an anti-mismatch rule which provided that, where by reason of a mismatch 
of residence rules with a treaty-partner country an Irish-incorporated company would neither be 
resident in that country nor in Ireland, the company would thus be treated as resident in 
Ireland145. In the second place, section 43 of the Finance Act 2014 reformed section 23 stipulating 
that companies incorporated in Ireland would automatically be regarded as resident for tax 
purposes therein, thus removing the additional conditions previously established by the anti-
avoidance provisions inserted in 1999 and 2013.  
To sum up, how do these legislatives changes impact Apple´s subsidiaries? In principle they will 
not be affected by the 2014 amendment, which only applies to companies incorporated on or 
after January 1st 2015, while companies incorporated before this date (the case of the Apple´s 
subsidiaries) would only be affected by this new rule from December 31st 2020 onwards, unless 
there is both a change in ownership and a major change in the nature and conduct of business of 
the company146, which is dubious in this case. However, AOI, ASI and AOE would still be covered 
by the 2013 amendment and shall thus be regarded as tax resident in Ireland as a result of the 
application of the anti-mismatch rule, which started to apply retroactively in January 1st 2015 to 
companies incorporated before the entry in force of the Finance Act (October 24th 2013)147. Ting, 
however, warned that Apple could easily circumvent the anti-mismatch rule by simply shifting the 
place of central management and control from the United States to: i) another country with whom 
Ireland does not have a tax treaty in force, since the anti-mismatch rule only applies in relation to 
treaty-partner countries or ii) a low-tax jurisdiction which considers the company as resident 
therein, since that would prevent them from being stateless and therefore the rule would not 
                                                          
141 See Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US 
Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 25 and the testimony of Prof. Shay on “Offshore profit shifting 
and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.) submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
p. 9. 
142 This is the conclusion reached by Shay during the investigation on Apple that was carried out by the US Senate in 
2013. See the Testimony of Prof. Shay on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.) submitted 
before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 9.  
143 The total tax expense recorded in Apple´s 2011 Consolidating Income Statement for ASI and AOE was $ 13 million. 
Bearing in mind that the amount corresponding to ASI was 10 million, 3 million would be the amount of taxes that 
correspond to AOE. See the Testimony of Prof. Harvey Jr on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple 
Inc.) submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 4. 
144 TING, A. (2014), p. 46.  
145 Irish Tax and Customs (2015): Tax & Duty manual on Company Residence in the State, p.4 and OECD (2015): Ireland- 
Information on residency for tax purposes. 
146 OECD (2015): Ireland- Information on residency for tax purposes and Irish Tax and Customs (2015): Tax & Duty 
manual on Company Residence in the State, p.1-3. The latter explains the requirements of this exception.  
147 Irish Tax and Customs (2015): Tax & Duty manual on Company Residence in the State, p. 4.  
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apply148. By doing so, the subsidiaries could effectively postpone their consideration as tax 
residents in Ireland until January 1st 2021 when the 2014 amendment would become applicable 
to them.  
 
2.2.2. THE USE OF COST-SHARING AGREEMENTS TO SHIFT THE 
PROFITS DERIVED BY APPLE´S IP OFFSHORE  
 
A cost-sharing arrangement (hereinafter CSA) is generally defined as a “framework among 
business enterprises to share the costs and risks of developing, producing or obtaining assets, 
services or rights and to determine the nature and extent of the interests of each participant in 
those assets services or rights”149. Under such arrangements, the participants share the costs of 
development of intangibles in proportion to their ownership rights on them. Accordingly, each 
participant is entitled to exploit its respective portion of interest separately as an effective owner 
thereof -without having to pay a royalty as in the case of licensees- in a way that the CSA ends up 
establishing a sort of co-ownership of the co-developed intangibles150. These agreements, 
however, do not commonly entail a genuine transfer of R&D activities to its signatories.  
The US regulation on CSAs151 is particularly beneficial for taxpayers since it enables US-based 
MNCs to easily shift profits derived by US intangibles to low or no tax jurisdictions, thus becoming 
a common key feature of the tax planning strategies followed by many US MNCs. Unlike the CSAs 
in most countries, those patterned after the US regulation operate essentially as safe harbors by 
shielding taxpayers from transfer pricing adjustments152: when the actual benefits derived from 
the exploitation of the intangible differ from the parties´ stated expected benefits (the 
“reasonably expected benefits”) and therefore are shared by the parties in a proportion other 
than that stated in the CSA, then than proportion is corrected based on ex-ante (low) costs rather 
than ex-post (high) value as it would occur if transfer pricing rules were to apply153.  
CSAs soon became the cornerstone of Apple´s tax planning scheme. Apple Inc., ASI and AOE have 
been routinely concluding CSAs since December 1st 1980154, when the latter two companies were 
incorporated in Ireland. According to these agreements155, Apple Inc., ASI and AOE agree to share 
the R&D costs of Apple´s IP in exchange for sharing the profits derived by such IP worldwide. Thus, 
while Apple Inc. continues to be the sole owner of the legal rights to Apple´s IP, the economic 
                                                          
148 In addition, Ting critized the fact that the 2013 amendment did not affect the more common structure of the “Double 
Irish Dutch Sandwich” used by other US MNC such as Google. See TING, A. (2014b), p. 238-239 and 242.  
149 OECD TPG, par. 8.3. CSAs are referred to as cost contribution arrangement (CCA). 
150 BRAUNER, Y. (2010), p. 556. 
151 Section 1.482-7 of the US Treasury Tax Regulation. Available at: https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-apa/482_regs.pdf  
152 BRAUNER, Y. (2014), p. 97 and BRAUNER, Y. (2010), p. 561.  
153 BRAUNER, Y. (2010), p. 556.  
154 See Testimony of Apple Inc. submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 3 and 
11. Some of the arrangements are included within the Exhibits used in the hearing on “Offshore profit shifting and the 
US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), p. 58. 
155 The arrangements are described in the Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple 
Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 25 et seq.  
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rights over it are geographically bifurcated between the three companies: Apple Inc. keeps the 
rights to manufacture/ have manufactured, sell and distribute Apple products in the “Americas” 
operating segment and ASI/AOE get the entitlement to manufacture/ have manufactured, sell and 
distribute Apple products in territories other than the Americas156.  
In order to determine their respective contribution to the R&D costs, Apple Inc. first calculates 
the total amount of R&D costs worldwide and then Apple Inc. and ASI/AOE agree to pay a portion 
of the pooled costs based upon the portion of product sales that occur in their respective 
operating segments. In the fiscal year 2011 the calculation was made on the following basis: 
Table 18 - Calculation of the contribution to R&D of the companies participating in the CSA in 2011 
Amounts expressed in billion dollars 
 Apple Inc. ASI / AOE Total 
Operating segments Americas EMEA, Japan, Asia-Pacific  
Profits from sales157 ~ 38,3 ~ 57,7 108  
% of sales158 ~ 40% ~ 60% 100% 
Contribution to R&D 
costs159 
1 1,4 2,4 
 
The fundamental reason why CSAs have become key in the tax planning strategies followed by 
technology MNCs is the fact that they commonly deal with intangibles, and a common attribute 
of intangibles is the fact that they may potentially generate income that is disproportionately 
higher than the costs incurred in their development160. And the case of Apple is surely no 
exception to this rule161. Accordingly, and by virtue of these CSAs, Apple is capable of shifting 
                                                          
156 See the explanation put forward by the company regarding the CSAs in the Exhibits used in the hearing on “Offshore 
profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), p. 99. The “Americas” segment includes North/South/Central 
America and the Caribbean. 
157 Please note that Apple´s Annual Reports of years prior to 2015 do not provide definitive data on the profits from 
sales in each one of the operating segments since at that time calculations were made taking into account an additional 
operating segment (“Retail”). However, considering the huge volume of retail stores in the United States it can be 
deduced that the majority of the $ 14 billion attributed to this operating segment mostly correspond to the “Americas” 
segment. See Apple Inc.´s 2013 Annual Report (form 10-K), p. 27. 
158 Subcommittee interview of Phillip Bullock, see Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 
2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 26.  
159 To see the contributions per company in fiscal years 2009, 2010 and 2011 see Exhibits used in the hearing on 
“Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), p. 79.  
160 Apple is not an exception, as many other US MNCs have been resorting to the CSA regime since it was first introduced 
in the 1990s. For a summary on this and an explanation of how US CSAs are typically used to shift the returns of 
intangibles offshore see the Testimony of Prof. Avi-Yonah on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 1 
(Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. In p. 
3 he states: “successful intangibles result in profits that far outweigh the costs of development”.  
161 See table 3 in Section 2.1.1.3.  
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enormous amounts of profits derived by its IP to its Irish subsidiaries, which acquire the 
entitlement to perceive such profits for a ridiculously low prize.  
Table 19 - Relationship between the contribution to R&D costs paid by ASI and its EBITDA /2009-2012)162 
Amounts expressed in billion dollars. 
 
There appear to be at least two options on the table that may be capable of countering the 
potential profit shifting resulting from the CSAs signed by the Apple group. The first path would 
be to make adjustments to the price of the transactions pursuant to transfer pricing rules. If we 
compare ASI´s EBITDA with its costs, the ratio is undoubtedly tempting: an average 15 to 1163. This 
high ratio suggests that the arrangement may not be commercially justifiable for transfer pricing 
purposes, since ASI derived disproportionally significant amounts of income in return for its cost 
sharing payments and it is hard to believe that Apple Inc. would have entered into these CSAs 
with an independent third party164. However, this outcome has never been confronted by the IRS 
as the US regime on CSAs operates, as it has been noted above, as a safe harbor against potential 
transfer pricing adjustments. Additionally, these agreements may also be potentially challenged 
from an anti-avoidance perspective, since they do not seem to involve apparent commercial or 
economic benefits beyond the tax savings. This is so for two main reasons. Firstly, the group 
operates successfully all over the world without transferring IP rights to each region or jurisdiction 
where it conducts business, being Ireland the only case.  Secondly, the CSAs did not serve to shift 
any R&D activities to Ireland165, whose subsidiaries barely perform significant functions. To our 
knowledge, however, the anti-avoidance path as a way to counteract the CSAs signed by Apple 
has not been explored yet.  
                                                          
162 The information is provided in Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” 
submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 29. According to p. 25 (footnote 102) 
of this report, although both ASI and AOE participate in the CSAs, most offshore earnings end up in ASI.  
163 The ratio is 6,6 in 2009, 13,3 in 2010, 15,71 in 2011 and 18 in 2012. 
164 The opinion is shared by TING, A. (2014), p. 45 and the Testimony of Prof. Shay on “Offshore profit shifting and the 
US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 9: 
“the appropriate way to test the reality of the Apple arrangement is to ask whether Apple would have entered into this 
cost sharing arrangement if Apple´s Irish affiliates had been unrelated (…) To answer yes strains credulity”.  
165 None of the 171 engineers participating in the 40 patents that were used in the sample was located in Ireland (see 
section 2.1.1.3). According to the information provided by Apple itself, only 1% of Apple´s R&D activities are conducted 
in Ireland, since ASI and AOE are in charge of a small number of specialty computers. See Memorandum on “Offshore 
profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations, p. 28. 
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2.2.3. THE AVOIDANCE OF US TAXATION PURSUANT TO THE CFC 
REGIME BY VIRTUE OF THE “CHECK-THE-BOX” PROVISION AND 
THE CFC EXCEPTIONS  
 
As it has already been explained, the CSAs signed by Apple Inc., ASI and AOE effectively shifted 
the income derived by Apple´s IP out of the US and into two Irish-incorporated subsidiaries that 
were stateless for tax purposes and whose income remained largely untaxed. Notwithstanding 
the above, the United States have mechanisms to subject to tax income earned by non-resident 
subsidiaries under certain circumstances, namely the regime on CFCs. However, Apple also 
managed to exploit the loopholes existing in such regulation to avoid taxation in the residence 
state of its parent company.  
As a general rule the United States do not impose taxes on income perceived by non-resident 
companies, regardless of whether they are wholly or partly controlled or owned by residents, as 
long as such income does not return to the US and thus becomes attributable to a resident 
therein. In principle, this stance allows the deferral of taxation until the moment in which the 
income is repatriated to the US, generally in the form of dividends. Concerned about tax haven 
deferral, President Kennedy introduced subpart F rules in the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter 
IRC) back in 1962166 with the intention of preventing tax deferral in certain cases.  
Subpart F provisions apply to certain types of income that are perceived by the so-called CFCs 
which are foreign corporations in which more than 50% percent of their total combined voting 
power or the total value of its stock is owned or considered as owned by United States 
shareholders on any day during the taxable year of such foreign corporation167. However, not all 
income perceived by the CFC is automatically subject to tax pursuant to Subpart F, since it only 
targets income that can be regarded as highly mobile or that entails risks for being split off from 
the activities that produce the value in the goods or services generating the income, that is, 
passive income (dividends, interests and royalties) and a few categories of active income resulting 
from certain activities identified in the IRC168. Subpart F income would be attributed to the 
controlling shareholder as if it was actually perceived by it and would thus be subject to tax in its 
own hands.   
In the case of Apple, the three Irish affiliates (ASI, AOE and AOI) qualified as CFCs and a large 
proportion of the income they perceived also qualified as Subpart F income. During the period 
                                                          
166 Sections 951 through 954 IRC. Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/subtitle-A/chapter-
1/subchapter-N/part-III/subpart-F For a comprehensive insight on the content and history of these provisions see 
KRAFT, G., BECK, D. (2012), p. 683-690.   
167 See section 957 IRC. 
168 Subpart F income includes: insurance income (as defined in section 953), foreign base company income (section 
954), income derived by illegal bribes or kickbacks and so on. See Sections 952- 954 IRC and Office of Tax Policy within 
the Department of Treasury (2000): The deferral of income earned though US controlled foreign corporations: a policy 
study, p. 12. 
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2009-2012 these subsidiaries earned a total amount of $ 44 billion169 that was in principle covered 
by the CFC regime pursuant to section 954 IRC as: 
- Foreign personal holding company (FPHC) income (section 954c): this category includes 
passive income such as interests, dividends, royalties and foreign currency gains among 
others. Accordingly, the dividends received by AOI and AOE from their respective 
subsidiaries (AOE and ASI) should be regarded as FPHC income and therefore covered by 
Subpart F.  
- Foreign base company sales (FBCS) income (section 954d): this category encompasses the 
income derived in connection with the purchase of goods from any person and its 
subsequent sale to a related person as long as such goods are 
manufactured/produced/grown/extracted outside the country of incorporation of the 
CFC and sold for use/consumption/disposition outside such country. In other words, the 
jurisdiction where the CFC is incorporated can neither be the origin nor the destination of 
the goods. In this case, ASI purchased the finished products from the unrelated Chinese 
manufacturers and then immediately resold them to the related subsidiaries which were 
in charge of distribution (ADI and AS). According to Apple, the transfer of products to ASI 
was made only “in title” since the products were directly shipped to the country of sale170. 
Consequently, the income generated by these sales qualified as FBCS income and thus 
remained under the scope of Subpart F. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
169 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 32.  
170 Information taken from the interview of Cathy Kearny, director of ASI, in 2013 as cited in Memorandum on “Offshore 
profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations, p. 33. P. 34 explains the objective of this provision: “it is this type of transfer of worldwide sales 
income to a tax haven subsidiary that the FBCS income provisions were designed to tax, because they do not contribute 
to the manufacturing or sales processes but serve only to concentrate profits in a low tax jurisdiction”.  
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Table 20 - Apple´s distribution structure and Subpart F income perceived by the Irish-incorporated subsidiaries171 
 
On this occasion Apple did not need to conceive a complex strategy to avoid the applicability of 
the CFC regime and thus the US taxation on a considerable amount of income obtained by the 
Irish-incorporated affiliates. They simply made use of other available US tax provisions that in 
practice rendered the CFC rules virtually ineffective: primarily the “check-the-box” provisions and 
secondarily the exceptions provided by Subpart F itself.  
Back in 1997 the US treasury issued the “check-the-box” regulations172 , which were intended to 
simplify the rules on entity classification by replacing the existing complex rules with a simple and 
elective regime, the so-called “check-the-box”. This regime allows eligible domestic and foreign 
entities to elect to be taxed as partnerships (transparent entities whose income flows to their 
shareholders in which hands is taxed) or companies (opaque separate entities subject to tax) for 
federal tax purposes. By virtue of these provisions, Apple checked the box of the bottom three 
tiers of its corporate offshore network (AOE, ASI, ADI, AS, Apple Retail Holding and all Apple retail 
subsidiaries) to ensure they would be treated as transparent pass-through partnerships and 
therefore disregarded for federal tax purposes173. Consequently, in the eyes of the IRS, these 
companies were not separate and distinct entities but rather part of their upper-tier subsidiary: 
AOI.  
                                                          
171 The original table is provided by the Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple 
Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p.32.  
172 Sections 301.7701-1 through 301.7701-3 Treasury Tax Regulations. Available at: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/part-301/subpart-lii20 For a description of the rules and the rationale behind 
them see MULLIS, K (2011), p. 371-380. 
173 For an almost complete list of Apple´s subsidiaries (22) that were disregarded by virtue of the check-the-box 
provisions see the Exhibits used in the hearing on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), 
p.75-77. 
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Table 21 - Disregarded offshore Apple subsidiaries by virtue of the check-the-box rules174 
 
 
The intended result was to make all the transactions conducted among these disregarded 
subsidiaries disappear, as the paying and recipient entities of such transactions were not 
considered as legally separate entities any more but rather part of the same company. The 
vanishing of all these transactions was decisive for the purposes of Subpart F: 
- Foreign personal holding company (FPHC) income: the dividends distributed by ASI and 
AOE (to AOE and AOI respectively) would not be considered as FPHC income under 
Subpart F any more, since the payments occurred within a single entity and not between 
distinct legal entities.  
Table 22 - Apple´s estimation of FPHC income received by AOI and AOE for the period 2009-2012175. 
Amounts expressed in million dollars 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AOE - 686 - - 
AOI 101 1.507 128 557 
Total 2.979 
 
                                                          
174 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 35.  
175 Exhibits used in the hearing on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), p. 105. 
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- Foreign base company sales (FBCS) income: AOI would be regarded as receiving sales 
income directly from the end customers so section 954 (d) would not apply any more to 
the extent AOI itself did not acquire any products (it was ASI who did so) for its subsequent 
sale to a related person (again, it was ASI the company responsible for the sale to the 
distribution subsidiaries)176.   
Table 23 - Apple´s estimation of FBCS income received by ASI, ADI and AS for the period 2009-2012177. 
Amounts expressed in million dollars 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequently, the check-the-box rules effectively allowed Apple to avoid paying US taxes on $ 44 
billion of its offshore income under Subpart F for the period 2009-2012: more than $ 10 billion 
only in the fiscal year under review (2011). And all this resulted for the simple gesture of checking 
a box in a form, maybe the most straightforward and effortless way to avoid taxes ever invented. 
While check-the-box rules undoubtedly play a crucial role in the circumvention of Subpart F, its 
repeal would not necessarily lead to the effective application of the CFC regime, since the regime 
itself provides further mechanisms that may still thwart its applicability178.  
- Foreign personal holding company (FPHC) income. With regard to the FPHC income, Apple 
could still use two other mechanisms to avoid the application of Subpart F. In the first 
place, the US enacted in 2006 the so-called “CFC look-through rule” in section 954 (c)(6) 
IRC which was meant be temporary but still remains in force179. This rule grants an 
exclusion from Subpart F taxation for certain passive income received from a related CFC 
under certain circumstances. In the second place, the same outcome may also be 
achieved by resorting to the so-called “same country exception” established in section 
954 (c)(3) which shields from taxation the dividends and interests paid to the CFC by a 
related CFC as long as they are both organized and operating in the same foreign country 
                                                          
176 See Exhibits used in the hearing on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), p. 103-104, 
where Apple representatives declared that “IRC section 954c generally does not apply to income received by ASI or any 
of Apple´s other Irish entities during the period 2008 to present because sales made to third parties are generally made 
through disregarded entities”.  
177 Exhibits used in the hearing on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), p. 105. 
178 All these options are explored in Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” 
submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 14-16 and 36-37.  
179 Section 954 (c) (6). Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/954 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ASI 1.191 4.698 9.823 24.614 
ADI - 21 155 350 
AS 4 7 16 180 
Total 41.059 
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and the latter has a substantial part of its assets used in the trade or business of that same 
country. As ASI, AOE and AOI are incorporated and also operate in the same country, 
Ireland, the dividend payments among them would be excluded from taxation by virtue 
of this exception.  
- Foreign base company sales (FBCS) income. In respect of the FBCS income, Apple could 
make use of the so-called “manufacturing exception” as envisaged in sections 954 
(d)(1)(A) IRC and 1.954-3 of the Treasury Regulations180, which stipulate that FBCS income 
would be exempted from Subpart F taxation as long as the CFC itself were a manufacturer 
and added substantive value to the goods. This situation would be deemed to be fulfilled 
when the CFC met one of the following three tests: substantial transformation, 
substantial activity and substantial contribution test. The latter one is no more than 
another possible loophole, since it establishes a low threshold that may be easily proven 
by the CFC181.  
In the present section we have argued that the only reason why Apple has effectively avoided US 
taxation on its offshore income can be found in the US legislation itself, most notably in the check-
the-box provisions and the statutory exceptions to CFC rules. This being the case, the resolution 
of the problem necessarily involves amendments to the abovementioned provisions and hence, 
solely depends on the will of the US legislator to do so.  The most obvious proposal would certainly 
be the deletion or reform of the check-the-box rules, which undermines the objective of Subpart 
F at a stroke182. Additionally, the enhancement and reinforcement of the exceptions of the CFC 
rules (look-trough and same country/ manufacturing exceptions) would also be indispensable183; 
otherwise Apple would still find itself in the situation illustrated in this section.  
2.2.4. THE MINIMIZATION OF TAXATION AT THE MARKET 
JURISDICTIONS THROUGH COMMISSIONAIRE ARRANGEMENTS AND 
THE INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF THE PERMANENT 
ESTABLISHMENT CONCEPT 
 
                                                          
180 Section 1.954-3 of the Treasury Tax Regulations available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/1.954-3 
181 The introduction of the “substantial contribution test” took place in 2008, leading to the weakening of the threshold. 
See TING (2014), p. 50-51 and Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” 
submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 16 and 37. 
182 This option has many advocates, see for example TING, A. (2014), Avi-Yonah (Testimony of Prof. Avi-Yonah on 
“Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 1 (Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations) and Harvey (Testimony of Prof. Harvey on “Offshore profit shifting and 
the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations). 
183 Some professors have also adhered to these options, see for example Harvey (Testimony of Prof. Harvey on 
“Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations) and Shay (Testimony of Prof. Shay on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – 
part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. See also the 
proposals for a change defended by the Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple 
Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 6. 
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By virtue of the CSA, ASI acquired the rights to have manufactured, distribute and sell the products 
patterned after Apple´s IP in all operating segments except for the American184. However, ASI has 
performed this function differently over the years. Prior to the 2012 restructuring, ASI purchased 
the finished goods from third-party manufacturers (mostly located in China) and then resold those 
finished goods directly to the retailers and internet customers185. After 2012, however, ASI started 
reselling the goods to the distribution subsidiaries: ADI for subsequent sales in EMEA and AS for 
Japan and Rest of Asia Pacific. When doing so, ASI charged these companies a significant higher 
price than it paid for the goods, thus benefiting from a very generous profit margin186. 
Table 24 - Apple´s distribution structure in the respective operating segments187 
 
Once the distribution subsidiaries acquired the goods, they managed the sales in their respective 
territories through third-party resellers, internet customers and retail subsidiaries. In the case of 
the latter, ADI/AS and the retail subsidiaries did not conclude sales contracts but rather 
“commissionaire arrangements”188. These arrangements do not involve the transfer of ownership 
of the goods from ADI/AS to the subsidiaries. Instead, the subsidiaries become entitled to act as 
agents or “commissionaires” of the principal (ADI/AS) and thus gain the legal capacity to sell the 
                                                          
184 See section 2.2.2.  
185 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 25, footnote 105 and p. 28, footnote 115. 
186 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 36. 
187 The original chart is provided by the Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple 
Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 27. As the chart shows the case 
of China is particular: the manufacturers sell the products to ADI which then resells them to the Chinese retailers. To 
do so, ADI sublicenses the right to distribute Apple products in China for a substantial amount ($ 5,9 billion in 2012). 
188 Apparently Apple became one of the first multinationals to deploy commissionaire structures to distribute its 
products in the different market jurisdictions back in the 80s according to the New York Times: “How Apple sidesteps 
billions in taxes”, April 28th 2012 and COCKFIELD, A., HELLERSTEIN, W., MILLAR, R., WAERZEGGERS, C. (2013), p. 188. A 
simple and brief description of the scheme is provided in OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the 
artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, p. 15-16. 
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goods in their respective jurisdiction in its own name but on behalf of ADI/AS, which never cease 
to be their true owners. And they perform this task in exchange for a commission that intends to 
remunerate the service provided by the agent for the principal.  
The main reason why MNCs as Apple tend to structure their operations this way is to minimize 
their taxation in the States where their ultimate subsidiaries are selling their products. Although 
the use of these arrangements for tax planning purposes will be discussed in depth in Chapter 3 
we can already anticipate that these arrangements lead to a substantial decrease of taxable base 
in the jurisdiction where the commissionaire is operating irrespective of whether the local tax 
administration considers the subsidiary as an agent PE of the non-resident (which would become 
subject to tax as non-resident therein)189 or simply taxes the subsidiary as a resident company for 
its worldwide income190. In other words, both approaches would be virtually neutral from a tax 
point of view. The reason is that, once the group manages to keep functions, assets and risks in 
the hands of the non-resident (ASI/AS in this case, which continue to be the owners of the Apple 
products and performs the functions related to them), the only item of income that, in principle, 
could be taxable in the hands of the agent PE/subsidiary would be the commission perceived as a 
remuneration for the services provided as a distributor, and such commission would be equally 
calculated at arm´s length both under article 7.2 or article 9 of treaties following the OECD Model 
Convention (hereinafter OECD MC)191. This being said, it should be noted that ASI has not declared 
any PE in any of the EMEA tax jurisdictions except for Ireland192. 
Table 25 - Transfer of ownership of the products from the manufacturers to the final consumer 
The chart graphically illustrates why ASI books huge profits while, on the contrary, the distribution 
and retail subsidiaries barely obtain taxable profits from the transactions. As recognized by Apple 
itself, the goods are generally shipped from the assembly facility (mainly in China) to the market 
country without stepping on Irish soil193.  
 
                                                          
189 Sometimes commissionaire arrangements succeed in preventing “agent” subsidiaries from becoming permanent 
establishments of their principal, since they effectively impede the fulfillment of the requirements of the dependent 
agent, the modality of permanent establishment set out in article 5.5 of OECD Model Convention. This article demands 
the agent to act on behalf of the enterprise and habitually exercise the authority to conclude contracts “in the name of 
the enterprise” and naturally this last requirement, if interpreted literally, is not met in the case of commissionaires. 
Sometimes tax administrations follow an anti-formalist/functional approach and arrive at the conclusion that agents 
should fall under the scope of article 5.5 and thus be deemed as permanent establishment of the non-resident. For an 
analysis of judgments following both approaches see CARMONA FERNÁNDEZ, N. (2013). 
190 We will explain this in more detail in Section 3.3.4. 
191 DZIURDZ, K. (2014), p. 136: “if the dependent agent is an associated enterprise of the principal, the dependent agent 
must be treated as an independent enterprise under article 9 and the principal´s dependent agent PE must be treated 
as a separate and independent enterprise under article 7(2). This means that both vis-à-vis the dependent agent and 
the dependent agent PE the profits must be attributed at arm´s length”.  
192 European Commission Decision on State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple (30th August 2016), p. 12. 
193 Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate 
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 27 and 33. 
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As a consequence of all this, Apple´s retail subsidiaries only receive a small commission for the 
sale of goods in their respective countries, a commission that remunerates their collaboration in 
the distribution and sale of Apple products to customers194. The exact commission percentage 
agreed between the distribution and the retail subsidiaries may vary from country to country and, 
as a general rule, is not disclosed. Exceptionally, the 2010 annual accounts of one of the Spanish 
retail subsidiaries recognized that the company received a 1% commission on sales in Spain for its 
services of sales support and promotion195. As the subsidiary must also bear labor and 
infrastructure costs, its net earnings before taxes may be greatly reduced.  
This information would be consistent with the proven fact that retail subsidiaries barely obtain 
taxable profits and are therefore subject to ridiculously low taxes despite conducting substantial 
sales in their respective countries. The following examples illustrate this. In Australia, Apple 
earned $ 6 billion sales revenue in 2014 and $ 7,9 billion in 2015, but the tax bill of the Australian 
subsidiary only amounted to $ 80,3 and $ 85 million respectively196. For its part, the British 
subsidiaries paid £11,4 million of CIT in 2013 while the estimation of net sales within UK soil during 
that period reached £10,5 billion197. In the case of Spain, Apple Marketing Iberia paid 2,5 million 
€ in 2011 out of an estimation of 1.775 million € of net sales within the territory. As can be 
                                                          
194 Testimony of Prof. Harvey Jr on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before 
the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 5 and 7.  
195 El País: “Apple factura en Irlanda el 99% de sus ventas en España”, March 16th 2011, referring to Apple Marketing 
Iberia.  
196 The Sydney Morning Herald: “Apple´s $ 85 million tax bill is a fraction of its almost $ 8 billion revenue”, January 26th 
2016. 
197 Mirror: “Apple´s UK tax avoidance in two numbers”, September 29th 2014. 
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appreciated, the amount of CIT paid by these subsidiaries barely represents between 0,11% and 
1,45% of the total net sales in their respective territories.  
Strangely enough, just one of the papers published in the context of the investigation on Apple´s 
tax affairs carried out by the US Senate in 2013 explicitly mentioned this strategy198. The rest of 
them, however, paid no attention to the scheme followed by Apple to minimize its tax bills in the 
market jurisdictions, while only a few vaguely pointed out the fact that Apple, somehow or other, 
had managed to shift income from these countries to the low-tax jurisdictions where its 
distribution subsidiaries were established, i.e. Ireland and Singapore199. At this point, Shay 
introduced in his testimony an interesting debate as to whether the income that had ended up in 
Ireland had been shifted from the United States (“where the largest part of the value in Apple´s 
products arises”) or from the countries where the customers were located, expressing his 
preference for the first option200. 
We have already demonstrated that the commissionaire arrangements used by Apple are partly 
responsible for the erosion of the tax base in the market jurisdictions, since they keep functions, 
assets and risks out of them, thereby ensuring the impossibility of allocating much taxable profits 
therein, either under article 7.2 (in case an agent PE is deemed to exist) or article 9 of the OECD 
MC. However, there is a further problem of a policy nature. As we will have the occasion to prove 
in section 3.3.6.2.2, the PE concept is often unable to deal effectively with many of today´s 
business models, including some used by Apple. 
As described in section 2.1.1.6, Apple resorts to online platforms to promote and commercialize 
its products. On one hand, Apple markets its popular electronic devices through its own website, 
usually offering the free shipment of the product to the consumer´s home. The cases in which the 
order of the product is placed online but it is delivered through conventional channels are usually 
referred to as “indirect” or “offline” e-commerce. On the other hand, Apple also sells digital 
content (apps, music, movies, podcasts, books, etc.) though diverse online platforms (App Store, 
iTunes, iBooks Store, etc.). This business model is usually called “direct” or “on-line” e-commerce, 
since it allows the order and delivery of goods and services entirely by electronic means201. This 
last line of business accounts for about 10% over Apple´s total net sales per year, representing $ 
20 billion of total revenue per year. 
                                                          
198 Testimony of Prof. Harvey Jr on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before 
the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 5 and 7. 
199 The Memorandum barely devoted one paragraph out of its 40 pages to the insignificant amount of taxes paid by the 
group in its market jurisdictions. See Memorandum on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple 
Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 40: “In 2011, for example, Apple´s 
ability to pass title to the goods it sells around the world through Ireland resulted in 84% of Apple´s non-US operating 
income being booked in ASI”. This view was also shared by Ting (“A substantial portion of the profits on the sale of the 
products in those markets is shifted to ASI”) and Harvey Jr. (“This result was accomplished by recording substantially all 
of the pre-tax income from customers outside of the Americas in ASI (…) Substantial pre-tax profits are accumulated in 
ASI and relatively minor amounts of pre-tax profit are reported in ADI and other downstream affiliates”). See TING, A. 
(2014), p. 52 and the testimony of Harvey Jr on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” 
submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 5 and 19.  
200 “It is doubtful that the preponderance of the Irish income is properly allocable in the in-country selling activity”- See 
Testimony of Prof. Shay on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US 
Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 9.  
201 The description of both types of electronic commerce may be found in OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 
– Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 55.  
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The PE concept in its present form does not properly cover any of these business models. In the 
first case, Apple may well sell its products through its website without having a fixed place of 
business (hereinafter POB) in the territory in question. At best, Apple may need a storage facility 
to ensure the fast shipment of products, but this facility is likely to fall outside the scope of the PE 
concept pursuant to one of its exceptions (article 5.4 of the OECD Model Convention). 
Furthermore, the consideration of Apple´s website as a PE by a tax administration would be 
extraordinarily rare, as it will be later argued in section 3.3. Regarding the second case, it becomes 
even more evident that no fixed POB is required in order to sell goods or provide services 
electronically202. The absence of a PE in the jurisdictions where Apple conducts sales through 
electronic means prevents them from taxing the profits derived from such sales that could be 
hypothetically attributed to the PE, at least in tax treaty scenarios in which the treaty follows the 
OECD MC.   
Consequently, as a result of the combined effect of the commissionaire structures set up by Apple, 
its business models and the inherent limitation of the PE concept, market jurisdictions are severely 
constrained to exercise their taxing rights on the profits perceived by Apple from their respective 
territories, as such taxing rights are generally confined to the small commission perceived by the 
retail subsidiary. 
This being so, one can only wonder where the profits generated in the market jurisdictions end 
up allocated. The answer is Ireland203. Surprisingly, section 2.1.3 revealed that the ratio between 
the accumulated EBIDTA of the three Irish subsidiaries in 2011 ($ 22.000 million including ASI, AOE 
and AOI) and the CIT effectively paid in Ireland ($ 13 million including $ 10 million by ASI and 3 by 
AOE) merely accounts for 0,06 %. The reason why these three subsidiaries have enjoyed exiguous 
tax liabilities in Ireland may be found in both the Irish domestic tax legislation and the tax rulings 
signed between ASI/AOE and the Irish Tax Revenue. As regards the former, the Irish tax legislation 
provides that a non-resident company would be subject to taxation in Ireland insofar it carries on 
“a trade in the State through a branch or agency”204, while its taxable profits would include “any 
trading income arising directly or indirectly through or from the branch or agency, and any income 
from property or rights used by or held by or for, the branch or agency”205. The apparent 
inconclusiveness and ambiguity of this latter clause along with the lack of recognition of the ALS 
when the time comes to attribute profits to a business lacking legal personality (i.e. a PE or a 
branch in this case)206 eventually opened the way for the subsequent tax rulings signed between 
ASI/AOE and the Irish Tax Revenue in 1991 and 2007, which pre-established a specific method for 
determining the net profit attributable to both branches for tax purposes207. In general terms, the 
rulings endorsed a number of methods that departed from a fixed percentage (10 to 15, 12,5, 20 
                                                          
202 This is the case of the software “Itunes”, whose profits end up booked in Itunes S.à.r.l., a company resident in 
Luxembourg. See COCKFIELD, A., HELLERSTEIN, W., MILLAR, R., WAERZEGGERS, C. (2013), p. 188. 
203 See table 26. 
204 Section 25.1 of the Irish Tax Consolidation Act 1997. See the complete wording of the provision in European 
Commission Decision on State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple (30th August 2016), p. 17. 
205 Section 25.2 of the Irish Tax Consolidation Act 1997. 
206 The ALS was not formally implemented in Ireland until the adoption of the Finance Act 2010, which inserted Part 
35A into the Irish Tax Consolidation Act 1997. Furthermore, such clause only applied to arrangements entered between 
associated persons, thus leaving outside those entered between the head office and its branch or PE. See European 
Commission Decision on State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple (30th August 2016), p. 17. 
207 European Commission Decision on State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple (30th August 2016), p. 13. 
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and 65% depending on the case) of the respective branch´s operating costs excluding certain 
ones208, a percentage that could vary depending on the amount of numerator209. These rulings, 
despite constituting unlawful State aid as declared by the European Commission in 2016210, have 
produced legal effects for many years, thus allowing for a great reduction of the tax liabilities of 
these branches in Ireland211. 
 
2.2.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
From the reading of section 2.2 it may be inferred that the transfer of profits carried out by Apple 
to jurisdictions with no business activity does not result from breaches to the letter or the spirit 
of the laws. On the contrary, as declared by Apple itself and recognized by those who have 
examined its case in depth, its tax planning strategy fully complies with the tax laws of the 
countries involved and there are no traces of abusive behaviors212.  
As the OECD itself came to recognize, the phenomenon of profit shifting is usually not a problem 
of tax compliance but rather a problem of rules213. Although, in our opinion, the problem primarily 
lies in the principles upon which such rules are built. The case of Apple is not an exception to this. 
In fact, this section has sufficiently demonstrated that the source of the problems described in 
the four previous subsections can be found in tax provisions, predominantly of domestic nature 
and mostly American. This leads to the next logical question: which specific rules are to be 
blamed?  Two groups of rules can be identified at this point. 
The first group comprises the domestic tax provisions, particularly those pertaining to the US 
domestic legislation, i.e. the regimes on CSAs and CFCs. In the first case, the American rule on 
CSAs allows a (related) company to become entitled to substantial profits derived by the 
exploitation of an intangible in exchange for an extremely low price (for bearing part of the costs 
of its development) and without requiring the transfer of any sort of genuine activities to it. In the 
second case, the so-called “check-the-box” rules together with the exceptions provided by the 
CFC regime bear the greatest responsibility for rendering the CFC regime virtually ineffective and 
thus thwarting the possibility of imposing US taxation on the offshore income perceived by the 
Irish subsidiaries. 
                                                          
208 E.g. costs related to material for resale, material costs, charges from Apples affiliates, cost-share for intangibles 
charged from Apple-affiliated companies, etc. 
209 In particular, the tax ruling with AOE pre-established a percentage of 65% of the branch´s operating costs up to an 
annual amount of $ 60-70 million and a percentage of 20% of the operating costs exceeding such threshold. 
210 European Commission Decision on State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple (30th August 2016), p. 120. 
211 In fact, the state aid has been provisionally estimated in € 13 billion for the years 2003 to 2014 (the Commission can 
only order recovery of illegal state aid for a 10-year period preceding the Commission´s first request for information in 
2013. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.htm  
212 TING, A. (2014), p. 45 and Testimony of Apple Inc. submitted before the US Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, p. 1. For his part, Shay did not adopt a position on the legal correctness of Apple´s tax position. See 
Testimony of Prof. Shay on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US 
Senate - Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 7.  
213 BEPS report, p. 5. 
 
62 
 
The good news is that the risks of profit shifting associated with such rules may be easily 
eradicated, since it would depend entirely on the willingness of the US legislator to repeal or 
amend such rules. The bad news is that these provisions have been in force for many years and, 
for some reason, neither the continuous recommendations from the experts nor the international 
political pressure have put an end to them. However, it is not difficult to intuit the reasons behind 
this decision. The US have indeed good reasons to maintain the status quo, since it enables them 
to keep their domestic tax base intact while encouraging profit shifting by their offshore 
subsidiaries in other jurisdictions, thus lowering the US MNC´s overall effective tax rate and 
strengthening their competitive position214.  
Although to a minor extent, we have equally demonstrated the important role played by the Irish 
domestic tax legislation along with the tax rulings endorsed by the Irish Revenue, now declared 
as illegal State Aid. 
The second group refers to other type of rules we believe to be largely responsible for the 
possibility to legally shift taxable profits to jurisdictions where the business activity is practically 
nil. We are referring to the tax connecting factors (i.e. the rules that link a taxpayer or an item of 
income to a certain tax jurisdiction) which have traditionally been configured around the notions 
of residence and source. In fact, the outcome of Apple´s tax planning strategy is in part 
attributable to the effect of the current definition of residence and source.  
In the first place, Apple exploited the mismatch in the definition of corporate residence in the US 
and Ireland (see section 2.2.1). As it has been anticipated, Ireland took action and amended its 
rules in order to prevent companies from playing with such mismatches in order to take advantage 
of them, although such amendments fell short for the reasons explained above. A closer look at 
the way corporate residence is usually defined leads us to wonder whether such definition 
deserves a serious reconsideration precisely to prevent cases of profit shifting such as the one 
conducted by Apple. In the second place, Apple employed commissionaire structures aimed at 
keeping functions, assets and risks in Ireland and thus narrowing the market jurisdictions´ options 
to tax either under article 7.2 (in case the commissionaire is deemed to be a PE) or under article 
9 of the OECD Model Convention (see section 2.2.4). Beyond this, we equally demonstrated that 
the PE, as it currently stands, is per se unable to cover some of the commercial activities carried 
out by Apple in the market jurisdictions.  
The following chapter will delve into the profit shifting risks that arise from three traditional 
paradigms underlying corporate income taxation: the separate-entity approach and the 
definitions of corporate residence and source for tax purposes. References will be made to the 
case of Apple in order to better illustrate the aforementioned problems and risks.  
 
 
                                                          
214 AULT, H.J. (2013), p. 1198 and TING, A. (2015), p. 414-415.  
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3. THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THREE 
PARADIGMS UNDERLYING CORPORATE INCOME 
TAXATION FOR THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN 
ECONOMIC AND TAX PRESENCE 
 
We demonstrated in Chapter 2 the existence of an increasing misalignment between the location 
where the actual business activities take place and the location where the profits are eventually 
reported for tax purposes (a phenomenon we referred to as “profit shifting”).  
In the present chapter we will devote our attention to three paradigms that have been underlying 
CITs from the very beginning: the separate-entity approach along with the arm´s length standard 
(section 3.1), the definition of corporate tax residence (section 3.2), and the definition of source 
for tax purposes with a particular emphasis on the PE concept (section 3.3). 
We will examine their respective origins, reflect on their supposed rationales and briefly describe 
how they tend to be translated into legal provisions by analyzing common patterns followed by 
States. However, our main goal is to demonstrate that they have ultimately become fundamental 
sources of profit shifting risks, in the sense that they enable, to a greater or lesser extent, 
corporate taxpayers to detach taxable profits from the jurisdictions where they are generated and 
instead book them in the jurisdiction of their choice. In other words, we intend to evidence that 
they all play a significant role in situations as that illustrated in Chapter 2.  
During our exercise, we will make reference to both domestic tax legislations and bilateral tax 
treaties. In this latter case, we will use the OECD MC (2014 version) as the primary point of 
reference, although references will be made to the UN MC (2011) and the US MC (2006) where 
appropriate. It should be noted that this chapter deliberately excludes the outcomes of the BEPS 
project and the subsequent changes it triggered in the respective MCs. This decision is based on 
two main reasons. The first one is that the case study (Chapter 2) we used to reveal the problem 
is based on data as of 2011 and is thus a consequence of the preexisting legal framework at that 
time. If the intention is to diagnose the causes of such problem, it seems coherent to look at the 
legal framework then in effect. The second reason is that we intend to evaluate in Chapter 5 
whether the outcomes derived by the BEPS project are able to effectively narrow the gap between 
the economic and the tax presence of the companies throughout the world. 
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3.1. THE SEPARATE ENTITY APPROACH AND THE 
INHERENT LIMITATIONS TO THE ARM´S LENGTH 
STANDARD MAY ENTAIL PROFIT SHIFTING RISKS 
In this section we will depart from the general treatment of companies as taxable entities separate 
from their respective shareholders in the context of both stand-alone companies and companies 
integrated in corporate groups or multinationals (section 3.1.1). We will first raise the question of 
whether the separate entity approach effectively contributes to the possibility of shifting profits 
to selected jurisdictions (section 3.1.2). As the answer is positive, we will then proceed to analyze 
whether the arm´s length standard, which was originally intended to counteract the profit shifting 
risks that the separate entity approach poses, effectively accomplishes its original mission or, on 
the contrary, still allows taxpayers to shift profits to jurisdictions other than those where business 
activities are taken place (section 3.1.3). 
 
3.1.1. THE RECOGNITION OF COMPANIES AS SEPARATE LEGAL 
SUBJECTS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES  
Companies are not real persons in the traditional sense of the word. However, at a certain time 
of history, domestic legislations began to confer them a legal status analogous to the one enjoyed 
by natural persons, comprised by a variety of rights, duties and obligations.  
In order to understand the raison d´être of companies it is important to first become acquainted 
with the context in which they were born215. After the industrial revolution, the volume of trade 
between nations soared. However, trade was a risky and capital consuming business at that time, 
frequently requiring the amalgamation of personal fortunes. This being so, there was a growing 
need to regulate the manner in which capital was invested and the rights of the investors. It is in 
this context that registered companies began to spring up in the domestic legislations of many 
jurisdictions216, rapidly becoming a regular vehicle through which most investments were 
conducted. Its success was largely due to the concession of limited liability of its members, which 
provided a significant incentive to invest in businesses, particularly those involving greater risks217. 
The nature of companies may be analyzed from a legal and an economic standpoint218. In the eyes 
of the law, a company is a sort of legal fiction or abstraction which receives a treatment analogous 
to that received by a natural person. This being so, legislations generally grant them certain 
powers and obligations similar to those of natural persons, namely, the capacity to own property, 
pursue legal actions, be sued, enter into contracts in their own name, etc. It should be emphasized 
that their legal personality remains distinct and separate from the personality of its members and 
is thus subject to a different statutory regime. The so-called “separate entity theory” erects a wall 
                                                          
215 For further information on the historic origins of corporations see COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 11 et seq. and HARRIS, P.A. 
(1996), p. 40-41. 
216 For example, the incorporation of companies was first regulated in the UK in 1844 by the Joint Stock Companies Act.  
217 COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 11. 
218 HARRIS, P.A. (1996), p. 42-46. 
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between the companies and their respective shareholders: a wall whose role is to maintain rights 
and duties at both levels in separate levels. For example, from a legal perspective, the debts of a 
company are not debts of a shareholder219, income perceived by a company is generally not 
considered as income of the shareholder either, and legal responsibility that may be held by the 
company is usually not extended to its shareholders. The “separate entity theory” equally applies 
to companies whose shares are held by other companies, in a way that companies pertaining to 
the same corporate group are deemed to be (and thus treated as) separate persons.  
From an economic viewpoint, the relationship between companies and their shareholders is not 
so straightforward. Companies and shareholders may well be regarded as economically 
independent or as economically integrated (i.e. as an economic single entity)220. In the case of 
widely held companies, a separation of ownership and control is often perceived. The majority of 
their shareholders resemble more to a lender than to an entrepreneur, since they abdicate their 
power to run the company in favor of a board of directors or other similar body and merely expect 
a given return on capital invested, whether in the form of dividend or capital gain. This being so, 
it is not the shareholders but the board of directors who decide when and in what amount 
dividends are distributed to shareholders, and for this reason widely-held companies and their 
respective shareholders may be perceived as economically independent. On the other hand, there 
is no such separation between ownership and control in the case of closely-held companies (e.g. 
family business) or wholly-owned or nearly wholly-owned subsidiaries pertaining to the same 
MNC. In this case, the role of shareholders resembles more the role of an entrepreneur, as they 
are likely to take decisions on the management, strategy and corporate structure of the company 
and, most importantly, decide whether and under what conditions dividends are distributed and 
thus perceived in their personal capacity. As a consequence of all this, as long as there is no clear 
boundary between ownership and control, companies and their shareholders (whether 
individuals or companies) may be regarded as economically integrated and thus forming an 
economic single entity.  
Once the nature of the company has been analyzed from both a legal and an economic standpoint, 
it is time to consider how companies are usually treated for income tax purposes. Since PITs began 
to emerge nearly two hundred years ago, income perceived by companies was almost invariably 
included within the ambit of income taxes. At this point, a distinction should be made as to how 
income derived by a company is ultimately taxed221. On one hand, countries may decide to treat 
the company as a separate taxpayer, distinct from its shareholders, whose income becomes 
taxable in its own hands at the time it is perceived222. Today this is the general tendency, since the 
overwhelming majority of countries have CITs in place which impose the tax at the level of the 
                                                          
219 Pursuant for the aforementioned privilege of limited liability, shareholders are not required to contribute any more 
to the debts of a corporation than the amount of capital with respect to the shares held.  
220 This is the distinction made by Harris. See HARRIS, P.A. (1996), p. 43-46.  
221 These two approaches are analyzed by HARRIS, P.A. (1996), p. 50-54 and LANG, M., STARINGER, C. (2014). It should 
be noted that the preference for either of them is a mere policy decision, although countries tend to assess some of 
the criteria exposed below when making such decision. Furthermore, certain countries allow taxpayers to choose 
whether a foreign entity should be considered as transparent or taxable, see previous section 2.2.3 on the US check-
the-box rule and LANG, M., STARINGER, C. (2014), p. 38 (the case of South Korea). 
222 HARRIS, P.A. (1996), p. 50-51. 
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company223. According to Harris, this option is particularly convenient for widely-held companies 
because, as it has been exposed above, they may be seen as economically autonomous from their 
owners. On the other hand, countries may decide to treat the company as fiscally transparent, in 
a way that results in the attribution of its profits to the shareholders behind it. Therefore, the 
profits flow from the entity who legally perceives them to its owners, becoming taxable in the 
hands of the latter in proportion to their shareholdings224. Under this approach, companies are 
regarded as mere conduits for income tax purposes. This approach is less common and is usually 
reserved for closely-held or wholly-owned entities whose owners handle the management of the 
entity. The most characteristic example of transparency regime is the CFC regime, one of the 
cornerstones of Apple´s tax planning scheme as analyzed in section 2.2.3. Although the 
coexistence of both approaches would seem a priori advisable (i.e. two-level taxation for portfolio 
investment and transparent taxation for controlling shareholders), domestic tax regimes rarely 
establish this sort of split approach225. 
 
3.1.2. THE SEPARATE ENTITY APPROACH IN THE CONTEXT OF 
CORPORATE GROUPS AND THE RISKS POSED BY TRANSFER 
PRICING MANIPULATION  
The following question would be whether the fact of belonging to a corporate group is considered 
relevant when it comes to the taxation of a company. Or in other words, whether companies 
integrated in groups are treated differently than stand-alone companies for income tax purposes. 
There are two main approaches countries may take in this regard. On one hand, they may choose 
to treat the different members of the groups separately, thus remaining faithful to the above-
mentioned “separate-entity theory”. On the contrary, they may opt to recognize the corporate 
group as a whole, ignoring the transactions between the group members and merely looking at 
outcomes for the overall group226.  
While the first approach has become mainstream, as it will be discussed further below, the latter 
one has not yet enjoyed an equivalent impact. Out of the total of 30 countries that participated 
in the research on group regimes headed by the International Fiscal Association in 2004, 20 had a 
group regime in place, although the majority of the remaining ones concluded that the adoption 
of such regimes was desirable227. However, the scope of such regimes is generally quite limited, 
since the recognition of corporate groups for income tax purposes has rarely transcended national 
                                                          
223 According to the IFA General Report on qualification of taxable entities, all branch reports confirmed that there is a 
corporate income tax in place in their respective jurisdictions. See LANG, M., STARINGER, C. (2014), p. 23 et seq.  
224 According to Harris there are two main methods to implement this approach in practice: the partnership or pass-
through method and the full taxation of capital gains. See HARRIS, P.A. (1996), p. 52-53. 
225 Schön explains why the split approach is rarely in place in domestic tax legislations. The first reason could be that, in 
practice, it would be hard to draw a borderline between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. The second 
reason is the danger to introduce “sudden” leaps within the continuum of possible arrangements. See SCHÖN, W. 
(2009), p. 108.  
226 The most paradigmatic example is the CCCTB Proposal, see EU Commission (2011): Proposal for a Council Directive 
on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). 
227 MASUI, Y. (2004), p. 26.  
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borders, remaining instead in the domestic level228. As a consequence, consolidation measures 
are generally confined to resident companies229 and, at most, the domestic PEs of non-resident 
companies230, with the only exceptions of Denmark, France and Italy, whose regimes also covered 
non-resident subsidiaries231. 
Notwithstanding the above, the “separate-entity theory” is certainly the most widespread 
approach at the transnational level. This is in part due to the fact that all tax treaties in place, 
without exception, depart from the recognition of each company as a separate subject for income 
tax purposes232. This being so, countries tend to treat each company separately and calculate its 
tax base on the basis of the profits reflected in its accounts233, irrespective of whether it belongs 
to a corporate group or not. The problem comes with the fact that the separate-entity approach 
enables corporate groups to significantly reduce their overall tax burden. This is so because it 
makes it possible for corporate groups to effectively shift taxable profits to selected jurisdictions, 
in which the level of taxation is low and the level of economic activity (if any) may be equally low. 
As entities within the same group are not constrained by the market forces, they simply need to 
manipulate the conditions of its intra-group transactions in a way that results in the transfer of 
profits to subsidiaries resident in such jurisdictions234.  
 
3.1.3. THE ARM´S LENGTH STANDARD AS A WIDESPREAD 
CORRECTIVE: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN TERMS OF 
PROFIT SHIFTING RISKS 
Naturally, countries have developed various tools in order to minimize or eliminate the risk of 
profit shifting in corporate groups via transfer pricing manipulation. Domestic legislations and tax 
treaties have been relying for a long time in the so-called “arm´s length standard” (hereinafter 
                                                          
228 MASUI, Y. (2004), p. 53 et seq. 
229 Vann identifies two reasons that may explain why consolidation measures are not generally extended to non-
resident companies. The first one is that allowing non-resident companies to utilize the rules opens up the potential for 
manipulating tax jurisdiction rules (e.g. a rule that allow a tax-free transfer of assets between group members may lead 
to an asset effectively being withdrawn from the tax jurisdiction by a transfer from a resident to a non-resident 
company). The second one is that group approaches blatantly contradicts the separate-entity approach followed by tax 
treaties and, as group regimes with transnational effects may be contrary to tax treaties, countries opt to avoid potential 
conflicts. See VANN, R.J. (2003), p. 133 et seq and MASUI Y. (2004), p. 26. 
230 The IFA general report revealed the general trend of jurisdictions affected by EU Law to extend the scope of their 
regimes to the domestic PEs of non-resident corporations, particularly after the year 2000. See MASUI, Y. (2004), p. 54 
and 58-62. 
231 These group regimes are described in MASUI, Y. (2004), p. 54-57.  
232 Both the OECD and the UN Model Tax Conventions adopt this approach. The Preface of the OECD TPG states “OECD 
member countries have chosen this separate entity approach as the most reasonable means for achieving equitable 
results and minimizing the risk of unrelieved double taxation”.  
233 OESTREICHER, A., SPENGEL, C., KOCH, R. (2011), p. 5-6. This paper confirms that all EU Member States tax their 
corporations individually and oblige them to determine their taxable income separately.  
234 Avi-Yonah believes that transfer pricing manipulation is “one of the simplest ways to avoid taxation” and “one of the 
most common techniques of tax avoidance”, see AVI-YONAH, R. (2007c), p. 1. This risk should not be underestimated, 
since intra-group transactions represent today around 60% of the worldwide transactions according to, for example, 
OWENS, J. (2005), p. 99 and BURKE, J. (2011), p. 614. 
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ALS)235, which intends to make adjustments to the conditions of intra-group transactions in a way 
that the tax base of the entity concerned includes the profits it would have obtained if the 
transaction had occurred with an unrelated entity. Accordingly, the ALS may be regarded as a legal 
fiction (it leads to treat two related parties “as if” they were unrelated) which embeds and builds 
upon other fictions (the companies are fictitious themselves)236. 
The current wording of article 9.1 of the OECD MC serves as an example of the legal configuration 
of the ALS: 
“Where a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in 
the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, 
or b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control 
or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State, and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the 
two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those 
which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which 
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by 
reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of 
that enterprise and taxed accordingly”. 
The fundamental function of the ALS is to reduce the leeway corporate groups would otherwise 
enjoy to manipulate internal prices and to shift profits between jurisdictions, thus preventing 
groups from “opting” for the allocation of a profit to a jurisdiction of their own choice237. From a 
theoretical perspective, the ALS should be capable of fully preventing profit shifting derived from 
transfer pricing manipulation, as the adjustments in the tax base of the related parties should in 
principle eliminate the incentive of MNCs to manipulate their respective transfer pricing to 
allocate profits in selected jurisdictions and thus reduce their overall tax burden238.  
In practice, however, the ALS has proven to be far from infallible in the accomplishment of the 
aforementioned task. The OECD itself came to recognize that multinationals have been able to 
“use and/or misapply those rules [the ALS] to separate income from the economic activities that 
produce that income and to shift it into low-tax environments”239, implicitly admitting that the ALS 
was inherently troublesome in this regard insofar its mere use was prone to lead to these 
undesirable outcomes. At this stage, it is necessary to ask ourselves why, how and to what extent 
the ALS fails to prevent MNCs from shifting income away from the jurisdictions where the 
economic activities are located. 
                                                          
235 It has been argued that the ALS has become a sort of “internationally accepted principle”. See for example BEPS 
report, p. 36 and AVI-YONAH, R. (2007), p. 102 et seq. For his part, Brauner regards the ALS as the “heart, spirit and the 
foundation of the current international transfer pricing regime”, see BRAUNER, Y. (2008), p. 96. 
236 PETRUCCI, R. (2016), p. 10. 
237 SCHÖN, W. (2010), p. 232. 
238 In fact, the ALS has undeniably played a key role in the prevention of profit shifting to jurisdictions. Brauner 
recognizes that transfer pricing rules are a “necessary component of any international income tax law” and that such 
legislation “stops MNEs from easily avoiding of significantly reducing taxation by shifting profits to low or no tax 
jurisdictions”. See BRAUNER, Y. (2008), p. 86.  
239 BEPS report, p. 19.  
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The fundamental flaw of the ALS (or in other words, the main responsible for its inability to 
satisfactorily fulfill its mission) lies in the ALS itself. That is, the basic failure of the ALS lies in its 
own nature. Being the ALS an eminently subjective parameter240, it makes it possible to equally 
advocate for the compatibility of two different transfer prices -significantly distant from each 
other- with the ALS. Navarro considers that the mandate imposed by the ALS is very broad and 
frequently generates a sort of “grey area” within which taxpayers and tax administrations may 
move freely and legitimately241. He warns that this constitutes a decisive advantage for 
resourceful taxpayers which may structure their transfer pricing assessment so as to “push the 
limits” of the ALS and thus get the most convenient pricing within the wide price range demanded 
by the ALS242. On the contrary, less-privileged taxpayers may lack the resources to perform a 
transfer pricing assessment as solid and convincing.  
This structural problem becomes apparent in the next two considerations we will refer to below, 
which we believe to be largely responsible for the fact that the ALS has been in practice unable to 
impede the shift of profits to jurisdictions which lack any kind of economic activities. These two 
considerations are: the asymmetries generated by the choice of the transfer pricing method and 
the way the inherent complexity of the ALS in practice lead to a two-speed system.  
In the first place, we will provide a general overview of the most common methods used for 
transfer pricing purposes and afterwards we will proceed to argue why the possibility to freely 
choose any of them generates profit shifting risks.  
Transfer pricing methods are used to establish whether the conditions imposed between 
associated enterprises are consistent with the ALS243. Both the OECD and the UN recommend the 
same 5 methods244, which tend to be the most widespread in the domestic legislations of 
countries following the standard. These methods are divided into two categories. On one hand, 
we have the traditional transaction methods, which are comprised by three different methods: 
the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP), the resale price (RP) and the cost plus (C+)245. These 
methods used to take precedence over the other two, although recent updates to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines (hereinafter OECD TPG) have abandoned this preference by 
introducing the so-called “best method rule”246. However, they are still regarded as the “most 
                                                          
240 However much it is based on an economic and supposedly objective analysis. In fact, Wittendorff recognizes that: 
“the arm´s length principle requires subjective, entity-specific valuation, while fair value requires subjective, market-
based valuation”. See WITTENDORFF, J. (2016), p. 353. 
241 NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2016), p. 57-58. 
242 Vann states that the transfer pricing methodology, based on functions, assets and risks, “has been manipulated in 
practice to allow diversion of profits to low-tax jurisdictions”. See VANN, R.J. (2010), p. 313. 
243 OECD TPG, par. 2.1. 
244 See OECD TPF, chapter 2 and UN (2013): Practical manual on transfer pricing, chapter 6.  
245 (a) Comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP): it compares the price charged for property or services transferred 
in a controlled transaction to the price charged in a comparable uncontrolled transaction in comparable circumstances. 
(b) Resale price method (RP). It begins with the price at which a product purchased from an associated enterprise is 
resold to an independent enterprise, and then such price is reduced by a gross margin which appropriately represents 
the amount a reseller would seek to cover its operating expenses plus the remuneration for the functions performed. 
(c) Cost plus method (C+). It begins with the costs incurred by the supplier in a controlled transaction for property 
transferred or services provided to an associated purchaser, and then an appropriate cost plus markup is added, a mark-
up that should be calculated on the basis of the functions performed by the supplier.  See their respective descriptions 
in OECD TPG, pars. 2.13, 2.21 and 2.39.  
246 See the 1995 OECD TPG, par. 3.2; and the current version on OECD TPG, par. 2.10. 
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direct means” of establishing whether the conditions agreed by the parties comply with the ALS247. 
As it may be deduced from their respective wording, the characteristic feature of these methods 
is the fact that they are usually applied on a transaction-by-transaction basis, as they seek 
comparable prices or margins from uncontrolled transactions248. The fact that they generally 
assess each transaction separately makes them more precise, therefore leading to a relatively 
narrower range of acceptable prices under the ALS. 
On the other hand, we have the transactional profit methods, which integrate the transactional 
net margin (TNM) and the transactional profit split (TPS) methods249. As noted above, these 
methods could only be applied in a subsidiary manner until very recently. Nowadays, its use is 
particularly recommended either in cases where each of the parties makes valuable and unique 
contributions in relation to the controlled transactions or where the parties engage in highly 
integrated activities or either in cases where there is no or limited reliable information on third 
parties250. Unlike the traditional ones, the profit methods do not usually assess transactions 
separately but rather use general parameters taken by comparable uncontrolled enterprises in 
order to arrive at the transfer pricing outcome251. As the ratios and indicators used for these 
purposes may vary considerably, the use of these methods ultimately leads to a wider range of 
prices that could arguably be in accordance with the ALS252.   
Once the two categories of transfer pricing methods have been briefly outlined, we will proceed 
to explain why the choice of the method is tending to become a new instrument for profit shifting, 
thus thwarting the original intent of the ALS. To prove this point, we will make a special reference 
to transactions involving intangibles, since the choice of method in this context is particularly 
troublesome insofar it entails significant profit shifting risks. 
The ALS has been harshly criticized for its inability to control tax-motivated transfer pricing with 
respect to the shifting of income from intangibles253. This sort of profit shifting phenomenon has 
acquired considerable importance in the last decades, as intangibles have become increasingly 
relevant in today´s business models. The OECD recognized at the time the BEPS Action Plan was 
published that the ALS had been unable to prevent MNCs from carrying profits associated with 
the transfer and use of such intangibles to jurisdictions other than those where value-added 
                                                          
247 OECD TPG, par. 2.3. 
248 The OECD TPG literally states that “ideally”, the ALS should be applied on a transaction-by-transaction basis, but this 
is only true in the case of the traditional methods. See OECD TPG, par. 3.9 
249 (a) Transactional net margin method: it examines the ratio between the net profit and an appropriate base (e.g. 
costs, sales, assets) that a taxpayer obtains from a transaction. (b) Transactional profit split method: it first aggregates 
the profits obtained from the controlled transactions in which the parties engage and then proceeds to split those 
combined profits between the different parties in accordance with an “economically valid basis” that approximates the 
division of profits that would have been anticipated and reflect in an agreement made at arm´s length. See OECD TPG, 
par. 2.58 and 2.108. 
250 OECD TPG, par. 2.4.  
251 Vann states that profit methods tend to aggregate transactions, thus leading to the “relaxation of the transactional 
requirement” even though the first stage in the analysis is transactionally based. See VANN, R.J. (2003), p. 168. 
252 Navarro warns against the high degree of subjectivity this method entails, indicating this is its most significant 
disadvantage. See NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2016), p. 30. 
253 Schoueri believes this is the “principal weakness” of the ALS. See SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 699.  
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activities were located254. This was precisely the case of Apple, where the conclusion of the CSAs 
(supposedly within the sphere of the ALS) between the parent and a number of subsidiaries 
enabled the group to attribute the vast majority of the profits derived by Apple´s IP to the 
subsidiaries incorporated in Ireland, a territory where no significant economic activities were 
taking place255. The ALS cannot however be blamed entirely for this outcome insofar the American 
regime on CSA can hardly be categorized as consistent with the ALS itself. The reason is that this 
domestic regime ultimately gives rise to situations such the one illustrated by Apple, where a 
company (ASI) got to earn disproportionally amounts of income in return for its cost sharing 
payment (an average ratio EBITDA/cost of 15:1) at the expense of Apple Inc., which would have 
hardly entered into an agreement like this with an unrelated party256. 
As one of essential features of intangibles is precisely their uniqueness and singularity257, a 
comparable product may hardly be found in the market. This fact generally makes the CUP 
method unsuitable in cases where intangibles are somehow involved. A second essential feature 
of intangibles is the fact that they may potentially generate income that is disproportionally higher 
that the costs incurred in their development258. This renders the C+ method considerably 
attractive to taxpayers, as well as any other pricing method based on costs, such as the American 
regime on CSA itself259. The preference of this method may be easily explained by means of an 
example that reflects a very common tax planning scheme. Entity A, resident in a high-tax 
jurisdiction, incorporates a subsidiary (A’) in a low-tax jurisdiction and injects a considerable 
amount of capital into it. A’ is highly capitalized and yet, it lacks significant human and material 
resources, reason why it may be regarded as a “cash box”. The parent company uses A’ to create 
and exploit an intangible asset, whose legal owner is from the beginning (and never ceases to be) 
entity A’. This being so, A’ is responsible for the management of the property and the supervision 
of the outsourced functions. At the time it perceives the returns generated by the intangible, A’ 
proceeds to remunerate the different entities for the functions performed on a cost-plus basis, 
meaning that the price would cover the costs incurred by the service supplier plus a markup that 
appropriately reflects the functions performed. However, these amounts, while being compliant 
                                                          
254 The OECD/BEPS project devoted one of its 15 action items to the application of transfer pricing rules to intangibles. 
One of the objectives of this action item was to ensure “that profits associated with the transfer and use of intangibles 
are appropriately allocated in accordance with (rather than divorced from) value creation”. See BEPS report, p. 20. 
255 Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.5. 
256 As it was previously stated in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.5, the American rule on CSA effectively allowed ASI, one of 
Apple´s Irish subsidiaries, to become entitled to substantial profits derived by the exploitation of Apple´s IP in exchange 
for a very low price (the ratio earnings/costs reached 15:1 in 2011 and 18:1 in 2012) and without requiring the transfer 
of any sort of genuine activities to Ireland. In fact, according to our own estimations based on the selected sample of 
Apple´s registered IP, no R&D activities are being conducted within this territory at all. In this particular case, however, 
the outcome was not due to the choice of method but rather to the US domestic regulation on CSAs, which operate as 
a safe harbor and thus prevent the application of transfer pricing adjustments, as section 2.2.2 demonstrated. The 
inconsistency between this CSA and the ALS has been noted by TING, A. (2014), p. 45 and the Testimony of Prof. Shay 
on “Offshore profit shifting and the US tax code – part 2 (Apple Inc.)” submitted before the US Senate - Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 9 
257 BRAUNER, Y. (2008), p. 87-92 and 134. 
258 The Apple case is no exception to this, see table 3 in the section 2.1.1.3. 
259 See sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.5.  
 
72 
 
with the ALS, are insignificant when compared to the overall profit obtained by reason of the 
intangible260.  
The abovementioned example only works to the extent the group manages to contractually 
separate intangibles from functions, which is one of the tax planning potentials of the ALS 
according to Wittendorff261. This way, the group may be able to place valuable intangibles in low-
tax jurisdictions while retaining functions in high-tax jurisdictions. As a consequence of this, while 
the high-taxed entity would be ascribed a routine return for the functions performed on a cost-
plus basis, the low-taxed entity, by contrast, would be ascribed the residual profits, which includes 
the entire organization return caused by the economies of integration. Considering the above, 
Wittendorff believes that the ALS ultimately creates, albeit unintentionally, an incentive to 
relocate intangibles which are in substance developed and managed from a high-tax jurisdiction 
to a low-tax jurisdiction262. 
The OECD has acknowledged the risks posed by the abovementioned transfer pricing methods, at 
least in respect of transactions involving intangibles. Therefore, it has been recently promoting 
the TPS option over the other ones in the context of the BEPS Project263. The new OECD approach 
regarding the application of the ALS to intangibles will be examined and evaluated in-depth in 
Section 5.2.1.1, while the present section will only refer to some of the risks that the use of this 
method may entail. 
In general, TPS method are less likely to generate profit shifting opportunities than the traditional 
ones, particularly with respect to intangibles. However, as it was noted above, these methods are 
based on ratios and indicators that may vary considerably, thus potentially leading to a wide range 
of prices that could be deemed to be at arm´s length. This means that both tax Administrations 
and taxpayers may “play” with the different indicators to move within such wide range in the 
desired direction. The result is more likely to benefit those who are better equipped to formulate 
the most convincing and solid transfer pricing analysis, as it was already noted above. 
Leaving aside the tax arbitrage caused by the choice of the transfer pricing method, it is time to 
move on to the second consideration we wished to put forward, which is the way the complexity 
of the ALS leads in practice to a two-speed system. 
Complexity seems to be inherent in the very nature of transfer pricing264 and, regrettably, this 
runs –once again- in favor of those who are better equipped, in terms of resources, to figure out 
                                                          
260 OECD (2014): BEPS Action 8 deliverable: guidance on transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, par. 6.42. This sort of 
tax planning scheme is also described and commented in YUAN, J.; LIU, R.; CHAN, H. (2015), p. 5 and NAVARRO 
IBARROLA, A. (2016), p. 250. 
261 He identifies this risk in the interpretation of the ALS resulting from the 1995 OECD TPG, and therefore welcomes 
the contribution of the BEPS Project in this area. See WITTENDORFF, J. (2016), p. 332.  
262 WITTENDORFF, J. (2016), p. 332. Avi-Yonah and Benschalom equally believe that “the porosity of current transfer 
pricing rules creates an artificial tax incentive to locate profits in low-tax countries, both by locating real economic 
activities in such countries and by shifting profits for tax purposes towards low-tax locations”, see AVI-YONAH, R.; 
BENSHALOM, I. (2011), p. 373. 
263 BEPS report, p. 20-21 and OECD (2014): BEPS Action 10: Draft on the use of profit splits in the context of global value 
chains, par. 33 et seq.  
264 Avi-Yonah and Benschalom consider that the system is “absurdly complex”. See AVI-YONAH, R.; BENSHALOM, I. 
(2011), p. 376.  
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a convincing transfer pricing assessment. Complexity is thus detrimental to less-privileged 
taxpayers but also to Tax Administrations, whose resources may rarely equal those of MNCs265. 
This places Tax Administrations at an insurmountable disadvantage when the time comes to 
perform the comparability analysis and apply the ALS, a disadvantage that is compounded by the 
fact that MNCs enjoy superior information266. As could not be otherwise, the problem is greatly 
exacerbated in the case of developing countries267. 
Beyond the particular profit shifting risks that the ALS poses, there are more structural problems 
concerning the application of the ALS that will be briefly outlined here: its inability to capture the 
so-called synergy rents, the considerable administrative burden it imposes and the legal 
uncertainty it generates.  
In the first place, various scholars understand that the ALS is “inherently flawed” because it treats 
the members of a MNC as separate entities rather than “inseparable parts of a single unified 
business”268, thereby obviating the real raison d´être of MNCs: the “internalization theory”269. 
According to this theory, corporate groups, due to its own organization, manage to internalize 
transactions costs and thus increase its efficiency in achieving economies of scale, raising capital 
advertising products, protecting valuable intangibles, etc.270. The result is that MNCs are able to 
enjoy higher margins of profits than those obtained by comparable enterprises that are not 
integrated in groups. Such extraordinary margins are referred to as “synergy rents” and the ALS 
as it currently stands is unable to take them into account (as they would not have arisen if 
unrelated parties had conducted such transaction) and thus soundly allocate them between the 
entities involved271. This means that the allocation of these rents decided by the taxpayer cannot 
be legitimately challenged by any jurisdiction involved, at least on the grounds of the ALS272. 
In the second place, the application of the ALS triggers an immense administrative and compliance 
burden for both taxpayers and Tax Administrations. This becomes visible in the huge industry of 
lawyers, accountants and economists that has emerged to assist corporate groups in their transfer 
pricing planning and compliance273. Thirdly and lastly, the application of ALS has effectively leaded 
to an unbearable degree of legal uncertainty, frequently depriving both taxpayers and countries 
                                                          
265 NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2016), p. 59. 
266 Problems related to information asymmetries between taxpayers and Tax Administrations are considered by the 
OECD, particularly in context of hard-to-value intangibles. See OECD (20015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – 
Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 109-112. 
267 OECD (2014): Two-part report to G20: Developing working group on the impact of BEPS in low income countries. 
268 OECD TPG, par. 1.6. 
269 This is the opinion shared by Vann, Avi-Yonah and Schoueri among others. See VANN, R.J. (2003), p. 139, SCHOUERI, 
L.E. (2015), p. 698 and AVI-YONAH, R. (2007c), p. 25.  
270 AVI-YONAH, R. (2007c), p. 25. 
271 Schoueri argues that the ALS, as it currently stands in the OECD and the UN Model Conventions, is incapable of 
dealing with synergy rents and that his failure cannot be corrected by way of an ambulatory interpretation of the ALS. 
See SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 698 and 711-713. Zornoza and Navarro stated in their comments to the changes proposed 
by Actions 8-10 of the BEPS Project that “it is virtually impossible that transactions exclusively undertaken by MNEs – 
and hence transactions that independent parties would not undertake – may respect the ALP”. See OECD (2015): 
Comments received on Public Discussion Draft: BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10: Revisions to Chapter I of the OECD TPG 
(including risk, recharacterisation and special measures), p. 511. 
272 SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 714. 
273 AVI-YONAH, R.; BENSHALOM, I. (2011), p. 376. For his part, Brauner is equally critical of the industry that revolves 
around transfer pricing compliance: “transfer pricing has created from scratch a large, economically wasteful industry 
which exists only to serve the need to supply these particular valuations”. See BRAUNER, Y. (2014b), p. 627 
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of the possibility to foresee the likely revenue outcome in a transfer pricing case. Avi-Yonah 
expresses concern over the possibility that potential investors may feel discouraged for the 
inability to forecast the tax burden on their potential international ventures and thus choose not 
to invest274. 
This section has analyzed some of the fissures that may be appreciated in two well-established 
paradigms (the separate-entity approach and the ALS) with the intention to demonstrate how 
such fissures may potentially be exploited by taxpayers to shift profits to jurisdictions where little 
or no value-adding activities are taken place. This view is shared by many scholars as Vann, who 
held that “virtually all problem areas in tax treaties could be traced to corporate groups and the 
separate taxation of the companies in the group”275. Now we will proceed to introduce the next 
two paradigms that will be covered in the next two sections.  
Once we depart from the general recognition of a company as a separate legal subject for tax 
purposes, it is time to identify the jurisdiction or jurisdictions that would be in principle entitled 
to tax its income. Such determination is largely based on the specific domestic tax legislations of 
the respective jurisdictions pursuant to their own tax sovereignty, without forgetting the 
limitations that could eventually be imposed by international treaties in place (if any). Each 
jurisdiction enjoys a great degree of freedom to define their respective “jurisdictional 
connections”276, that is, the criteria used to connect the material element of the taxable event 
with the scope of a State´s taxing power277. It is equally true, however, that jurisdictions have 
exercised their respective powers in a quite uniform way; and virtually all of them have followed, 
although with nuances278, the notions of residence and source taxation279. 
As in the case of individuals, corporate taxpayers are generally taxed in two different ways: as 
residents or as non-residents of the jurisdiction concerned for their income sourced therein280. On 
one hand, a resident company is usually taxed on its worldwide income, regardless of its origin, 
given its strong nexus with the State. On the other hand, a non-resident corporation is commonly 
subject to source taxation on the income that is considered to be sourced in the State concerned. 
Two levels of taxation are generally distinguished at this point. Firstly, when the non-resident 
company has a PE in the territory of a State such State usually imposes taxes on the (worldwide) 
profits that are considered attributable to it, reaching a level of taxation comparable to that borne 
by residents281. Secondly, when the non-resident company lacks a PE in the territory of a State, it 
                                                          
274 AVI-YONAH, R. (2007c), p. 26.  
275 VANN, R.J. (2003), p. 133.  
276 Below, section 4.3 will analyze in depth to what extent States are free to determine the scope of their taxing powers 
over persons and items of income under Public International Law. 
277 SCHINDEL, A., ATCHABAHIAN, A. (2005), p. 28. 
278 In the next sections we will refer to some of these nuances. 
279 As it may be inferred from the general report on the 2005 IFA subject on residence and source. See SCHINDEL, A., 
ATCHABAHIAN, A. (2005), p. 28 (“basically, source and domicile (residence, nationality) are the traditional jurisdictional 
principles”). 
280 COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 2 et seq  and LANG, M., STARINGER, C. (2014), p. 24.  
281 In fact, in tax treaty scenarios, article 24 of the 2014 OECD MC forbids States to grant a less favorable tax treatment 
to permanent establishments than to resident enterprises.  The same holds true for United States whose domestic 
legislation lacks a concept of permanent establishment but still makes a similar distinction between income effectively 
connected with a US trade or business and income which is not.  
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is generally liable to tax just for the specific items of income that are deemed to be sourced in 
such State, for example dividends, interests and royalties paid by residents therein.  
The next two sections will cover the way both residence and source have been defined (at the 
domestic and the tax treaty level) and will try to discern whether they, somehow, may potentially 
generate profit shifting opportunities.  
 
3.2. CURRENT CORPORATE TAX RESIDENCE TESTS DO NOT 
GENERALLY GUARANTEE A GENUINE AND SUFFICIENT 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE CONCERNED AND MAY 
INSTEAD GENERATE PROFIT SHIFTING RISKS  
 
This section seeks to discern whether the way corporate residence is currently defined for tax 
purposes may further exacerbate the risks of profit shifting. In essence, the question on the table 
is whether the definition of corporate tax residence effectively enable taxpayers to shift their 
taxable profits out of the jurisdiction(s) where the business activities take place to the 
jurisdiction(s) of their choice where no relevant business is occurring. Or in other words, whether 
the way corporate tax residence is currently defined contributes to widen the gap between the 
economic and the tax presence of companies in jurisdictions, as previously detected through the 
Apple case in Chapter 2. 
Further, we will try to demonstrate that corporate residence tests are not the fruit of a thorough 
reflection in policy terms and tend to rely on factors that are increasingly inappropriate and whose 
application generates a high degree of dissatisfaction in the States.   
To this end, we will devote the first two subsections to the critical analysis of corporate tax 
residence in the domestic level while the latter subsections two will analyze the implications from 
the perspective of tax treaties. Firstly, we will evaluate the most common residence tests used by 
the jurisdictions in their respective corporate income tax regulations (section 3.2.1). Secondly, we 
will analyze whether the lack of coordination in the definition of corporate tax residence may 
eventually exacerbate the abovementioned risks (section 3.2.2). Thirdly, we will study the role 
played by domestic residence tests when a company intends to access the benefits provided by a 
tax treaty and will analyze the function performed by LOB provisions in this context (section 3.2.3). 
Finally, we will critically analyze the way jurisdictions deal with dual residence of companies in tax 
treaties (section 3.2.4). 
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3.2.1. DOMESTIC CORPORATE TAX RESIDENCE TESTS: A 
COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW AND SOME CONSIDERATIONS 
The present section is divided into two parts. In the first part we will briefly outline the content 
and features of the most widespread tests used by jurisdictions to assign tax residence to a 
company along with their respective (alleged) rationales. Additionally, we will evaluate to what 
extent the different categories of tests effectively enable corporate taxpayers to book their profits 
in jurisdictions where no value-adding activities related to such profits are being carried on.  In 
the second part, we will draw some preliminary conclusions.  
3.2.1.1. Most common criteria used to confer corporate residence for 
domestic tax purposes, their corresponding alleged rationale and their 
potential profit shifting risks 
By the time jurisdictions started to treat legal entities as separate persons distinct from their 
owners and furthermore chose to impose income taxes on them, it became necessary to 
determine the cases in which they would become subject to taxation. Such determination was 
made by reference to certain criteria that denoted a particular connection between the corporate 
taxpayer and the jurisdiction concerned. 
Naturally, income taxes in force at that time had been conceived for individuals. And such taxes 
were largely built upon the notion of residence of the relevant individual taxpayer282. In this 
context, corporate taxpayers inherited, by analogy, the ability to reside in a certain jurisdiction for 
income tax purposes. For example, in countries as the United Kingdom there was certainly no 
other option, as the British courts were required to apply the Income Tax Acts enacted in the mid-
19th century to companies long before the introduction of a statutory corporate tax residence test 
in 1988. In the meantime, they had to live with an Act that established the taxation of profits 
arising or accruing to “any person residing in” the United Kingdom and therefore strive to adjust 
the notion of “residence” to make it compatible with companies283.  
In this context, jurisdictions extrapolated the notion of individual tax residence to companies in 
very different ways, and they did so either by introducing statutory residence tests or by the 
progressive development of a case law doctrine.  
While theoretical economics literature tends to regard residence as the place where the owner of 
the capital resides284, tax legislators have traditionally resorted to different criteria whose 
outcome may not be necessarily consistent with the economists´ view. Hereafter we will proceed 
to classify the most common tests currently used to attribute the status of tax resident to 
companies in four general categories. The following subsections will cover all four categories: (i) 
tests relying on the creation of the company and its seat, (ii) tests relying on its governance, (iii) 
                                                          
282 MAISTO, G. (ed.): (2010) and SCHINDEL, A.; ATCHABAHIAN, A. (2005). 
283 COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 28-33 and LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 102. 
284 DEVERAUX, M.; DE LA FERIA, R. (2014), p. 6. 
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test relying on the residence of its shareholders and (iv) tests relying on the location of its business 
activity.  
Although the analysis will be conducted separately for each category of tests, it is important to 
first note that most countries combine various approaches, as tables 27 and 28 in section 3.2.1.1.5 
will show below.  
3.2.1.1.1. Tests relying on the creation of the company and its registered seat 
All tests comprised in this category are of a purely formal nature. Some of them choose to focus 
on the moment of legal birth of the company. For example, under the POI test a company would 
be deemed to be tax resident in a certain jurisdiction provided that it is incorporated in 
accordance with the domestic legislation of such jurisdiction. On the other hand, as companies 
are generally required to indicate a legal seat (e.g. registered office or statutory seat) in their 
bylaws at the time of registration, some criteria choose instead to confer the tax residence to all 
companies whose legal seat is located within the territory concerned. 
Both tests were effectively borrowed, albeit not explicitly, from private international law285. 
Indeed, they have been compared to the individual´s place of birth or citizenship286, to the extent 
they all refer to factors pertaining to the inception of the respective taxpayer while completely 
disregarding their subsequent evolution and development.  
The rationale behind them 
Despite being the most widespread type of tests to establish corporate tax residence, as section 
table 27 in section 3.2.1.1.5 will demonstrate below, the rationale behind its use, surprisingly, 
remains a mystery.  
Undoubtedly, formal tests offer high functional advantages287. They do not require an 
interpretative effort of any kind, their application is univocal and straightforward and therefore 
the outcome is easily predictable. As a consequence, they entail, at least a priori, a high degree of 
legal certainty for both taxpayers and tax administrations.  And perhaps more importantly, formal 
tests rarely distort taxpayer´s economic behavior, if ever288.  Therefore, we may come to the 
conclusion that this option would be the most efficient one from an economic standpoint, 
meaning that it would not a priori affect the allocation of productive resources conceived by the 
corporate taxpayer.  
Besides these utilitarian arguments, there do not seem to be clear and solid policy reasons behind 
the appropriateness of taxing companies on these grounds289.  In this regard, it has only been 
                                                          
285 COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 31. 
286 LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 104. 
287 A comprehensive explanation of the virtues of these tests may be found in MARIAN, O. (2013), p. 1620-1625. 
288 MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 473.  
289 Loomer attempted to shed some light on the reasons behind the decision of Canada and the UK to introduce the 
POI test (in 1961 and 1988 respectively) once their respective tests based on the decision-making of the company were 
already consolidated. He concludes that “the policy foundations of the corporate tax were likely not given much 
consideration in the course of adopting the incorporation test, and perhaps the best explanation for its adoption in 
Canada and the United Kingdom was a desire for a clear, simple residence rule”. See LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 108-109. 
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argued that the POI test would be consistent with the purpose of CITs only to the extent these are 
regarded as “fees for the benefits of incorporation”, among which we could mention the granting 
of limited liability, the transferability of interests, the centralization of management, etc.290. 
However, this argument is weak and does not always stand, as there may be cases in which 
companies may achieve all benefits of incorporation with little or no corporate tax 
consequences291.  
The potential profit shifting risks they pose 
It seems evident that formal tests do not require a strong nexus between the company and the 
jurisdiction concerned292. Quite the contrary: they content themselves with a tenuous link that 
merely makes reference to a number of factors of a mere bureaucratic nature. Factors that are, 
besides, within the direct control of the taxpayer. This certainly raises serious profit shifting risks, 
leading to the already well-known phenomenon of “residence electivity”293, since taxpayers are in 
the position to simply “select” the jurisdiction in which they wish to incorporate the company or 
establish its registered office and, by extension, the jurisdiction in which they aspire to make its 
entity subject to tax294.  
This being so, the most straightforward –and rudimentary- way to initiate a tax planning scheme 
would be the incorporation of a company in a low-tax jurisdiction or a tax haven295. In fact, De 
Broe notes that countries applying formal tests and having beneficial tax regimes effectively 
“attract companies that are set up to enjoy the tax benefits but that do not necessarily have a 
genuine nexus with that country (letter box, base companies performing holding activities, 
conduits…)”296. However, this option is naturally not as optimal as it may seem in the beginning, 
partly because operating in such territories may be troublesome due to the lack of an adequate 
legal framework and the difficulties to raise capital and also because such arrangement is likely to 
                                                          
290 AVI-YONAH, R. (2004), p. 1205-1206. This idea seems equally present in Shaviro´s discourse, where he refers to the 
US taxation imposed upon foreigners incorporating a company in the US as “a fee for US incorporation” and then 
continue to enumerate some of the advantages of being incorporated in the US, as being subject to securities law 
regimes or the enjoyment of an easier trading on US capital markets. Besides, he points out that some companies may 
consider that the US incorporation “brands them legally, reputationally, and otherwise as real company with high 
standards”. In the case of certain industries (defense contracting or airlines) the incorporation in the US may be “legally 
or politically necessary, or at least advantageous” (SHAVIRO, D. (2011), p. 130-132). Schön argues that “entities owe 
their very existence and internal governance structure to the legal order of the country of incorporation” (SCHÖN, W. 
(2009), p. 91). 
291 This would be the case of the United States as a result of the check-the-box regulations. See MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 
476.  
292 As De Broe notes: “the application of such a formal criterion does not ensure that the company is subject to 
comprehensive tax liability in the country with which its economic nexus is closest”. Further, he even challenges the POI 
test from the perspective of the ability to pay principle: “The question may be raised whether the incorporation test is 
in accordance with the ability to pay principle”. See DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 99-100. We cannot agree with this latter 
assertion, since the compliance with the ability to tax principle is better measured by reference to the extent of the tax 
liability. 
293 SHAVIRO, D. (2011). 
294 MARIAN 2013B, p. 479: “the fact that our tax laws ask us to treat a mailbox in Ireland as a foreign corporation is an 
insult to intelligence”. 
295 See DESAI, M.A.; DHARMAPALA, D. (2010), p. 728, where the authors detected that tax haven incorporations rose 
to 10% of US incorporations in the period 2005-2009, and peaked at 30% in 2008. 
296 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 101. 
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be dismantled through anti-avoidance measures297, which will be later covered by section 
3.2.1.2.2.  
However, the opportunities for “residence electivity” are not exhausted with the decision to 
incorporate a company in a certain jurisdiction. Besides, domestic tax legislations may allow the 
inbound and outbound migration of companies, that is, the domestication of companies 
incorporated elsewhere and the expatriation of a locally incorporated company. The study of such 
options goes far beyond the scope of this research and cannot be comprehensively examined. 
However, the case of the United States may serve as an illustrative example of how these options 
could operate in practice.  
Shaviro conducted a research in the United States that intended to discern whether the cases of 
domestication and expatriation of companies were noteworthy and thus contributed to further 
aggravate the issue of “residence electivity”298. As regards the first scenario, he noted with 
surprise that it was relatively common and desired by certain companies for non-tax reasons. 
Furthermore, many states specifically provide for the “domestication” of foreign entities and the 
procedures tend not to be burdensome. For example, the procedure for reincorporating a 
company in Delaware is as simple as filing a certificate of corporate domestication and a certificate 
of incorporation299. One notable example is the multinational News Corporation, an Australian 
company which reincorporated in Delaware in 2004300. As regards the opposite scenario, as could 
not be otherwise, he observed that the United States did not precisely favor the way out of the 
country. Once a company has been incorporated in the United States, the only way to escape its 
status as US resident is by being genuinely purchased by new owners301. For example, this 
occurred back in 1988, when Chrysler, the US automaker, was acquired by Daimler, a German 
company, and later become DaimlerChrysler, a company resident in Germany for tax purposes302. 
Although one may think that the barriers imposed by the US IRC may be sufficient to discourage 
the emigration of companies, the next data is revealing: from 1988 to 2009 the percentage (for 
all US M&A deals) in which the acquirer was a foreign company located either in a tax haven or 
an exemption country more than doubled303. 
It is clear that the United States does not treat homogenously the cases of inbound and outbound 
corporate migration: while in the first case they simply demand the submission of a document, in 
the second case they require a genuine acquisition by a foreign entity. Although we cannot infer 
a general trend from the particular policy followed by the United States, it would be reasonable 
to expect equally disparate treatments in other jurisdictions304. 
                                                          
297 ZORNOZA PÉREZ, J. (2013), p. 15. 
298 SHAVIRO, D. (2011), p. 108 and 128-136. 
299 BRAUNER, Y. (2009), p. 866. 
300 SHAVIRO, D. (2011), p. 108. 
301 Section 7874 of the US IRC. Besides, article 1.4 of the 2016 US MC provides that the Contracting States may continue 
to tax its “former citizen or former long-term resident” in accordance with its domestic laws notwithstanding the other 
provisions of the Convention.  
302 SHAVIRO, D. (2011), p. 101-102 and 133: “opting out of the US corporate residence is therefore costly unless one 
actually wants to engage in meaningful cross-border M&A”.  
303 DESAI, M.A.; DHARMAPALA, D. (2010), p. 730-731. 
304 For instance, exit taxes are expected in outbound scenarios.  
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3.2.1.1.2. Tests relying on the corporate governance 
Overall, these tests tend to confer the status of tax resident to companies which are somehow 
managed from their respective territories. Contrary to the first category, these are eminently 
substantive and applied on a case-by-case basis. And naturally, it is necessary to monitor their 
fulfillment with certain frequency, as the place of management of a company may be subject to 
changes. 
The fact that the precise wording varies significantly from one State to another305 complicates the 
task of drawing some general defining lines. However, De Broe noted in his study that the 8 
jurisdictions applying this criterion did so in a relatively homogenous manner by means of the 
following three-step analysis306: 
o Identification of the relevant management activities307. As there may be a great number 
of decision-making bodies and persons with autonomous decision-taking powers within 
a company, he distinguished three different levels of management: strategic, day-to-day 
and “shop floor” management. The first one refers to the general policy decisions that 
affect the long-term course of the business of the company. The second one alludes to 
the decisions that intend to implement the strategic guidelines and manage the daily 
progress of the business. Lastly, the third one refers to the immediate supervision of the 
day-to-day operations.  
It is in this first part of the analysis where the disparities between jurisdictions are more 
profuse. For example, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and France among others tend to 
opt for the first approach while Germany and Switzerland opts for the second. On the 
other hand, jurisdictions as Austria and Italy do not follow consistently a unique approach.  
o Identification of the persons who perform the relevant management activities308. There 
is a general tendency, observed by De Broe, to depart from the assumption that 
companies are effectively managed by those who have been entrusted with management 
in conformity with the respective domestic company legislation (and when appropriate, 
their bylaws). This being so, company legislation typically establishes a single-tier 
management structure where the board of directors tends to be the corporate body 
responsible for management functions309. There are however notable exceptions. For 
example, the legislation of certain jurisdictions establishes for certain types of companies 
                                                          
305 De Broe analyzed the definition of corporate residence in the legislation of 8 civil law jurisdictions and concluded 
that all of them contained a factor based on the decision-making of the company. However, the terms varied 
significantly: principal (management) establishment and seat of management or administration (Belgium), effective 
seat (France), center of chief business management (Germany), place of management (Italy), place of effective 
management (Spain and Switzerland). On the other hand, the Netherlands employs a factual-based test in which the 
place of effective management plays a decisive role. See DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 102, footnote 14. For his part, Avery 
Jones explained the way common law judge-based rules (originally from the UK although followed by other common 
law countries) have traditionally used criteria equally based on the governance of the company to determine tax 
residence, only they call their test “central management and control”. See AVERY JONES, J.F. (2009), p. 121-161. 
306 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 102-119. 
307 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 102-107. 
308 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 107-114. 
309 This is the case of all the 8 countries surveyed. However, smaller companies may only have one or more managing 
directors. See DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 107. 
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a two-tier management structure comprised by the board of directors plus a supervisory 
board whose functions include the advice and supervision of the board of directors310. 
Equally, the legislation of certain jurisdictions allows (or even specifically establishes) 
shareholders to somehow get actively involved in the management of the company311 
even though, as a matter of principle, shareholders do not enjoy management powers.  
Notwithstanding the above, tax administrations and courts do not generally forgo the 
opportunity to verify whether the body appointed by the corporate legislation for the 
management of the company (i.e. the board of directors) effectively exercises in practice 
the mandated functions312. They may do so by means of a substance over form through 
which they examine all the relevant and objectively ascertainable facts of the case in order 
to discover who is de facto managing the company in lieu of the ones theoretically 
entrusted with such responsibility. Such analysis would eventually lead to the 
identification of the so-called de facto managers, which will be usually the ones to be 
taken into account for the purposes of the application of the corporate residence rule. 
The abovementioned substance over form analysis may potentially point at the 
shareholders as the de facto managers of the firm. Although there is nothing preventing 
this from actually happening, one should always perform the analysis with due 
consideration. This is so because, as mentioned before, one cannot confuse the general 
powers of the shareholders (e.g. the right to appoint and dismiss the directors) with 
management powers. This becomes particularly tricky in the case of subsidiaries 
belonging to corporate groups: “the more difficult question is from what point the 
involvement of shareholders (and in particular shareholders and parent companies) in the 
management of the company shifts the management from the level of the board or 
managing directors of the subsidiary to the level of the shareholders”313. Tax 
administrations and courts generally depart from the recognition of the subsidiary as a 
legal entity distinct from its shareholders and subject to a separate and autonomous 
management. It is generally believed that the fact that the board of the subsidiary 
behaves in conformity with the economic interests and overall objectives of the group to 
which it belongs does not imply that they are not effectively performing management 
functions314. However, it may be rightly concluded that the de facto managers of the 
subsidiary are in fact its shareholders to the extent they “usurp the management powers 
of the board of directors and frequently and constantly make the management decisions 
on their own order”315.  
                                                          
310 This is the case of Austria and Germany (Aktiengesellschaften), the Netherlands (structuurvennootschappen), France 
(sociétés anonymes) and Italy (società per azione). See DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 107. 
311 The bylaws of French companies may provide that management decisions are to be approved by the shareholders. 
In Belgium, the shareholders may vote, on request by the board, on the modification of the company´s object, its 
dissolution and certain changes of the bylaws. For their part, the shareholders of German and Austrian Gmbhs may pass 
resolutions with specific orders to be followed by the directors. See DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 108.  
312 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 109-114. 
313 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 110-114. 
314 COUZIN, R. (2002), P. 96. 
315 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 113. This situation is illustrated in a case brought before the British House of Lords in 1959. A 
parent company resident in the UK had three wholly-owned subsidiaries operating in Kenya. The evidence showed that 
these subsidiaries were resident in Kenya and had their respective separate board of directors. However, it was in fact 
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o Localization of the relevant management activities. The last step of the analysis typically 
requires the determination of the place where the management activities are in 
substance made, regardless of the place where they are prepared, implemented, 
executed or communicated316.  
Once again, tax administrations and courts usually depart from a general assumption, 
according to which relevant management decisions are made in the meetings regularly 
held by the corporate body appointed to that effect (i.e. the board of directors)317. 
However, this does not prevent administrations and courts from rebutting the 
presumption by applying a substance over form approach that may eventually lead to a 
different conclusion. This would be the case if the directors limit themselves to approving 
in their meetings decisions that were made elsewhere by the de facto managers. The test 
is wrongfully applied by certain jurisdictions that allude to criteria that bears no relation 
to the location of the decision-making, as for example the place of shareholders meetings 
(to the extent they are not deemed to be de facto managers), the residence of the 
directors, the localization of assets or the place where the main activities of the company 
are carried out318. For its part, the Gibraltarian rule steps aside from the general trend by 
explicitly conferring the tax residence to companies whose management and control is 
exercised outside Gibraltar provided that the persons in charge of managing the firm are 
ordinarily resident in Gibraltar319. 
The rationale behind them 
The original rationale behind these criteria may be inferred from the UK case law of the second 
half of the 19th century. The study of this case law turns out to be particularly interesting for two 
main reasons. The first one is that residence rules based on the governance of the company 
developed earlier in the UK than in civil law countries320 and the second one is that, unlike 
legislators, courts have the duty to explain the considerations that substantiate their positions, 
which allows us to witness first-hand the original raison d´être of this category of tests. 
                                                          
established that none of the boards ever made any decisions and simply stood aside in all matters of importance. 
Consequently, the Court reached the conclusion that the central management and control of the subsidiaries was 
effectively exercised by the parent board, regardless of whether this fact could be found to be contrary to the 
subsidiaries´ bylaws: “the business is not the less managed in London because it ought to be managed in Kenya”. See 
the Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1959, “Unit Construction Co. Ltd V. Bullock (Inspector of 
Taxes)”. 
316 With the only exception of jurisdictions following the day-to-day management approach, in which case relevance is 
given to the place where the strategic management is implemented in the form of day-to-day managerial decisions. 
See DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 115. 
317 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 115. 
318 The Spanish tax administration and courts and tend to presume that the residence of the directors of a company is 
equivalent to the place where the meetings of the board take place and, by extension, the place were management 
decisions are in substance made. The residence of the directors is therefore considered not only as a valid indicator in 
the determination of the place of management but frequently the decisive one. See for example the judgment by the 
Spanish High National Court (Audiencia Nacional), April 21st 2005. Additionally, De Broe found more case law in this 
regard in Belgium, France and Switzerland. See DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 116.  
319http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/tax-residency/Gibraltar-
Residency.pdf 
320 AVERY JONES, J.F. (2009), p. 121. 
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Two cases argued and decided together in the UK in 1876 set the pace for subsequent judgments 
in the country. We are referring to The Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd V. Nicholson and The Calcutta Jute 
Mills Co Ltd V. Nicholson321. Both companies were incorporated in the UK and had most of their 
directors in the UK, while their business operations were carried out wholly abroad (in Italy and 
India respectively) where their assets were situated and their respective managing directors and 
the majority of their shareholders resided (74% and 64% respectively)322. In order to settle the 
case, the court began disregarding the POI as a decisive factor, since it was regarded as 
“insufficient” to establish residence therein. Then, the court departed from a private international 
law rule laid down in an 1846 Act that established that a court would have jurisdiction insofar the 
dependent “dwells or carries on his business” within the court´s area. Huddlestone B, following 
previous judgments in private law matters, stated that the rule referred to the place where “the 
real trade and business is carried on” or “le centre de l´enterprise”323. At this point, and against all 
odds, the Court considered these companies as UK residents for tax purposes on the grounds that 
this expression ought to be interpreted as “place of intellectual control of the business”324, namely, 
the place where the central management and control is found instead of the place where the 
productive operations were taking place325. This approach was later reinforced in the leading case 
De Beers326 and progressively consolidated in subsequent cases. 
The British courts law always expressed their preference for the highest level of control at the 
expense of the day-to-day management, as one may easily infer from the terminology used by 
several judgments: the “paramount authority”327, the “head and brain”328 or “the superior and 
directing authority”329. Lord Halsbury advocated this position by saying that, even though the 
company in question dealt with land, goods and clients in another territory, “the person who 
                                                          
321Judgment by the High Court (Exchequer Division), 1876, “The Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd V. Nicholson” and “The Calcutta 
Jute Mills Co Ltd V. Nicholson”. 
322 AVERY JONES, J.F. (2009), p. 130-131. 
323 Judgment by the High Court (Exchequer Division), 1876, “The Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd V. Nicholson” and “The Calcutta 
Jute Mills Co Ltd V. Nicholson”. 
324 AVERY JONES, J.F. (2009), p. 129. 
325 Avery Jones includes an excerpt of the judgment in which Huddlestone B explained his position: “No doubt the 
manufacturing part was done in Italy, and the company might have found sulphur in another country, and carried on 
the manufacturing part of the business in that other country, but the administrative part were carried on at the place 
from which all the orders flowed, where officers and agents were appointed and recalled, where their powers were 
granted and revoked, where whatever money was sent was received, and where the dividends were declared and were 
payable”. See AVERY JONES, J.F. (2009), p. 136.  
326 Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1905, “De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. V. Howe (Surveyor 
of Taxes)”, where Lord Loreburn stated that “a company resides, for the purposes of income tax, where its real business 
is carried on… I regard that as the true rule; and the real business is carried on where the central management and 
control actually abides”. In a subsequent decision by the House of Lords, Viscount Sumner argued that the term resident 
was “exceedingly unsuited” to describe a legal entity and “the only analogy that is really possible between a person and 
a company is that of carrying on business at a place”. See also the Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 
1928, “Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. Ltd. V, Todd (Inspector of Taxes)”. 
327 Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1912, “American Thread Company V. Joyce (Surveyor of 
Taxes)”.  
328 Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1895, “San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Company Limited V. 
Carter (Surveyor of Taxes)”.  
329 Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1953, “Union Corporation Limited V. Commissioners for the 
Inland Revenue”  
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governs the whole commercial adventure (and) makes the profits by his skill or industry, however 
distant may be the field of his adventure” is the person who is trading330.  
Be that as it may, tests based on the place where the corporate decisions were made, either in 
the form of the expression “place of effective management” (hereinafter POEM) or the “central 
management and control”, became the fundamental tests in common law countries331 and were 
rapidly incorporated in civil law countries along with formal ones.  
Similarly, it has been argued by a few scholars that the use of these tests would be consistent with 
one of the policy purposes traditionally attributed to corporate income taxation (at least in the 
United States): the control over managers that accumulate substantial power and the restriction 
of potential abuses of power332. This being so, subjecting a company to CIT in the jurisdiction from 
which their managers effectively exercise their powers would fulfill the aforementioned 
purpose333. Additionally, this choice would also be consistent with the fact that companies are 
increasingly entrusting their board of directors with the responsibility to oversee the company´s 
tax planning strategies and further ensure that it obeys the relevant tax legislation334. 
The potential profit shifting risks they pose 
Nonetheless, it was only a matter of time before companies started to use these rules at their 
own convenience.  
In the first place, companies may easily transfer their board meetings to a jurisdiction of their 
choice, to the extent it provides a residence test based on the place where the company is 
effectively managed and controlled. Similarly, they may incorporate subsidiaries in other 
jurisdictions and make them liable to tax therein for their worldwide income to the extent they 
manage to keep in such jurisdiction an ostensibly independent board of directors335. This being 
so, taxpayers can easily capture the residence status of the jurisdiction that best fits their needs. 
Unlike what happens with formal tests336, the very nature of this category of residence tests 
especially favors subsequent shifts of corporate residence. As a matter of principle, jurisdictions 
relying on these tests accept that any transfer of managerial functions would effectively cause the 
end of the residence status in their country337, since anti-avoidance rules would rarely apply to 
the extent the transfer is genuine. Indeed, the effective transfer of management functions to a 
foreign jurisdiction of choice in order to capture a tax residence status therein is not rare. The 
                                                          
330 Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1895, “San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Company Limited V. 
Carter (Surveyor of Taxes)”.  
331 AVERY JONES, J.F. (2009), p. 138-139. 
332 Avi-Yonah has traditionally defended the maintenance of the corporate tax on the grounds that it assists in curbing 
undesirable power accumulations by corporate management. See AVI-YONAH, R. (2004) and AVI-YONAH, R. (2007b), 
p. 383. These arguments were, however, firmly repealed by Brauner in BRAUNER, Y. (2008b), p. 602-617. 
333 MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 477.   
334 As fostered by the OECD itself, see OECD (2015): Principles of corporate governance, p. 45 and 47. 
335 Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1959, “Unit Construction Co. Ltd V. Bullock (Inspector of 
Taxes).  
336 See the case of the United States in Section 3.2.1.1.1.  
337 SHAVIRO, D. (2011), p. 138.  
 
85 
 
phenomenon started in the UK right after the judgment on De Beers338. And more recently, Voget 
empirically demonstrated that 6% of a sample of 140 MNCs relocated their headquarters 
essentially for tax reasons in the period 1997-2007339.  
As a result of the above mentioned, one could come to the conclusion that tax residence migration 
tend to be easier in jurisdictions relying on tests based on the effective management of the 
company than in others following formal tests, as evidenced by the abovementioned example 
regarding the United States340. For this reason, we could say that the substantive nature of these 
tests has not prevented them from eventually becoming another “tax-planning device”341 insofar 
they still allow companies to select their country of residence at will342. 
More recently, these tests have been facing new challenges related to the information and 
communications technology. As rightfully identified by the OECD back in 2001, the availability of 
technologies such as videoconferencing renders unnecessary any physical meeting of persons in 
one particular place to hold discussions and make decisions343: telephone and internet enable 
each director to state his point of view and participate and the decision-making process without 
being physically present at a certain place344. This further exacerbates the tax planning 
opportunities outlined in the previous paragraph.  
In case decisions are taken during a videoconference held by managers located in different 
jurisdictions, it may well occur that no jurisdiction claims the residence status of the company or, 
on the contrary, that all or many of them simultaneously do so, being difficult or even impossible 
to distinguish a solely dominant place of management345. In such situations, taxpayers may take 
precautions not to trigger an unwanted change of residence status346.  
And besides the particular challenges posed by the internet, global business may have a managing 
director “constantly on the move” that may make decisions while flying over the ocean or while 
                                                          
338 Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1928, “Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. Ltd. V, Todd 
(Inspector of Taxes)”. As a curiosity, this company appointed a foreign board in 1907, just one year after De Beers. 
339 VOGET, J. (2010). On the other hand, Marian did not find significant studies proving a causative correlation between 
the adoption of these tests and real migration of corporate headquarters, see MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 477. 
340 See Section 3.2.1.1.1. 
341 ARNOLD, B.J. (2003), p. 1564.  
342 The British Inland Revenue itself recognized this reality back in 1981, acknowledging that the test had “become 
artificial with the passage of time and technical innovation” and that it had “enabled companies to arrange a residence 
for tax purposes which may bear little relation to the seat of the company´s operations”. See British Inland Revenue 
(1981): Company residence: a consultative document, paragraph 2.  
343 See in general OECD (2001): The impact of the communications revolution on the application of “place of effective 
management” as a tie breaker rule (Discussion Draft) and particularly its pages 8 and 9. Although the draft revolves 
around the concept of POEM as envisaged in the OECD Model Convention, most of its considerations apply equally to 
domestic tests based on the same criteria. 
344 RIVIER, J-M- (1987), p. 75. 
345  Chan provides a complete overview of the challenges and risks that technologies bring when it comes to the 
interpretation of the central management and control test that is in place in Australia. See CHAN, C. (2014) HUGHES, D. 
(2013), p. 164-171. 
346 Hughes provides practical advice on how to maintain the non-residence status and thus avoid the UK residence in a 
scenario characterized by a profusion of information technologies. For instance, he states: “it would be highly advisable 
that directors did not call into board meetings from the UK, but instead where necessary, attended the board meeting 
held abroad in person”. Similarly, he provides advice with respect of the use of different means of communication, as 
fax, email, smartphone communication, telephone, videoconferencing, etc. See HUGHES, D. (2013), p. 164-171. 
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visiting the branches of the company in different continents347. Similarly, it may well be the case 
that the meetings of the board of directors may be held in different places throughout the year 
on a rotational basis, with the consequent difficulty of discerning the one that should prevail for 
the purposes of applying the residence tests348. 
We can therefore conclude that, even though these tests are of a substantive nature, they still 
confer the taxpayer a certain degree of freedom to select its country of residence irrespective of 
the real ties it may have with such country. Additionally, challenges related to the ICT may further 
increase such freedom of choice, not to mention the complex interpretation issues it may cause 
and the consequent risks of either companies with multiple tax residences (and double taxation) 
or stateless companies. 
3.2.1.1.3. Tests relying on the residence of the corporate shareholders 
These factors confer the status of tax resident to companies whose shareholders controlling the 
voting power of the company are residents of the jurisdiction concerned. This approach is rather 
exceptional and can only be seen in very few countries as Australia (when it is applied jointly with 
the “carry on business” test that will be analyzed in the next subsection) although countries as 
Greece and the Netherlands tend to take it into consideration when applying the POEM test349.  
In Australia, the term is interpreted so as to require an “actual” control of the voting rights and 
not merely the holding of those rights, meaning that the test would only be considered satisfied 
when shareholders actually exercise such control and not in cases the shareholders abstain from 
voting at the general meeting350. Additionally, the resident shareholders must have actual control 
over 50% of the voting power for the rule to be applied.   
The rationale behind them 
Originally, this test came up in common law countries in a context in which locally-owned 
companies appointed foreign board of directors in order to avoid the already well-established 
“central management and control” principle351. It was in 1920 when the UK Royal Commission on 
the Income Tax recommended the UK legislator to introduce a rule by which companies would 
still be considered as tax resident in the UK insofar the majority of the voting power could be 
exercised in the UK. Although the UK did not follow the recommendation, other common law 
countries as Australia did.  
Although this test originally emerged with the specific objective of closing a previously detected 
loophole, some scholars have further supported its appropriateness on certain policy 
                                                          
347 OECD (2001): The impact of the communications revolution on the application of “place of effective management” 
as a tie breaker rule (Discussion Draft), p. 9. 
348 According to the guidelines provided by the UK Government, the HMRC will not review the residence status of 
companies in which the board of directors meets regularly overseas but holds a “small minority of meetings, not more 
than one or two” in the UK in any one accounting period. See British HM Revenue & Customs (2014): International 
Manual, part INTM120150.  
349 See the profile of the respective country: http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-
assistance/tax-residency/ 
350 DIRKIS, M. (2009), p. 328. 
351 AVERY JONES, J.F. (2009), p. 140. 
 
87 
 
considerations. For example, the test would be considered to be consistent with the idea of taxing 
companies with the purpose of reaching the pockets of its individual shareholders and thus taxing 
the wealth they accumulated behind corporate forms352. As Marian notes: “if the purpose of 
corporate taxation is to serve as a vehicle for taxing individuals, corporate tax residence tests 
should be designed to ensure that the corporate tax eventually burdens the intended 
individuals”353 and clearly the best way to do is by establishing a test equivalent to that provided 
by the Australian legislation, as already supported by a few scholars354.  For example, Nikolakakis 
introduces the expression of “substantial residence” referring to the residence of the “ultimate 
economic beneficiary”355, so it may be inferred from his words that he equates the true residence 
of a company with the residence of its respective shareholders.  
One of the potential disadvantages this category of tests may entail is the administrative burden 
it may eventually pose, particularly in relation to publicly traded companies356. A risk that has been 
dismissed by Marian, who suggests that such determination could be made on a time-average 
basis to simplify the process357. 
The potential profit shifting risks they pose 
Unlike the two previous categories, these tests carry fewer risks of manipulation than the 
precedent ones and are thus less prone to generate profit shifting risks. Nonetheless, they would 
still be troublesome insofar the residence of the shareholders is determined by easily manipulable 
tests as the previous two ones. Particularly considering that the majority of the shareholders of 
MNCs are frequently institutional investors (e.g. investment funds)358, which in turn tend to select 
their respective residence States for tax reasons.  
3.2.1.1.4. Tests relying on the location of the business activity of the company 
Although much rarer, some domestic legislations confer tax residence to companies whose main 
business activity is carried on within their respective jurisdiction. This is the case of Italy359, 
Australia and, to some extent, also territorial systems as France and Costa Rica among others360.  
                                                          
352 AUERBACH, A. J. (2006), BANK, S.A. (2007), p. 393 and KLEINBARD, E.D. (2012b), p. 684. In the latter paper it is stated 
that “the strongest justification for the existence of a corporate income tax is that it serves as a substitute for the 
imposition of current tax on the firm´s owners”.  
353 MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 474. 
354 GREEN, R.A. (1993), p. 70-74 and KLEINBARD, E.D. (2001), p. 160.  
355 NIKOLAKAKIS, A. (2009), p. 916. 
356 SHAVIRO, D. (2011), p. 415. 
357 Marian argues that 87% of the aggregate value of companies traded in the US stock markets is owned by US residents 
and that it does not seem realistic to think that many companies would have their ownership percentages constantly 
moving up and down the 50% threshold. See MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 478. On the other hand, Graetz does not think this 
is an appropriate solution: “linking corporate residence to the residence of its owners does not seem practical in the 
context of multi-tiered multinationals”. See GRAETZ, M.J. (2001), p. 323. 
358 As illustrated in the case of Apple, see section 2.1.1.1. 
359 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 118-119 and TENORE, M. (2009), p. 530-544. 
360 Back in 1984 Tillinghast found a similar rule in the domestic legislation of Pakistan, according to which any company 
which had more than half of its gross income effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in Pakistan 
would be regarded as tax resident therein. See TILLINGHAST, D.R. (1984). 
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The most emblematic example of this category of tests is the Italian test, which may be found in 
the article 73 of the Italian Corporate Income Tax Act)361: 
3. For the purposes of income taxation, a company having its legal set, headquarters or main 
object of the activity in the territory of the State for the greater part of the tax period will be 
considered as resident therein (…) 
4. The exclusive or main object of the activity of the resident company will be determined 
according to the law, the act of incorporation or the corporate bylaws in case they take the 
form of a public deed or authenticated private agreement. Main activity will be interpreted as 
the activity that is essential to directly achieve the primary goals of the company as laid down 
in the law, act of incorporation or bylaws. 
5. In the absence of an act of incorporation or corporate bylaws in the aforesaid forms, the 
resident company´s main activity will be determined on the basis of the activity that is 
effectively exercised in the territory of the State (…) 
For its part, the Australian residence test is established in Section 995-1(1) of the (Australian) 
Income Tax Assessment Act of 1997362: 
Resident or resident of Australia means: (...) 
b) a company which is incorporated in Australia, or which, not being incorporated in Australia, 
carries on business in Australia, and has either its central management and control in Australia, 
or its voting power controlled by shareholders who are residents of Australia.  
Both tests confer the tax residence status to companies that are either carrying on the main object 
of their activity (oggetto principale dell´attività) or a business in general in their respective 
territories. However, the Australian test explicitly demands an additional requirement: the 
company must either have its central management and control or the residence of the majority 
of its shareholders in Australia.  
We will start by interpreting the terms “oggetto principale dell´attività” and “business” and 
further ascertain which sort of activities may eventually fall under the scope of both terms. Both 
States advocate for a “wide” interpretation of these terms, covering both operational activities 
(e.g. manufacturing, trading, provision of services, etc.) and the mere management of activities, 
assets and stock portfolios among others (e.g. real estate management, trusts, investment funds, 
holdings, etc.).  
The Italian Supreme Court interprets oggetto principale as production activities, conclusion of 
contracts and any other economic relations that the company maintains with third parties363. 
Antonini underlines the importance of distinguishing between the location of the activity from 
which the income derives and the place where tangible and intangible goods (real estate, titles, 
                                                          
361 The original text may be found here: http://www.altalex.com/documents/leggi/2014/07/17/tuir-titolo-ii-capo-i-
soggetti-passivi-e-disposizioni-generali#61906  
362 The Australian Income Tax Assessment Act may be found complete here: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/itaa1936240/s6.html  
363 DELLA VALLE, E. (2016), p. 5. 
 
89 
 
shareholding, patents, licenses, etc.) are kept, since the latter should not influence the outcome 
of the analysis364. He gives a couple of example to illustrate his point. Firstly, he gives the example 
of a company incorporated elsewhere whose primary business is the management of a couple of 
buildings located it Italy. In such case, he understands that the “oggetto principale dell´attività” 
cannot be found where the immovable are (Italy) insofar the real business activity is the 
management of the buildings and it was carried out from elsewhere. The second example he gives 
concerns a holding company which owns a subsidiary365. He believes that the “oggetto principale” 
of the holding company is not located where the shareholdings are (the country of residence of 
the subsidiary) but rather in the State where the holding company is actually managing its 
portfolio366. The position defended by Antonini is the prevailing one in Italy. In a case analogous 
to the first example he provided, the Italian Corte di Cassazione reached the same conclusion367 
and a resolution by the Italian Tax Administration of 2003 sustained the same approach he did 
with regard to holding companies368. 
On the other hand, the Australian Taxation Office (hereinafter ATO) draws a distinction between 
companies with operational activities (e.g. trading, manufacturing or mining activities) and those 
that merely manage investment assets369. While the former ones would be considered to carry on 
a business in Australia to the extent their “major operation activities” take place therein, the latter 
ones would have their business in Australia insofar their “high-level investment decisions” are 
made therein. This statement allows us to conclude that the term “business” is conceived by the 
ATO as a wide concept that integrates passive activities as the investment in property or shares370. 
Australian courts weigh different factors when the time comes to decide whether the company is 
effectively carrying on a business within its soil, for example: the repetition of transactions and 
activities, their commercial nature, their size and scale, the existence of a profit motive, the 
organization and system underlying the activities, the inherent characteristics or qualities of the 
property deal in and the inherent characteristics of the taxpayer371. Also, the courts require that 
the company is effectively carrying on the business in the territory of Australia, thereby excluding 
“dormant” businesses. 
This fact-based approach offers the advantages and disadvantages that are typically inherent in 
all substance over form approaches. On one hand, it prevents companies from declaring a 
business object in their bylaws (other than the genuine one) that take place in a territory other 
than Italy or Australia precisely to avoid the tax residence status therein. On the other hand, it 
                                                          
364 ANTONINI, M. (2008), p. 150. 
365 ANTONINI, M. (2008), p. 151-154. 
366 This position is equally defended by MANZITTI, A. (1998), p. 181, who believes that the “oggetto principale” of a 
holding company is not necessarily influenced by the residence of the companies it owns. 
367 Judgment by Corte di Cassazione in December 10th 1974 (civil law case). 
368 Resolution by the Italian Tax Administration, January 29th 2003, n. 18/E. 
369 Australian Taxation Office (2004): Draft Taxation Ruling: “Residence of companies not incorporated in Australia – 
carrying on business in Australia and central management and control”, par. 9-12. 
370 KASHYAP, A.; SHAFLENDER, L. (2004). p. 187 and Australian Taxation Office (2004): Draft Taxation Ruling: “Residence 
of companies not incorporated in Australia – carrying on business in Australia and central management and control”, 
par. 40: “a company may be carrying on business (…) even if its main activity is the management of investment assets. 
Examples of the types of returns a company may receive from the management of its investment assets include rent, 
dividends, interest and royalties”. 
371 See DIRKIS, M. (2009), p. 325-327, where he exposes the most representative cases that shape the notion of “carry 
on business” for the purposes of the residence test. 
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gives the administrative and judiciary bodies a great power (and its consequent wide margin of 
discretion) to interpret the rule, with the resulting high degree of legal uncertainty.  
The Italian test poses a further uncertainty as regards its interpretation. Should it be interpreted 
in a way that the activities carried out in Italy must prevail over those exercised in other States 
(relative prevalence) or that the Italian activities must outweigh the activities of the entire 
company (absolute prevalence)? Italian courts have showed their preference for the latter 
approach372. This problem has not arisen in Australia, as its domestic test merely demands the 
carrying on a business therein, without referring to the relative weight of the Australian business 
within the global business of the company. 
It must be finally noted that, in both cases, the analysis departs from paper. The Italian rule 
specifically indicates that the assessment should start from the object of the entity as determined 
on the law, the act of incorporation or the bylaws. The oggetto principale dell´attività is presumed 
to be the one that may be regarded as “essential to directly achieve the primary goals of the 
company as laid down in the law, act of incorporation or bylaws”373 to the extent these sources 
take the form of a public deed or an authenticated private agreement. For its part, Australian 
courts equally begin with the statutory definition of the corporate business374. However, as one 
would expect, both tests make real facts prevail in case they do not correspond to the content of 
the aforementioned sources375. Manzitti describes the Italian test as “an absolutely objective and 
factual criterion” despite its reference to formal factors376. The reason is that, ultimately, the 
Italian courts must focus on the activities that are “effectively exercised” in Italy377. The same 
considerations apply in the case of Australia.  
Finally, a special reference should be made to jurisdictions with territorial tax systems, although 
they do not exactly fit in this category to the extent the notion of tax residence is theoretically 
irrelevant for them. France is a paradigmatic case that may serve as an example. According to its 
territorial system, companies would only be subject to tax on income derived from any business 
carried out in France378. This being so, the concept of residence should theoretically be irrelevant 
when it comes to the taxation of a company in France. This is however not entirely true. In 
practice, the French system has ended up being a “mixed approach”, partly due to the influence 
of tax treaty practice379. As a consequence of this, the systems departs from two general 
rebuttable presumptions that stand upon the very notion of residence: (i) companies having their 
“seat” in France would be taxable in France except with respect to the profits deriving from a PE 
                                                          
372 Approach endorsed by scholars as Novara, considering that resident companies are, after all, subject to tax on a 
worldwide basis. See NOVARA, G. (1990), p. 14 et seq.  
373 Article 73.3 of the Italian Presidential Decree 917/1986, which regulates both the personal and the corporate income 
tax. The rule then defines the term: “per ogetto principale si intende l´attività essenziale per realizzare direttamente gli 
scopi primary indicate dalla legge, dall´atto constitutive o dallo statuto”. This approach finds its origin in the civil 
doctrine according to ANTONINI, M. (2008), p. 149. 
374 DIRKIS, M. (2009), p. 325-327. 
375 ANTONINI, M. (2008), p. 149 and TENORE, M. (2009), p. 538-539 on the Italian rule. 
376 A reference that he describes as inadequate, see MANZITTI, A. (1998), 180-181. 
377 ANTONINI, M. (2008), p. 149 
378 Article 209.1 of the Code Général des impôts. Text available here: 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000030059670&cidTexte=LEGITEXT00000606
9577&dateTexte=20141230&oldAction=rechCodeArticle&fastReqId=275759247&nbResultRech=1  
For an explanation on how the regime works see also DE BOYNES, N. (2009), p. 446-452. 
379 DE BOYNES, N. (2009), p.448. 
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located abroad, and (ii) a company having its seat abroad is taxable in France only if it maintains 
a PE in France”380. As it can be observed, both presumptions depart from the idea that corporate 
profits are taxable by default in the country of residence. Furthermore, and contrary to what 
would happen in a pure territorial system, the burden of proof to overturn the presumption falls 
on the taxpayer381. A similar approach is equally followed by other jurisdictions as Costa Rica.  
The rationale behind them 
These tests would be coherent with the policy purpose of CITs to the extent they are regarded as 
fees for the use or the enjoyment of public services by the corporate taxpayer. Antonini argues 
that the Italian test is indeed justified by the greater use by the company of the infrastructures 
and economic, legal and financial resources provided by the State in which it exercises its main 
business activity382.  
This rationale is commonly known as the theory of “benefit” or “economic allegiance”, albeit this 
theory has traditionally serve to justify source-based taxation instead, as we will later argue in 
Section 3.3.2. 
The potential profit shifting risks they pose 
By their very nature, this category of tests cannot lead to outcomes detached from the existence 
of economic activity. The reason is obvious, as they are the only ones of all the four categories 
that actively pursue economic activity.  
Nonetheless, we should warn about certain other risks that these tests may pose. By conferring 
the tax residence status on these grounds, jurisdictions face the risk of distorting the taxpayer´s 
economic behavior, as taxpayers may feel tempted to base their business decisions on tax reasons 
rather than on reasons of efficiency. On one hand, they may decide not to establish a business 
activity in an otherwise optimal jurisdiction for the simple fact that they wish to avoid the tax 
residence status therein. On the other hand, taxpayers may choose to bring their business in a 
jurisdiction which follows other categories of tests despite the fact it does not provide the perfect 
environment for their business in terms of workforce, infrastructures or legal system.  
We should acknowledge that CITs, for their very nature, always generate distortions in the 
taxpayer´s economic choices, such as the organizational form (the incorporation decision), the 
financial structure (debt/equity ratio), the dividend policy (pay-out ratio) or certain investments 
decisions with respect to industry, asset mix, location, risk-taking or timing383. However, it is 
equally true that the adoption of these tests may contribute to further aggravate the distorting 
effects of these taxes.  
                                                          
380 These presumptions are established in administrative guidelines according to DE BOYNES, N. (2009), p.448. 
381 DE BOYNES, N. (2009), p.448. 
382 ANTONINI, M. (2008), p. 153. 
383 BIRD, R. (2002), p. 194.  
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3.2.1.1.5. Presence of these tests in the domestic tax legislations throughout the world 
Table 26 - Criteria used by 53 jurisdictions to establish corporate tax residence in their respective domestic 
legislations. The source of the information belongs to the OECD384 
  Incorporation / seat Governance Residence sharehold. Location business 
Argentina X       
Australia X   X X 
Austria X X     
Belgium X X     
Belize   X     
Brazil X       
Bulgaria X       
Canada X  X     
China X X     
Colombia X X     
Costa Rica       * 1 
Croatia X X     
Czech Republic   X     
Denmark X X     
Estonia X       
Faroe Islands X X     
Finland X X     
France       * 2 
Germany X X     
Gibraltar   X     
Greece  X X * 3   
Hong Kong X X     
Hungary X X     
Iceland X X     
India  X X     
Ireland X X     
Isle of Man X X     
Italy X X   X 
Japan X       
Korea X X     
Latvia X       
Liechtenstein X X     
Lithuania X       
Luxembourg X X     
Malta X X     
Mexico   X     
Netherlands * 4 X * 4   
New Zealand X X     
Norway X X     
Poland X X     
Portugal X X     
San Marino X X     
Singapore   X     
Slovak Republic X X     
Slovenia X X     
South Africa X X     
Spain X X   * 5 
Sweden X X     
Switzerland  X X     
Turkey X X     
United Kingdom X X     
United States  X       
Uruguay X       
                                                          
384 Information displayed on the table is based on the most updated and comprehensive source of data in this regard, 
which is provided by the OECD website. See http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-
assistance/tax-residency/ Additionally, one may also consult MAISTO, G. (ed.) (2009) for a number of both civil and 
common law jurisdictions and RIBES, A. (2012) for EU Member States. 
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(*) Comments and observations 
1.? Costa Rica has a territorial system, meaning that it taxes all income from Costa Rican sources irrespective of the place 
where the legal entity was incorporated, has its domicile or its place of management. 
2.? France has equally a territorial system. 
3.? When applying the POEM test, Greece weighs different criteria such as the residence of the majority of the company 
shareholders. 
4.? When applying the POEM test, the Netherlands also takes into account the place where the company was incorporated 
and the residence of the shareholders. 
5.? Spain only refers to the place where the business is conducted in the context of an anti-tax haven deemed residence 
rule (for further details see Section 3.2.1.2.3) 
 
Table 27 - Most common combination of residence tests in the 53 surveyed countries 
FT: formal tests (POI and/or registered office), CG: tests based on corporate governance (POEM 
or central management and control), RH: tests based on the residence of the shareholders and 
BS: tests based on the location of the business activities (includes the two jurisdictions following 
territorial tax systems). 
 
Out of the total of 53 surveyed jurisdictions: 85% used formal tests and 77% employed tests 
relying on the governance of the company, while criteria based on the residence of the 
shareholders and the location of the business activities were only trusted by 2% and 4% 
respectively. The preferred combination of rules, followed by 66% of the surveyed jurisdictions 
was the one conformed by formal tests and tests based on the company decision-making. All 
countries apply both alternatively (if one is met the company would be deemed to be resident) 
except for Sweden who requires both cumulatively. Only 17% of the jurisdictions employed solely 
formal tests while only 9% of them choose to use solely tests based on the place where the 
company is effectively managed.  
 
66%
17%
9%
4% 2% 2%
FT+CG FT CG BS FT+CG+BS FT+RH+BS
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3.2.1.2. Some preliminary conclusions  
3.2.1.2.1. Most corporate tax residence tests currently in place were inherited from private 
international law  
Private international law arose from the need to settle “conflicts of laws”. That is, situations in 
which individuals or companies, as a result of their actions or transactions, exposed themselves 
to being subject to the legislative and/or judicial jurisdiction of two or more countries. In this 
context, private international law serves the function of establishing which country would have 
jurisdiction over the individual or company to prescribe legal rules or adjudicate legal conflicts by 
means of the so-called “connecting factors”385.  
Prof. Behrens was the responsible for drawing the conclusions from the comparative study of the 
connecting factors used by 13 countries386 to determine the circumstances under which their 
respective company legislation (lex societas) would be applicable to a given company387. In doing 
so, he classified the criteria used into three different categories: (i) factors relying on the creation 
of the company as a legal person, (ii) factors relying on the internal governance structure and 
decision-making and (iii) factors relying on the business activity of a company. 
Undoubtedly these categories should sound familiar to us at this point. And a closer study of the 
criteria within each category388 ultimately confirms our first impressions: they are suspiciously 
similar to the residence tests used for corporate income tax purposes. Naturally, we are not alone 
in holding this opinion, as it is shared by some other scholars389. Indeed, Couzin explicitly 
recognized that the absence of statutory or case-law definitions of corporate residence made 
legislators and courts seek inspiration in the field of private international law, which had already 
developed a methodology, vocabulary and approach390.  
                                                          
385 BEHRENS, P. (2009), p. 3. 
386 We are referring to the comparative analysis published in MAISTO, G. (ed.) (2009), which covered a total of 13 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States.  
387 BEHRENS, P. (2009), p. 3-27. 
388 The first category encompasses POI, place of registration, registered office or statutory seat as defined in the articles. 
The second one covers the “nerve center” of the company, the place of principal administration/center of management, 
the place of most important decisions, the place of implementation of the most important decisions and the place 
where the controlling organ of the company is located (board meetings and shareholders´ meetings). Lastly, the third 
category includes criteria such as the principal POB, the principal place of activities and the place “d´exploitation”. See 
BEHRENS, P. (2009), p. 7-10. 
389 De Broe stated that: “in most countries all or some of the tests applied for corporate tax purposes are identical or 
similar to those applied for private international law purposes”, see DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 97. In the same vein, Couzin 
argued that the “the adaptation of connecting factors [from private international law] theretofore limited to natural 
persons to incorporated companies by means of analogy become the touchstone in the explication of corporate 
residence for income tax purposes”. However, he finally concluded that income taxation had “produced rather than 
inherited” a generally accepted meaning of corporate residence. See COUZIN, R. (2002), p.21. Similarly, Van Daele stated 
that: “if we compare the criteria used by various countries to determine the applicable company law, on the one hand, 
and the criteria used to establish a country´s taxing jurisdiction, on the other hand, it appears that there are many 
occasion where they coincide”. See VAN DAELE, J. (2011), p. 195. 
390 COUZIN, R. (2002), p.21. The inspiration is certainly undeniable in the case of the formal tests. Couzin recognized 
that the POI test for tax purposes “effectively, although not explicitly, borrowed from the private international law the 
definition of domicile”. More recently, Loomer stated that “for the purposes of private international law, a corporation´s 
domicile is considered to be the country of its incorporation”. See COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 31 and LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 
104. 
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This being the case, the next question would be whether the resemblance of these criteria is 
merely superficial or, on the contrary, their interpretation is equally homogeneous. De Broe 
believes that the interpretation of the terms in both areas of law “very much converges”391. This 
is particularly true in the case of common law countries. We should recall at this point that the 
British courts of the 19th century that gave birth to the “central management and control” test 
departed, in their reasoning, from a rule of private international law and followed the ideas 
previously expressed in judgments in private law matters392, as Section 3.2.1.1.2 exposed above. 
For their part and as a general rule, civil law countries tend not to be carried away by the case law 
in private international law when it comes to the interpretation of the residence tests393. 
This reality would not be worrying per se if not were for the fact that tax law and private 
international law respond to different rationales394. It is true that both legal orders share the 
common purpose of connecting cases having a foreign element with a certain country on the basis 
of a connection with the latter395. However, the ultimate function performed by both legal orders 
and their respective connecting factors differs significantly: while private international law intends 
to identify the “proper law” of a company for the purposes of applying it in a legal dispute before 
a court, tax law aims at identifying a connection (between a country and a person or item of 
income) that triggers a tax liability, or more specifically, an unlimited tax liability when it comes 
to residence-based taxation396. 
Once we have understood the purpose underlying private international law when it comes to the 
identification of the proper lex societas, it is easier to appreciate the appropriateness of its 
connecting factors. In the case of the POI test, for example, it is only natural that a company is 
governed by the laws of the country of incorporation, to the extent it is ultimately a creature of 
such laws and its existence is necessarily linked to them397. As regards the factors relying on the 
governance and the business of the company, it is argued that one of the objectives of company 
laws it the protection of the creditors, and these factors lead to point at the country in which the 
company is more closely linked and by extension, where such creditors may be presumably 
located398.  
                                                          
391 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 97. On the contrary, Behrens believes that the convergence merely occurs in the surface, while 
“their precise meaning is context-dependent and may therefore be quite different”. See BEHRENS, P. (2009), p. 27. 
392 In the case “The Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd V. Nicholson”, the seed of the “central management and control” test, the 
court referred in multiple occasions to judgments pertaining to the area of private international law. See Judgment by 
the High Court (Exchequer Division), 1876, “The Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd V. Nicholson” and “The Calcutta Jute Mills Co 
Ltd V. Nicholson” and AVERY JONES, J.F. (2009), p. 134, where an excerpt of it may be found. 
393 Two exceptions should be highlighted. The first one is Austria, where the interpretation of “centre of business 
direction” (term used in its tax legislation) and “seat of administration” (term used in private international law) is quite 
uniform. In the case of Italy, the interpretation of the main activity test is again quite homogeneous. See SIMADER, K. 
(2009) and TENORE, M. (2009). 
394 In the same vein, Van Daele states that: “it is important to emphasize that connecting factors serve a different 
purpose from private international law and work according to a different mechanism regarding the taxation of 
companies”. See VAN DAELE, J. (2011), p. 194. In the same vein, see BEHRENS, P. (2009), p. 26: “it is important to 
understand the different function fulfilled by connecting factors in this context (corporate taxation) as opposed to the 
private international law context”. 
395 SACHDEVA, A.M. (2014), p. 3. 
396 BEHRENS, P. (2009), p. 26-27. 
397 BEHRENS, P. (2009), p. 8.  
398 BEHRENS, P. (2009), p. 8-10. 
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While these connecting factors may make some sense in the field of private international law if 
we bear in mind its specific purposes and rationale, we cannot say the same in the context of tax 
law. In other words, the mere extrapolation of terms from private international law to tax law 
without taking into consideration the different functions performed by each legal order 
constitutes a manifest error. And most importantly, it reveals that the gestation process of current 
tax residence tests lacked a serious reflection on the particular objectives, specificities and needs 
of tax law. Consequently, some scholars have recently pleaded, albeit belatedly, for a true 
reconsideration of current tax residence tests which finally contemplates the particularities and 
purposes of tax law399.   
3.2.1.2.2. The implementation of new residence tests has generally been motivated by the 
desire of closing the loopholes of previous tests rather than by clear policy purposes 
The analysis of the origins and rationales of the respective residence tests has led us to conclude 
that jurisdictions have usually incorporated new residence tests to their respective legislations or 
jurisprudence with the aim of remedying the shortcomings and deficiencies of the preexisting 
tests.  
For example, the decisions by the British House of Lords that planted the seeds of the “central 
management and control” test back in the 19th century came up with this new test as a reaction 
against formal tests, which they had despised for being “insufficient”. In fact, the leading case De 
Beers expressly asserted that, in the absence of a “central management and control” test a 
company “might have its chief seat of management and its centre of trading in England under the 
protection of English law, and yet escape the appropriate taxation by the simple expedient of being 
registered abroad and distributing its dividends abroad”400. More recently, it has even been 
argued that this test works “as an anti-avoidance provision”401, a view we do not share and 
furthermore regard as problematic402. 
                                                          
399 For example, Behrens stated that “international taxation cannot easily borrow from international law (…) it must 
develop the relevant notions according to its own principles and policies”. See BEHRENS, P. (2009), p. 27. Van Daele 
shared his view but he also brought forward additional arguments from an EU Law perspective. In a nutshell, he noted 
that the interaction of the criteria from both legal orders caused a distortion to regulatory competition, in a sense that 
tax consequences appear as soon as one wants to relocate a business in order to pursue a more suitable company 
legislation. He finally suggested the use of different criteria in both fields of law “in order to enhance the mobility of 
companies, without tax issues deterring companies from choosing the company law that best serves the enterprise´s 
business needs”. See VAN DAELE, J. (2011), p. 195. Nonetheless, we also found dissenting opinions. Sachdeva, for 
example, advocated for the convenience of using conflict of laws jurisprudence in international tax matters and used 
an example some US judgments that followed this approach. See SACHDEVA, A.M. (2014).  
400 Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1905, “De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. V. Howe (Surveyor 
of Taxes)”. See Section 3.2.1.1.2, where the origins of this category of tests are explained. 
401 In 2013 Hughes defended that the British central management and control test “operates primarily as an anti-
avoidance provision to prevent companies from manipulating their residence status”. See HUGHES, D. (2013), p. 3. With 
respect to the Spanish rule on place of effective management, Martínez Giner states that “(its) purpose is to prevent 
international tax avoidance when companies when companies are incorporated under foreign law with registered offices 
abroad but carry on their activities in Spain where they have their place of effective management” while Carmona argues 
that it allows to “attract the tax residence of entities that have been illegitimately delocalized”. See MARTÍNEZ GINER, 
L.A. (2009), p. 766 and CARMONA FERNÁNDEZ, N. (2007), p. 137. For its part, the explanatory notes of the Bill to amend 
the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act explicitly said this criterion ensured that “a number of companies 
incorporated outside Australia whose sole or principal business is located in Australia” were taxable as residents.  
402 In our opinion such argument should be dismissed, since the rule lacks the traditional components of anti-avoidance 
rules (e.g. artificiality, business purpose, valid economic reasons, existence of other legal or economic non-tax 
consequences, etc.) and instead presents itself as regular connecting factor with the sole purpose of assigning tax 
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Ironically, there was a movement in the opposite direction a few decades later. Some common 
law countries with an already well-established case law on the “central management and control 
test” amended their respective legislations to introduce the POI test403. The reason behind this 
decision is that the governments were concerned about tax avoidance through the manipulation 
of central management and control404.  
Similarly, tests based on the residence of the company´s shareholders equally arose with this 
same objective. Australia, the only surveyed jurisdiction which currently follows this approach, 
adopted this test in a context in which locally-owned companies were appointing foreign boards 
of directors in order to avoid the “central management and control” test. This being so, Australia 
decided to follow the advice of the UK Royal Commission on the Income Tax, which recommended 
the introduction of this test as a way to counteract this widespread practice405. Lastly, although 
not explicitly mentioned, it would be reasonable to conclude that the introduction of residence 
tests relying on the location of the business activity of the company equally responds to the same 
purpose. 
The analysis of these residence tests also reveals the increasing tendency to rely on factors much 
less mobile and more difficult to manipulate. A tendency that culminated with the adoption by 
some countries of tests based on the residence of the shareholders and the location of the 
business activity which, by their very nature, are beyond the control of the taxpayer. This 
tendency is also visible in the special anti-avoidance rules that will be described below in Section 
3.2.1.2.3. 
Nevertheless, beyond the perceptible objective of overcoming the deficiencies and weaknesses 
of preexisting residence tests, it seems that a serious reflection on the policy purposes that each 
one of the tests could accomplish was missing.  
 
3.2.1.2.3. Current residence tests are often criticized for leading to jurisdictions in which the 
company is not sufficiently connected from an economic point of view: a “flaw” that tends to 
be corrected by means of anti-avoidance rules 
 
                                                          
residence status under certain circumstances. Besides, such understanding may be troublesome to the extent it may 
potentially lead to misleading interpretations of the rule that go beyond its scope.  
403 For example, Canada did so in 1961 and the United Kingdom in 1988. 
404 In the case of the United Kingdom it is more evident. It was explicitly stated in the International Manual published 
by the HMRC that the incorporation rule was added to deal with so-called nowhere companies, being incorporated in 
the United Kingdom but managed and controlled in a State that does not use management and control as a residence 
test. See the British HM Revenue & Customs (2014): International Manual (https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-
manuals/international-manual/intm120050). In the case of Canada, the official reason was not so clearly disclosed, but 
Pyrcz and Loomer believe it is the same. See PYRCZ, O.A. (1973) and LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 108 (“the most cogent 
explanation is that the government was concerned about tax avoidance through the manipulation of central 
management and control”). Arnold described the central management test resulting from De Beers as a new “tax 
planning device”. See ARNOLD, B. J.  (2003), p. 1560. 
405 See Section 3.2.1.1.3, where the origins and purposes of this test are briefly outlined.  
 
98 
 
We should first acknowledge that, as a matter of principle, there are not residence tests that are 
better than others. Each one of them simply serves a different policy purpose.  
Therefore, if we follow the POI test because we regard our CIT as a fee for the benefits of 
incorporation406, we should not be bothered by the fact that a group of persons decides to 
incorporate a company in a low-tax jurisdiction or a company previously incorporated in our 
country chooses to migrate. Similarly, if we choose to follow the POEM test because we believe 
that our CIT serves the function of preventing potential abuses of power by the managers407, we 
should not be concerned by the fact that a company genuinely transfers its board of directors out 
of our territory. In both cases, we should respectfully accept the outcome of our own residence 
tests: that the company concerned would effectively cease to be tax resident in our jurisdiction. 
And, to the extent we truly believe in the logic behind our own rules, these practices should not 
pose any problem.  
The problem is that, generally speaking, most jurisdictions do not seem satisfied with the logical 
outcomes of their respective residence tests. And, in our opinion, the motive is that jurisdictions 
adopt these tests without really knowing, understanding and accepting their supposed rationale. 
Instead, they believe these tests per se ensure a “sufficient relationship” between the jurisdiction 
concerned and the company that would become liable to tax for its worldwide income on the 
basis of these criteria. Or perhaps, they believe the tests contain some sort of indicia of some 
“deeper and less visible corporate trait”408. As a consequence, they observe with surprise and 
disappointment that such tests may lead to a situation in which the company is tax resident in a 
jurisdiction in which it does not have any significant connection beyond the one explicitly stated 
by the residence test, i.e. the country where it was incorporated, where it has its registered office 
or where its board of directors meet, for example.  
More specifically, jurisdictions seem to be particularly worried with the fact that the residence 
tests lead to consider a country in which the company does not have “economic substance” as its 
residence country for tax purposes. For example, the British Inland Revenue stated back in 1981 
that the British residence tests had “enabled companies to arrange a residence for tax purposes 
which may bear little relation to the seat of the company´s operations”409.  These complaints have 
equally impregnated multiple doctrinal articles. For instance, De Broe argued in 2009 that the 
application of current residence tests “does not ensure that the company is subject to 
comprehensive tax liability in the country with which its economic nexus is closest”410. In the same 
vein, Schön asserted that the application of residence-based taxation to companies which are 
merely incorporated under the laws of the country concerned makes little sense insofar there is 
no “serious economic connection” with the country411. 
                                                          
406 See Section 3.2.1.1.1 to see the rationale that is allegedly behind the POI test.  
407 See Section 3.2.1.1.2 to see the rationale that is allegedly behind the residence tests based on the governance of the 
company.  
408 COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 263-264. He believes that countries following traditional residence tests (as POI or place of 
effective management) regard them as a “signal for something else”, as he finds illogical that a country considers a 
company incorporated in accordance with its law as domestic regardless of where its shareholders reside, its business 
is managed, its profits are made, its assets are deployed and the labor of its employees is exercised.   
409 British Inland Revenue (1981): Company residence: a consultative document. 
410 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 99. 
411 SCHÖN, W. (2005), p. 345. 
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This scenario is, however, a quite plausible one. As a matter of fact, such scenario would be the 
natural consequence of the majority of current residence tests. The reason is that most tests, by 
their very nature, do not specifically require an economic attachment between the company and 
the country concerned412, the only exception being the tests based on the location of the 
economic activity that are currently in force in Italy and Australia413.  
As many jurisdictions do not accept the outcomes of their own rules, they try to remedy this “flaw” 
by means of anti-avoidance rules that effectively and actively pursue the desired economic 
substance.  We shall confine ourselves to providing a few examples, as a thorough study of the 
application of anti-avoidance rules in the context of tax residence tests clearly goes beyond the 
scope of the present investigation. Hence, our sole purpose is to note the general tendency to 
rely on anti-avoidance rules as a way to correct the unwanted (albeit logical) outcomes of current 
residence tests.  
In the first place, jurisdictions may resort to their general anti-avoidance rules (hereinafter GAARs) 
to counteract the effects of the residence tests and either deny the residence status of allegedly 
domestic companies or extend the residence status to foreign ones. On one hand, we have the 
case of Germany, where the tax administration is entitled on the basis of their domestic GAAR to 
deny the residence status to companies which merely have their legal seat in Germany but do not 
have a “genuine economic link” with the country to the extent the only reason behind the election 
of Germany as the legal seat is to obtain a tax advantage414.  
However anti-avoidance rules would more likely operate the other way round, that is, to extend 
the residence status to a (formally) foreign company that is still heavily present in the jurisdiction 
concerned. Indeed, as Zornoza cautions, the incorporation (or migration) of a company in (to) a 
tax haven or low-tax jurisdiction, although optimal at first glance, is very likely to be targeted by 
a great number of anti-avoidance rules415.  The IFA General report on the topic observed that, at 
least back in 2001, jurisdictions hardly ever used their GAARs (or equivalent unwritten principles) 
in these scenarios for various reasons: e.g. the difficult access to the relevant information for the 
purposes of the application of the rule, the recent adoption of such rules and, most importantly, 
the existence of other domestic provisions that specifically targeted these cases416. 
Indeed, as noted by the IFA general report, domestic legislations have multiple specific anti-
avoidance rules (hereinafter SAARs) that may take the form of deemed residence rules or 
rebuttable presumptions whose application lead to the treatment of a non-resident company as 
resident for corporate income tax purposes in cases in which the company is somehow still 
                                                          
412 Loomer shares our view: “various legal meanings ascribed to corporate residence require little in the way of economic 
attachment to the purported home state”. See LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 92. 
413 See Section 3.2.1.1.4.  
414 In similar situations Germany has made use of its domestic GAAR, established in article 42 of the Abgabenordnung 
(German Tax Code). See the judgment by the Finanzgericht Baden-Württenmerg, April 13th 2000, 3 K 235/97. Although 
this is the most correct way to deal with these situations, Englisch noted that some scholars advocate instead for the 
application of the sham rule (article 41.2 of the Abgabenordnung), considering that the legal seat in Germany is a 
“simulated act” that has to be disregarded pursuant to such rule. We agree with Englisch on the appropriateness of 
using the GAAR in these scenarios. See ENGLISCH, J. (2009), p. 486. The Abgabenordnung may be consulted here: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ao_1977/index.html 
415 See ZORNOZA PÉREZ, J. (2013), p. 15-16 and for a more comprehensive insight see ARNOLD, B. J.; DIBOUT, P. (2001).  
416 ARNOLD, B. J.; DIBOUT, P. (2001), p. 34 and more recently VAN WEEGHEL, S. (2010), p. 28. 
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sufficiently connected to the jurisdiction concerned. Such connection is generally defined by 
means of criteria that are much less susceptible to manipulations. For example, the fact that the 
company carries on its business within the territory or the fact that most of their shareholders are 
resident therein. The following examples illustrate this trend. 
Under the Spanish Corporate Income Tax Act, when a company resident in a low-tax jurisdiction 
carries on its activity in Spain it will be deemed to be tax resident in Spain unless it effectively 
proves that its effective management is located in the former jurisdiction and that it operates for 
“valid economic reasons”417. This rule applies as a rebuttable presumption and therefore it would 
not produce effects if the company is able to successfully prove both the location of the POEM 
and the “valid economic reasons” together with the “good business purpose”418. 
For its part, Italy provides a rebuttable presumption according to which a company incorporated 
in a jurisdiction other than Italy would be presumed to have its POEM in Italy (and thus become 
tax resident therein) if, at the end of the fiscal year, such company directly controls one or more 
companies resident in Italy and, at the same time, at least one of the next conditions is met: either 
(i) it is controlled (directly or indirectly) by shareholders that are resident in Italy or, (ii) it is 
managed by a board of directors mainly composed by members resident in Italy. Once these 
conditions are met, the foreign company will be treated as a resident in Italy unless it is able to 
demonstrate that it is not effectively managed from Italy419.  
The United States incorporated an equivalent SAAR is the IRC back in 2004. Pursuant to such rule, 
a foreign company would be regarded as domestic for tax purposes provided that the following 
three conditions are met: (i) the company directly or indirectly acquires substantially all of the 
properties held directly or indirectly by a domestic company, (ii) after the acquisition, at least 80% 
of the stock (by vote or value) is held by former shareholders of the domestic company and (iii) 
after the acquisition the expanded affiliated group (which includes the entity) does not have 
substantial business activities in the foreign country in which the entity is created or organized, 
when compared to the total business activities of such expanded affiliated group420. 
The SAARs described above effectively lead to the automatic extension of the residence status to 
foreign companies for being “closely linked” to the jurisdiction concerned in terms of ownership 
and/or business activity. This being so, once the SAAR becomes applicable, the tax jurisdiction of 
the country would automatically cover a company that is a priori out of its scope, and 
consequently such company would be regarded as a domestic taxpayer for all legal intents and 
                                                          
417 Article 8.1 of the Spanish Corporate Income Tax Act. See http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Fiscal/540273-l-
27-2014-de-27-nov-impuesto-sobre-sociedades.html#a8 Martínez Giner translated the rule as follows: “the tax 
authorities may presume that an entity situated in a tax-free territory pursuant to paragraph 2 of the first additional 
provision of the Act on Measures for the Prevention of Tax Fraud or in a tax haven, has its residence in Spain when its 
main assets, directly or indirectly, consist of property located in Spain or rights that are fulfilled or exercised in Spanish 
territory, or when its main activity is carried on in this country, unless the entity accredits that its effective management 
takes place in the former territory and it was incorporated and operates for valid economic reasons and good business 
purpose other than the simple management of securities or other assets”. See MARTÍNEZ GINER, L.A. (2009), p. 775-
778. 
418 The Spanish General Directorate for Taxation held that this clause should be interpreted in the sense that there 
should be more reasons for the incorporation apart from securing the tax advantage.  
419 Article 73.5-bis of the Italian Presidential Decree 917/1986, which regulates both the personal and the corporate 
income tax. This provision was introduced in 2006.  
420 Sections 7874 (b) and 7874 (a) (2) (B) IRC.  
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purposes. That is, the company would become subject to full tax liability on its worldwide income 
and additionally, would be obliged to comply with the other tax and administrative requirements 
to which domestic companies are ordinarily subject421. 
A more unorthodox (and definitely undesirable) approach is the one recently taken by the Spanish 
tax authorities so as to gain the tax residency of a holding company incorporated and managed 
from a territory other than Spain. As the Spanish SAAR was inapplicable to the case (the territory 
in question was not a low-tax jurisdiction), the Administration chose to resort to the POEM test 
so as to conclude that the holding had its POEM in Spain on the grounds that its main assets were 
located in Spain and its main shareholders and main manager were tax resident therein, despite 
the fact that the meetings of the board of directors occurred abroad. This approach entails a 
genuine “deep subversion” from the legal criteria used in Spain to determine POEM422.  
At this point, we should briefly allude to other category of rules that in substance plays an 
equivalent role. We are referring to CFC rules, also known as fiscal transparency regimes), which 
are present in a large number of domestic legislations423. Just as the above mentioned SAARs, CFC 
rules lead to the taxation of non-resident companies (CFCs) on the basis that they are “closely 
linked” to the jurisdiction concerned in the sense that they are effectively controlled by domestic 
companies424. However, unlike those SAARs, the CFC would not be regarded as a domestic 
taxpayer for all intents and purposes. That is, it would neither be taxed for its worldwide income 
nor be subject to the same compliance requirements as domestic companies. On the contrary, 
the CFC would solely be taxed provided certain conditions are met and merely on certain 
categories of income that are deemed to pose greater profit shifting risks, e.g. passive income425.   
We could conclude that the existence of the abovementioned anti-avoidance and CFC rules 
reveals the underlying determination of countries to tax companies which, while not meeting 
their respective residence tests, are nevertheless sufficiently connected to their territories, either 
because they are controlled by residents or because they carry on a business activity therein. 
However, instead of amending their residence tests straightaway so that they effectively require 
the desired degree of linkage or “substance”, they choose to resort to rules with anti-avoidance 
nature that help them reach the desired outcomes. For his part, Maisto sympathized with the idea 
of introducing new residence tests which would render unnecessary the existence of such anti-
                                                          
421 Bardini reaches this conclusion in respect the Italian SAAR but the same applies to the remaining ones. See BARDINI, 
C. (2010), p. 379. 
422 BÁEZ MORENO, A.; ZORNOZA PÉREZ, J.J. (2017), p. 12-13. 
423 The IFA general report on limits on the use of low-tax regimes by MNCs noted that, back in 2001, 19 countries (out 
of a total of 30 surveyed) had adopted or were in the process of adopting CFC rules. See ARNOLD, B. J.; DIBOUT, P. 
(2001), p. 38. The objective of these rules is to counteract tax deferral opportunities that would otherwise exist, to the 
extent resident companies may easily incorporate foreign companies in lower-tax jurisdictions and shift their income 
there, particularly passive income 
424 Bardini compares the effects of the deemed residence rule and the CFC regime in Italy and subsequently proceeds 
to assess their compatibility with EU Law. See BARDINI, C. (2010). 
425 For example, as a general rule, CFC regimes only apply when the CFC is subject to taxes below a certain threshold 
and merely subject to CFC taxation income that is more likely to be geographically mobile (e.g. dividends, interests, 
insurance income, IP income, insurance income). The above mentioned IFA general report on the use of low-tax regimes 
by MNCs is useful to compare the different approaches followed by the surveyed counties back in 2001. See ARNOLD, 
B. J.; DIBOUT, P. (2001), p. 38-66. More recently, the OECD has published some recommendations to strengthen 
domestic CFC rules to effectively counteract profit shifting risks, see OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 3: 
Designing effective Controlled Foreign Company rules. 
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avoidance rules. In particular, he suggested the  introduction of a residence test according to 
which a company would be deemed to be tax resident in a jurisdiction to the extent most of its 
shareholders are tax resident therein426. He stated that such approach would effectively render 
unnecessary CFC rules427.  
 
3.2.2. THE LACK OF COORDINATION IN THE DOMESTIC 
DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE TAX RESIDENCE MAY GENERATE 
MISMATCHES THAT COULD BE USED TO SHIFT PROFITS 
The freedom of countries to define residence and thereby select the persons who would become 
liable to unlimited taxation is theoretically boundless, without prejudice to a few vague limitations 
that may be inferred from public international law428. In fact, a general overview of the domestic 
residence tests quickly reveals that each one follows a different approach, albeit it is possible to 
identify some common patterns429. 
It seems that jurisdictions have indeed managed to keep the definition of residence under their 
sovereignty, squandering the opportunities to achieve a certain level of international coordination 
at both the tax treaty or the EU level.  
With regard to tax treaties, none of the most influential model tax conventions, namely the OECD, 
the UN or the US ones (the MCs)430, has suggested the introduction of a consensual definition of 
residence. In fact, the matter was deliberately left out of the discussion in the Commentaries to 
the OECD Model Convention, which states that: “conventions (…) do not normally concern 
themselves with the domestic laws of the Contracting States laying down the conditions under 
which a person is to be treated fiscally as resident (…) they do not law down standards which the 
provisions of the domestic laws on residence have to fulfill in order that claims for full tax liability 
can be accepted between the Contracting States  (…) States take their stand entirely on the 
domestic laws”431.  
With regard to EU Law, the conclusion does not differ, as neither positive nor negative integration 
has led to any sort of coordination between the Member States. Yet, there have been a few 
proposals in this direction. For example, Ribes and González Sánchez have called for the 
harmonization of corporate tax residence definitions as, in their opinion, it would limit both tax 
evasion and double taxation and thus improve the economic integration in the EU432.  
                                                          
426 This test already exists in Australia, where it is applied in conjunction with other tests. See Section 3.2.1.1.3. 
427 MAISTO, G. (2014), p. 327. 
428 See Section 4.3. 
429 See Section 3.2.1. 
430 See articles 1 and 4 of the OECD Model Convention: https://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/2014-model-tax-
convention-articles.pdf, the UN Model Convention: 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Model_2011_Update.pdf  and the US Model Convention: 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/model006.pdf 
431 Commentaries to article 4 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 4.  
432 Ribes suggests the simultaneous application of two tests: POI and “effective economic integration of the company in 
the Sate in question”. For her part, González Sánchez proposes the application of both the POI and place of effective 
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In general, asymmetries among domestic tax systems inexorably generate tax planning 
opportunities, a phenomenon that is commonly referred to as “international tax arbitrage”433. The 
same is true with regard the disparities between the respective definitions of residence for 
corporate income tax purposes, as taxpayers can easily exploit these mismatches to shift their 
profits to territories where no value-adding activities take place or even make them disappear 
from the face of the Earth. Indeed, we already witnessed the emblematic example of Apple. 
Although Section 2.2.1 studied the matter in depth, let us simply recall that three subsidiaries 
belonging to the Apple group achieved the status of “stateless” to the extent they were not 
regarded as tax resident by any jurisdiction, as they did not meet any of the residence tests 
provided by the jurisdictions with which they were somehow linked. In a nutshell, as Ireland 
followed (at that time) solely the “central management and control” test inherited from the UK 
case law while the United States followed (and still do) only the POI test, the subsidiaries did not 
meet any of these tests, since they were incorporated in Ireland but managed from the United 
States. 
Apple successfully exploited a mismatch in the residence tests of Ireland and the United States. 
However, such disparities are not at all rare. If we go back to Section 3.2.1.1.5 and consult table 
27 we could check at a glance that this same asymmetry is equally present in multiple 
combinations of jurisdictions. As there are 9 jurisdictions that solely follow the POI test while 5 do 
likewise with tests relying on the decision-making of the company, this makes a total of 45 
combinations (within a sample of barely 53 countries) that are equally exploitable. For instance, 
this same asymmetry between the domestic residence tests of Ireland and Bermuda was equally 
used by Google Ireland Holdings, one of Apple´s subsidiaries434.  
 
3.2.3. THE ELEVATION OF THE THRESHOLD TO ACCESS TAX 
TREATY BENEFITS REVEALS THE WEAKNESSES OF DOMESTIC 
CORPORATE RESIDENCE TESTS AND THE GREAT DISTRUST THEY 
GENERATE 
 
The entitlement to the benefits provided by tax treaties is usually conditioned upon compliance 
with various general requirements. For the purposes of reviewing such requirements, we will 
make reference to the three MCs.  
                                                          
management tests, although she strongly advocates for a source-based taxation system within the EU and merely 
maintains the relevance of the residence tests in the relationships between EU Member States and non-EU States. See 
RIBES, A. (2012) and GONZÁLEZ SÁNCHEZ, E. (2005). 
433 Rosenbloom studied this phenomenon in ROSENBLOOM, D. (2000), where he noted that it was only natural that 
taxpayers seeking to keep their tax burdens to a minimum study the rules of individual countries for the purpose of 
turning them to their advantage: “the effort will involve a focus on differences in the applicable rules” (p. 140). 
434 Kleinbard observed that Google Ireland Holdings was incorporated in Ireland while managed from Bermuda. As 
Ireland followed at that time solely the “central management and control” test and Bermuda provides a POI test, the 
consequence was that Google Ireland Holdings was stateless. See KLEINBARD, E.D. (2011), p. 710. 
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3.2.3.1. Departure from the domestic definition of tax residence 
In the first place, article 1 of all three models makes the application of the treaty subject to the 
fact that the person, either individual or legal entity, is resident of one or both of the contracting 
States. The determination of the residence status for the purposes of the tax treaty depends on 
article 4 of the three MCs. The wording of article 4.1 is almost identical in the three models except 
for a few details435.  
Table 28 - Comparison of article 4.1 in the three MCs 
Words in bold and strikethrough indicate the variations from the OECD MC. 
OECD Model Convention 
(2014) 
UN Model Convention (2011) US Model Convention (2006) 
For the purposes of this 
convention, the term 
“resident of a Contracting 
State” means any person 
who, under the laws of that 
Sate, is liable to tax therein by 
reason of his domicile, 
residence, place of 
management or any other 
criterion of a similar nature 
(…) This term, however, does 
not include any person who is 
liable to tax in that State in 
respect only of income from 
sources in that State or capital 
situated therein” 
For the purposes of this 
Convention, the term 
“resident of a Contracting 
State” means any person 
who, under the laws of that 
State, is liable to tax therein 
by reason of his domicile, 
residence, place of 
incorporation, place of 
management or any other 
criterion of a similar nature… 
This term, however, does not 
include any person who is 
liable to tax in that State in 
respect only of income from 
sources in that State or capital 
situated therein” 
Except as provided in this 
paragraph, for the purposes 
of this Convention, the term 
"resident of a Contracting 
State" means any person who, 
under the laws of that State, is 
liable to tax therein by reason 
of his domicile, residence, 
citizenship, place of 
management, place of 
incorporation, or any other 
criterion of a similar nature 
(…) The this term “resident of 
a Contracting State” however 
does not include any person 
who is liable to tax in that 
State in respect only of 
income from sources in that 
State or capital situated 
therein or of profits 
attributable to a permanent 
establishment in this State” 
 
From the reading of the model provisions, we may infer a few ideas. The first one is that the 
models do not provide an agreed definition of residence for the purposes of its application. The 
second one is that all MCs make a reference to the domestic legislations of the Contracting States 
which are ultimately entrusted with the function of designating which persons will be considered 
as “residents” for both domestic and treaty purposes. The third idea is that the models provide a 
non-exhaustive list of criteria that may be used by the Contracting States in order to establish the 
residence status of both individuals and legal entities. And finally, the fourth and last idea is that 
                                                          
435 Later on, in Section 5.2.2.4.1, we will put forward a way to interpret article 4.1 of the tax treaties patterned after the 
OECD MC. 
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the models would only respect the domestic residence status as long as they trigger an unlimited 
tax liability in the State concerned436. 
3.2.3.2. The inclusion of LOB provisions in some tax treaties 
3.2.3.2.1. LOB provisions as anti-treaty shopping measures and their presence in the global tax 
treaty network 
The United States was probably the first jurisdiction to consider that the requirements to access 
the benefits provided by a tax treaty were per se insufficient. It was believed that the sole 
condition of being resident in one of the contracting states allowed taxpayers to claim treaty 
benefits in situations that were regarded as abusive or simply “inappropriate”. In particular, the 
United States was concerned with cases in which taxpayers that were resident in third States 
managed to capture the benefits of a tax treaty that was not a priori intended for them. Or in 
other words, cases in which such taxpayers succeeded in “shopping” into an otherwise 
unavailable tax treaty437. Situations that are commonly referred to as “treaty shopping”.  
The next example will show how this outcome is quite easy to achieve. Once the taxpayer knows 
the state from which he expects to derive income from (the source state), a careful examination 
of the treaty network of such state allows him to “select” the most favorable treaty, i.e. the one 
that limits source-based taxation to a greater extent438.  Once the desired treaty is selected, the 
taxpayer simply needs to make use of a legal entity that is resident in the state with which the 
source state has signed such treaty. As by the mere fact of being resident of one of the contracting 
states the application of the treaty is triggered by virtue of its articles 1 and 4, the taxpayer would 
easily gain access to its benefits and thus minimize his tax burden at source. As a consequence of 
the above-mentioned, residents of a third state would be able to indirectly access the benefits of 
a treaty that is intended to be reciprocal between two states. 
Once the phenomenon of “treaty shopping” was identified as a problem, some jurisdictions began 
to implement measures to counteract it439. In this context, the United States pioneered the 
adoption of LOB provisions in bilateral tax treaties in 1945440. A LOB provision may be broadly 
defined as a rule that imposes additional requirements beyond the residence status that must be 
satisfied for a person to claim the benefits under a tax treaty441. Its overall objective is therefore 
to prevent taxpayers that are not “sufficiently” linked to its residence state from enjoying the 
benefits of its tax treaties, e.g. conduit companies.  
                                                          
436 As Zornoza points out that “article 4(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention (…) defines residence not by reference to 
the circumstances which determines it (…) but by the effect it produce, i.e. the liability to tax on a worldwide basis”. See 
ZORNOZA PÉREZ, J. (2013), p. 4-5. 
437 ROSENBLOOM, D. (1994), p. 83.  
438 ROSENBLOOM, D. (1983), p. 764.  
439 For a comprehensive review of these measures, see VEGA BORREGO, F.A. (2003), p. 74-146 and DE BROE, L. (et.al.) 
(2011), p. 384-389. 
440 The first LOB may be found in the tax treaty signed between the US and UK in 1945, although the first comprehensive 
one did not arrive until 1989 in the tax treaty between the US and Germany. A brief review of the evolution of the US 
treaty policy in relation to LOB provisions may be found in AVI-YONAH, R.; PANAYI, H.J.I. (2010), p. 41-44. 
441 BATES, J.D. (et al.) (2013), p. 395. 
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Although the LOB provisions originally arose in the United States in the 1940s, they progressively 
made their way into the most influential model tax conventions442 and gained a large number of 
adepts throughout the world in the subsequent decades. As a matter of fact, more than 200 
bilateral tax treaties included a LOB provision as of August 2012 and the United States was a party 
to only fifty of them443, as other jurisdictions as Japan and Canada444 have equally incorporated 
these provisions in their respective tax treaty networks. Finally, as a result of the BEPS project it 
can be expected that LOB provisions will soon become more widespread in the forthcoming tax 
treaties445. 
3.2.3.2.2. The clauses comprised in the LOB provision 
A comprehensive study of the different clauses integrated in the LOB provision clearly exceeds 
the scope of this research446 so this section will limit itself to enumerate and roughly describe 
some of its most common clauses. In general terms, all of them intend to seek a “sufficient” and 
“genuine” connection between the company and its respective residence state in order to deny 
treaty benefits to resident companies which lack such connection. However, each one of the 
clauses defines such “sufficiency” and “genuineness” by means of factors and indicators of very 
diverse natures.  
For a greater clarity we will divide them into the next three categories: 
Tests that confer the status of “qualified resident person” and give access to all treaty benefits 
o Publicly-traded companies test (art. 22.2.c US MC and art. X.2.c proposed for the 
OECD MC)447. A publicly-traded company is presumed to be sufficiently connected to 
the country in which its shares are primarily and actively traded. The rationale behind 
this criterion is the general belief that the burden imposed by securities regulation 
and the corresponding exposure to public scrutiny makes publicly-traded companies 
an anomalous (and thus unlikely) choice for treaty shopping448. It has also been 
                                                          
442 LOB provisions may be found in the US model tax conventions of 1977, 1981, 1996, 2006 and 2016, in the 
Commentaries to article 1 of the OECD model tax convention (paragraph 20) since 2003 and in the Commentaries to 
article 1 of the UN model tax convention (paragraphs 17-20).  
443 BATES, J.D. (et al.) (2013), p. 396. 
444 The inclusion of LOB provisions in the Japanese treaties was driven by a shift in its tax treaty policy under which 
Japan adopted a zero withholding tax rate on cross-border investment income with the intention of promoting cross-
border economic activities. Naturally, such a generous offer needed to be supplemented by anti-treaty shopping 
measures. See BATES, J.D. (et al.) (2013), p. 396. For its part, Canada finds itself in a similar situation. See BROWN, P.A. 
(2014), p. 742. 
445 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate 
circumstances. 
446 For a detailed study of these clauses, see VEGA BORREGO, F.A. (2006). The LOB provision of the US Model Tax 
Convention is analyzed in the Technical Explanation accompanying the United States Model Tax Convention. For its 
part, the LOB proposed by the OECD in the context of the BEPS project is commented in OECD (2015): Final Report on 
BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances. 
447 Art. 22.2.c US MC: “a company, if the principal class of its shares (and any disproportionate class of shares) is regularly 
traded on one or more recognized stock exchanges, and either:  i) its principal class of shares is primarily traded on one 
or more recognized stock exchanges located in the Contracting State of which the company is a resident; or ii) the 
company’s primary place of management and control is in the Contracting State of which it is a resident”. 
448 BATES, J.D. (et al.) (2013), p. 395. In the same vein, the OECD stated that “as a general rule, because the shares of 
publicly traded companies and of some entities are generally widely held, these companies and entities are unlikely to 
be established for treaty shopping”. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty 
benefits in inappropriate circumstances, p. 35.  
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argued that this test may have been initially thought as a surrogate for local 
ownership. However, it should be noted that there may be no correlation between 
the place where the company is listed and the place where its owners reside. In fact, 
such link is increasingly weaker449. 
o Ownership and base-erosion tests (art. 22.2.f.i-ii US MC and art. X.2.e.i-ii proposed 
for the OECD MC)450. These tests depart from the assumption that a company is 
sufficiently connected to its residence state if the majority of the persons who 
ultimately own the company are equally residents of such state. At this point, the first 
prong of the test (ownership) alludes to equity owners while the second prong (base-
erosion) refers to lenders and others in a non-equity relationship. The logic behind 
these tests is that companies whose owners and lenders are resident in its same state 
are deemed to be sufficiently connected to such state and therefore deserve to enjoy 
the benefits of its tax treaties. 
Tests that grant access to non-qualified resident persons to certain treaty benefits 
o Active trade or business test (art. 22.3 US MC and art X.3 proposed for the OECD 
MC)451. A company is presumed to be genuinely connected to its resident state to the 
extent it conducts an active trade or business within its territory. The test applies 
provided that two conditions are met: i) the company or a related person is engaged 
                                                          
449 JIANG, Q. (2015), p. 144. 
450 Art. 22.2.f  US MC: “a company, if: i) at least 50 percent of the aggregate vote and value of the shares (and at  least 
50 percent of the aggregate vote and value of any disproportionate class of  shares) in the company is owned directly 
or indirectly by five or fewer companies  entitled to benefits under subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, provided that, in 
the  case of indirect ownership, each intermediate owner is a resident of the  Contracting State from which a benefit 
under this Convention is being sought or  is a qualifying intermediate owner; and ii) with respect to benefits under this 
Convention other than under Article 10  (Dividends), less than 50 percent of the company’s gross income, and less than 
50  percent of the tested group’s gross income, is paid or accrued, directly or indirectly, in the form of payments that are 
deductible for purposes of the taxes  covered by this Convention in the company’s Contracting State of residence (but  
not including arm’s length payments in the ordinary course of business for  services or tangible property, and in the case 
of a tested group, not including intra- group transactions): (A) to persons that are not residents of either Contracting  
State entitled to the benefits of this Convention under subparagraph (a), (b), (c) or (e) of this paragraph; (B) to persons 
that are connected persons with respect to the  company described in this subparagraph and that benefit from a special 
tax regime  with respect to the deductible payment; or (C) with respect to a payment of  interest, to persons that are 
connected persons with respect to the company  described in this subparagraph and that benefit from notional 
deductions  described in subparagraph (e) of paragraph 2 of Article 11 (Interest)” 
451 Art. 22.3 US MC: “a) A resident of a Contracting State shall be entitled to benefits under this Convention with respect 
to an item of income derived from the other Contracting State, regardless of whether the resident is a qualified person, 
if the resident is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business in the first-mentioned Contracting State, and the 
income derived from the other Contracting State emanates from, or is incidental to, that trade or business. For purposes 
of this Article, the term “active conduct of a trade or business” shall not include the following activities or any 
combination thereof: i) operating as a holding company; ii) providing overall supervision or administration of a group of 
companies; iii) providing group financing (including cash pooling); or iv) making or managing investments, unless these 
activities are carried on by a bank, insurance company or registered securities dealer in the ordinary course of its business 
as such. b) If a resident of a Contracting State derives an item of income from a trade or business activity conducted by 
that resident in the other Contracting State, or derives an item of income arising in the other Contracting State from a 
connected person, the conditions described in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be considered to be satisfied 
with respect to such item only if the trade or business activity conducted by the resident in the first-mentioned 
Contracting State to which the item is related is substantial in relation to the same or complementary trade or business 
activity carried on by the resident or such connected person in the other Contracting State. Whether a trade or business 
activity is substantial for the purposes of this paragraph shall be determined based on all the facts and circumstances. 
c) For purposes of applying this paragraph, activities conducted by persons connected to a resident of a Contracting 
State shall be deemed to be conducted by such resident”. 
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in an active trade or business in the residence state and ii) the income from the source 
state emanates from such trade or business. Similarly, the test would also apply in 
cases in which the income is derived by a trade or business that the company or a 
related person carries on in the source state as long as the business activity in the 
residence state is “substantial” in relation to that of the source state452. Naturally, this 
test must be assessed item by item, so treaty benefits will only be granted in relation 
to those items of income that effectively comply with all the required conditions. The 
rationale behind this test is that the conduct of a business in the residence state 
sufficiently demonstrates that there is a “good business purpose” behind the 
presence of a company in that state453. It is evident that this test finds its origin in the 
doctrine of economic substance, according to which it may be presumed that a 
structure or transaction with economic substance is not artificially arranged for the 
purpose of tax avoidance454. 
o Derivative benefits test (art. 22.4 US MC and art. X.4 proposed for the OECD MC)455. 
By virtue of this test, benefits are granted only if the tax rate to which the equivalent 
beneficiary is entitled under the treaty between its residence state and the source 
state is at least as low as the tax rate provided by the treaty between the state in 
which the company seeking benefits is resident and the source state456. Unlike 
previous tests, the rationale of this test is unclear457, although some scholars have 
argued that it departs from the assumption that third-country residents are not 
“shopping” a treaty to the extent they would have been entitled to equally beneficial 
treaty benefits458. 
                                                          
452 The Technical Explanations accompanying the 2006 US MC specify that this assessment should be made with “due 
regard will be given to the relative size of the economies in both contracting states”. 
453 BATES, J.D. (et al.) (2013), p. 396 and 399. 
454 JIANG, Q. (2015), p. 146. 
455 Art. 22.4 US MC: “A company that is a resident of a Contracting State shall be entitled to a benefit under this 
Convention, regardless of whether the resident is a qualified person if, at the time when the benefit would be accorded, 
and on at least half of the days of a twelve-month period commencing or ending on the date when the benefit otherwise 
would be accorded: a) at least 95 percent of the aggregate vote and value of its shares (and at least 50 percent of any 
disproportionate class of shares) is owned, directly or indirectly, by seven or fewer persons that are equivalent 
beneficiaries, provided that, in the case of indirect ownership, each intermediate owner is a qualifying intermediate 
owner; and b) less than 50 percent of the company’s gross income, and less than 50 percent of the tested group’s gross 
income, is paid or accrued, directly or indirectly, in the form of payments that are deductible for purposes of the taxes 
covered by this Convention in the company’s Contracting State of residence (but not including arm’s length payments in 
the ordinary course of business for services or tangible property, and in the case of a tested group, not including intra-
group transactions): (i) to persons that are not equivalent beneficiaries; (ii) to persons that are equivalent beneficiaries 
only by reason of paragraph 5 of this Article or of a substantially similar provision in the relevant comprehensive 
convention for the avoidance of double taxation; (iii) to persons that are equivalent beneficiaries that are connected 
persons with respect to the company described in this paragraph and that benefit from a special tax regime with respect 
to the deductible payment, provided that if the relevant comprehensive convention for the avoidance of double taxation 
does not contain a definition of a special tax regime analogous to the definition in subparagraph (l) of paragraph 1 of 
Article 3 (General Definitions), the principles of the definition provided in this Convention shall apply, but without regard 
to the requirement in clause (v) of that definition; or (iv) with respect to a payment of interest, to persons that are 
equivalent beneficiaries that are connected persons with respect to the company described in this paragraph and that 
benefit from notional deductions of the type described in subparagraph (e) of paragraph 2 of Article 11 (Interest)”. 
456 BATES, J.D. (et al.) (2013), p. 400. 
457 BATES, J.D. (et al.) (2013), p. 400. 
458 BROWN, P.A. (2014), p. 746. 
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o Headquarters test (art. 22.5 US MC)459. This test grants access to treaty benefits to 
resident companies which function as headquarters for a multinational group 
provided that the multinational carries on significant businesses in various states 
other than the residence state and effectively derive a significant amount of income 
from them. This test was recently incorporated to the last update of the US MC in 
2016 and clearly responds to the particular needs of this state since it is no secret that 
it hosts the headquarters of the most profitable multinationals throughout the world. 
Safeguard clause that grants access to non-qualified resident persons to all or certain treaty benefits 
o  Discretionary relief (art. 22.6 US MC and art. X.5 proposed for the OECD MC)460. This 
clause authorizes the competent authority to discretionally grant benefits to resident 
taxpayers who fail the objective tests but still “deserve” to be entitled to such 
benefits. For this purpose, the competent authority must assess all relevant facts and 
circumstances to further determine whether the establishment, acquisition or 
maintenance of the resident and the conduct of its operations had “as one of its 
principal purposes” the entitlement to the treaty benefits461. If the answer is no, the 
                                                          
459 Art 22.5 US MC: “A company that is a resident of a Contracting State that functions as a headquarters company for 
a multinational corporate group consisting of such company and its direct and indirect subsidiaries shall be entitled to 
benefits under this Convention with respect to dividends and interest paid by members of its multinational corporate 
group. A company shall be considered a headquarters company for this purpose only if: a) such company’s primary place 
of management and control is in the Contracting State of which it is a resident; b) the multinational corporate group 
consists of companies resident in, and engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business in, at least four countries, 
and the trades or businesses carried on in each of the four countries (or four groupings of countries) generate at least 
10 percent of the gross income of the group; c) the trades or businesses of the multinational corporate group that are 
carried on in any one state other than the Contracting State of residence of such company generate less than 50 percent 
of the gross income of the group; d) no more than 25 percent of such company’s gross income is derived from the other 
Contracting State; e) such company is subject to the same income taxation rules in its Contracting State of residence as 
persons described in paragraph 3 of this Article; and f) less than 50 percent of such company’s gross income, and less 
than 50 percent of the tested group’s gross income, is paid or accrued, directly or indirectly, in the form of payments 
that are deductible for purposes of the taxes covered by this Convention in the company’s Contracting State of residence 
(but not including arm’s length payments in the ordinary course of business for services or tangible property or payments 
in respect of financial obligations to a bank that is not a connected person with respect to such company, and in the case 
of a tested group, not including intra-group transactions): (i) to persons that are not residents of either Contracting State 
entitled to the benefits of this Convention under subparagraph (a), (b), (c) or (e) of paragraph 2 of this Article; (ii) to 
persons that are connected persons with respect to such company and that benefit from a special tax regime with 
respect to the deductible payment; or (iii) with respect to a payment of interest, to persons that are connected persons 
with respect to such company and that benefit from notional deductions described in subparagraph (e) of paragraph 2 
of Article 11 (Interest). If the requirements of subparagraph (b), (c) or (d) of this paragraph are not fulfilled for the 
relevant taxable year, they shall be deemed to be fulfilled if the required ratios are met when averaging the gross income 
of the preceding four taxable years”. 
460 Art 22.6 US MC: “If a resident of a Contracting State is neither a qualified person pursuant to the provisions of 
paragraph 2 of this Article, nor entitled to benefits under paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of this Article, the competent authority of 
the other Contracting State may, nevertheless, grant the benefits of this Convention, or benefits with respect to a specific 
item of income, taking into account the object and purpose of this Convention, but only if such resident demonstrates 
to the satisfaction of such competent authority a substantial nontax nexus to its Contracting State of residence and that 
neither its establishment, acquisition or maintenance, nor the conduct of its operations had as one of its principal 
purposes the obtaining of benefits under this Convention. The competent authority of the Contracting State to which 
the request has been made shall consult with the competent authority of the other Contracting State before either 
granting or denying a request made under this paragraph by a resident of that other Contracting State”. 
461 The memorandum of understanding between the US and the Netherlands lists a number of factors to consider when 
it comes to the application of the discretionary provision: i) the date of incorporation of the company seeking benefits, 
the continuity of the historical business and ownership of the company, iii) the business reasons for the company 
residing in its state of residence, iv) the extent to which the company is claiming special tax benefits in its country of 
residence, v) the extent to which the company´s business activity in the source state is dependent on the capital, assets 
or personnel of the company in the residence state and vi) the extent to which the company would be entitled to treaty 
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benefits could be granted by virtue of this clause. The purpose behind this clause is 
the fact that the previous mechanical tests may not always cover all the cases in which 
it is considered appropriate to grant access to treaty benefits and therefore the need 
for a test of a more subjective nature arises. In fact, Bates noted that competent 
authorities, in practice, tend to apply this clause only when the taxpayer nearly 
qualifies under one or more of the objective clauses462. 
3.2.3.2.3. Some preliminary conclusions 
Before drawing the conclusions that are more directly linked with the subject of this investigation, 
we would like to first share a preliminary reflection. 
It seems that both the US and the OECD have been unable to accurately identify what they 
understand by “treaty shopping” and therefore which specific situations should fall under its 
scope. On the contrary, both have provided general, vague and equivocal definitions of this 
phenomenon463 that potentially encompass a broad spectrum of situations ranging from purely 
abusive wholly artificial arrangements to bona fide arrangements with substance464. Furthermore, 
ambiguous and subjective notions as “improper” or “inappropriate” use of tax treaties465 do not 
obviously contribute to clarify the contours of this phenomenon. On top of this, it seems that is 
not even clear whether treaty shopping should be regarded as troublesome or not in the first 
place466.  
In a context in which the (supposed) problem is not clearly outlined, it is thus hardly surprising to 
find a very wide range of motley measures that intend to address it. The LOB provision is a 10-
pages set of varied clauses of disparate natures that seem to lack a coherent and uniform 
purpose467. Instead, the provision presents a wide range of safe harbors whose satisfaction lead 
us to the irrefutable presumption that the resident company in question does not pose problems 
from a treaty shopping perspective. In a nutshell, these safe harbors draw a dividing line between 
what the state considers as a reprehensible access to treaty benefits and what is not. A dividing 
                                                          
benefits comparable to those afforded by the US-Netherlands treaty if it had been incorporated in the country of 
residence of the majority of its shareholders. 
462 BATES, J.D. (et al.) (2013), p. 396. 
463 This opinion is shared by JIANG, Q. (2015), p. 139. Such “definitions” may be found in the Technical Explanations to 
the US MC (“anti-treaty shopping provisions are intended to prevent residents of third countries from benefiting from 
what is intended to be a reciprocal agreement between two countries”, in the Commentaries to article 1 of the OECD 
MC, par. 20 (“[LOB provisions] are aimed at preventing persons who are not residents of either Contracting States from 
accessing the benefits of a Convention through the use of an entity that would otherwise qualify as a resident of one of 
these States”) and finally in the OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty benefits 
in inappropriate circumstances, p. 9 (“treaty shopping (…) involves strategies through which a person who is not a 
resident of a State attempts to obtain benefits that a tax treaty concluded by the State grants to residents of that State”).  
464 AVI-YONAH, R.; PANAHI, H.J.I. (2010), p. 21-25. 
465 These expressions appear constantly in OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty 
benefits in inappropriate circumstances. 
466Scholars have generally identified five arguments against treaty shopping: i) it defeats the purpose of tax treaties, ii) 
it breaches the principle of reciprocity in a tax treaty and alters the balance of concessions, iii) it is contrary to the 
principle of economic allegiance, iv) it is a disincentive for states to negotiate tax treaties with source states and v) it 
causes an undesired loss of revenues in source states. These arguments are explained and supported by WARDZYNSKI, 
A. (2014), p. 472-473. On the contrary, Avi-Yonah and De Broe provide counterarguments to each one of them in DE 
BROE, L. (et.al.) (2011), p. 383-384 and AVI-YONAH, R.; PANAJI, H.J.I. (2010), p. 25-30. 
467 FLEMING, J.C. (Jr.) (2012) and JIANG, Q. (2015), p. 139. In fact, Jiang suspects this is intentional: “the OECD has 
deliberately left the concept broad so as to have flexibility in developing anti-treaty shopping measures”.  
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line that is arbitrary468, lacks a coherent rationale469 and is merely an ad-hoc response to a 
phenomenon that, while perceived as troublesome, has not yet been accurately identified.  
That being said, we will now proceed to formulate the conclusions that are more directly linked 
to this work.  
In the first place, it can be concluded that the “problem” of treaty shopping arises as a direct 
consequence of the weakness of residence tests470. Using the words of Fleming, the first line of 
defense established by treaties against treaty shopping is precisely the residence status of the 
taxpayer in at least one of the contracting states471. While jurisdictions seem to trust the criteria 
commonly used to confer the residence status to individuals, to the extent LOB clauses 
automatically regard them as qualified persons and thus entitled to treaty benefits472, the same 
cannot be said with regard to companies. Traditional corporate residence tests (particularly the 
formal ones), as opposed to personal residence tests473, do not per se guarantee a sufficient and 
substantive connection between the taxpayer and the relevant State474. This being so, 
jurisdictions observe that taxpayers that formally comply with the residence tests may be entitled 
to treaty benefits in circumstances in which they are not sufficiently attached to their residence 
state. For this reason, they prefer not to trust traditional residence tests as a valid and sufficient 
threshold to access treaty benefits. 
Secondly, as section 3.2.1.2.3 revealed above, jurisdictions tend to counteract the dissatisfaction 
associated with traditional residence tests with a layer of anti-avoidance rules. This case is no 
exception to this trend. Instead of directly amending their respective domestic residence tests to 
ensure the desired level of connection between the taxpayer and the territory concerned, 
jurisdictions choose to require such connection by means of an anti-treaty shopping rule: the LOB 
provision. It is not coincidental that the LOB provision originally arose in a jurisdiction (the United 
States) that has the weaker type of residence test (it solely relies on a POI test)475. The introduction 
of the LOB provision ultimately results in the distinction between mere residents and “true 
residents” or “qualified residents”, when only the latter deserve to be entitled to treaty benefits. 
Thirdly, jurisdictions use LOB provisions to demand a nexus between the taxpayer and the 
relevant territory that is stronger and more meaningful than the one required by traditional 
residence tests476. The different clauses that compose the LOB provisions seek a “sufficient” and 
“genuine” relationship between the taxpayer and its residence state but, as noted above, they do 
so by means of different factors and indicators of varied natures. However, it can be appreciated 
                                                          
468 BATES, J.D. (et al.) (2013), p. 401. 
469 It should be noted that some LOB clauses directly respond to the particular needs of the jurisdiction that promotes 
them. The best example is the headquarters test promoted by the US, as this country hosts the headquarters of a great 
number of multinationals. See section 3.2.3.2.2. 
470 COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 264: “Limitation on benefits provisions (…) reflect a perceived weakness in the residence 
definition”. BRAUNER, Y. (2009), p. 901: “the background for the evolution of LOB is in the abuse of the simple corporate 
residence rule”.  
471 FLEMING, J.C. (Jr.) (2012), p. 248. 
472 See art. 22.2.a) US MC and X.2.a) proposed for the OECD MC. KEMMEREN, E.C.C.M. (2001), p. 260: “abusive 
application of tax conventions via interposing individuals currently does not seem to be the main problem”. 
473 Section 5.2.2.3.1.  
474 As section 3.2.1.2.3 demonstrated. 
475 WHEELER, J.C. (2011), p. 294. 
476 In the words of Brauner, “LOB politely rejects the basic corporate residence rule”. See BRAUNER, Y. (2009), p. 901. 
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that many LOB clauses tend to rely on similar criteria to those used by the SAARs studied in section 
3.2.1.2.3. As with the SAARs analyzed in that section, LOB clauses equally tend to rely on indicators 
that are less susceptible to manipulations. Indicators that may be classified into two main groups: 
those related to the location of the company´s owners (publicly-traded companies477, ownership, 
base-erosion and derivative benefits tests) and those related to the location of the company´s 
business (active trade or business test). 
The above considerations ultimately confirm many of the findings already set out in section 
3.2.1.2. Additionally, the analysis carried out in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 allows us to reach a more 
general conclusion. We believe that a greater use of residence tests relying on the residence of 
the corporate shareholders478 or the location of the business activity of the company479 (as 
jurisdictions as Australia and Italy are already doing), as they per se demand a higher level of 
connection between the taxpayer and the state concerned, would in practice render LOB 
provisions unnecessary, as they would all lead to equivalent outcomes for the reasons explained 
above.  
 
3.2.4. CAUSES AND REMEDIES FOR SITUATIONS OF DUAL 
RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES IN TAX TREATY SCENARIOS 
As a consequence of the variety of residence tests that jurisdictions employ and the different ways 
to interpret them, a company may well be regarded as resident for domestic tax purposes in two 
or more jurisdictions. This situation would thus trigger the more severe case of double taxation, 
as all jurisdictions may potentially intend to tax the worldwide income perceived by the company. 
In cases in which two of those residence states have signed a tax treaty patterned after one of the 
most influential model tax conventions, the issue would be a priori solvable. However, for the 
purposes of applying the tax treaty, it becomes necessary to discern which contracting state will 
perform the role of “residence state” and which one would eventually perform the role of “source 
state”, as treaties allocate taxing rights on the basis that there is a residence and a source state. 
In this context, article 4.3 provides a “tie-breaker” rule that serves to tip the balance in favor of 
one of the two contestant states.  
Table 29 - Comparison of article 4.3 of the OECD MC and the UN MC and 4.4 of the US MC 
OECD Model 
Convention (2014) 
UN Model 
Convention (2011) 
US Model Convention (2006) 
                                                          
477 Although the fact that the shares of a company are publicly traded in a domestic stock exchange does not necessarily 
proves that its shareholders primarily reside therein, it has been said that this test functions as “surrogate” for domestic 
ownership. See section 3.2.3.2.2. 
478 See section 3.2.1.1.3.  
479 See section 3.2.1.1.4.  
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Where by reason of the provisions of 
paragraph 1 a person other than an 
individual is a resident of both Contracting 
States, then it shall be deemed to be a 
resident only of the State in which its place of 
management is situated. 
Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 
1 of this Article a company is a resident of both 
Contracting States, then if it is created or 
organized under the laws of one of the 
Contracting States or a political division 
thereof, such company shall be deemed to be a 
resident of the first-mentioned Contracting 
State. In all other cases involving dual resident 
companies, the competent authorities of the 
Contracting States shall endeavor to determine 
the mode of application of the Convention to 
such company. If the competent authorities do 
not reach such an agreement, that company 
will not be treated as a resident of either 
Contracting State for purposes of its claiming 
any benefits provided by the Convention. 
3.2.4.1. The US peculiar approach: place of incorporation as tie-breaker 
rule and the subsequent removal of the tie-breaker rule 
First of all, we will refer to the US MC, as its approach to the dual residence issue is entirely 
divergent. The US MCs published both in 1996 and 2006 did have a tie-breaker rule which tipped 
the balance in favor of the contracting state in which the company had been created or organized 
under its respective legislation. The technical explanations, however, did not provide any single 
argument to support the choice of the POI test. In cases in which this rule was not able to resolve 
the dual residence conflict, article 4 used to entrust the competent authorities of both states with 
the task of reaching an agreement.  
3.2.4.2. Place of effective management as tie-breaker rule 
For their part, the solution promoted by both the OECD and the UN is the use of the POEM test 
as a tie-breaker480. This time we will not dwell on the content and interpretation of the provision 
nor discuss the risks it poses, since section 3.2.1.1.2 already did. Unlike the Technical Explanations 
to the US MC, the Commentaries to the OECD and the UN MC explicitly state the reasons behind 
their choice. Both state that “it would not be an adequate solution to attach importance to a 
purely formal criterion like registration (…) therefore paragraph 3 attaches importance to the place 
where the company, etc. is actually managed”481.  
                                                          
480 To consult the historical evolution of this rule in the models of the League of Nations and the OECD see LOOMER, 
G.T. (2015), p. 123-126. 
481 Commentaries to article 4 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 22 and Commentaries to article 4 of the UN 
Model Convention, paragraph 8, which limits itself to copy the wording of the Commentaries to the OECD MC. This 
reasoning derives from an OECD report that dates back from 1958, according to LOOMER, g. (2015), p. 125. 
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3.2.4.3. Mutual agreement procedure to resolve the dual residency 
dispute 
A special mention should be made to a recent trend that is visible in the treaties negotiated in the 
last few years. Jurisdictions tend increasingly to leave the resolution of the dual residence issue in 
the hands of the competent authorities of the contracting states, although they restrict the 
authorities´ discretionary power by enumerating some factors that must necessarily be taken into 
account, as the POI of the company or the place where it is effectively managed. This shift of 
paradigm has been indirectly promoted by the OECD and the UN, since they both include in their 
Commentaries to their respective MC an alternative version of article 4.3 which equally refers to 
the mutual agreement procedure (hereinafter MAP)482. The reason put forward by the OECD and 
the UN is that the case-by-case approach is the best way to deal with the difficulties in determining 
the POEM that may arise from the use of new communications technologies483, a risk that we 
already noted and discussed above484.   
It can be expected that this approach gains new adepts in the following years, since the OECD has 
recently upgraded this test and fostered its incorporation into the OECD MC in the context of the 
BEPS project485. Interestingly, the OECD now proposes an amendment to the Commentaries that 
would lead to change the supposed justification of the rule. While the previous Commentaries 
justified the resort to the MAP on the grounds that the interpretation of the POEM tests was 
problematic, the proposed Commentaries state that the reason behind the shift of paradigm lies 
in the fact that “there had been a number of tax avoidance cases involving dual resident 
companies”486.  
3.2.4.4. General trends identified in the global tax treaty network 
A study of the tax treaty network of the G8 member states (a total of 720 treaties as of 2012)487 
revealed that the POEM test endorsed by the OECD and the UN was present in 51% of the treaties. 
For its part, 22% of the treaties instead entrusted the competent authorities of the contracting 
states with the task of reaching a solution by means of the mutual agreement procedure. The 
third preferred option (10%) entailed the absence of a tie-breaker rule, as suggested by the 2016 
                                                          
482 Commentaries to article 4 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 24.1 (introduced in 2008) and Commentaries 
to article 4 of the UN Model Convention, paragraph 10. They both suggest the same wording for article 4.3: “Where by 
reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 a person other than an individual is a resident of both Contracting States, the 
competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavor to determine by mutual agreement the Contracting State 
of which such person shall be deemed to be a resident for the purposes of the Convention, having regard to its place of 
effective management, the place where it is incorporated or otherwise constituted and any other relevant factors. In the 
absence of such agreement, such person shall not be entitled to any relief or exemption from tax provided by this 
Convention except to the extent and in such manner as may be agreed upon by the competent authorities of the 
Contracting States”. In addition to the place of effective management and the POI, the Commentary add a few more 
factors to take into account: where the accounting records are kept.  
483 Commentaries to article 4 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 24.1. 
484 See section 3.2.1.1.2. 
485 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate 
circumstances, p. 72-75. 
486 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate 
circumstances, p. 73. 
487 http://www.eatlp.org/uploads/Academic/2013/posters/Carelli.pdf 
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US MC. And finally, the fourth preferred option (7%) relied on formal tests488 as the previous 
versions of the US MC used to propose. 
3.2.4.5. Some preliminary conclusions 
First of all, we would like to share a general reflection that is more closely related to the cause of 
the problem than to its remedy. 
The mere fact that cases of dual residence are far from rare should make us wonder whether it 
may be a sign of a malfunction of the domestic residence tests. In other words, the fact that a 
company may be regarded as tax resident by various jurisdictions by virtue of their respective test 
leads us to believe that these tests may be “overshooting” and attracting companies that do not 
really belong to them489. On the other hand, residence tests that in fact demand a substantive and 
strong nexus between the corporate taxpayer and the jurisdiction concerned, by their own nature, 
would be less prone to cause overlapping attributions of residence490.  
That being said, we will proceed to extract a two main conclusions from the analysis on the way 
jurisdictions tend to resolve the dual residence of companies in tax treaties. 
Firstly, we should recall the scope and precise role played by article 4.3. Its function is confined to 
solving cases of dual residence where the taxpayer is deemed to be resident in both contracting 
states by virtue of their respective domestic residence tests. This means, sensu contrario, that it 
does not deal with companies that are not resident anywhere (stateless companies)491, primarily 
because the application of the treaty would not be triggered in the first place to the extent the 
taxpayer is not resident in any of the contracting States492. As a result, we may conclude that 
article 4.3 is inherently unable to deal with one of the most common profit shifting techniques, as 
the Apple case study revealed493. 
Secondly, we have analyzed the alleged rationale behind the different policy choices as expressed 
in their corresponding soft law instruments in the previous subsections. With respect to the use 
of formal tests as tie-breaker rules, the Technical Explanations to the US MC (1996 and 2006) did 
not provide a single justification. However, we suspect that this choice may have been motivated 
by mere policy interests, as the United States solely employs this test for domestic tax purposes. 
With regard to the POEM test, the explanation provided by both the Commentaries to both the 
OECD and the UN MC cannot be regarded satisfactory. They do not conveniently explain why the 
state in which the POEM is located should win the tie-breaker test and therefore be the resident 
state for treaty purposes. On the contrary, they resort to the simplistic argument that POEM tests 
are “better” than formal tests. As far as the MAP approach is concerned, while its first alleged 
justification was that the POEM test was increasingly difficult to apply in practice, the OECD 
                                                          
488 These tie-breaker rules mostly belong the treaty network of the US and Canada. In the case of the latter, 55 out of a 
total of 92 treaties in place follow this criterion according to LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 122. 
489 COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 266. 
490 For example, the tests relying on the residence of the shareholders (section 3.2.1.1.3) or the business activity of the 
company (section 3.2.1.1.4) 
491 See section 3.2.2. 
492 Articles 1 and 4 of the tax treaties. See section 3.2.3. 
493 See section 2.2.1.  
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recently changed its position. Indeed, it now argues that the advisability of resolving the cases of 
dual residence on a case-by-case basis is due to the need to tackle “tax avoidance” cases involving 
dual resident companies. 
We may therefore conclude, thus confirming the general reflection already exposed in section 
3.2.1.2.2, that a careful consideration on the meaning and purpose of the residence standard is 
again missing. We already observed at the domestic level that jurisdictions do not seem to give 
serious consideration to the configuration of their respective domestic residence tests and more 
importantly, the respective policy purposes they intend to accomplish with them494. Likewise, 
jurisdictions do not seem to reflect on why the residence status of a company in one state should 
prevail over the residence status in the other contracting state for tax treaty purposes495. Instead, 
we find a conglomeration of arbitrary tie-breaker rules that do not seem to follow a thoughtful 
and coherent logic.  
 
3.3. THE PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT THRESHOLD IS 
CURRENTLY UNABLE TO COVER ALL SITUATIONS IN 
WHICH THE NON-RESIDENT COMPANY IS ENGAGED IN 
SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN THE HOST STATE 
AND MAY THUS TRIGGER PROFIT SHIFTING RISKS 
 
Jurisdictions do not solely tax the profits earned by their resident corporate taxpayers but also 
tend to tax non-residents for the income deemed to be sourced in their respective territories. For 
example, wherever they have a PE in their territories. 
The fundamental purpose of this section will be to ascertain whether the legal configuration of 
source -by means of the PE concept- has in fact enabled corporate taxpayers to book their profits 
in jurisdictions other than those where the significant economic activities take place.  
However, we will also examine the origins and supposed rationale behind the PE concept to 
demonstrate that it is the result of the economic context where it originally arose and responds 
to the particular needs and wishes of the capital exporting jurisdictions, as represented by the 
OECD. As a result, we intend to prove that its lack of adaptation to present times has given rise to 
                                                          
494 See section 3.2.1.2.2. 
495 The OECD suggested back in 2001 and 2003 a few changes to article 4.3 of the OECD MC that fell by the wayside. 
One of the proposals was to tip the balance in favor of the contracting state in which the company had a stronger 
economic nexus. In p. 12 the OECD recognized that this criterion was not at first sight aligned with the “underlying 
rationale for residence taxation”. This is remarkable since the OECD itself does not seem to believe there is a clear and 
unique rationale behind residence taxation, since in the same paper it proposed a conglomerate of alternatives for 
article 4.3 (e.g. POI or registration, place where the shareholders or the directors reside) that do not appear to follow a 
unique rationale. See OECD (2001): The impact of the communications revolution on the application of “place of 
effective management” as a tie breaker rule (Discussion Paper). 
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numerous problems that tend to be addressed by means of unfortunate interpretations of the 
clause.  
To this end, this section intends to point out the undetermined significance of source (section 
3.3.1) to later review the theoretical foundations upon which source-based taxation has 
traditionally been built (section 3.3.2). Later, we will provide a general overview of the trends on 
how source has generally been defined for corporate income tax purposes at both the domestic 
and the tax treaty level, with a particular emphasis in the PE threshold (section 3.3.3), whose tax 
treatment is increasingly equivalent to that of a resident subsidiary (section 3.3.4). Subsequently, 
we will analyze the most widespread modalities of PEs and identify the particular profit shifting 
risks each of them tend to pose (section 3.3.5). Lastly, a number of conclusions will be drawn 
(section 3.3.6). 
  
3.3.1. THE DEPARTURE POINT: THE UNDETERMINED SIGNIFICANCE 
OF SOURCE 
It is generally asserted that, pursuant to their own sovereignty, States would be in principle 
entitled to tax income sourced in their respective territories irrespective of the circumstances 
surrounding the person who obtain it496. Yet, there does not seem to be a clear and unambiguous 
understanding on what “source” actually means. On the contrary, in the words of Vogel, source 
is unambiguous only in what it excludes: taxation based on “source” is different from taxation 
based on residence or citizenship497. 
Economists have intended to shed some light on the notion of source from a theoretical 
perspective. In general terms, source is predominantly identified with the territory that is 
somehow connected to the production of the income in question or where value is added to a 
good498. However, economists have attempted to further specify this broad definition by means 
of two approaches: the supply and the supply-demand499. The first one would identify the source 
with the place where the production factors generating the profit are, while the second one would 
locate the source of the profit both where the production factors are and where the final product 
is used or consumed, to the extent it regards the profit as the result of the interplay of both supply 
and demand.  
It is precisely due to the inherent vagueness of the notion of source of income that it has 
traditionally been located in a variety of places500, e.g.: where the tangible or intangible property 
is located501 or used502, where the services are performed, where the contract is signed or 
                                                          
496 See Section 4.3 to consult the implications of Public International Law on the way States may exercise their tax 
jurisdiction.  
497 VOGEL, K. (1988), p. 223. 
498 VOGEL, K. (1988), p. 223. 
499 Musgrave understands that there is no straightforward economic basis for choosing one approach over the other. 
See MUSGRAVE, P.B. (1984), p. 245.  
500 KEMMEREN, E.C.C.M. (2001), p. 33. 
501 PIRES, M. (1989), p. 122. 
502 PIRES, M. (1989), p. 121. 
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executed, where the payer is located or reside503, where the payment is made or where the 
expenses are borne504, inter alia. 
3.3.2. THE THEORETICAL RATIONALES BEHIND SOURCE-BASED 
TAXATION 
The lack of a preexisting natural concept of source confers tax legislators a considerable margin 
of discretion when it comes to the legal configuration of source for income tax purposes. 
However, there is a tendency to draft source rules in a quite homogeneous way, and the reason 
behind this behavior may be the fact that jurisdictions have, knowingly or unknowingly, follow 
patterns of source-based taxation that seem theoretically justifiable. As there is a great variety of 
potential justifications that may serve to legitimize the exercise of taxing rights over non-
residents´ income505, this section will merely focus on the most relevant ones: economic 
allegiance, capital import neutrality and base erosion.  
There are no commonly agreed principles that govern the share of the tax base between residence 
and source states. However, back in the 1960s the economist Musgrave provided a theoretical 
framework named “inter-nation equity” which called for an equitable division of the tax revenue 
between the different jurisdictions that are to some extent involved in the generation of cross-
border income506. At this point, she suggested making use of the old principles of benefit507 and 
“economic allegiance”508 to evaluate and calibrate the appropriate level of inter-nation equity in 
each given case. Accordingly, it would be understood that the division of the tax base is equitable 
to the extent each jurisdiction is entitled to a share of the tax revenue arising from a cross-border 
transaction in proportion to the supposed benefits it provided to the taxpayer509. Thus, a taxpayer 
that is granted access to these public services would owe a certain degree of economic allegiance 
to the provider jurisdiction that should result in a tax liability as a compensation for the costs 
incurred by such jurisdiction that contributed to the generation of the profit510. This theoretical 
framework on the share of the tax base undoubtedly favors source-based taxation511, to the 
                                                          
503 These nexuses follow the so-called “paying state principle”  
504 PIRES, M. (1989), p. 122. 
505 An overview of the fundamental theoretical foundations for source-based taxation may be found in PINTO, D. (2003), 
p. 17-46. 
506 For a deeper analysis on her theory, see MUSGRAVE, P.B. (1963), p. 15-22, MUSGRAVE, P.B.; MUSGRAVE, R.A. (1972) 
and more recently KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 188-201. As explicitly recognized by Graetz, Musgrave´s analysis has 
dominated the international income tax policy literature for more than three decades. See GRAETZ, M.J. (2001), p. 286. 
507 MUSGRAVE, P.B. (1963), p. 15-16. When discussing Musgrave´s theory, Vogel argued that “the only valid 
legitimation, therefore, can be derived from benefits aspects”. See VOGEL, K. (1988c), p. 398. We will later assess the 
implications of the benefit principle in Chapter 4.2. 
508 The term was first coined by SCHANZ, G. (1892) and later analyzed by GRIZIOTTI, B. (1929) and ALLIX, E. (1937). 
509 MUSGRAVE, P.B. (1963), p. 16. Benefits as the use of public facilities and infrastructures, education and training for 
the labor force, a secure legal framework that protects property rights or the police/fire/defense protection, among 
many others. See PINTO, D. (2003), p. 19. 
510 According to Kelsen, a country would be entitled to tax the income and wealth of its residents or citizens whose 
rights to the protection and services provided by the State are matched by their duties to the State, among which is the 
duty to pay taxes. See KELSEN, H. (1946), p. 75. 
511 VOGEL, K. (1988c), p. 398: "Without this state´s economic opportunities the income normally would not have been 
generated” and AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 520: “These benefits justify source-based corporation taxation in the sense 
that the host country´s government bears some of the costs of providing the benefits that are necessary for earning the 
income”. In the same vein, see also BROWN, F.B. (2011), p. 574-575, SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 75 and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 
190. 
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extent it may be presumed that the state of source is the one providing most or all the benefits 
that are relevant for the production of the income and would thus deserve to be compensated 
for the costs incurred under the inter-nation equity theory.  
Although the ideas of inter-nation equity, benefit and economic allegiance feature prominently 
among the traditional justifications for source-based taxation512, others have equally played a role 
in the literature, although to a lesser extent. This is for example the case of the principles of 
neutrality (particularly capital import neutrality) and base erosion. 
Neutrality essentially requires that economic processes should not be affected by external factors 
(as taxes) since productivity would be higher provided that the production factors are distributed 
by the market mechanism without public interference513.  Scholars have generally identified two 
dimensions of neutrality: capital export neutrality (investors should pay the same tax whether 
they receive income from a given investment made locally or abroad) and capital import neutrality 
(capital funds originating in various countries should compete at equal terms in the capital market 
of any country)514. While the first option has enjoyed great support for being more economically 
efficient from a theoretical point of view, the second option (which tends to justify source-based 
over worldwide taxation) has been advocated for fostering international competitiveness. 
However, Gandenberger provided two strong counter-arguments that dismantled the arguments 
in favor of capital export neutrality515, thus concluding that source-based taxation was better 
justified in terms of neutrality. 
As regards the base erosion principle, it is deemed to justify source-based taxation insofar it 
relates to a payment that is deductible against the tax base of the source country516. However, as 
it is frequently critized for not providing by itself a sufficient justification for source taxation517, it 
has been argued that it should solely play a subsidiary role518.  
                                                          
512 As explicitly recognized by Graetz, Musgrave´s analysis has dominated the international income tax policy literature 
for more than three decades. See GRAETZ, M.J. (2001), p. 286. In addition, the economic allegiance theory was also 
embraced by the so-called “four experts” who drafted the first known tax model, as it will be later discussed in Section 
4.2.1. See Economic and Financial Commission for the League of Nations (1923): Report on Double Taxation, P. 19.  
513 VOGEL, K. (1988b). 
514 VOGEL, K. (1988b), p. 311. 
515 These are the two arguments he put forward. Firstly, in a residence-based regime where the residence State´s tax 
rates are higher than the ones imposed by the source State, a reduced after-tax profit would reduce the chance of an 
enterprise to finance new investments in the source State. The reason being hat the enterprise has to anticipate a 
higher overall tax burden than its competitors from lower-tax States. Secondly, as the level of taxation in each State is 
likely to correspond to some extent to the level of public goods provided, a State providing less public benefits may 
have a lower tax rate than its neighboring States.  This being so, if the source State has a lower tax rate than the 
residence State, the enterprise´s decision whether or not to invest in such State may be affected by this fact. See VOGEL, 
K. (1988), p. 222 citing a paper written by Otto Gandenberger back in 1983. 
516 Arnold notes that this principle has traditionally served to justify the taxation of both the director´s fees and the 
employment income derived by non-residents where they receive the income from an employer resident or a PE 
located in the source State. See ARNOLD, B.J. (2011), p. 66. 
517 BRAUNER, Y.; BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2015), p. 9. 
518 ARNOLD, B.J. (2011), p. 66. 
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3.3.3. THE EMERGENCE OF LEGAL CONVENTIONS TO ESTABLISH 
TAXATION AT SOURCE AND THE ORIGIN OF THE PERMANENT 
ESTABLISHMENT 
Departing from the non-self-defining nature of source, domestic and tax treaty rules defining the 
source of specific items of income could not aspire to become more than artificial legal 
conventions519. We will go through some of the most common source rules applicable to income 
obtained by companies by taking the OECD MC as a point of reference. 
The legal conventions used by the OECD MC to define the source of income may be classified into 
two main categories520. The first category includes substance-based rules that intend to trace the 
economic source of the income, that is, the territory where the income economically arises, either 
where the production factors are located or used (supply-based approach) or where the 
production factors and the market are located (supply-demand approach). This is the option 
preferred for active income521 and certain types of passive income522. Undoubtedly, these rules 
are likely to be better aligned with the principles set out in the previous section, particularly the 
benefit and the economic allegiance principles.  On the other hand, the second category 
comprises formal rules that refrain from seeking the true economic source of the income and 
instead content themselves with an arbitrary threshold that is certain and easy to administer. This 
category often encompasses source rules in relation to certain types of passive income and 
generally refers to the territory where the income is made available and where costs 
corresponding to that income are incurred523, e.g. the jurisdiction where the payer resides524. They 
generally lack a clear policy justification525 beyond practicability considerations, since they tend 
to apply in the context of passive income whose ultimate economic source is hard to discern and, 
even in the case it could be identified, the imposition of a tax at source would be difficult or simply 
impossible to enforce526. 
                                                          
519 AVI-YONAH, R. (2007), p. 27: “the source of income is difficult to define (…) this problem has been partially resolved 
by arbitrary rules embodied in tax treaties that define the source of various categories of income”. AULT, H.J.; 
BRADFORD, D.F. (1990), p. 12: “A complex series of somewhat arbitrary rules is used to establish source”. 
520 Distinction made by AVI-YONAH, R. (2007), p. 42-43 and PIRES, M. (1989), p. 121-122. 
521 Article 7 of the OECD MC allows the state in which the corporate taxpayer have a “permanent establishment” to tax 
the business profits attributable to it irrespective of the residence of the company.   
522 These rules tend to follow the situs principle. According to article 6 of the OECD MC, income derived from immovable 
property may be taxed by the jurisdiction where the property is physically located, irrespective of the circumstances of 
the recipient. Similarly, article 13 of the OECD MC (paragraphs 1 and 4) states that gains derived from the alienation of 
immovable property or from the alienation of shares (whose value, in turn, predominantly derive from immovable 
property) may be taxed by the jurisdiction where the property is located.  
523 PIRES, M. (1989), p. 122. 
524 These rules follow the so-called “paying State principle” and may be seen in articles 10 (dividends) and 11 (interests) 
of the OECD MC.  Article 10.2 explicitly allows the jurisdiction where the company paying the dividend is resident to tax 
it at source while article 11.2 does the same in respect of the jurisdiction where the interest “arises”, meaning the 
jurisdiction where the payer is resident (as article 11.5 clarifies).  
525 In the case of rules following the “paying State principle”, they could arguably be justified in the base erosion 
principle as described in the previous section. 
526 Avi-Yonah argues that the main reason behind the “paying State principle” in the case of dividends is that it would 
be administratively hard for a State to tax a dividend paid by a foreign corporation to a foreign shareholder whenever 
it considers that the income originally arose from its territory. See AVI-YONAH, R. (2007), p. 43,  
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Among the first category of source rules, comprising those of substantive nature, we find the 
concept of PE. The history of the PE is as long as the history of the tax treaties itself527. In fact, it 
was already present in the first commonly regarded tax treaty signed by Austria-Hungary and 
Prussia in 1899, being its immediate precedent (the Bestriebsstätte) in the Prussian domestic 
legislation since 1845528. Later on, the League of Nations borrowed the concept and introduced it 
in the first Model tax convention in history529, so did the OECD, the UN and the US in their 
respective future MCs. Over time, the PE has become an international standard that is almost 
invariably present in both tax treaties and domestic tax legislations.  
The PE concept is consistent with the supply-based approach530, thus disdaining the relevance of 
the providing a market of goods or services. Further, it reflects the economic context in which it 
arose and the policy interests of the jurisdictions with greater power to influence the debate on 
international tax rules. It is the continued presence of these two factors what explains not only its 
initial success but also its perpetuation over the subsequent decades531. 
With respect to the first factor, the PE is surely a result of the economic context where it emerged. 
Essentially, the clause makes source taxation of business profits conditional on a physical and 
stable presence of the non-resident enterprise in the host jurisdiction. Considering the economic 
context where the PE originally arose, where the physical presence was critical to perform any 
kind of business activity (including the provision of services)532, a parameter entirely based on 
physical presence seemed to be a proper way to measure the degree of involvement in the 
economic life of the host State. Additionally, the imposition of a source-based tax by the State in 
which a PE is located was regarded as justified by virtue of the principles mentioned in the 
previous section. In other words, the degree of economic presence revealed by the fulfilment of 
the requirements of the PE clause lead to the presumption that the non-resident taxpayer having 
a PE in a jurisdiction was in fact enjoying to some extent the public benefits provided by such 
jurisdiction533. 
                                                          
527 SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 71. 
528 SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 72-75.  
529 Economic and Financial Commission for the League of Nations (1928): Report on Double taxation and tax evasion. 
530 OECD (2003): Are the current treaty rules for taxing business profits appropriate for e-commerce? Final report, p.14: 
“the TAG’s approach was therefore in line with the supply-based approach of considering that business profits should 
be viewed as originating from the location of the factors that allow the enterprise to realize business profits. It therefore 
rejected the suggestion that the mere fact that a country provides the market where an enterprise’s goods and services 
are supplied should allow that country to consider that a share of the profits of the enterprise is derived therefrom”. 
531 ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 8-9. 
532 McLure describes the fundamental features of the economic context in which international taxation was born: 
international trade consisted primarily of tangible products, communications were relatively slow and physical presence 
was generally required for the conduct of business. See MCLURE, C.E. (Jr.) (2001), p. 333-334. Along the same lines, see 
SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 65-67 and TILLINGHAST, D.R. (1996), p. 524: “the exiting body of international tax rules (…) is 
based in large part on the supposition that international trade consists of the physical shipment of goods or the physical 
movement of persons to perform services at different locations”.  
533 SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 559: “the conventional wisdom is that an enterprise with a foreign PE has extended its activities 
abroad to such a degree that the benefits from this country´s expenditure networks justify taxation in that country (…) 
a PE is merely a piece of evidence of economic allegiance”. This assumption still remains in the Commentaries to article 
7.1 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 9: “it is perhaps sufficient to say that it has come to be accepted in 
international fiscal matters that until an enterprise of one State sets up a permanent establishment in another State it 
should not properly be regarded as participating in the economic life of that other State to such an extent that it comes 
within the jurisdiction of that other State´s taxing rights”. See also DOERNBERG, R.L.; HINNEKENS, L.; HELLERSTEIN, W.; 
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Above and beyond these considerations, the PE was also a policy decision that undeniably 
responded to the particular needs and wishes of the capital exporting jurisdictions, whose 
interests were (and still are) primarily represented by the OECD. Both the League of Nations and 
the OECD chose to give preference to residence-based taxation in their respective Model 
Conventions to satisfy the fiscal interests of such jurisdictions, and they did so by adopting a high 
threshold as the PE to minimize the chances of taxation at source534.  
3.3.4. THE PROGRESSIVE PERSONALIZATION OF THE PE TOWARDS 
THE “FUNCTIONAL RESIDENT”  
The PE has succeeded to become the most characteristic threshold allowing source taxation of 
business profits by antonomasia. However, its role does not end there. Both tax treaties and, by 
extension, domestic tax legislations have conferred the PE a wider role that goes beyond enabling 
the jurisdiction where the PE is located to tax the business profits that arise from it by virtue of 
article 7535. This section will explain why. 
A PE is not a legal person but rather an economic reality. It only acquires significance from a legal 
point of view once the compliance with the requirements envisaged in the PE clause is verified. 
However, the moment a PE is deemed to exist it is automatically granted a tax treatment 
equivalent to that of legal persons. That is to say, while lacking legal personality, PEs do in turn 
enjoy a sort of “fiscal personality” that somehow equates them with legal persons536. 
Further, there is a growing tendency to equate the tax treatment of PEs and resident entities for 
income tax purposes537. We will now proceed to provide various arguments that sustain this 
statement.  
The first and most evident reason is that the State where the PE is located (hereinafter PE-State) 
is a priori entitled to tax the worldwide income attributable538 to the PE as if it were in fact an 
entity resident therein. In this respect, two observations should be noted.  Firstly, the PE does not 
solely capture active income under the scope of article 7. As article 7.4 of the OECD MC points 
                                                          
JINYAN, L. (2001), p. 349: “the permanent establishment rule was justified by the territorial theory of economic 
allegiance: whoever benefits from an economic community ought to pay tax to that community”. 
534 The US actively supported the adoption of the PE in the debates within the League of Nations to protect the interests 
of US enterprises carrying on business overseas. On the other hand, capital importing countries as the Latin-American 
ones, have leaded a long fight against the PE threshold, as evidenced in the 1943 Mexican Model Convention and the 
Andean Pact Model where the PE is merely an example of source-based taxation of business profits. For the US stance 
see GRAETZ, M.J.; O´HEAR, M.M. (1997), p. 1074-1089 and for the Latin-American position see ZAPATA, S. (1998), p. 
252-253. 
535 In the same vein, see SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 104-105, where this phenomenon is referred to as “the double-sided 
nature of the PE concept”. 
536 GUTIÉRREZ DE GANDARILLA, F.A. (2010), p. 22-44. The author provides powerful arguments to demonstrate that the 
PE has been subject to a “progressive personalization”.  
537 Schön believes there is an “implicit analogy” between PE and residence taxation and furthermore regards the PE as 
an “extension of unlimited tax liability to non-incorporated business units” rather than a threshold for limited tax 
liability. See SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 104-105. In the same vein, see VANN, R.J. (2003), p. 144-146. 
538 While article 7.1 of the OECD MC solely covers profits that are “attributable to the permanent establishment” in 
accordance to article 7.2, article 7.1 of the UN MC equally covers profits derived by sales of goods or merchandise in 
the PE-State, as well as profits derived by other business activities carried out in such State of the same or similar kind 
as those effected through the PE. This approach is referred to as “limited force of attraction rule”. See HIRSCHBÖCK, M. 
(2003), p. 405-424. 
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out, the PE-State may equally tax other types of income (covered by articles of the MC other than 
7) as long as they are attributable to the PE. This is the case of passive income under articles 10, 
11, 12 and 13, which may be found attributable to the PE to the extent the underlying right or 
asset giving rise to such income is “effectively connected” to it539. Secondly, article 7 of the OECD 
MC allows the PE-State to tax the worldwide income that may be attributable to the PE 
irrespective of its sources. Thus, it would be irrelevant whether its income is sourced in the State 
where the enterprise (its head office) reside, the State where the PE itself is located or even a 
third State540. This fact suggests that the nature of the tax liability triggered by the PE is much 
more closely in line with the notion of personal tax liability than with that of objective nature, the 
reason being that the latter one is by its own nature constrained by the territoriality principle and 
thus limited to sources of a particular jurisdiction541. In short, all these factors allow us to conclude 
that the tax treatment of PEs seems to be substantially equivalent to that of resident taxpayers542. 
The analogous status of taxpayers resident in a State and PEs located therein is further confirmed 
by the methodology employed to assign profits to them, particularly after the advent of the 
“authorized OECD -approach” (hereinafter AOA) back in 2010543. In essence, the AOA puts forward 
the so-called “functionally separate entity approach”, a variation of the preexisting “separate 
entity approach” followed to allocate profits between associated companies. In accordance with 
the AOA, a PE would be attributed the profits it might be expected to make, in particular in its 
dealings with other parts of the enterprise, “if it were a separate and independent enterprise” 
engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions.  
However, the application of such rule entails a major obstacle: the PE is not a “separate and 
independent enterprise”, as it is not legally distinct from the rest of the enterprise. As noted above, 
the PE lacks legal personality and is therefore unable to legally own assets, assume risks, possess 
capital or conclude contracts. This makes it necessary to develop a previous mechanism aimed at 
hypothesizing the PE as a (functional) “separate and independent enterprise” distinct to the legal 
entity to which it really belongs. To do so, it becomes necessary to “put flesh into the fiction” by 
equipping the PE with the assets, risks and capital it would have if it truly were a separate entity 
performing the same functions544. The first step of the two-step analysis proposed by the AOA 
precisely takes care of this545. At this point, the OECD suggests starting by the identification of the 
                                                          
539 See the respective PE provisos in articles 10.4, 11.4, 12.3 and 13.2 OECD MC. The income will be considered as 
“effectively connected” when it is possible to regard the holding (with regard to a dividend), the debt-claim (interest), 
the right or property (royalty) or the alienated movable property (capital gain) as “functionally connected” to the PE. A 
complete overview on the function and interpretation of such clauses may be found in HALLER, B. (2003), p. 227-250, 
where the author is critical with the lack of guidance on how to interpret “the effectively connected” criterion. 
540 SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 104: “it is common ground that third-country income can be allocated to a PE if there is some 
economic connection between the third-country income and the activities of the PE, thus hypothesizing a restricted sort 
of unlimited tax liability for the PE in the jurisdiction where it is located” 
541 GUTIÉRREZ DE GANDARILLA, F.A. (2010), p. 32 and SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 105. 
542 GARCÍA PRATS, F.A. (1994), p. 473. García Prats acknowledges that the tax liability imposed on PEs has been subject 
to a progressive “personalization”, to the extent the State where the PE is located may tax on a “worldwide effectively-
connected income basis”.  
543 This is the thesis maintained by BURGERS, I.J.J.  (2009). However, it should be noted that the AOA does not represent 
a rupture with the previous system but rather an enhancement of it. See BENNET, M. (2008), p. 469 and OECD (2008): 
Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, which resulted in the amendment of the OECD MC (article 7.2) and 
its Commentaries in 2010.   
544 SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 104: “(the AOA) transforms the PE into a notional subsidiary for the purpose of tax allocation”.  
545 OECD (2008): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 13-19. 
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significant people functions performed by the PE. Once identified, the AOA would first attribute 
to the PE the economic ownership of the assets presumably used in the functions it performs546. 
Subsequently, the AOA would attribute to the PE any risks inherent in (or created by) the PE´s 
own significant people functions relevant to the assumption of risks547. Lastly, the AOA would 
assign to the PE the necessary capital to support the function it undertakes, the assets it 
economically owns and the risks it assumes548. Once the PE has taken the form of a functional 
separate enterprise distinct from the rest of the enterprise to which it belongs, the second step 
of the AOA comes into play. The AOA leads to the recognition of most of the dealings between 
the PE and the rest of the enterprise as if it were transactions between related parties549. And, 
once such dealings are recognized, they ought to be priced on an arm´s length basis following, by 
analogy, the OECD TPG550. It is precisely at this point where the treatment of PEs largely equates 
that of associated subsidiaries551.  
Besides, there are some minor additional arguments that similarly contribute to confirm the 
quasi-residence status enjoyed by the PEs. As Vann points out, the fact that the State where the 
enterprise is tax resident exempts from taxes the business profits of a foreign PE may be read as 
an implicit recognition of the foreign PE as a foreign taxpayer that falls under the jurisdiction of 
other State552. Additionally, tax treaties themselves tend to treat PEs and residents as 
interchangeable categories for certain purposes. For example, article 15.2 of the OECD MC allows 
the State where the activity is performed to tax the employment income perceived by a non-
resident provided that the remuneration is born either by an employer resident or a PE located in 
the State of the activity. Lastly, some scholars have even advocated for the amendment of article 
1 of the MCs to ensure the access of PEs to the benefits of the treaty and thus avoid the double 
taxation that is likely to arise in triangular scenarios553. 
The increasingly uniform tax treatment conferred to residents and PEs is not accidental, but rather 
the logical outcome of legal mandates coming from both tax treaties and EU Law. In the first place, 
the treaty principle of non-discrimination as applied to PEs554 seeks to ensure that a PE is not 
treated by the PE-State less favorably than enterprises resident in such State and carrying on the 
same activities. This principle is by no means demanding effective neutrality: PEs and residents 
may be treated differently for tax purposes just as long as the PE is subject to tax on its net profits 
and not at a higher rate than those of the resident555.  Secondly, EU Law equally calls for neutrality 
of legal form in cross-border situations, thus prohibiting the unjustified discriminatory treatment 
                                                          
546 OECD (2008): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 15-16. 
547 OECD (2008): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 16-17. 
548 OECD (2008): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 17-18. 
549 OECD (2008): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 18-19 and SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 111: “the 
OECD´s profit attribution project hypothesizes the permanent establishment as an independent unit capable of entering 
into notional dealings with the head office, as are regularly concluded between a parent and its subsidiary company”.  
550 OECD (2008): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 20. 
551 In Section 3.1.3 we described the ALS as a legal fiction that builds upon other fictions (as companies are also legal 
fictions). The ALS as applied to PEs is a fiction on top of fiction (the company as if where a person) on top of fiction (a 
PE as if it were a company). See PETRUCCI, R. (2016), p. 10 (footnote 44). 
552 VANN, R.J. (2003), p. 144. 
553 GARCÍA PRATS, F.A. (1994), p. 481. 
554 Article 24.3 of the OECD and UN MC (same wording) and article 24.2 and 24.3 of the US MC. The second sentence 
establishes an exception but it only applies to PEs of individuals.  
555 PANAYI, H.J.I. (2013), p. 229-230. 
 
125 
 
between subsidiaries and PEs in objectively comparable situations556. Although the non-
discrimination principle derived by EU Law goes certainly further than the treaty principle, it does 
not unconditionally grant a neutral tax treatment between PEs and subsidiaries. The principle 
reason is that they will not always be found to be in comparable situations, as the comparability 
criterion will only be satisfied to the extent PEs are taxed in a similar way to resident 
subsidiaries557. 
In conclusion, even though there is an undeniable tendency to assimilate PEs to subsidiaries for 
tax purposes, largely inspired by the non-discrimination principles envisaged in treaties and EU 
Law, there are still major differences between them that should not be overlooked. Firstly, both 
the PE and the enterprise to which it belongs will generally have the same creditworthiness, while 
parents and subsidiaries may well have a different one558. Secondly, it is impossible for a PE to 
guarantee the creditworthiness of the rest of the enterprise or vice versa559. Thirdly, the PE does 
not have its own shareholders, unlike a subsidiary560. Fourthly, parents and subsidiaries may enter 
into transactions with full legal effects while dealings between a PE and its home office are solely 
recognized for the purposes of attributing profits to the PE561. And lastly, the AOA may not 
necessarily achieve equality of outcome between subsidiaries and PEs, since PEs are likely to be 
more profitable, as the PE structure provides for efficient capital utilization, risk diversification, 
economics of scale, etc.562.  
 
3.3.5. ANALYSIS OF THE PE CONCEPT IN TAX TREATIES IN ITS 
RESPECTIVE MODALITIES AND THE PROFIT SHIFTING RISKS THEY 
MAY POSE 
This section intends to briefly analyze the PE concept in its different modalities: the POB (also 
known as “basic rule”), the construction clause, the agency PE and the service PE. To do so, we 
will depart from the wording of article 5 as drafted in the MCs. It is not the objective of this thesis 
to provide a thorough analysis on the content of the rule and the interpretation issues it may 
pose, as other scholars have already greatly contributed to its understanding563. On the contrary, 
the main purpose of the analysis, as we did before with the previous paradigms in sections 3.1 
and 3.2, is to ascertain whether the way the PE is drafted de facto allows corporate taxpayers to 
detach taxable profits from the jurisdictions where they are generated and instead book them in 
those of their choice.  
                                                          
556 For an analysis of the ECJ case law on the matter see PANAYI, H.J.I. (2013). 
557 Panayi is critical with the fact that the ECJ only regards tax considerations when it comes to the analysis of 
comparability, thus omitting other regulatory differences between PEs and subsidiaries that may be of relevance. See 
PANAYI, H.J.I. (2013), p. 229. 
558 OECD (2008): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 18. 
559 OECD (2008): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 18. 
560 BURGERS, I.J.J.  (2009), p. 73. 
561 MOERER, O.; KLAVER, B. (2015), p. 1590. 
562 OECD (2008): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 75-76. 
563 Most importantly SKAAR, A.A. (1991), GARCÍA PRATS, F.A. (1996) and WILLIAMS, R.L. (2014), among others. 
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As a matter of principle, source is predominantly identified with the territory that is somehow 
connected to the production of the income in question or where value is added to a good (section 
3.3.1). In view of the above, the PE aspired to become the translation of such ambiguous notion 
of source into an easy-to-administer and pragmatic rule. Thus, in principle, on would expect that 
the different modalities of PE would precisely represent various forms of income-generating or 
value-adding business activities. As a consequence of the above mentioned, theoretically, the PE 
concept by its very nature should be capable of bringing the tax bases closer to the jurisdictions 
where such business activities are taking place. In other words, the PE concept should a priori 
contribute to minimize the breach between economic and tax presence.  
This section intends to demonstrate that the above-mentioned assumptions may no longer be 
true. On the contrary, the PE concept is at risk of not fulfilling such function due to its lack of 
adaptation to the current business environment. In a nutshell, the key question that needs to be 
addressed is the following: in the light of the features of the current business environment, are 
there significant income-generating and value-adding business activities apart from those 
explicitly covered by the 19th-century PE clause?  
3.3.5.1. Fixed place of business (arts. 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4 of the OECD MC) 
All the three most influential MCs agree on the definition of the PE as a “fixed place of business 
through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on” (art 5.1 of the MCs). 
Similarly, they all provide the same non-exhaustive list of illustrative examples of the kind of 
premises the PE clause intends to encompass564: places of management, branches, offices, 
factories, workshops, mines, oil or gas wells, quarries and other places of extraction of natural 
resources (art 5.2 of the MCs). For its part, article 5.4 of the respective MCs lists a number of 
business activities which shall not be considered PEs regardless of the fulfillment of the 
requirements established by article 5.1. Their common feature is that they may be regarded as 
activities of preparatory or auxiliary character, and the main reason why they are automatically 
excluded is that they are merely support activities that barely add value to the primary business 
activity of the non-resident enterprise565. Besides, even if they could constitute a PE, little profits 
would be attributable to it pursuant to article 7 as it currently stands (section 3.3.4). 
The potential profit shifting risks it poses 
The OECD noticed a couple of risks in the context of the BEPS project. Firstly, MNCs having a 
cohesive operating business in the host jurisdiction may easily split such activities into 
geographically separate places of business (under the responsibility of either the parent company 
or any other related party) which, on their own, qualify for the exemption envisaged in article 5.4 
of the MCs for being “preparatory or auxiliary”566. The fact that such activities are not carried out 
altogether in the same POB but in separate ones would render ineffective article 5.4.f), which 
                                                          
564 The general belief is that the mere inclusion in the list does not automatically convert the place into a PE for tax 
treaty purposes. On the contrary, all requirements established in article 5.1 will need to be fulfilled. See SKAAR, A.A. 
(1991), p. 113-114. 
565 Commentaries to article 5.4 of the OECD MC, paragraph 23. 
566 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, 
p. 10. The risk was already foreseen in the Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 27.1. 
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solely combines the activities of a sole POB for the purposes of evaluating whether the 
combination effectively exceeds the threshold. This phenomenon is typically referred to as 
“fragmentation of activities” and eventually allows MNCs to have a substantial economic 
presence in a jurisdiction without incurring in tax liabilities therein567.  
Secondly, article 5.4 currently presumes that all the activities listed in the paragraph are 
preparatory or auxiliary without admitting evidence to the contrary. This gives rise to the question 
as to whether such activities, in the context of certain recent business models, may play a 
prominent role in practice and may thus become significant in their respective value chains568. If 
that were the case, the PE clause would be automatically excluding relevant business activities 
from its scope and thus preventing its taxation at source.  
3.3.5.2. Construction PE (art. 5.3 of the OECD MC) 
All the three MCs provide a special category of PEs for building sites and construction or 
installation projects to the extent they last for a certain time period569. Originally, at least in the 
case of the OECD MC570, they were integrated in the non-exhaustive list of fixed places of business 
provided by article 5.2. The reason for their exclusion was that these kinds of sites and projects, 
by their own nature, could hardly ever comply with the permanence requirement and, besides, 
the OECD wished to avoid the erroneous interpretation that the places listed in article 5.2 do not 
need to satisfy the general requirements set by article 5.1.  
The potential profit shifting risks it poses 
The OECD itself noted an important profit shifting risk related to this clause in the context of the 
BEPS project. Article 5.3 of the MCs is vulnerable insofar the temporal requirement may be easily 
circumvented by means of contract-splitting between related companies571. In those cases, while 
the economic activity may well persist for the required period, a mere contractual arrangement 
would be sufficient to render ineffective the clause and thus impede taxation at source. 
3.3.5.3. Dependent agent (arts. 5.5 and 5.6 of the OECD MC) 
All three MCs likewise agree that a non-resident company should be treated as having a PE in the 
host jurisdictions when, under certain conditions, a person (the dependent agent) is acting for it 
therein. The rationale behind this alternative threshold is the principle of equity, as it is argued 
that an enterprise conducting business through a separate legal person (the dependent agent) 
                                                          
567 MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 7. 
568 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, 
p. 10 and 28. 
569 The three provisions vary considerably. The UN MC adds “assembly projects” and “supervisory activities in 
connection therewith” while the US MC adds the “installation or drilling rig or ship used for the exploration of natural 
resources”. As regards the temporal requirement, both the OECD and US MCs demand 12 months while the UN reduces 
the minimum period to 6 months. 
570 1963 OECD MC. 
571 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, 
p. 11 and 42. The risk was already foreseen in the Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 
18.  
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should be granted a tax treatment equivalent to that conferred to an enterprise conducting 
business directly in the source state by means of a fixed POB by virtue of article 5.1572. 
As Vogel noted, it does not seem appropriate in policy terms to regard any dependent agent as a 
PE of its principal. On the contrary, the PE status should be reserved to agents who, “in view of 
the scope of their authority or the nature of their activity” involve their principal to a sufficient 
extent in business activities in the host jurisdiction573. At this point, each of the MCs demands 
different conditions pursuant to their respective policy goals. 
The OECD and the UN MCs require a person acting on behalf of the non-resident enterprise who 
“has and habitually exercises” in the host jurisdiction “an authority to conclude contracts in the 
name of the enterprise”. For its part, the UN MC adds a supplementary provision, since it would 
still regard the agent as a PE to the extent it habitually maintains in the host jurisdiction “a stock 
of goods or merchandise from which he regularly delivers goods or merchandise on behalf of the 
enterprise”, even if it lacks the aforementioned authority to conclude contracts. Lastly, article 5.5 
of the US MC is similar to that of the OECD except for the fact that the US MC does not require 
the contracts to be concluded “in the name of the enterprise” but rather to be “binding” on such 
enterprise574.  
The different approaches followed by the OECD/UN and the US in their respective definitions of 
agents are grounded in the disparate regulation of agency in civil and common law575.   
On one hand, civil law regards the agent as a person entitled to conduct contracts that are legally 
binding on the principal. For a contract to bind the principal, two conditions are generally required 
in civil law scenarios576. Firstly, the principal needs to previously grant the agent the authority to 
perform legal acts on his behalf.  And secondly, the agent endowed with such authority needs to 
disclose the principal to the third party in the process of contracting. A priori, the contract would 
only bind the principal if both conditions are met. Accordingly, a commissionaire who acts in its 
own name (albeit for the account of the principal) would not be regarded as an agent for the 
purposes of civil law and would thus be unable to legally bind the principal577.  
On the other hand, common law defines the agent in a similar way as a person who can represent 
the principal in such a way as to affect his legal position578. However, the above-mentioned 
conditions are not required any more. Common law does not regulate the agency contract and 
furthermore regards the contract between the agent and the third party as one in fact concluded 
between the principal and the third party whether or not the principal is disclosed or not. As 
                                                          
572 EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 482-483 and HOOR, O.R.; O´DONNELL, K. (2015), p. 932, 
573 VOGEL, K. (1997), p. 329 and Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 32.  
574 Curiously, the American clause is aligned with the concept of agent originally conceived by the League of Nations for 
the first MC: “a foreign enterprise regularly has business relations in another country through an agent established 
there, who is authorized to act on its behalf”. See League of Nations (1929): Report on the Council on the work of the 
First Session of the Committee, p. 4. It was not until 1963 that the “in the name of” requirement was included in the 
OECD MC.  
575 A comprehensive overview of such differences may be found in AVERY JONES, J.F.; LÜDICKE, J. (2014), particularly in 
p. 204-209. 
576 AVERY JONES, J.F.; LÜDICKE, J. (2014), p. 204-205. 
577 AVERY JONES, J.F.; LÜDICKE, J. (2014), p. 206. 
578 AVERY JONES, J.F.; LÜDICKE, J. (2014), p. 205. 
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contracting “in the name” of the principal is irrelevant, such expression is unknown in common 
law. For all these reasons, the distinction between agents and commissionaires does not arise in 
this context579.  
Once the agent is deemed to fulfill all the requirements established in the relevant PE clause, it 
would be treated as a PE (dependent agent-PE, hereinafter DAPE) and thus attributed the 
corresponding profits.  
Lastly, brokers, general commission agents and any other agents of an independent status are not 
considered agents for the purposes of article 5.5 to the extent they act “in the ordinary course of 
their business”580. The reason is clear: they should not be regarded as a prolongation of the non-
resident enterprise but rather as autonomous entrepreneurs carrying out separate businesses581.  
The potential profit shifting risks it poses 
We will now proceed to analyze three profit shifting risks that relate to the agency clause582.  
The first risk we will make reference to is more acute in the OECD MC. The most sensitive part of 
the clause is the one that requires the agent to have and habitually exercise an authority to 
conclude contracts “in the name of the enterprise”. Its reliance on a mere formality (the fact that 
the contract is concluded in the name of the non-resident taxpayer) increases the possibilities of 
circumventing the rule by simply changing the literal terms of the contract. This is the reason why 
MNCs (Apple among them)583 have recently switched from their previous distribution 
arrangements to the present “commissionaire arrangements”584. First of all, the agent transfers 
to its principal its fixed assets, stock and customer base. Subsequently, and pursuant to the so-
called “commissionaire arrangement”, the agent would be entitled to sell the non-resident´s 
products in its own name but on behalf of the non-resident, who would never cease to be the 
legal owner of  such products585. This simple restructuring effectively allows MNCs to keep the 
same amount of commercial activity in the host jurisdiction without technically having a PE 
therein to which profits would be attributable for tax treaty purposes. On the contrary, the host 
jurisdiction would solely be entitled to tax the small commission such agent is expected to receive 
for the services provided586.  
                                                          
579 AVERY JONES, J.F.; LÜDICKE, J. (2014), p. 206. 
580 Article 5.6 of the OECD and the US MCs and article 5.7 of the UN MC. 
581 SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 513-515. 
582 The OECD has historically cautioned against these risks, more recently in OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 
7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status.  
583 See section 2.2.4. Similarly, Dell converted 17 European subsidiaries into commissionaires back in 1995 and Roche 
equally conducted a similar business restructuring, see MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 63 and 65.  
584 The strategy is explained in OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of 
permanent establishment status, p. 15-16 and EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 483. 
585 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, 
p. 15. 
586 The commissionaire’s service to the principal is usually remunerated at a cost-plus basis and this is the only profit 
that would be subject to tax in the source State. If the company succeeds to minimize the functions, assets and risks 
that could be attributable to the commissionaire, then a typical commission may merely amount to 5-15% of the sales 
proceeds. See DARBY, J.B. (2006), p. 15-16 and EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 484. 
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This risk is much more limited in the US and the UN MCs. For its part, the US MC does not regard 
the formalities of the contract but rather refers to its effects (“contracts that are binding on the 
enterprise”). Thus, the American clause would be less likely to be circumvented by a simple 
contractual arrangement587. On the other hand, the UN MC provides a rule identical to that of the 
OECD but further complements it with an alternative provision. Such provision would regard the 
agent as a PE of the non-resident taxpayer to the extent it maintains in the host jurisdiction a 
stock of goods or merchandise from which it regularly delivers goods or merchandise on behalf 
other enterprise. Once again, the reliance on a more substantive minimizes the potential profit 
shifting risks that may derive from the PE clause. 
The second risk occurs equally in all three MCs. As they literally refer to the authority to “conclude” 
contracts in the host jurisdiction, a PE would solely exist to the extent the conclusion of the 
contract effectively takes place in such territory. It is therefore possible for a company to 
substantially negotiate contracts though agents in the host jurisdiction but eventually conclude 
them abroad588. In those cases, the commercial activity would remain the same but a mere 
formality would de facto prevent the constitution of the PE and the corresponding taxation at 
source. 
The third risk also arises in all the three MCs. MNCs may attempt to “disguise” a dependent agent 
as an independent one for the purposes of qualifying for the exception established in article 5.6 
of the OECD MC. To this end, MNCs may make use of a related party that acts (exclusive or almost 
exclusively) on behalf of the principal but in the guise of an independent agent acting in the 
ordinary course of its business589. Pursuant to the literalism of article 5.6, such agent would not 
constitute a PE despite being substantially equivalent to a dependent agent.  
3.3.5.4. Provision of services (art. 5.3.b of the UN MC) 
The UN MC provides a special category of PE that refers to the furnishing of services. Pursuant to 
such article, a non-resident enterprise would be deemed to have a PE in the host jurisdiction if it 
engages employees or other personnel for the provision of services (including consultancy 
services) if such activities continue within the territory of the jurisdiction concerned for more than 
183 days in any 12-months period for the same or connected projects. 
The potential profit shifting risks it poses 
The clause poses risks equivalent to those of the construction PE. The reason is evident. The 183-
days rule may be easily circumvented by splitting the project into various contracts with related 
parties590. In those cases, the provision of services may well persist for a long period but a mere 
                                                          
587 The proof is that article 5.5 was not been amended by the 2016 update to the US MC, which intended to implement 
some of the recommendations derived by the BEPS project. 
588 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, 
p. 9-10. 
589 This risk was also identified in the course of the BEPS project. See for example OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS 
Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, p. 10: “where the person that 
habitually exercises an authority to conclude contracts constitutes an “independent agent” to which the exception of 
Art. 5(6) applies even though it is closely related to the foreign enterprise on behalf of which it is acting”. 
590 MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 52. 
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contractual arrangement would effectively impede the application of the rule and thus the 
taxation of its attributable profits at source. 
3.3.6. SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
3.3.6.1. The permanent establishment acts as a “substantive resident” in 
contrast to the “vacuous resident” resulting from the application of the 
residence tests 
Section 3.3.4 provided numerous arguments demonstrating the increasing tendency to equate 
the tax treatment of PEs and resident companies for income tax purposes. The primary reason 
being that the PE-State is a priori entitled to tax the worldwide income attributable to the PE a 
non-resident enterprise has within its territory. 
Additionally, in situations in which the wide taxing rights of both the Residence and the PE-State 
are expected to collide, tax treaties tend to give precedence to the taxing rights of the PE-State 
over those of the Residence State. They do so by obliging the latter to either exempt the profits 
that are attributable to the PE or give a credit for the levied by the PE-State591. In other words, tax 
treaties tend to deny the taxing rights of the Residence State over the profits obtained by one of 
its residents inasmuch as they are attributable to a PE located abroad. In those cases, the PE-State 
would effective appropriate such profits for tax purposes.  
Consequently, we could say that the PE has not only become a sort of “functional resident” with 
a tax status equivalent to those enjoyed by resident entities. It has further gained primacy over 
the taxing rights of the Residence State, at least in tax treaty scenarios. The question remains as 
to why this 19th century legal fiction promoted by tax treaties has managed to undermine the wide 
taxing rights traditionally enjoyed by the jurisdictions with respect to their own residents.  
At this stage we should look back at the conclusions of section 3.2, particularly those laid down in 
section 3.2.1.2.3. We then reached the conclusion that most residence tests are inherently unable 
to ensure, per se, a genuine and sufficient relationship between the corporate and the jurisdiction 
concerned. The overwhelming majority of the domestic residence tests (92%) lead to attribute 
the status of tax resident to companies incorporated, with their registered office and/or 
effectively managed from the their territory592. Thus, the fact that the residence jurisdiction 
coincides with that to which the company is more economically bound is left to chance. On the 
other hand, the PE concept does ensure a genuine and substantive connection between the PE-
State and the corporate taxpayer, as section 3.3.5 revealed.  
In this context, it is easy to understand in policy terms why the PE-State is593 legitimized to tax the 
worldwide profits attributable to the PE of a non-resident enterprise at the expense of its 
                                                          
591 Articles 23A and 23B of the OECD MC, respectively. 
592 The 53 countries-survey presented in Section 3.2.1.1.5 revealed that 92% of the jurisdictions rely on formal tests 
(17%), governance tests (9%) or a combination of both (66%).  
593 And should continue to be to the extent residence tests are not reconsidered. 
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Residence State594. In fact, one may interpret the progressive tendency to equate the tax 
treatment of PEs and residents (section 3.3.4) and its strengthening over the last decades as a 
natural reaction to the growing weaknesses and inconsistencies of the residence tests595. This is 
because it is increasingly difficult in a globalized world to maintain the assumption that the 
Residence State (i.e. where the corporate taxpayer is incorporated or managed) is the one that 
enjoys a closer connection to the taxpayer, while the PE is able to ensure such close connection 
more straightforwardly.  
3.3.6.2. The PE as a growing source of segregation between taxable 
profits and income-generating activities  
The primary purpose of section 3.3 was to ascertain whether the legal configuration of source (i.e. 
the PE) in fact enables corporate taxpayers to book their profits in jurisdictions other than those 
where the value-adding business activities are.  
Later on, in section 3.3.5, we departed from the general assumption that the PE is theoretically 
supposed to represent various forms of income-generating activities and therefore, it should a 
priori contribute to minimize the breach between economic and tax presence, as it is expected to 
bring the tax bases closer to the territories where the income is produced. Back then, we 
wondered whether this assumption ever was, and still is, true. We then raised the following 
question: in the light of the features of the current business environment, are there significant 
income-generating and value-adding activities apart from those explicitly covered by the PE 
clause? 
After the analysis conducted in the present section we are inclined to think that this general 
assumption is not as true as it used to be in past. In other words, we believe that the clause, as it 
currently stands, does not appropriately cover all kinds of significant income-generating business 
activities596. As a result, the PE does not help, as much as it is expected to, to truly align business 
activities and taxing rights. Martín Jiménez seems to share this opinion, as he stated back in 2014 
that: “the PE may inherently produce the effect of segregating taxable income from activities that 
generate it”597.  
Jurisdictions are aware that a literal, strict interpretation of the PE clause prevents them taxing 
the profits obtained by non-residents in cases in which they have a substantial economic presence 
in their territories. As they do not generally seem to accept the (logical) outcome of following the 
literal wording of the PE concept598, they may choose either to force the interpretation of the 
                                                          
594 For example, Brauner believes that the United States have compensated an extremely simple residence test (the 
POI) with a strong and far-reaching source rule (the “trade or business” test). See BRAUNER, Y. (2009), p. 867. 
595 VANN, R.J. (2003), p. 148: “the taxation of PEs is nowadays best viewed as a residence-supporting concept rather 
than a source taxing principle”. The weaknesses of residence tests were analyzed in Section 3.2. 
596 In the same vein, see MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 13: “the PE was designed to tax significant activity carried on 
in the State of source, but it permits some relevant presence and activity taking place there go to untaxed”.  
597 MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 9. See also pages 45 and 54-55. Skaar equally shares this view: “rather than protecting 
the tax base in the source State, the PE principle has become instrumental in ensuring avoidance of source-State 
taxation” (SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 559). 
598 The same was true in the context of the residence rules, as section 3.2.1.2.3 highlighted. Martín Jiménez provides 
various arguments to demonstrate the general “sense of dissatisfaction in some countries with the PE threshold in article 
5 of the OECD Model”. See MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2016), p. 458. 
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preexisting rule beyond its literal meaning599 or, conversely, amend the rule in the desired 
direction (the “policy approach”).   
3.3.6.2.1. Tendency to resort to substance-based interpretations and anti-avoidance rules as a 
way to counteract the profit shifting risks posed by the PE concept 
At least before the arrival of the BEPS project, jurisdictions generally opted for the first approach, 
thus perpetuating the unfortunate habit of trying to counteract the weaknesses of rules by 
resorting to either eccentric interpretations, substance-over-form approaches and anti-avoidance 
rules600. We will now provide various examples for each one of these approaches, placing special 
emphasis on the so-called “PE-Spanish approach”601 taken by the Spanish administrative and 
judiciary bodies, as it very well illustrates each one of them.  
Firstly, jurisdictions have sometimes opted for peculiar interpretations of the PE concept that go 
beyond either its literal wording or its supposed spirit or intention. It was the advent of the ICT 
and the popularization of the internet what exacerbated the pressures upon the PE concept and 
originated the perfect breeding ground for these unconventional practices.  
The e-commerce phenomenon brought serious interpretative issues in relation to the PE, and the 
OECD sought to address such issues in the early 2000s in order to ensure a uniform and 
coordinated understanding of the term to prevent conflicts of interpretation and the subsequent 
unintended double taxation602.  In the case of websites, the OECD defined them as a mere 
“combination of software and electronic data”, rightly concluding that they were inherently 
unable to fulfill the first of the requirements of the PE concept, insofar an intangible property 
could never constitute a “place”603. Such interpretation, albeit perfectly consistent with the literal 
wording of the PE concept, did not satisfy Greece, Spain and Portugal, which expressly reserved 
their rights not the follow this position604.  This served as an excuse to the Spanish Central 
Economic-Administrative Court to regard a website as a PE and further attribute all the profits 
                                                          
599 Martín Jiménez regards the interpretation of the PE concept by the Spanish courts as a “defensive” mechanism to 
some of the structures that the BEPS Project later tried to eliminate. MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2016), p. 458. 
600 A tendency we already critized in the context of the residence tests. See sections 3.2.1.2.3 and 3.2.3.2.3.  
601 For a general overview of the singular interpretation of the PE concept in Spain see CARMONA FERNÁNDEZ, N. (2013) 
and MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2016). 
602 OECD (2003): Are the current treaty rules for taxing business profits appropriate for e-commerce? Final report and 
ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 10.  
603 Commentaries to article 5, paragraph 42.2. 
604 Back then all three included their reservations in the Commentaries to article 5. To this day, only Greece, Chile and 
Portugal maintain such reservations. See Observations on the Commentaries to article 5, paragraph 45.6 and 45.11. 
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derived by the online sales to it back in 2012605. Similarly, India maintains that a website by its 
own may constitute a PE in certain circumstances606.  
On the other hand, the OECD equally addressed the possibility of a server (i.e. the computer 
equipment where websites are stored) constituting a PE. In essence, the OECD came to recognize 
such possibility as long as two requirements were met: (i) the server should be effectively at the 
disposal of the non-resident enterprise607 and (ii) activities carried out through it could not be of 
preparatory or auxiliary nature608.  Again, such interpretation was perfectly consistent with the 
wording of article 5. However, we believe the outcome of such interpretation is not only absurd 
but also contrary to the alleged spirit of the PE concept609, which is to provide a threshold that 
denotes a significant economic involvement with the host jurisdiction610. For its part, a server does 
not per se manifest any kind of participation in the economic life of the host State beyond the 
presence of a “dusty computer running in the basement of a building”611. But these concerns did 
not rise at that time and, most importantly, did not prevent many jurisdictions (Austria, Germany, 
India, Italy, among others) from actually considering servers as PEs612. For their part, other 
jurisdictions (Brazil, Ireland, UK and the US among others) acted more wisely and categorically 
refused to accept the interpretation offered by the OECD613. 
Secondly, a much more common approach has been the adoption of an economist or substance-
based approach when interpreting the PE concept. Once again, we should refer to the so-called 
“PE-Spanish approach”, as it has become paradigmatic. First of all, it should be noted that the 
substance-based interpretation of the PE concept has not emerged spontaneously: it has been 
explicitly promoted by the OECD through the 2002 and 2003 updates to the Commentaries of the 
                                                          
605 Resolution by the Spanish Central Economic-Administrative Court (TEAC), March 15th 2012, “Dell case”. CALDERÓN 
CARRERO, J.M.; MARTÍNEZ-MATOSAS, E. (2012), p. 386: “the TEAC did not accept the application of the OECD 
commentaries to article 5 (…) the tax authorities and the Court argued that such OECD commentaries do not apply to 
the case under analysis as the activities performed in Spain were economically significant (that is, trading, selling and 
delivering)”. MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2016), p. 463: “the TEAC attributed relevance to the web pages for the Spanish 
market, which were maintained and fed by personnel in Spain (…) the TEAC finally concluded that, as the activities were 
significant, the commercialization of Dell products in Spain though the web page must be attributed to the activities of 
Dell Ireland in Spain”. Later on, both High National and the Supreme Court corrected the reasoning of the TEAC, rightly 
concluding that a website can never constitute a “place” of business.  
606 Positions of non-OECD economies to Commentaries to article 5, paragraphs 26 and 33. According to such position, 
India manifests that a website may constitute a PE in certain circumstances (par. 33) as it regards that intangible 
property may on its own constitutes a “place” (par. 26).  
607 It should be noted that the taxpayer can easily circumvent this requirement by means of the so-called “hosting 
arrangements”, through which the non-resident taxpayer does not rent the server as such but an amount of disk space 
to store the corresponding website. See ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 10. 
608 Commentaries to article 5, paragraphs 42.2 to 42.9. 
609 ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 10. 
610 See Section 3.3.2.  
611 ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 10. Other scholars have also strongly critized the OECD´s stand on this matter. See for 
example COCKFIELD, A. (2006), p. 172 and DOERNBERG, R.L.; HINNEKENS, L. (1999), p. 7: “Servers can easily be located 
anywhere and their location is generally unknown and unimportant in a business transaction”. In fact, Google registered 
a patent in 2008 that consisted on the installation of mobile data center platforms at the sea by stacking containers 
filed with servers and storage systems. See New York Times: “Google´s search goes out to the sea”, September 7th 2008. 
612 This book provides a very complete overview on the position of a diverse group of jurisdiction regarding the server-
PE, including administrative guidelines and judgments. See COCKFIELD, A., HELLERSTEIN, W., MILLAR, R., 
WAERZEGGERS, C. (2013), p. 127-131. 
613 The United Kingdom submitted an explicit reservation in this matter, see Observations on the Commentaries to 
article 5, paragraph 45.5. The position of the other jurisdiction is well explained in COCKFIELD, A., HELLERSTEIN, W., 
MILLAR, R., WAERZEGGERS, C. (2013), p. 127-131. 
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OECD MC614, as will be shown below. Furthermore, it may be read as a “defensive” reaction of tax 
administrations and courts towards the recent business restructurings carried out by MNCs with 
the purpose of avoiding the constitution of a PE in the host jurisdiction615. During the 1990s and 
early 2000s, many MNCs restructured the business of their subsidiaries, converting distributors 
into commissionaires and full-fledged manufacturers into contract-manufacturers616. As a result, 
the MNCs managed to maintain the same business activity than before whilst preventing the host 
jurisdiction from taxing the profits attributable to that activity.  
The courts´ general premise was that Spain was legitimized to tax the profits of a non-resident 
enterprise to the extent there was a high degree of penetration of its economic activity in the 
Spanish territory617.  In light of this, we will now proceed to provide a few examples on the impact 
of the Spanish substance-based interpretation of the PE concept.  
In the first place, the Spanish courts followed a substance-based interpretation with regard to 
articles 5.1 and 5.4 to address the fragmentation of activities in the host jurisdiction with the 
intention of qualifying for the “auxiliary/preparatory activity” exception (section 3.3.5.1). In 
particular, they coined the expression “complex operating settlement with economic coherent” so 
as not to apply the PE-exceptions envisaged in article 5.4 and thus consider the existence of a PE 
in Spain. In “Borax”, the courts argued that article 5.4 was not applicable because the activities 
carried out by the subsidiary could not be considered in isolation but rather as parts of an 
“established, permanent and complete business structure”618. A similar consideration may be 
found in the Commentaries to article 5.4.f of the OECD MC619, where the courts may well have 
found their inspiration. What is interesting is that the applicable treaty lacked a clause equivalent 
to that of the article 5.4.f) of the OECD MC, and this fact alone should have prevented the courts 
from combining the activities of the non-resident and further argue that such combination of 
activities went beyond what might be considered as preparatory or auxiliary.  
Secondly, the Spanish courts equally followed an economic interpretation in the context of article 
5.5 of the OECD MC to counteract the effects of the so-called “commissionaire arrangements”. 
We should recall at this point that, under such arrangements, the agent is legally entitled to sell 
the non-residents products in its own name but on behalf of the non-resident. As section 3.3.5.3 
warned above, such arrangements managed to circumvent one of the requirements explicitly 
established in article 5.5: the conclusion of contracts “in the name of the enterprise”. In this 
                                                          
614 MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 61. 
615 MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 68.  
616 MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 61. This was precisely the case of Apple, see section 2.2.4. 
617 Resolution by the Spanish Central Economic-Administrative Court (TEAC), March 15th 2012, “Dell case” and MARTÍN 
JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 66. 
618 Judgment by the Spanish High National Court (Audiencia Nacional), February 9th 2011, “Borax case” and, later on, 
the judgment by the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), June 18th 2014, “Borax case”, both applying the UK-
Spain tax treaty.  
619 Commentaries to article 5, paragraph 27.1: “subparagraph f) is of no importance in a case where an enterprise 
maintains several fixed places of business within the meaning of subparagraphs a) to e) provided that they are separated 
from each other locally and organizationally, as in such a case each place of business has to be viewed separately and 
in isolation for deciding whether a permanent establishment exists. Places of business are not “separated 
organizationally” where they each perform in a Contracting State complementary functions such as receiving and storing 
goods in one place, distributing those goods through another, etc. An enterprise cannot fragment a cohesive operating 
business into several small operations in order to argue that each is merely engaged in a preparatory or auxiliary 
activity”.  
 
136 
 
context, the courts did not accept the logical outcome of the literal wording of article 5.5 and 
chose not to focus on mere contractual formalities but rather focus on the economic effects of 
the acts performed by the agent. And they did so by concluding that an agent acting on behalf of 
a non-resident conformed a PE to the extent its acts were able to bind the principal, thereby 
omitting the part of the clause that specifically required the conclusion of the contracts “in the 
name of the enterprise” 620. Such interpretation did not come out of thin air, as the OECD itself 
promoted it in the Commentaries to the MC621. However, the Spanish courts went one step 
further in the controversial judgments on the “Roche Case”: both the High National and the 
Supreme Court agreed that an agent-PE exists not only where there is a person with authority to 
enter into contracts on behalf of a principal but also when this person “involves the foreign 
principal in the national market”622. It should be noted that this approach towards the agent-PE 
has not succeeded in all civil law States despite the global-reaching influence of the Commentaries 
to the OECD MC623. 
Thirdly, the Spanish courts equally resorted to an economic interpretation of article 5 to presume 
that subsidiaries acted as PEs of their parents. It should first be noted that, as a matter of principle, 
tax law regards parents and subsidiaries as independent legal entities subject to unlimited tax 
liabilities in their respective Residence States. This does not however preclude a subsidiary from 
constituting a PE of their respective parent to the extent it effectively complies with the 
requirements set out in article 5624. For example, the subsidiary may constitute a fixed POB insofar 
it makes its facilities or premises (complying with the location and duration tests) available to the 
parent (“right-to-use” test) through which the parent carries on its own business (“business 
activity” test). Similarly, the subsidiary may constitute a DAPE of the parent if has and habitually 
exercise the authority to conclude contracts in the name and on behalf of the parent. 
Nonetheless, article 5.7 of the OECD MC625 states that the fact that a subsidiary is controlled by a 
non-resident parent and the latter carries on business in the subsidiary´s States “shall not of itself” 
mean that the subsidiary is serving as a PE of the parent company. In essence, article 5.7 
establishes that the condition of PE cannot be presumed on the basis of the economic 
dependence between the two companies and should instead by sufficiently demonstrated on a 
case-by-case basis. However, the Spanish courts have neglected the effects of article 5.7 and the 
principle of legal independence of parents/subsidiaries, as they have frequently resorted to the 
economic dependence between them to presume that the subsidiary was effectively serving as a 
                                                          
620 Judgment by the Spanish High National Court (Audiencia Nacional), January 24th 2008, “Roche case”, judgment by 
the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), January 12th 2012, “Roche case” and resolution by the Spanish Central 
Economic-Administrative Court (TEAC), March 15th 2012, “Dell case”. See also MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 62. 
621 Commentaries to article 5, paragraph 32.1: “the phrase authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise 
does no confine the application of the paragraph to an agent who enters into contracts literally in the name of the 
enterprise; the paragraph applies equally to an agent who concludes contracts which are binding on the enterprise even 
if those contracts are not actually in the name of the enterprise”. The courts made explicit references to the 
Commentaries to the OECD MC in their respective judgments.  
622 Judgment by the Spanish High National Court (Audiencia Nacional), January 24th 2008, “Roche case” and, later on, 
the judgment by the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), January 12th 2012, “Roche case”. This position has 
been severely criticized by MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 64, who believes the Spanish courts departed from an 
erroneous assumption when they reached this conclusion.  
623 See for example the judgments by the French Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil d´État), March 31st 2010, 
“Zimmer Ltd V. Ministre d l´Économie, des Finances et de l´Industrie”, the Norwegian Supreme Court, December 2nd 
2011, “Dell products V. Tax East” and the Italian Supreme Court, March 9th 2012, “Boston Scientific”. 
624 SCHOUERI, L.E.; GÜNTHER, O-C (2011), p. 69. 
625 Article 5.8 of the UN MC and 5.7 of the US MC, although this last one has a slightly different wording.  
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PE of the former without carefully assessing whether the requirements of article 5 were 
effectively fulfilled626.   
Finally, we will refer to the last of the three approaches we mentioned at the beginning of the 
present section. That is, the use of anti-avoidance rules to compensate the deficiencies of the PE 
concept627. We intend to demonstrate here that this approach is as troublesome as the two 
previous ones, albeit for different reasons. 
In the first instance, we observe an overuse of terms as “abuse”, “avoidance” or “artificial” when 
it comes to the definition of certain arrangements conducted by MNCs that essentially lead to 
minimize taxation at the host jurisdiction628. We believe it is indeed an “overuse” because some 
of the practices labeled as such do not technically deserve such label629.  For example, is it 
reasonable to argue that the act of fragmenting the business activities of a MNC into 
geographically separate places (under the responsibility of different related parties) necessarily 
constitutes an abuse of article 5? And similarly, is it reasonable to conclude that the 
commissionaire arrangements are nothing more than artificial schemes with the purpose of 
avoiding the constitution of a PE?  
Having said this, and even considering that we are facing practices that in fact fall under the scope 
of anti-avoidance rules, we should further assess whether the application of such rules is 
technically feasible or not. In this context, we find another obstacle. To the extent the MCs do not 
provide SAARs that may be applicable in the context of article 5 or GAARs, there is no choice but 
to resort to domestic anti-avoidance rules. This leads us to the endless debate as to whether the 
application of domestic anti-avoidance rules in tax treaty-scenarios is compatible with the 
relevant treaty in place. Although the OECD wished to make it very clear that domestic anti-
avoidance rules were perfectly compatible with tax treaties630, we very much doubt of such 
                                                          
626 Judgment by the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), January 12th 2012, “Roche case” and judgment by the 
Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), June 20th 2016, “Dell case”. Martín Jiménez is very critical with this 
approach, see MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 64, 65 and 68. 
627 Martín Jiménez analyzes the appropriateness of using GAARs in the context of article 5, arguing that Spain should 
have resorted to its domestic GAAR instead of adopting the above-mentioned economic interpretation of the article. 
He does not, nevertheless, refer to the problems that domestic GAARs pose in tax treaty scenarios. See MARTÍN 
JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 70-71. Additionally, the OECD itself encourage the use of domestic anti-avoidance rules in tax 
treaty scenarios, see for example Commentaries to article 5, paragraph 6.2, paragraph 18 (“such abuses may, depending 
on the circumstances, fall under the application of legislative or judicial anti-avoidance rules”) and paragraph 42.45 
(“the 183-day thresholds provided for in the alternative provision may give rise to the same type of abuse as is described 
in paragraph 18 above. As indicated in that paragraph, legislative or judicial anti-avoidance rules may apply to prevent 
such abuses”).  
628 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status.  
629 Martín Jiménez seems equally reluctant to use the label of “artificial” in certain circumstances. He stated: “the PE 
(…) is a threshold designed as an exception to a general rule, taxation in the country of residence (…) so it is not easy to 
say that when the outcome of a structure or transaction is in lie with the general rule (taxation in the state of residence) 
it is “artificially avoiding the exception (taxation in the State of the PE)”. MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 9. He then 
added that “in strict legal terms, what the taxpayers did was in line with the legal standard admitted in article 5 of the 
OECD Model” (MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2016), p.465. 
630 Particularly in Commentaries to article 1, paragraph 9.2: “these anti-avoidance rules are part of the basic domestic 
rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which facts give rise to a tax liability, they are not addressed in tax treaties 
and are therefore not affected by them. Thus, as a general rule, there will be no conflict between such rules and the 
provisions of tax conventions”.  
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position631 and rather believe that the application of domestic anti-avoidance rules is likely to lead 
to a treaty override.  
Once the three approaches to counteract the weaknesses of article 5 have been analyzed, we will 
proceed to draw a few general conclusions.  
What these approaches primarily reveal is that article 5 has become a source of endless 
frustration. This is so because jurisdictions seem increasingly reluctant to accept the logical 
outcomes derived from the literal wording of article 5 as it currently stands632. They simply 
realized that following literally the wording of article 5 prevented them from taxing the profits of 
a non-resident enterprise in cases in which it had a very significant business presence in their 
territories.  
As a matter of principle, we may sympathize with the general premise on which the “PE-Spanish 
approach” (and its respective versions in other States) is based, i.e. the fact that a non-resident 
enterprise should be subject to tax in the host jurisdiction in cases in which it carries on a 
significant business activity therein. And by extension, we may agree with the outcomes of these 
approaches. However, we believe that it is not acceptable to achieve this goal by the means 
described in the present section633. The reason being that all three approaches, to a greater or 
lesser extent, compromise the principle of legal certainty and, more generally, the respect for the 
rule of law. Using some of the examples above referred, we will now put forward three reasons 
to justify our position. 
Firstly, some of the administrative and case law doctrines above referred go beyond the possible 
meaning of the terms of the rule. This is for example the case of the virtual PE, as some courts 
understood that a website constituted a “place” for the purposes of article 5.1 (Dell case). Further, 
other doctrines even constitute a direct breach of the corresponding rule they intend to interpret. 
Let us take as an example the omission of the “in the name of” requirement when applying the 
agency-PE clause (Roche and Dell) or, what is even worse, the consideration of an agent as a PE 
in cases in which it lacked the authority to enter into contracts (Roche case). In Borax, for example, 
the courts chose not to apply the PE-exceptions of article 5.4 on the basis that they all formed 
part of a sole business cycle, despite the tax treaty in place did not entitle the court to do so, as it 
lacked article 5.4.f) of the OECD MC. Similarly, the courts presumed that certain subsidiaries were 
acting as PEs of their respective parents even though article 5.7 literally establishes that such 
condition cannot be presumed (Roche and Dell). On a more general level, the application of 
domestic anti-avoidance rules in tax treaty scenarios may likewise lead to a direct breach of a tax 
treaty rule (and by extension the pacta sunt servanda principle) for the reasons previously stated. 
Secondly, there are cases in which the courts have literally followed the wording of article 5 but 
the outcome of such interpretation defeats the alleged purpose of the PE rule. This is clearly the 
case of the server-PE.  As explained above, the PE threshold is intended to capture a significant 
economic involvement with the host jurisdiction, while a server does not per se manifest any kind 
                                                          
631 We endorse the arguments and conclusions of Zornoza and Báez in ZORNOZA PÉREZ, J.; BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2010).  
632 A tendency we already observed in the context of residence tests back in section 3.2.1.2.3. 
633 MARTIN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2016), p. 458: “it is true that the response is unfortunate in the terms that are considered in 
this article, but it is probably not as unfounded, in substance, although not in form, as it may appear at first sight”. 
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of participation in the economic life of such jurisdiction beyond the presence of a “dusty computer 
running in the basement of a building”. 
Thirdly, we have observed that the origin of the vast majority of these approaches is commonly 
found in the Commentaries to the OECD MC. At this point, we would like to warn against the 
indirect amendments of the wording of the MCs by means of soft law instruments. Particularly 
when such amendments explicitly or implicitly contradict the literal meaning of the rules they 
intend to interpret. Although these soft law instruments do not directly produce legal effects of 
any kind nor constitute authoritative interpretation materials, they undoubtedly have a great 
influence in administrative bodies and courts. And for this reason alone the OECD should be more 
careful when drafting them to avoid undesirable outcomes as the ones referred above.  
In short, all these arguments ultimately reveal that the resort to eccentric interpretations, 
substance-based approaches and anti-avoidances rules as a way to neutralize the dissatisfaction 
that article 5 generates is dangerous, in the sense that it compromises the principle of legal 
certainty and undermines the system of “rule of law”634. At this stage, the only way forward is to 
carefully assess the deficiencies of the PE concept as it currently stands and subsequently suggest 
amendments to the rule in Chapter 5. 
Last but not least, attention should also be paid to the PE-Spanish approach as regards the 
attribution of profits to the PEs. Back in Section 3.3.4 we succinctly described the methodology 
recently suggested by the OECD (commonly known as “AOA”) as to how to apply article 7.2 of the 
OECD MC to attribute profits to the PEs. The Spanish courts deviated from the orthodox approach 
once again, as some judgments disregarded the functional analysis required by the OECD TPG 
and/or the AOA report and instead departed from all the income derived from the sales in Spain 
with a deduction of expenses directly connected with those sales, even those obtained by a 
French subsidiary of the group635. As a result of this, the Spanish courts succeeded in bringing the 
profits derived from the Spanish market to the Spanish taxable base by means of their peculiar 
interpretation of both articles 5 and 7.2 of the OECD MC. 
The position held by the Spanish courts should be once again regarded as a threat to the principle 
of legal certainty and the rule of law. However, the question remains as to whether the outcome 
reached by the Spanish court is indeed legitimate. If the response is positive, the question arises 
as to whether the methodology proposed by the OECD for the attribution of profits to PEs 
constitutes in fact an obstacle for the aforementioned goal and, if so, whether it should be 
reconsidered. We will equally address these questions later in Chapter 5. 
                                                          
634 Along the same lines see MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2016), p. 472. He believes that the Spanish approach is a “nothing 
more and nothing less than a reaction that questions the current PE threshold” and such reaction “should have been 
undertaken using other mechanisms rather than by way of a peculiar interpretation of article 5 (…) trying to lower that 
threshold by interpretation obviously gives rise to a problem of uncertainty”. Elsewhere, Martín Jiménez argued that 
the “PE-Spanish approach” transmits a wrong message internationally: the fact that the Spanish authorities and courts 
are aggressive and technically not very sophisticated and the fact that legal certainty is at risk when conducting 
transactions in Spain. See MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 69. 
635 MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2016), p. 464, 466 and 468-469. See the Resolution by the Spanish Central Economic-
Administrative Court (TEAC), March 15th 2012, “Dell case”, the judgment by the Spanish High National Court (Audiencia 
Nacional), June 8th 2015, “Dell case” and the judgment by the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), June 20th 
2016, “Dell case”. 
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3.3.6.2.2. A more profound evaluation of the causes that turn the PE into another source of 
segregation between taxable profits and income-generating activities as a first step to amend 
the rule 
We will now refer to the inherent deficiencies of the PE concept we believe to be the primary 
causes for the misalignment between taxing rights over profits and location of the activities that 
generate them. 
In the first place, section 3.3.5 already brought forward a few potential profit shifting risks derived 
by article 5 that somehow contribute to this misalignment. Jurisdictions have traditionally dealt 
with them by means of substance-based interpretations, anti-avoidance rules, etc. (section 
3.3.6.2.1), but we have strongly critized this approach for the reasons referred above and 
advocate instead for the direct amendment of article 5 of the treaties636. As the BEPS project has 
fortunately chosen this same approach, we will further analyze in chapter 5.2.3 the outcomes of 
the project in this regard. 
However, we believe there is a more fundamental problem concerning the PE threshold that per 
se largely explains the misalignment between taxing rights over profits and location of the 
activities that generate them. As we know, the PE equates physical and stable presence with 
taxable presence637: a common pattern that is obvious and visible in all the four modalities of PEs 
set out in the MCs. This fact alone leads to leave untaxed all other significant business activities 
that, on the contrary, do not meet these requirements: 
- Fixed POB (art 5.1 of the MCs). The “fixed place of business” clause was originally intended 
to encompass various forms of business to the extent they required a physical, fixed and 
relatively permanent presence of the non-resident taxpayer in the host jurisdiction. 
Conversely, the clause is noticeably unable to capture other forms of business that do not 
entail such physical, fixed and relatively permanent presence in the host jurisdiction. This 
would be the case of commercial activity conducted through remote means, e.g. 
catalogue shopping via mail-order transactions or sales carried out through call centers, 
websites, smartphone “apps”, etc.  
- Construction PE (art 5.3 of the MCs). The construction PE equally requires a physical 
presence in the host jurisdiction in the form of a building site or a construction of 
installation project, a physical presence that needs to be maintained over a certain period 
of time. However, this clause does not pose any problems, as it refers to a form of 
business that necessarily involves a physical presence in the host jurisdiction. As regards 
the time frame, jurisdictions simply need to waive the advantages and disadvantages of 
brief and long periods before making the policy decision that best fits their needs. 
                                                          
636 Position shared by Martín Jiménez, see MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 55: “this solution (the policy approach) has 
an advantage over others, and specially, anti-avoidance norms or doctrines: if drafted clearly and having administrability 
in mind, they are often much easier to apply than anti-avoidance rules or doctrines or transfer pricing legislation”.  
637 ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 8. 
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- Dependent agent (art 5.5 of the MCs). As the previous clauses, the agency PE equally 
demands the physical presence of the agent in the host jurisdiction, as all the MCs require 
that the agent “acts” in such jurisdiction. Accordingly, the agent needs to be acting 
physically in the territory of the State, although it does not need to be resident or have a 
POB therein638. A contrario sensu, the clause would automatically exclude persons 
performing remotely this very same commercial activity or concluding the contracts 
outside the host jurisdiction639. 
- Service PE (art 5.3.b of the UN MC). This clause is equally dependent on a physical and 
continued presence in the host jurisdiction. This implies that the remote provision of 
services would by its own nature fall outside its scope and would thus remain untaxed at 
source. 
As pointed out above in section 3.3.3, requiring a physical and stable presence was perfectly 
consistent with the economic context in which the PE arose, where the physical presence was 
critical to perform any kind of business activity640. Back then, this 19th century legal clause was 
certainly able to cover most of the significant economic activities that could take place in a 19th 
century business environment.  
Changes in business models, communications and technology have broken the assumption on 
which the PE is based, i.e. the fact that most substantial business activities necessarily entail a 
physical presence maintained over time. On the contrary, it is increasingly possible to conduct a 
significant economic activity in the host jurisdiction that does not express itself in the terms 
required in the PE clause641. This would be the case, for example, of commercial activities and/or 
sales conducted through remote means (call centers, websites, smartphone “apps”) or the 
remote provision of services. All these activities may acquire great economic relevance but would 
still fall outside the scope of the PE clause without any trace of artificiality whatsoever642. In this 
regard, section 2.2.4 already provided some examples of business activities carried out by Apple 
that were not captured by the PE clause and effectively allowed Apple to substantially participate 
in the economic life of the host jurisdiction without triggering tax liabilities therein. In this context, 
it is hardly surprising that the companies that best represent these technological advances (i.e. 
the so-called “digital companies”, Apple itself among them) are, on average, able to enjoy much 
lower global effective tax rates than equivalent non-digital companies in the host jurisdictions 
where they operate643.  
                                                          
638 Such interpretation may be logically inferred from the wording of the clause and is further confirmed by the 
Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 32. 
639 MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 28. 
640 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 21: “when the benefit theory developed and the PE definition was implemented 
into the OECD Model, neither the digital world nor computers existed. This could be one reason why it is argued that a 
physical presence is required for source taxation as there had not been any possible benefits besides physical benefits 
that could occur (e.g. streets, public transport, police, etc.)”. 
641 ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 10. 
642 SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 573: “an enterprise´s connection to the soil, its PE, is no longer a reliable evidence of economic 
allegiance”.  
643 This was revealed in a study conducted by the European Commission. In a sample of 7 major digital companies and 
7 major non-digital companies, all US-based, it was demonstrated that the former enjoyed an average effective tax rate 
of 9.58% in 2011 as opposed to the 17.54% of the latter. See EU Commission Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital 
Economy (2014): Final report, p. 54-55.  
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To sum up, we believe these new features that characterize the 21st century business environment 
are the primary reasons why the PE itself has inadvertently (but increasingly) given rise to a 
misalignment between substantial economic presence and taxable presence644.  
3.4. CONCLUSIONS 
As evidenced though the Apple case study in chapter 2, there is an increasing misalignment 
between the location where the actual business activities take place and the location where the 
profits are eventually reported for tax purposes (a phenomenon hereinafter referred to as “profit 
shifting”). In order to appropriately dissect the causes giving rise to this phenomenon, we first 
analyzed the particular rules and strategies that enabled Apple to shift their profits out of the 
jurisdictions where the business activities took place (section 2.2). Beyond these factors, we 
perceived the influence of other causes of a more general and fundamental nature (section 2.2.5).  
This chapter intended to ascertain whether three long-standing paradigms underlying corporate 
income taxation were in fact sources of profit shifting. The main purpose of this chapter was to 
ascertain to what extent the separate-entity approach and the definitions of residence and source 
for tax purposes have effectively contributed to allow corporate taxpayers to detach taxable 
profits from the jurisdictions where they are generated and instead book them in the jurisdiction 
of their choice. 
In the first place, section 3.1 referred to the separate-entity approach. We then observed that the 
separate tax treatment of companies belonging to a same group enabled taxpayers to easily shift 
taxable profits to selected jurisdictions (section 3.1.2). The ALS serves as a corrective and indeed 
manages to minimize this risk, but it is unable to completely eradicate it (section 3.1.3). In this 
regard, we argued that the ALS is far from being a mathematical parameter and instead tends to 
lead to a wide range of acceptable prices within which taxpayers and tax Administrations may 
move freely and legitimately. We noted that this fact constituted an advantage to resourceful 
taxpayers, as they are better equipped to push the limits of the ALS and get the price within the 
range that best fits their needs. Besides, we also demonstrated that transfer pricing outcomes 
perfectly compliant with the ALS could still entail significant profit shifting risks. The example we 
provided referred to the use of transfer pricing methods based on costs in scenarios involving 
intangibles, as intangibles may potentially generate income that is disproportionately higher than 
the costs incurred in their development. 
Secondly, section 3.2 sought to discern whether the way corporate tax residence is defined 
equally triggers profit shifting risks. After the analysis of the most common corporate tax 
residence tests (section 3.2.1.1), we realized that most of them were inherited from private 
international law (section 3.2.1.2.1). At this point, we warned of the risks derived by a mere 
extrapolation of terms from a legal order whose function and purpose had little to do with those 
of tax law, noting that this ultimately revealed that the gestation process of current tax residence 
tests lacked a serious policy assessment. We also demonstrated that, historically, the 
implementation of new residence tests was primarily driven by the desire of closing the loopholes 
of the preexisting tests rather than by clear policy purposes (section 3.2.1.2.2). In our opinion, the 
                                                          
644 Opinion shared by Martín Jiménez in MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 45. 
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fact that jurisdictions adopted residence tests without really knowing, understanding and 
accepting their supposed rationale and meaning resulted in the unwillingness of jurisdictions to 
accept the logical outcomes of their own residence test (section 3.2.1.2.3). Particularly when the 
residence tests led to consider a State in which the company does not have “economic substance” 
as its residence State for tax purposes. While jurisdictions tended to counteract this risk by means 
of anti-avoidance rules, the fact remains that such scenario was indeed a quite plausible one, as 
the great majority of residence tests, by their own nature, does not specifically require any kind 
of economic attachment between the corporate taxpayer and the potential Residence State. 
Therefore, residence tests that do not guarantee a sufficient economic bond with the State could 
be instrumental in tax planning schemes intended to shift profits to selected jurisdictions where 
no business activities take place.  
Ultimately, the conclusions drawn in sections 3.2.3.2.3 and 3.2.4.5 further confirmed those 
exposed above. Firstly, we demonstrated that treaty shopping opportunities were a direct 
consequence of the weakness of residence tests. In this context, anti-treaty shopping measures 
(e.g. LOBs) became necessary to compensate such deficiencies and further require a sufficient 
and substantive connection between the corporate taxpayer and the relevant State, as most 
residence tests were inherently unable to do so. Secondly, we argued in section 3.2.4.5 that the 
proliferation of dual residence cases was equally a consequence of the malfunction of domestic 
residence tests. The reason being that residence tests that do not demand a genuine and strong 
connection between the corporate taxpayer and the jurisdiction concerned (that is, most of them) 
were more prone to cause overlapping attributions of residence.   
Furthermore, section 3.2.2 revealed that that the lack of coordination in the domestic definition 
of corporate tax residence was likely to generate profit shifting opportunities. The most 
emblematic example was that of “stateless companies”, i.e. companies that were not regarded as 
tax resident by any jurisdiction and, accordingly, were able to shift taxable profits to territories 
were no business activity was taking place or even make them disappear from the face of the 
Earth (evidenced in the Apple case study, in section 2.2.1). After the study of the residence tests 
used by a sample of countries, we demonstrated that the same asymmetry exploited by Apple 
was equally present in many other combinations of jurisdictions.  
Finally, section 3.3 intended to ascertain whether the definition of source for tax purposes was 
similarly a source of profit shifting opportunities. Due to its relevance, we decided to focus on the 
PE concept, explaining its origins (section 3.3.3) and the significance it had acquired over the years 
in international tax law. Subsequently, we stated that the PE had ultimately become a sort of 
“functional” resident, as there was an increasing tendency to equate the tax treatment of PEs to 
those of resident subsidiaries (section 3.3.4). Further, tax treaties gave precedence to the taxing 
rights of the PE-State over those of the Residence State, thus emptying the tax base of the latter 
in favor of the former (section 3.3.6.1). A preference that could be justified by the fact that the 
residence tests rarely guarantee a substantive connection between the taxpayer and the territory, 
while the PE concept does. 
We departed from the general assumption that, as a matter of principle and considering the 
rationale behind source-based taxation, the PE concept should lead us to the territory where the 
income-producing activities take place (section 3.3.5). Thus, theoretically, the PE concept was 
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expected to contribute to minimize the breach between economic and tax presence. A closer 
study to the content of the PE concept in its different modalities revealed that this general 
assumption had ceased to be entirely true. The PE clause, if literally interpreted, was unable to 
cover all sorts of significant economic presence in the host jurisdiction (section 3.3.6.2). As 
jurisdictions were not satisfied by the outcomes derived by the literal wording of article 5, they 
tended to counteract its limitations by means of substance-based interpretations and anti-
avoidance rules (section 3.3.6.2.1). We strongly critized this approach, since we believed it 
potentially led to compromise the principle of legal certainty and, more generally, the respect for 
the rule of law. On the contrary, we advocated for an amendment of article 5 as the best way to 
counteract its inherent deficiencies and further adapt it to the 21st century economic context 
(section 3.3.6.2.2). We argued that such amendment could in fact contribute to realign the 
substantial economic presence with the tax presence without compromising the principles of the 
rule of law. 
For all the arguments presented in this chapter, we believe that these three paradigms have 
contributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to allow corporate taxpayers to book their profits in 
jurisdictions other than those where the economic activities giving rise to them take place and, 
by extension, to widen the gap between tax and economic presence.  
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4. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EXISTENCE 
AND FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE INCOME TAXES 
AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PREEXISTING 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
We intended to demonstrate in Chapter 2 the existence of an increasing misalignment between 
the location where the actual business activities take place and the location where the profits are 
eventually reported for tax purposes (a phenomenon we referred to as “profit shifting”). Later, 
Chapter 3 provided several arguments to sustain that three long-standing paradigms underlying 
corporate income taxation were in fact largely responsible for the afore mentioned misalignment, 
as they have contributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to allow corporate taxpayers to book their 
profits in jurisdictions other than those where the economic activities giving rise to them take 
place and, by extension, to widen the gap between tax and economic presence.  
It is one of the main objectives of the present study to suggest a few policy initiatives in Chapter 
5. However, we believe this task should ideally be preceded by a profound reflection on matters 
of a more fundamental nature which refer the own existence of the CIT and its foundations, an 
exercise that has been omitted by the BEPS project. This reflection is particularly aimed at 
determining whether the misalignment corroborated by Chapter 2 (and perceived as a threat by 
the BEPS project) constitutes indeed a problem that needs to be overcome. If the answer is 
positive, such reflection is likely to help us lay down the policy guidelines that should inspire the 
amendments we intend to put forward in Chapter 5. 
In the first place, we will call for a careful deliberation on the very existence and raison d´être of 
CITs (section 4.1). Secondly, we will try to identify the principle(s) that should theoretically 
underlie income taxation and further ascertain whether they are indeed observed in CITs and, if 
necessary, how they should ideally guide the content of CITs (section 4.2). Lastly, we will review 
the implications that the preexisting legal framework (i.e. Public International Law) may pose (if 
any) for the exercise we intend to conduct later in Chapter 5 (section 4.3).   
Hopefully, the exercise we intend to undertake in the present chapter will enable us to extract a 
few positive guidelines that may help us draft the proposals in Chapter 5.  
 
4.1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE VERY EXISTENCE OF 
THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
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We can only start with the most fundamental question of all645. Why are companies taxed on their 
income in the first place? Is this policy choice justified on solid grounds? 
As indicated in Section 3.1.1, companies are nothing more than mere fictions created by the law 
at the time of the industrial revolution with the intention of providing citizens with a reliable 
investment vehicle through which they could limit their potential liabilities in the event of 
losses646. Jurisdictions granted them a legal personality status analogous to that enjoyed by 
natural persons. A status that generally entailed the capacity to hold both rights and obligations 
within a certain legal system, such as entering into contracts, suing and being sued, incurring debt 
or owning property. Naturally, the legal personality of both the company and its shareholders 
remains separate, so the rights and duties of the company are distinct from the rights and duties 
of its members. 
At this point jurisdictions faced a fundamental decision: whether or not to remain faithful to the 
legal fiction for tax law purposes. In other words, should countries treat the company as a 
separate person, distinct from its own shareholders, also for tax purposes? Should they tax its 
income separately at the time it is perceived? The vast majority of countries responded positively 
to these questions, thereby extending their preexisting income tax systems to these new legal 
subjects and imposing a separate tax at the level of the company647. The reason(s) behind this 
choice may naturally vary from country to country, but we have reasons to believe it was most 
probably driven by inertia rather than clear policy purposes. 
That said, the decision to tax the income in the hands of the company has always been 
controversial. It is rare to find an economist who supports the existence of CITs648, while quite a 
few tax experts have similarly despise them. We will now briefly highlight some of the problems 
it may pose. 
In general, all taxes tend to be inefficient, discourage economic activity and lead to distortions in 
the decision-making process of the taxpayers. Naturally, CITs are no exception to this rule. In 
particular, CITs are likely to condition decisions concerning the choice of the business sector, the 
organizational form (the incorporation decision), the location of the activities, the company´s 
capital structure (the debt:equity ratio), the policy dividend, etc.649. Additionally, it is no secret 
that CITs often generate such a large amount of costs and such a high degree of legal uncertainty 
with regard to the ultimate tax implications of the business decisions that they may dissuade 
potential investors or entrepreneurs from investing, initiating, maintaining or expanding a 
business activity. 
Of course, one could rapidly forgive CITs for the problems stemming from their implementation 
to the extent one could conclude that their advantages effectively offset its drawbacks. In this 
regard, there is a widespread assumption that CITs are inherently fair, insofar they appear to 
contribute to redistribute wealth from the companies (symbols of wealth and power) to the less 
                                                          
645 The ideas comprised in this section are based on a previous publication. See ESCRIBANO, E. (2017), p. 252-253. 
646 See Section 3.1.1. For a greater insight on the historical origin of companies see and HARRIS, P.A. (1996), pp. 40-41. 
647 See Section 3.1.1 and IFA General Report on the matter (LANG, M., STARINGER, C. (2014), p. 23 et seq.). 
648 See for example the position held by the Nobel Prize for Economics Wickrey:  WICKREY, W. (1991). 
649 BIRD, R. (2002), p. 194. 
 
147 
 
privileged social classes650. However, multiple studies have dispelled this myth, concluding that 
CITs do not necessarily help to redistribute wealth the way we expect them to do. 
For a better understanding of how redistribution works in corporate income taxation, the first 
question that arises is who is affected by the payment of these taxes. Even though companies are 
the nominal taxable subjects of the tax, as they are mere legal fictions, they are not the ones 
ultimately bearing the tax burden. Rather, it is those individuals who are tangentially linked to the 
companies that do651. The next question that arises is which individuals are affected by the 
payment of the CITs, as companies make such payments with funds that would otherwise have 
served other purposes. Empirical studies have concluded that CITs are ultimately borne by three 
different groups of individuals: shareholders (as a result of a decrease in their invested capital)652, 
employees (by way of a reduction in their pay)653 and consumers (through an increase in prices)654. 
In particular, globalization may have aggravated the burden on the less mobile individuals, i.e. the 
employees655. 
This revelation calls into question the wealth redistributive role supposedly played by CITs, as the 
tax revenues do not appear to flow from the “prosperous powerful" companies, but rather from 
their shareholders, clients and, primarily, employees. At this point, it should be noted that most 
tax systems already subject to tax the ability to pay expressed by these groups of individuals, by 
means of both direct and indirect taxes. As a result, it seems that wealth redistribution systems 
of jurisdictions with CITs in place tend to penalize unjustifiably these groups of individuals, as they 
are compelled to contribute to their national budget by means of a considerable number of tax 
instruments, CITs among them.  
What is more, if we regarded those who ultimately bear the burden of CITs as the true taxpayers, 
it could hardly be argued that these CITs are consistent with the ability-to-pay principle. The 
reason is that the calculation of the tax liability in CITs tends to rely solely on the amount of net 
profits obtained by the company during the tax period concerned, irrespective of the particular 
ability to pay of the individuals (whether shareholders, clients or employees) who are deemed to 
bear the tax burden at the end of the day. Accordingly, such tax burden would fall equally on all 
these individuals regardless of their respective economic positions656. 
In conclusion, it would be easier to accept the aforementioned pernicious effects of CITs insofar 
they could be regarded as effective wealth redistribution tools. However, as long as this myth is 
dismissed, it appears to be difficult to maintain the usefulness of these taxes. This also appears to 
be particularly ironic in the context of the BEPS project, as the discourse of the media, the NGOs 
                                                          
650 BRAUNER, Y. (2008b), p. 594. 
651 BIRD, R. (2002), p. 195, AUERBACH, A. J. (2006) and BRAUNER, Y. (2008b), p. 592. Marian adheres to the idea that 
the CIT is merely “an instrument to get into the pockets of, or affect the behavior of, certain individuals”. See MARIAN, 
O. (2013), p. 1627. 
652 HARBERGER, A.C. (1962), recently reviewed by AUERBACH, A.J. (2006), p. 33. 
653 ARULAMPALAM, W.; DEVERAUX, M.; MAFFINI, G. (2007). 
654 KRZYZANIAK, M.; MUSGRAVE, R.A. (1963). 
655 GRUBERT, H.; MUTTI, J. (1985). 
656 BIRD, R. (2002), p. 195. 
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and the OECD itself has revolved around the notions of equity, wealth redistribution and paying a 
“fair share” 657. 
As a result of the above reasons, some have recently pleaded for the abolishment of CITs and their 
replacement by a mechanism that would turn the company into a mere withholding agent 
responsible for the collection of the income tax imposed on the individual shareholders658. In 
other words, this would operate as a tax transparency system preventing tax deferral with regard 
to the income accumulated by companies. Such a system presents major challenges, one of them 
being the identification of the individual shareholders behind the corporate veil. Nowadays, 
information on the ownership of companies is rarely public, as we had the chance to personally 
experience back in Section 2.1.1.1, where we were unable to identify the shareholders behind 
Apple beyond its top institutional shareholders. The OECD intends to make some progress in this 
regard, as it has recently stated that one of its next priorities is to “address the question of 
beneficial ownership (…) identify the natural persons behind the companies, trusts and other 
arrangements”659. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the abolishment of CITs is today an unattainable chimera. This is 
mainly because citizenship (and by extension its political representatives) feel that such taxes are 
both useful and fair, no matter how much these assumptions are based on unfounded 
intuitions660. So departing from the preservation of the tax, we will subsequently identify the main 
theories justifying its imposition as a way to better address its potential reform. 
 
4.2. THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE AS AN EQUITABLE AND 
USEFUL GUIDELINE TO IDENTIFY THE TAXPAYERS OF 
CORPORATE INCOME TAXES 
 
The present Section intends to call for the recovery of a long-standing principle –the benefit 
principle- and further suggest the specific role it should play in the context of CITs661.   
To this effect, we will try to ascertain the role that the benefit principle could play in income taxes 
and how it may be complemented by the ability to pay principle (section 4.2.1). Secondly, we will 
determine the specific manner in which the benefit principle could be complied with in the 
                                                          
657 There are multiple references to the principle of fairness along the BEPS report, see the BEPS report, pp. 37, 48, 49 
and 50. See also RUSSO, R.; SAINT-AMANS, P. (2013) and RUSSO, R.; SAINT-AMANS, P. (2016): The BEPS Package: 
promise kept.  
658 BRAUNER, Y. (2008b), pp. 635-636. On the other hand, Marian advocates for the maintenance of the CIT but instead 
makes clear that its structure (and particularly its residence test) should be designed to ensure that the corporate tax 
eventually burdens the intended individuals, whether its shareholders or others. See MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 474. 
659 OECD (2016): Tax Transparency: report on progress, p. 5. 
660 BRAUNER, Y. (2008b), p. 593 and 635; and BIRD, R. (2002), p. 194. On the contrary, other scholars still advocate for 
the maintenance of this tax, see for example AVI-YONAH, R. (2004). 
661 BROADWAY, R.; BRUCE, N.; MINTZ, J. (1984), p. 286: “only when the rationale for levying a corporate tax has been 
determined can we evaluate existing systems and suggest improvements”. 
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context of corporate income taxation (section 4.2.2). Thirdly, we will try to ascertain whether this 
principle is indeed observed in the paradigms underlying today´s corporate income taxation 
(section 4.2.3). Finally, a preliminary conclusion will be drawn (section 4.2.4).   
 
4.2.1. THE ROLE THAT THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE SHOULD PLAY IN 
INCOME TAXATION 
 
In the present section we intend to explore the role that the benefit principle could (in our view, 
“should”) play in the context of income taxes together with its advantages and inherent 
limitations. Lastly, we will make a brief reference to the specific role that the ability to pay 
principle may perform in this scenario and further explain why we believe both principles should 
not be regarded as mutually exclusive but rather compatible and complementary, as they cover 
their respective shortcomings. 
The benefit principle is one of the most common justifications for the imposition of taxes, 
although its meaning has significantly varied throughout history662. Originally, its proponents 
argued that taxpayers ought to contribute to government in proportion to the benefits obtained 
from government institutions and programs663 but this view only stands today in very specific 
scenarios664. Conversely, the old theory has greatly evolved towards more modern views, such as 
                                                          
662 VOGEL, K. (1988d) and DODGE, J.M. (2004). For example, in the context of Rousseau´s social contract theory 
(between the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century), the imposition of taxes on the citizens was regarded 
as justified insofar the tax revenues contributed to serve the general will and thus provided benefits for each of the 
members of the community individually considered, most notably the effective defense of his person and property 
(VOGEL, K. (1988d), p. 26 and 35). At that time, Montesquieu defined taxes as “a portion that each subject gives of his 
property in order to secure or enjoy the remainder (…) in other to fix such revenues, both the needs of the State and the 
citizens must be taken into account” (“les revenues de l´État son tune portion qui chaque citoyen donne de son bien pour 
avoir la sureté de l´autre, ou pour en jouir agréabelement (…) pour bien fixes ces revenus, il faut avoir égard aux 
necessities de l´État et aux necessities des citoyens”). See MONTESQUIEU, C.L. (1747), book XIII, chapter I. Later, in the 
19th century, the theory according to which taxes would be justified on a (individual) quid pro quo basis according to 
the specific benefits provided by the sovereign to each of its citizens began to lose its strength. Conversely, the emerging 
understanding that all taxes collected corresponded to all State services as a whole rapidly spread, thereby shifting to 
a “general” quid pro quo approach between the government and its citizens as a whole according to which there should 
be a global equivalence between government services and government levies. See VOGEL, K. (1988d), p. 28, 32 and 35 
and BUCHANAN, J.M. (1960), p. 19: “there should exist a quid pro quo relationship between government and all 
individuals together”. According to him, taxation would only be justified to the extent an equivalence between 
government services and the tax payments made by individuals, collectively considered, exists.  
663 DODGE, J.M. (2004), p. 2. 
664 According to Dodge, the “old” benefit theory has been cabined off to government activities that involve citizen use 
of government property, facilities and services (e.g. highway tolls, hunting and fishing licenses, tuition at educational 
institutions, etc.). See DODGE, J.M. (2004), p. 3. 
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the “expanded version of the traditional benefit principle”665, the “partnership theory”666 and the 
“entitlement theory”667. Our view of the benefit principle and its utility for the purposes of this 
thesis is more aligned with this latter theory, as will become apparent throughout this section.  
We believe the benefit principle is particularly useful and appropriate when the time comes to 
identify the members of the community that ought to contribute to the financial support of the 
government668. The benefit principle would justify the imposition of a tax burden on persons who 
find themselves in a position to effectively benefit from the relevant public goods, services and 
infrastructures provided by the State concerned, as this fact makes them the most suitable 
candidates for assuming the responsibility to financially support the maintenance of such 
services669. The reason is obvious: it seems only fair that those enjoying (or in a position to do so) 
the benefits funded by a State should contribute to their financial support.  
                                                          
665 DODGE, J.M. (2005), p. 399: “the new benefit principle (…) holds that the proper index for measuring the benefits 
received from government by an individual taxpayer is the taxpayer´s economic well-being, that is, how well taxpayers 
do in the market economy, because government, by providing security, law and infrastructure (in the broad sense) 
enables the market economy”. See also DODGE, J.M. (2004). This idea can be traced back to Adam Smith, where he 
stated that the subjects of every State ought to contribute towards the support of the government “in proportion to 
their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the 
State” (SMITH, A. (1776), p. 639). Although he has been credited with the earliest reference to the ability to pay theory, 
his words imply he does not really provide a brand new standard, as it seems to rely once again on benefit grounds 
(KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 157 and MUSGRAVE, R.A. (1959), p. 92) to the extent he seems to depart from the next two 
assumptions. Firstly, that a person having twice as much property is expected to receive twice as much protection by 
the State and therefore ought to pay twice as much for such protection. And secondly, that the protection of property 
was the only purpose and responsibility held by the government. The four experts of the League of Nationals equally 
followed this approach in their 1923 influential report: “the ability-to-pay principle is more comprehensive than the 
preceding (benefit) theory because it includes what there is of value in the benefit theory. So far as the benefits 
connected with the acquisition of wealth increase individual faculty” (See Economic and Financial Commission for the 
League of Nations (1923): Report on Taxation, p. 18). 
666 Also known as the “economic version of the benefit principle”. According to Dodge, this theory “is based on the notion 
that government should share in national income (…) because government, by supplying infrastructure in the broad 
sense (physical infrastructure, national and domestic security, a capitalism enabling legal system and regulatory 
structure), “earns” a share of the GDP” (DODGE, J.M. (2004), p. 19). This theory indeed justifies income taxation, as it 
enables the government to get a “share” of the profits of an economic enterprise as if it were a “partner” or “investor” 
in the private business to which it has contributed by means of a public investment (DODGE, J.M. (2005), p. 444 et seq). 
This theory is barely distinguishable from the “expanded” version of the traditional benefit theory. 
667 The entitlement theory is usually associated to Peggy Musgrave, who contended that the source State should be 
entitled to tax income originating within its borders because it is the State where the “income-generating activity” take 
place and thus the one that economically contributes to the production of income and therefore. This being so, it ought 
to be compensated for its contribution. See MUSGRAVE, P.B.; MUSGRAVE, R.A. (1972), p. 71 and MUSGRAVE, P.B. 
(1984), p. 228-246. McLure argues that entitlement to corporate tax revenue exists “any time a firm avails itself of the 
productive resources or the market of a nation, that is, if it has an economic presence in the nation” (MCLURE, C.E. (Jr.) 
(2000), p. 6:4). Subsequently, he highlights the three main differences between the traditional benefit principle and the 
entitlement theory. Firstly, the former concentrates on the benefits provided by the government to business while the 
latter is based on economic benefits (e.g. the benefits of exploiting a market). Secondly, the latter is preferred in cases 
in which the tax base is calculated departing from the profits obtained by the company. Thirdly, the latter supports a 
higher level of corporate income taxation than the former.  
668 MUSGRAVE, R.A. (1959), p. 62: “the benefit principle has the advantage of providing for a simultaneous 
determination of public services and tax shares”.  
669 SCHANZ, G. (1892), p. 372-373: “every person who is economically tied to this community, that is every person who 
would benefit from the obligations of the commune being fulfilled, also shares the responsibilities (…) the inhabitants 
who, by necessity, are provided with internal and external security, roads from transport, sanitation, educational 
establishments, and are engaged with economic and cultural affairs, need to be taken account of just as much as those 
who live outside the community but who depend on the former for the protection of their property and who share in the 
consumption of the community´s efforts in the form of value increases, profit and safe revenues” (free translation by 
HARRIS, P.A. (1996), p. 276). See also KEMMEREN, E.C.C.M (2001), p. 520: “to assess whether a sufficient point of 
connection for the assignment of tax jurisdiction is present, a link should be made between the territory principle with 
 
151 
 
This fact does not only justify on theoretical grounds the imposition of a tax burden on this group 
of persons, it also underlines the mutual “quid pro quo” commitment between the State 
concerned and its respective taxpayers. That is, on one hand taxpayers are likely to feel part of 
the community and thereby understand and accept the reason why they ought to contribute to 
its preservation and development, in fact they will generally be able to witness first-hand the 
correlation between their economic effort and the quantity and quality of the public goods, 
services and infrastructures. On the other hand, the State would feel committed towards its own 
community of taxpayers and endeavor to provide the highest possible quality of services and 
infrastructures, just as if they were its clients. This sense of engagement between the taxpayer 
and the State concerned is prone to prevent the so-called “secret tax revolt” referred to by 
Vogel670, that is, the increasing predisposition of normal responsible citizens -who would normally 
be incapable of stealing-  to conceal taxable transactions to reduce its tax liabilities. 
The benefit principle acquires particular significance in cross-border scenarios, where it relates to 
the “inter-nation equity” principle, as coined by the Musgraves671. This principle calls for an 
equitable division of the international tax revenue between the countries that are somehow 
involved in its generation672. A way to determine whether a State has participated to some extent 
in the generation of a particular item of income is precisely by establishing whether its 
infrastructures and public services have effectively or potentially contributed to its generation. If 
the answer is positive, inter-nation equity would theoretically entitle the State to impose a tax 
burden on the taxpayer who has economically benefited from its services673. Conversely, inter-
nation equity would be violated if the country providing the public services comes away “empty-
handed” while a country that did not provide any public goods “gets the lion´s share of the tax 
revenue”674. This principle does not differ much from the motto proposed by the four economists 
in their 1923 report: “the individual´s whole faculty should be taxed only once, and that liability 
should be divided among the tax districts according to his relative (economic) interests (allegiance) 
in each”675. 
                                                          
the direct benefit principle, i.e. taxation should be considered as a contribution for benefits provided to an individual 
through state activities”.  
670 VOGEL, K. (1988d), p. 22. 
671 MUSGRAVE, P.B.; MUSGRAVE, R.A. (1972). 
672 ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 7 and KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 156: “the rules governing the extent of a country´s 
competence to tax are essentially an international matter. Internation equity (…) must provide the foundations for an 
equitable international tax system”. Ultimately, this doctrine intends to provide a justification for country´s right to tax 
vis-à-vis other countries (GADZO, S. (2016), p. 188). 
673 MUSGRAVE, P.B.; MUSGRAVE, R.A. (1972), p. 71: “a country should be entitled to charge for the cost of public services 
which it has rendered to the foreign investor”. VOGEL, K. (1988c), p. 398: “the only valid legitimation, therefore, can be 
derived from benefit aspects (…) usually it is the state of source that has provided most or all of the benefits relevant for 
production of the income (…) without this State´s economic opportunities the income normally would not have been 
generated”. SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 77: “under this principle, the allocation of taxing rights between the countries involved 
should correspond to the relative amount of public goods provided by these jurisdictions to the overall profit of the 
enterprise”. VOGEL, K. (1988c), p. 398: “the only valid legitimation, therefore, can be derived from benefit aspects (…) 
usually it is the state of source that has provided most or all of the benefits relevant for production of the income (…) 
without this State´s economic opportunities the income normally would not have been generated”.  
674 RUST, A. (2010), p. 86. This last case is very well illustrated with an ironic example put forward by Gadzo, who makes 
reference to a popular Monty Python´s quote (“to boost the British economy I´d tax al foreigners living abroad”) to later 
explain that any layman would condemn such practice considering the “lack of benefits that foreigners living outside 
United Kingdom receive from the State, thus making the taxation uncalled-for” (GADZO, S. (2016), p.1).  
675 Economic and Financial Commission for the League of Nations (1923): Report on Taxation, p. 20. The bracketed 
words were inserted by KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 197, as she believed that by “interests” the experts meant “economic 
 
152 
 
The aforementioned considerations suggest that the benefit principle may be helpful and useful 
when the time comes to identify the community of taxpayers of each State in an international 
setting676. In fact, we have provided several arguments to justify why this principle should indeed 
condition this determination, the first one being that it helps to theoretically justify the imposition 
on a group of persons and the second one being that it underlines the commitment of the 
taxpayer towards its State and furthermore is likely to serve as a deterrent against tax avoidance. 
This means that the benefit principle should ideally underlie the tax rules that ultimately identify 
the taxpayers that would become subject to a State´s tax jurisdiction (hereinafter the “tax 
connecting factors”).  
Of course the problem arises when the times comes to determine whether a State´s services and 
infrastructures have effectively contributed to the generation of a taxpayer´s income. 
Undoubtedly, it seems to be increasingly troublesome, not to say impossible, to identify the 
particular benefits a taxpayer receives from each specific government in today´s globalized 
economy677. In view of these difficulties, it does not seem reasonable for connecting factors to 
demand a case-by-case empirical demonstration of the effective use and enjoyment of the State´s 
public services by the taxpayer and a correlation to his subsequent realization of profits678. On the 
other hand, these evident technical obstacles should never result in a complete disregard of the 
benefit principle.  
We believe in a halfway solution between the practical difficulties above mentioned and the 
outright disregard of the benefit principle. Tax connecting factors could rely on certain indicia or 
factors whose presence in the territory concerned is visible and easily ascertainable and further 
allows us to assume that the taxpayer is in a position to (effectively or potentially) use and enjoy 
the State´s services and infrastructures. This approach has the virtue of avoiding the technical 
difficulties above referred while ensuring that the benefit principle still plays a role in the 
identification of the community of taxpayers of a State. In our view, the reliance on assumptions 
and hypothesis679 is preferable to a complete omission of the benefit principle680. In the same 
vein, we should remember a very illustrative statement made by Barna back in 1945: “even the 
setting-up of untested explicit hypothesis concerning benefit accrual is preferable to omission 
altogether”681. The choice of the relevant factors would be up to the State concerned and would 
                                                          
allegiance”. The first model tax convention drafted by this Commission of Experts precisely intended to effect a division 
of the cross-border income that would approximate that which would occur if each country´s economic interest in the 
income could be quantified using an economic allegiance analysis (KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 200). 
676 KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 188. 
677 SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 75: “nowadays a business located in country A may well be supplied from country B, selling 
final products to Country C. It seems to be more and more unfeasible to identify the benefits a company has received 
from a specific government or a defined market as compared to benefits received from other governments or markets”. 
678 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 21: “evidently, if one tries to allocate income to a jurisdiction with a direct and 
precise link to the benefits obtained, it seems impossible to achieve a perfect result” 
679 Tillinghast also makes the benefit principle rest on mere presumptions: “all individuals and legal entities that benefit 
(or may reasonably pre presumed to benefit from their connecting with the United States should share in the burden of 
supporting the nation through taxes”. See TILLINGHAST, D.R. (1984), p. 242.  
680 Buchanan shares his view, as he believes that the traditional difficulties derived by the benefit principle should not 
be deterrent and that the benefit principle “should not be left out” of the theoretical framework justifying taxation. See 
BUCHANAN, J.M. (1960), p. 22. On the other hand, there are many skeptical voices despising the utility of principles 
guiding the allocation of taxing rights, the benefit principle among them. See for example SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 93: “the 
outcome of the game is truly open and one should not look for the holy grail of a natural allocation of taxing rights”. 
681 BARNA, T. (1945), p. 3. He added that “it is impossible to speak of the burden of taxation without considering, at the 
same time, the benefits from expenditure made out of such taxation”. Buchanan shares his view, as he believes that the 
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largely depend on the nature of each income tax. In Section 4.2.2.2 we will later refer to the ones 
we suggest for CITs and in Chapter 5 we will try to translate these ideas into manageable and 
pragmatic rules. 
Notwithstanding the evident utility of the benefit principle, it also shows notable deficiencies, as 
it is inherently unable to provide certain responses when it comes to the imposition of taxes. Most 
notably, it will rarely serve to measure the extent of the tax liability in income taxes, that is, the 
calculation of the tax base and the decision on the relevant tax rate682. The reason is that there is 
no reliable proportionality between the size of the income arising from a certain economic activity 
and the amount of public goods that could have contributed to generate such income683. For 
example, it may well be the case that a company whose activity is heavily reliant on public 
infrastructures is unable to be profitable while, on the other hand, a company whose activity does 
not require the use of any public service whatsoever may be in a position to make huge profits. 
For all these reasons, we advocate for the outright rejection of the “expanded” version of the 
benefit principle (as explained above in Section 4.2.1) and instead propose that the benefit theory 
should be, as a matter of principle, left out of the calculation of the tax liability of income taxes. 
This does not preclude the States to exceptionally use the benefit principle for these purposes, as 
would be the case of the so-called “user charges” (also known as “casual taxes”), i.e. taxes paid in 
direct exchange for a specific public service provided by the State or the transfer of the right to 
use a particular public domain. In these cases, the tax amount would generally be a fixed sum 
(“poll tax”) that tends to depart from the cost of the service or the value of the right to use the 
public domain684. 
If one interprets the benefit principle as a strict quid pro quo exchange between the government 
and the individuals (either from a global or an individual point of view), the principle is prone to 
show further notable deficiencies685. In the first place, it poses an important technical one, as 
there does not seem to be a precise manner to impute the shares of the common benefit from 
public services to specific individuals686. Secondly, when it comes to the identification of the public 
services concerned, it should be borne in mind that a significant portion of public funds may be 
intended to finance the “general welfare” (i.e. services of a very vague and general character) 
which does not provide precise, quantifiable and individualized benefits to individuals and groups 
                                                          
traditional difficulties derived by the benefit principle should not be deterrent and that the benefit principle “should 
not be left out” of the theoretical framework justifying taxation.  
682 Georg von Schanz stated that the benefit theory should only serve to determine the group of people liable for tax. 
Once this group is identified, the degree of the tax liability may be fixed on the basis of other rules and the benefit 
principle should not play any role in this regard.  SCHANZ, G. (1892), p. 374 (free translation by HARRIS, P.A. (1996), p. 
277). In the same vein, see SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 76, VOGEL, K. (1988d), p. 57 (“a standard for measuring individual tax 
burdens, however, cannot be derived from this kind of reciprocity (…) the theory of justification of taxation cannot, 
therefore, provide and answer to the question how to shape a just tax rate”) and KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 158 (“a 
decision to implement a tax based on benefit theory does not mandate the selection of a specific tax base or a particular 
rate structure”). 
683 SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 75-76: “even if the use of public goods by a taxpayer may bear some relationship with the size 
and nature of the business (the use of public infrastructure, the education of workers or the protection of intellectual 
property), the final outcome –the profit- bears no such relationship”, MCLURE, C.E. (Jr) (2000b), p.1288-1289 and BÁEZ 
MORENO, A. (2015), p. 270. 
684 BUCHANAN, J.M. (1960), p.12 and MILL, J.S. (1848), p. 622. 
685 BUCHANAN, J.M. (1960), p. 13. 
686 DODGE, J.M. (2005), p. 399, BUCHANAN, J.M. (1960), p. 13-14, SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 76 and BÁEZ MORENO, A. 
(2015), p. 270-271. 
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of persons687. And thirdly, one should take into consideration that public revenues do not 
generally serve solely to defray public services, they may also be used to further distribute goals 
by shifting wealth between the different social classes688. 
We do not think the strict quid pro quo approach is either ethically acceptable in the present times 
or practicable when it comes to the imposition of taxes. So, while sharing the risks and challenges 
identified in the previous paragraph, we believe none of them would affect the role we intend to 
attribute to the benefit principle as a principle underlying tax connection factors.  In the first place, 
there is no need to individualize or quantify the specific benefits to specific taxpayers. With regard 
to the second and third observation, the fact that tax revenues are used to cover services of 
general character or for wealth redistribution purposes does not preclude us from using the 
benefit principle the way we intend to do. 
In a nutshell, we could say that we do not adhere to the traditional strict conception of the benefit 
principle but rather intend to use it as a general guiding principle for the purposes of identifying 
the community of taxpayers of a certain State, in line with the postulates of the aforementioned 
“entitlement theory”. 
Lastly, we intend to briefly note the role that the ability to pay principle can perform in this 
scenario and further explain why both can coexist and complement each other.  
As opposed to the benefit principle, the ability-to-pay principle is inherently unable to guide us in 
the identification of the taxpayers that ought to become subject to a certain State´s tax 
jurisdiction689. For example, it is unable to indicate which part of the income should be taxed in 
which State in a cross-border scenario690. This being so, the ability to pay principle will not come 
into play until the benefit principle first fulfills its function and identifies the community of 
taxpayers that “belongs” to the State concerned691.  
Once the community of taxpayers has been properly identified (e.g. in benefit terms), inter-
individual equity is tasked to ensure equal treatment at the domestic level692 between the specific 
taxpayers belonging to such community693. In general terms, the ability to pay principle is 
regarded as a common yardstick of equality in tax matters, meaning that it would determine 
which taxpayers should be deemed to be in an equal economic position. This being so, inter-
individual equity would demand that taxpayers in an equal economic position (e.g. same ability 
                                                          
687 BUCHANAN, J.M. (1960), p. 13-14. He believes that the first reason is merely a technical challenge (that could 
eventually be overcome under certain circumstances) while the second one constitutes a theoretical (even ethical) 
rejection of the benefit principle. Schön states that the supposed benefits obtained by a taxpayer from the procurement 
of public goods and services are often not observable (SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 76). 
688 SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 76.  
689 MUSGRAVE, R.A. (1959), p. 63 (“it does not tell us just how the tax burden is to be distributed. Worse still, it disregards 
the expenditure side of the problem”) and ZORNOZA PÉREZ, J. (2013), p. 5  
690 VOGEL, K. (1988c), p. 398 (“if the tax claims of the two States collide in such ways, sacrifice theory cannot give 
preference to taxation by either State”) and MÖSSNER, J.M. (2006), p. 505. 
691 KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 164: “(it) takes for granted that the government has properly identified its taxpayers”. 
692 KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 164: “inter-individual equity in taxation is primarily a domestic issue”. 
693 SCHANZ, G. (1892), p. 9-10: “tax basis and tax rate are two different subjects (…) tax liability is made dependent upon 
an economic relation: after the circle of taxable persons has been determined (…) society may say: each person 
economically bound to me is taxed (…) to exonerate the economically weak (…) according to a progressive system”.   
(free translation by VOGEL, K. (1988), p. 219).  
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to pay) should be subject to the same amount of tax694. This generally involves the measurement 
of the tax liability of each specific taxpayer, in particular the calculation of the tax base (total 
amount that is subject to taxation)695 and the election of the relevant tax rate (when applied to 
the tax base, it indicates the amount of tax to pay)696. With regard the former, the ability to pay 
principle has generally served as a basis to grant tax exemptions for a certain minimum of income 
that corresponds to the amount that the citizen would be expected to need to effectively meet 
his basic needs. With regard to the latter, it has traditionally been used to advocate for progressive 
tax rates in cases in which States wish to redistribute wealth by means of their income tax systems. 
The usefulness of the ability to pay (and by extension the inter-individual equity) principle begins 
and ends with the measurement of the taxpayer´s tax liability, i.e. the tax base and the applicable 
tax rate697. And this is precisely the most relevant (and maybe sole) contribution of the 
principle698. Beyond this, it seems to lose its meaning699.  
 
4.2.2. THE ROLE THAT THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE SHOULD PLAY IN 
CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION 
 
In Section 4.2.1 we mentioned the supposed function that the benefit principle is expected to play 
in income taxation. Now, we intend to determine the specific manner in which the benefit 
principle could effectively be observed in corporate income taxation. 
The recognition of the “corporate fiction”, i.e. that a company is a separate legal person for tax 
purposes independent from its shareholders (Sections 3.1.1 and 4.1), theoretically implies the 
recognition of its faculty to have its own ability to pay (independent and separate from that of its 
shareholders) and to use and enjoy the public benefits provided by the State (equally independent 
                                                          
694 KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 156-157: “inter-individual equity concerns the nature and extent of an individual 
responsibility to support the government financially and the relative amount of each individual´s obligation to do so in 
relation to the obligations of other individuals”. See also MÖSSNER, J.M. (2006), p. 505 
695 DODGE, J.M. (2005), p. 449: “although the ability to pay norm often is said to be imprecise in its implementation, it 
prescribes the defining characteristics of an income tax base, although the extent of this prescription may be debated”. 
The common assumption is that the amount of income regularly obtained by a person is the best measure of his ability 
to pay. 
696 Kendrick argues that the principle gives rise to three different theories of taxation: the equal, the equal-proportional 
and the least-sacrifice theory. According to the first one, taxes would be laid in such a manger that the sacrifices of all 
taxpayers are equal. As regards the second one, the tax amount would bear an equal proportion to the respective 
taxpayers´ incomes. Lastly, the third one would advocate for a system in which taxes would be laid first on the incomes 
of the very rich, and only when these incomes are reduced to the level of the rich, then the rich would be taxed, and so 
on. See KENDRICK, M.S. (1939), p. 95.  
697 Kaufman states that inter-individual equity merely addresses the content of the tax base and the rate structure. 
KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 166. Gadzo argues that this standard merely serves the purpose of “quantifying, in monetary 
terms, the duty of a person to contribute to the society” (GADZO, S. (2016), p. 182). 
698 In the same vein, see SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 73: “ability to pay helps to define the cake but it does not help to slice it” 
699 Vogel argued that the primary goal of all the German advocates for the sacrifice theory was to introduce a 
progressive income tax and, once this was achieved, the theory lost its “moral impact”. In particular, and contrary to 
the benefit principle, it does not serve to provide a basic justification for taxation. See VOGEL, K. (1988d), p. 30-31.  
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from the use and enjoyment by its shareholders)700. This being so, if CITs were to be guided as any 
other income taxes by the benefit and the ability to pay principles, their regulation should 
theoretically regard the ability to pay of the company per se, as well as the benefits used and 
enjoyed by the own company, regardless of the situation of its shareholders. 
To this effect, we will first determine which of the public benefits defrayed and provided by the 
States are susceptible to be used and enjoyed by companies (Section 4.2.2.1). Secondly, we will 
ascertain how tax connecting factors may in fact regard such use and enjoyment in practice 
(Section 4.2.2.2).  
 
4.2.2.1. Public benefits that are susceptible to be used and enjoyed by 
companies 
Jurisdictions may allocate their funds to a great number of varied ends. Of all the benefits they 
may potentially provide to their subjects701, only some of them are susceptible to be used and 
enjoyed (either directly or indirectly) by these legal fictions702. We will now proceed to classify 
such benefits into the next groups: 
a) Major public infrastructures. This category encompasses infrastructures related to 
transportation (e.g. road and/or railway network, airports and airways, harbors, canals, 
bridges, tunnels, pipelines, etc.) and communication (e.g. telecommunication networks 
of all sorts).  
b) General public policies which require financial support. This category refers to policies 
that entail the adoption of political measures, frequently accompanied by a significant 
economic investment. These policies seek diverse objectives, as the fostering of legal 
certainty (provision of a legal framework along with a system which ensures its 
compliance), a conducive business environment (e.g. the adoption of measures to keep 
exchange rates stable and interest low, boost the confidence of both business and 
consumers, ensure a safe and transparent financial system, etc.)703 and a stable social 
order along with a just society (assistance for the most deprived, wealth redistribution 
system) among many others. 
                                                          
700 MARIAN, O. (2013), p. 1626: “The underlying assumptions (…) are that the corporation is the true beneficiary of 
government-created public goods, and that the corporate entity is a truly separate being from the individuals involved 
with it” 
701 FLEMING, J.C. (Jr.); PERONI, R.J.; SHAY, S.E. (2002), p. 90, AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 520 and PINTO, D. (2003), p. 17-
23.  
702 MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 474: “corporations, just like individuals, benefit from government-created public goods, and 
it is therefore justifiable that they pay for them”. A study carried out in the US in the 1990s estimated that 13,8% of the 
state-local public expenditure directly or indirectly benefited businesses. The estimation covered the totality of 
expenditure programs specifically aimed at businesses (e.g. agricultural and water transportation terminals) as well as 
a proportionate apportionment of the so-called “prorated” programs (e.g. public buildings, legislative and financial 
administrations) and “joint” or “shared” expenditures (police and fire, transportation, etc.). See OAKLAND, W.H., TESTA, 
W.A. (1996), p. 8-9. 
703 GRAETZ, M.J.; O´HEAR, M.M. (1997), p. 521 quoting T.S. Adams “a large part of the cost of government is traceable 
to the necessity of maintaining a suitable business environment”.  
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c) Provision of general services for the community. This is the case of services of a general 
character and scope which tend to benefit all members of the community, including 
companies. E.g. water and energy supply, police and fire protection, judiciary system, 
postal service, waste disposal and recycling services, public safety, national security, 
military protection, etc. 
d) Provision of services targeted for individuals with an indirect benefit for companies. These 
services are directly enjoyed by individuals but produce positive externalities to 
companies. E.g., education and healthcare greatly contribute to a healthy and educated 
workforce704 . 
 
4.2.2.2. Factors relying on the assumption of use and enjoyment of 
public benefits by the company 
 
Once it has been ascertained that companies have the ability to use and enjoy a great number of 
public benefits under conditions equivalent to individuals, the next question that arises is how tax 
connecting factors may identify these situations and further stipulate legal consequences in the 
form of a tax liability.  
Back in Section 4.2.1 we observed the notable difficulty of identifying situations in which a specific 
(corporate) taxpayer obtains certain benefits by a particular government in today´s globalized 
economy. We thus concluded that it does not make sense for tax connecting factors to demand a 
case-by-case demonstration of the effective use and enjoyment of the State´s public services by 
the (corporate) taxpayer and a correlation to its subsequent realization of profits. On the contrary, 
we advocated for an alternative approach that entails the use of certain indicia whose presence 
in the territory concerned is visible and easily ascertainable and further allows us to assume that 
the (corporate) taxpayer is in fact in a position to (effectively or potentially) use and enjoy the 
State´s services and infrastructures. 
The next challenge is the determination of the relevant indicia upon which tax connecting factors 
could rest. In other words, the selection of factors that may lead us to presuppose an effective or, 
at least, potential benefit by the company from the services and infrastructures provided by the 
State concerned.  
4.2.2.2.1. The performance of a physical economic activity in the territory concerned 
As a matter of fact, it seems that a company would only find itself in a position to use and enjoy 
the State´s services and infrastructures to the extent it has a significant presence in its territory. 
More precisely, we could reach such conclusion to the extent the company is effectively carrying 
on an economic activity within its borders. Taxing a company´s profits on these grounds may be 
                                                          
704 For example, Marian suggested that AOI (company that belongs to the Apple group) could be viewed as benefiting 
from some form of public good in the United States, as its skilled labor force. See MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 474. 
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regarded as justified on the assumption that the sole presence of economic activities within a 
sovereign territory generally entails the enjoyment of the public services and infrastructures 
provided by the State concerned705. Let us think of a company that maintains a manufacturing 
facility, a warehouse and various stores in the territory of a State through which it produces, 
distributes and eventually sells its own products. These facts alone allow us to presume that the 
company is likely to be using most, if not all, the services we enumerated in Section 4.2.2.1. This 
being so, if tax connecting factors relied on factors related to the presence of a relevant economic 
activity within the territory, taxation would not be based on an actual, self-evident and 
demonstrated effective enjoyment of public benefits: it would rather be based on certain indicia 
implying that such enjoyment is very likely to have occurred.  
4.2.2.2.2. The performance of a remote (non-physical) economic activity in the territory 
concerned 
The question arises as to whether this assumption should be extended to economic activities that 
do not entail a physical presence in the territory concerned and still allow the company to reach 
its market.  
This is a particularly topical question; as the past few decades have witnessed an unparalleled 
advance in communications, technology and transportations resulting in an undeniable increasing 
ability to reach new markets without the need to maintain a physical presence in the territory 
concerned706. It is now entirely possible to either provide services remotely (e.g. cloud computing, 
e-mails, videoconferences) or conduct sales by remote means (e.g. websites, smartphone “apps”, 
etc.). Let us think for example of a company that uses a website to reach the market of a certain 
State and confines itself to buying the products from foreign providers and having them delivered 
right to its customers´ homes.  
It is clear that the scope of benefits that would be within the company´s reach in these 
circumstances would be more limited in cases in which it is not physically present in the State. For 
example, the company would rarely be in the position to enjoy general public services as the 
police/fire protection or the water supply707. However, we believe the company would still be 
likely to benefit to a greater or lesser extent of many other of the services and infrastructures 
enumerated in Section 4.2.2.1, either directly or indirectly.  
                                                          
705 The Musgraves concluded that a State should be entitled to tax the income resulting from activities taking place 
within its borders. See MUSGRAVE, P.B.; MUSGRAVE, R.A. (1972), p. 71. This way, the practical implications of the 
territoriality principle would not differ much from those derived from the benefit principle. See BROWN, F.B. (2011), p. 
591: “the economic nexus basis for sourcing is best understood as a surrogate for the benefits principle -that is, the 
location of economic activities is where the taxpayer receives government benefits that justify a source tax” and p. 608: 
“numerous public benefits arise from government services that are provided in countries where taxpayers conduct 
income-producing activities”. He then enumerates some of the most common benefits that a company may derive from 
the States where its economic activities take place. See also VANN, R.J. (2003), p. 145: “if we think of source taxation in 
terms of benefit theory, then the place where the relevant activity of the payer is based has some claim if the income 
recipient is relying on institutions in that place” and MCLURE, C.E. (Jr) (2000), p. 6:12, footnote 14: “most of those costs 
(governmental costs from which a company obtains benefits) are probably related to production or distribution”. 
706 This phenomenon was illustrated in Section 2.2.4 (the Apple case) and more generally in Section 3.3.6.2.2. 
707 MCLURE, C.E. (Jr.) (2000), p. 6:5-6:6: “it seems that in this world most of the public services that benefit business 
firms (…) do so only if the firm has a physical presence in the country”. PINTO, D. (2003), p. 21: “many of the services 
described earlier (e.g. police and fire protection) (…) would only be available and relevant in the case where such 
businesses maintain a physical presence in source countries”.  
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In all the above mentioned scenarios, the host State would be after all providing a market for the 
company. It is an incontestable fact that business profits only arise where supply and demand 
meet708. However, the relevant question for the purposes of this section is whether we may infer 
from the presence of a considerable market of customers in a certain territory that the State has 
contributed financially to build this market and further make it possible the relevant transaction 
that would ultimately give rise to the profit. Our response is positive and we will now proceed to 
explain why. 
In the first place, the existence of a potential market of well-educated, healthy and prosperous 
customers is clearly not a random spontaneous event, but rather the consequence of diverse 
circumstances including, inter alia, their hard work and efforts, the socio-economic context in 
which they operate and a number of policies and services promoted (and defrayed) by their 
government over the years to foster their general well-being, access to education and healthcare, 
economic prosperity, labor protection, etc.709. There is no doubt that companies are likely to 
obtain greater profits from States whose citizens are safe, healthy, have their basic needs met and 
further enjoy a considerable purchasing power, circumstances that are to a certain extent due to 
public investments. 
Secondly, the presence of an attractive market of potential customers in a territory does not on 
its own lead to sales. A framework that is conducive to electronic trade and remote transactions 
is as necessary as the market itself, and this framework is equally the result of the proper 
functioning of public infrastructures, services and policies. An appropriate infrastructure of 
telecommunications and supply of energy would ensure high-quality internet access; an extensive 
transport network together with a fast and efficient postal service would enable a quick and 
guaranteed delivery of the products; an appropriate legal framework supported by an efficient 
and reliable judicial system would enable the protection of IP rights, the enforcement of payment 
in the context of electronic transactions and the protection of both business and customer´s rights 
and interests among others; and lastly, waste disposal and recycling services would enable the 
                                                          
708 This fact alone (beyond benefit considerations) has frequently served as an argument to justify the tax claim of the 
market jurisdiction. See DEVERAUX, M.; DE LA FERIA, R. (2014), p. 11: “it is from sales that profits are generated, without 
sales there would be no income to tax”. The four experts responsible for the first MC also acknowledged the importance 
of this factor: “the oranges upon the trees in California are not acquired wealth until they are picked, and not even at 
that stage until they packed, and not even at that stage until they are transported to the place where demand exists 
and until they are put where the consumer can use them” (See Economic and Financial Commission for the League of 
Nations (1923): Report on Double Taxation, p. 23). See also SCHOUERI, L.E.; GALENDI, R.A. (2017), which refer to 
Kirchhoff´s theory to conclude: “if an individual derives income, this is due both to her/his personal effort and to the 
existence of the market: it would be a waste of effort if there was not a market where one could act”. Along the same 
lines, see HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 33: “a strict understanding of the principle of origin according to which 
only individuals on the supply side can create value ignores the fact that the demand side is also value creating. For a 
mere economic perspective, the inputs (i.e. the supply) and the outputs (i.e. the demand) of an enterprise lead to value 
creation and could guide as a principle of income allocation”. Lastly, Schön argues that “it cannot be disputed that the 
existence of a customer base in a territory, leading to the transfer of financial means from the customers to the taxpayer, 
forms a strong economic allegiance” (SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 92).  
709 See FLEMING, J.C. (Jr.); PERONI, R.J.; SHAY, S.E. (2002), p. 91 and BROWN, F.B. (2011), p. 609-610: “the market in any 
country could not exist without the necessary physical, economic, and legal infrastructure, and this is largely a result of 
governmental functions. And by accessing a country's market through the sale of goods and services, a taxpayer is 
benefiting from these governmental activities, thus justifying a (…) tax” and p. 619: “a portion of the income should be 
assigned to that country even without the taxpayer's actual presence in the country” 
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proper disposal of the packaging materials710. In scenarios in which the company confines itself to 
selling digital content through a website, the response would greatly differ, as the only public 
services that would still be at its reach would be certain infrastructures (mostly 
telecommunication network and supply of energy), the legal framework and the judicial system. 
The above mentioned examples reveal that a company trading remotely with customers residing 
in a State without being physically present in its territory would still be in a position to use, enjoy 
or, at least, indirectly benefit from the State´s services and infrastructures. This assumption has 
served certain scholars to justify the legitimate demand of market jurisdictions to tax the profits 
that companies derive from the remote sales or provision of services with their residents711, while 
the argument has not historically convinced the OECD, at least before the advent of the BEPS 
project712.   
4.2.2.2.3. Preliminary conclusions 
It is an undeniable fact that the number of benefits within the reach of the company and the 
extent of its effective or potential use are expected to be greater when the company physically 
performs an economic activity in the State concerned than in cases in which the company reaches 
its market through remote means713. 
At this stage we should recall that tax connecting factors operate as all-or-nothing rules that 
merely identify the taxpayers that should belong to the community of a certain State, while not 
getting involved in the quantification of its tax liability714. This being so, the reduced degree of 
enjoyment of public benefits would not be taken into account in the form of a reduced tax liability. 
                                                          
710 PINTO, D. (2003), p. 21-23, HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 22, COCKFIELD, A. (2003), p. 3, GADZO, S. (2016), p. 
227), MCLURE, C.E. (Jr.) (2000), p. 6:6 and 6:13 (“sellers of digitized content would have nor market in a country lacking 
basic telecommunications infrastructure or whose population lacks computer skills”) and BROWN, F.B. (2011), p. 611 
(“one would be unable to spend and consume income within a given country in the absence of the governmental services 
that support physical, legal, and economic infrastructure as well as public safety”). 
711 This has clearly been the case in the context of destination-based corporate tax proposal (see DEVERAUX, M.; DE LA 
FERIA, R. (2014), p. 13: “countries where consumers reside provide services that are complementary to the consumption 
of their residents” and AVI-YONAH, R. (2000), p. 1670-1675) and the sales factor of formulary apportionment systems 
(see DURST, M.C. (2014): “the market for goods and services within a country is a kind of natural resource located within 
the country's borders, and income from the exploitation of that resource should be apportioned at least in part to the 
country's tax base”). See also VOGEL, K. (1988c), p. 401: “taxation by the sales State must be considered under the 
aspect of inter-nations equity as well. It cannot convincingly be denied that providing a market contributes to the sales 
income at least to some extent as providing the goods does. There is no valid objection therefore against a claim of the 
sales State to tax part of the sales income”. VANN R.J. (2003), p. 145: “if we think of source taxation in terms of benefit 
theory, then the place where the relevant activity of the payer is based has some claim if the income recipient is relying 
on institutions in that place (…) It gives a claim to the place of sale in the business context in the sense of the location of 
the buyer (…) Such a justification (…) will be based on some measure of benefit from the institutions in the jurisdiction”. 
See also SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 559-560, MCLURE, C.E. (Jr.) (2000), p. 6.5-6.6, GADZO, S. (2016), p. 227 and TADMORE, 
N. (2012), p. 5. 
712 OECD (2003): Are the current treaty rules for taxing business profits appropriate for e-commerce? Final report, p. 
14: “(the Technical Advisory group) therefore rejected the suggestion that the mere fact that a country provides the 
market where an enterprise’s goods and services are supplied should allow that country to consider that a share of the 
profits of the enterprise is derived therefrom (…) they do not regard an enterprise which may have access to a country’s 
market as necessarily “using” that country’s infrastructure and, even if that were the case, they consider that such mere 
use of a country’s general infrastructure would be too incidental to the business profit-making process to consider that 
a significant part of the profits are attributable to that country”. 
713 Pinto maintains a divergent opinion, as he believes that the amount of public benefits that may be accessed by 
companies could be “equally (if not more)” relevant in an electronic commerce context. See PINTO, D. (2003), p. 19 
714 This is the conclusion we reached back in Section 4.2.1. 
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This fact should make governments thoroughly reflect on the advisability of extending the benefit 
assumption to remote economic activities and thereby making tax connecting factors rely on it.  
In our opinion, the assumption should stand considering the great amount of public benefits that 
companies would presumably be in the position to enjoy while conducting remote economic 
activities in a certain market jurisdiction715. However, it may be appropriate for tax connecting 
factors to give, where possible, more relative weight to indicia revealing a physical economic 
activity in the relevant territory than to those which do not.  
 
4.2.3. THE ROLE THAT THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE CURRENTLY PLAYS 
IN TODAY´S CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION 
 
In the present section we intend to corroborate whether the benefit principle complies in fact 
with its alleged mission in today´s corporate income taxation. To do so, we will analyze whether 
tax connecting factors of CITs seem to be somehow inspired by such principle. 
If we accept the postulates exposed in the previous Sections, we would only consider that tax 
connecting factors are aligned with the benefit principle insofar they make companies carrying on 
economic activities (physically or remotely) within a given territory subject to taxation therein, 
since one could infer from this fact that they would be in a position to effectively or potentially 
use and/or enjoy the services and infrastructures defrayed by the taxing State.  
This being so, the question we intend to respond here resembles the one we addressed back in 
Chapter 3. That is: do tax connecting factors contribute to make companies subject to taxation 
wherever they carry on their respective economic activities and thus wherever they are expected 
to economically benefit from the services provided and defrayed by the taxing State?  
In Chapter 3 we reached the conclusion that these paradigms tend to have the opposite effect, as 
they have become instrumental in detaching taxable profits from the jurisdictions where the 
economic activities giving rise to them take place and instead enable companies to book them in 
the jurisdiction of their choice. We referred to this phenomenon as “profit shifting” and provided 
several arguments to sustain that three of the most important paradigms underlying corporate 
income taxation (the separate entity approach along with the ALS, corporate tax residence and 
the PE threshold) have indeed become fundamental sources of profit shifting.  
We will now proceed to briefly recall some of the conclusions reached back in Chapter 3 and 
further add a few comments on each one of the paradigms under review in the light of the policy 
considerations exposed in the present Chapter.  
                                                          
715 McLure, following the “entitlement theory” (equivalent to the benefit principle and already referred to in Section 
4.2.1), argues that entitlement to tax corporate profits exists “any time a firm avails itself of the productive resources 
or the market of a nation” (MCLURE, C.E. (Jr) (2000), P. 6:4). 
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4.2.3.1. The benefit principle, transfer pricing regulation and the arm´s 
length standard 
Transfer pricing regulation has been historically grounded on the ability to pay principle and, by 
extension, in the inter-individual equity principle716. The reason is that related parties have the 
power to misprice a controlled transaction and hence shift taxable profits to the jurisdictions of 
their choice (normally those imposing a lower tax burden), a situation that places them in a 
privileged position with respect to independent parties undertaking equivalent transactions 
under comparable conditions. In this scenario, transfer pricing intends to reestablish equality 
among taxpayers by allocating income according to their ability to pay irrespective of their power 
to influence the prices of their transactions.  
While the aforementioned seems to be indisputable, it is equally evident that the application of 
the transfer pricing rules leads in practice to the transfer of taxable bases among sovereign 
States717. In other words, the pricing adjustment in the taxable bases of the relevant parties 
incidentally gives rise to a transfer of tax revenues between at least two jurisdictions718. As it was 
pointed out by Brauner, “when profits are allocated to be taxable in a jurisdiction (via an entity 
taxpaying in such jurisdiction) (…) such a country is perceived as deserving tax jurisdiction”719. In 
the same vein, Schoueri noted that “discussions concerning transfer pricing have moved from the 
fair taxation of a taxpayer within a given community (…) to the allocation of tax revenues among 
States”720. So, if we regard transfer pricing and the ALS as tools that eventually serve to allocate 
taxable profits among jurisdictions, the next question that arises is whether such allocation is 
guided by the benefit principle.  
The ALS allows States to make adjustments to the conditions of intra-group transactions in a way 
that the tax base of the entity concerned includes the profits it would have obtained if the 
transaction had occurred with an unrelated entity721. This means that the ALS would assign the 
profit to the entity that would have been entitled to it (i.e. the one that would have deserved it) 
in an arm´s length scenario. Generally, in transactions between independent parties, 
compensation will reflect the functions that each party performs722. So, as long as the ALS leads 
to attribute the profit to the entity carrying on an economic activity we could say that it is 
consistent with the benefit principle, since the tax base would end up in the State where the 
                                                          
716 SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 692 and 695. 
717 SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 703: “the immediate function of transfer pricing rules is not to allocate income among 
States. The allocation of income among States is one outcome of the application of transfer pricing rules”.  
718 SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 703: “the immediate function of transfer pricing rules is not to allocate income among 
States. The allocation of income among States is one outcome of the application of transfer pricing rules”. In the same 
vein, see SCHÖN, W. (2010), p. 230: “right from its early days the arm´s length standard has been regarded not primarily 
as a tool to allocate profits to different taxpayers within a group but as a tool to allocate the revenue from the activities 
of multinational enterprises to jurisdictions on a territorial basis”.  
719 BRAUNER, Y. (2016), p. 108. 
720 SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 691. In fact, the OECD itself speaks in such terms: “transfer pricing rules serve to allocate 
income earned by a multinational enterprise among those countries in which the company does business” (see BEPS 
report, p. 19). 
721 See Section 3.1.3. 
722 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 20 (new 
OECD TPG, par. 1.51). 
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corporate taxpayer is assumed to be in a position to use and enjoy the benefits provided by the 
State. Otherwise, we cannot say that the outcome of the ALS is aligned with such principle. 
The reality is way more complex than this and the interpretation and application of the ALS is 
neither univocal not straightforward. This means that the application of the ALS will sometimes 
give rise to outcomes that are consistent with the benefit principle, but this will not always be the 
case. As concluded in section 3.1.3, taxpayers can exploit the inherent subjectivity of the transfer 
pricing rules following the ALS to shift profits out of the jurisdictions where economic activities 
take place, particularly in transactions involving intangible assets. To the extent the ALS does not 
regularly ensure this outcome, we cannot claim that the benefit rationale is a principle underlying 
the ALS. 
 
4.2.3.2. The benefit principle and corporate tax residence 
As regards corporate residence-based taxation, we cannot say that it is generally influenced by 
the benefit theory either. In fact, we concluded in Section 3.2.1.2.2 that the adoption of the 
respective domestic residence tests did not seem to follow any clear policy purpose at all and was 
most probably driven by mere inertia, as some of the tests were extrapolated from Private 
International Law while some others were solely intended to close the loopholes of the previous 
tests in place. This being so, the benefit principle does not seem to play any significant role in the 
definition of corporate tax residence. Strangely enough, it has been largely assumed that taxing 
rights exerted by Residence States are per se legitimate and do not necessarily need to comply 
with any standard of inter-nation equity, as opposed to source-based taxation723. 
There are however a couple of possible exceptions to this general rule. Firstly and most notably, 
the scarce tests in place that rely on the location of the corporate business activity (section 
3.2.1.1.4) appear to be consistent with the benefit principle724. And secondly, tests relying on the 
POI (section 3.2.1.1.1) may be considered as influenced by the benefit principle to the extent the 
resulting tax liability is regarded as a “fee” for the benefits of incorporation (the granting of limited 
liability, the transferability of interests, the centralization of management, etc.)725. Interestingly, 
residence tests in the context of personal income taxation are, in contrast, greatly influenced by 
the benefit rationale, as we will later have the chance to explain in detail in Section 5.2.2.3.1.  
                                                          
723 This conclusion is inferred by Gadzo from Peggy´s Musgrave doctrine on inter-nation equity (referred to in Sections 
3.3.2 and 4.2.2.1), see GADZO, S. (2016), p. 186. Curiously, this same author buys the argument only a few pages later 
(p. 189) (“assuming that nationality and residence of a person are both undisputable proxies for participation in a 
society”), probably due to the predefined limited scope of his thesis. For their part, Vogel dismantles this starting 
assumption (VOGEL, K. (1990), p. 160). 
724 We confront Marian´s position according to which all factual-based corporate residence tests (as those relying on 
the governance of the company, the residence of the majority of its shareholders or the carrying-on of activities) are 
ultimately inspired by the benefit principle. We believe that that the assumption of enjoyment of services can only be 
made to the extent the company is carrying out an economic activity in the territory concerned (Section 4.2.2.2). See 
MARIAN, O. (2013), p. 1625-1626. 
725 Section 3.2.1.1.1. See AVI-YONAH, R. (2004), p. 1205-1206 and SHAVIRO, D. (2011), p. 130-132. 
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4.2.3.3. The benefit principle and the permanent establishment 
threshold 
On the other hand, the benefit principle does seem to play a supposedly significant role on 
corporate source-based taxation. In fact, back in Section 3.3.2 we found the benefit principle 
among the most common theoretical rationales for source-based taxation along with inter-nation 
equity, economic allegiance and neutrality. This being so, one would expect that the most 
paradigmatic pillar in source-based taxation (the PE threshold) should be a priori aligned with the 
benefit principle726.  
Indeed, the PE concept encompasses a great number of economic activities that would 
presumably put the non-resident enterprise carrying out such activities in the position to use and 
enjoy a considerable amount of services and infrastructures provided by the host jurisdiction727. 
However, an in-depth analysis of the proviso as it currently stands led us to question whether the 
consistency between the clause and the principle is complete (section 3.3.6.2). In Section 3.3.6.2.2 
we argued that the PE largely equates physical and stable presence with taxable presence (a 
common pattern that is visible in all the four modalities of PEs in the MCs)728, thus leaving untaxed 
all other significant business activities that, on the contrary, do not meet such requirements. So, 
as long as we understand that a company carrying on business activities that do not meet the 
requirements demanded by the PE proviso would still be in a position to use and enjoy the benefits 
provided by the State (as we concluded back in Section 4.2.2.2.2), we would reach the conclusion 
that the PE is not as consistent with the benefit principle as one would expect it to be. 
4.2.3.4. Preliminary conclusions 
In general terms and except for a few notable exceptions, the benefit principle does not seem to 
underlie tax connecting factors currently present in corporate income taxation. On the contrary, 
tax connecting factors have occasionally become instrumental in detaching taxable profits from 
the jurisdictions where corporate taxpayers are in position to use and enjoy the public benefits 
(wherever they carry out their economic activities, either physically or remotely) and instead 
enable them to book their profits in the jurisdiction of their choice729. As a matter of fact, the 
misalignment perceived in Chapter 2 between the economic and the tax presence of MNCs 
                                                          
726 In fact, this seems to be the underlying idea in the next assertion envisaged in the Commentary on art. 7.1 of the 
OECDMC, paragraph 9: “it is perhaps sufficient to say that it has come to be accepted in international fiscal matters that 
until an enterprise of one State sets up a permanent establishment in another State it should not properly be regarded 
as participating in the economic life of that other State to such an extent that it comes within the jurisdiction of that 
other State´s taxing rights”. 
727 See section 3.3.5 concerning the clause along with section 4.2.2.2.1, where we concluded that access to public 
benefits may be assumed in scenarios where the company carries out physical economic activities in the State 
concerned. See also GADZO, S. (2016), P. 246.  
728 ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 8. 
729 AUERBACH, A.J.; DEVERAUX, M.P.; KEEN, M.; VELLA, J. (2017), p. 34: “note, however, that current taxes on business 
profit do not satisfy the prescriptions of the benefit principle either, as they can result in high taxation for companies 
which derive very little value from publicly provided goods and services and no taxation for companies which derive a 
great value. In other words, there is no necessary connection between benefits derived and taxes paid”. 
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throughout the world (as evidenced by the Apple case) constitutes a valuable piece of evidence 
in this regard. 
 
4.2.4. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have reached the conclusion that the benefit principle should ideally underlie the tax rules 
that ultimately identify the taxpayers that would become subject to a State´s tax jurisdiction (the 
tax connecting factors), while it should not play any role when the time comes to calculate their 
respective tax liabilities, as it is the ability to pay principle the one that is better equipped to 
provide an answer in this regard730. Nonetheless, the previous subsection tried to demonstrate 
that current tax connecting factors do not seem to be inspired by such principle. 
It is in this spirit that we intend to suggest a few proposals later in Chapter 5 to translate these 
ideas into manageable and pragmatic rules, not without first checking in the next subsection 
whether Public International Law may condition or limit our pretensions. 
 
4.3. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR A 
POTENTIAL CORPORATE INCOME TAX REFORM 
 
We believe that the tax reform we intend to propose in the light of the benefit principle should 
preferably be preceded by a brief analysis of its viability in strict legal terms. In other words, we 
will analyze whether the current preexisting legal framework (i.e. Public International Law) may 
somehow limit or condition the exercise we intend to conduct in Chapter 5. 
To this effect, we will start with the most fundamental question, which is whether the imposition 
of taxes may be legally justified and, if so, on which specific legal grounds (section 4.3.1). Secondly, 
we will introduce the legal framework governing the exercise of the tax jurisdiction as derived by 
the principle of sovereignty, i.e. Public International Law (Section 4.3.2). Thirdly, we will endeavor 
to figure out whether this legal framework poses any constraints as to how Sovereign States may 
exercise their respective tax jurisdictions (Section 4.3.3). 
 
                                                          
730 See Section 4.2.1, where we explained the role that both principles should play in income taxation and Section 4.2.2 
where we suggested how the benefit principle could be of help in the context of CITs.  
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4.3.1. SOVEREIGNTY AS THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RIGHT 
TO IMPOSE TAXES 
 
Before analyzing the implications of Public International Law in the matter of taxation it is useful 
to first understand what the legal justification behind the States´ power to tax is.  
Some authors believe that jurisdiction is equivalent to physical power and thus a State would have 
the right to tax people and property just as long as it can actually enforce such powers731. This 
being so, the definition of taxable events and subjects would strictly depend on the proper 
functioning and the efficiency of the administrative, executive and judicial bodies of the States. 
Although the feasibility to enforce a tax measure should undoubtedly be a factor to be considered 
by the legislator when drafting the rules, it is also true that this theory cannot stand as an 
acceptable justification for the right to tax in a democratic and civilized society for the simple 
reason that it lacks a legal basis and does not respect the rule of law732. 
It has been indeed commonly accepted that the legal justification of tax jurisdiction is the principle 
of sovereignty733. Sovereignty has been defined by the ICJ as the possibility of States to decide 
their political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of their foreign policy734. 
Jurisdiction is one of the powers a State has under International Law pursuant to its own 
sovereignty, and it encompasses the competence to prescribe/enforce rules and subject persons 
or things to its courts735. In other words, jurisdiction would be the power of a State under 
international law to govern persons and property by its own rules, among which we find of course 
those in tax matters. 
 
4.3.2. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
EXERCISE OF TAX JURISDICTION 
Sovereign States are a historical necessity and, being their primary right and their primary 
obligation to secure their own existence, it is their responsibility to demand the necessary 
resources to survive from those that are subject to their laws736. The next logical question would 
be: who are those that are, or should be, subject to the laws of a Sovereign State demanding its 
resources? Could a State ask for a contribution to any citizen it pleases and in respect of any item 
                                                          
731 STIMSON, E. (1933) where he coined the expression “law of the fiscal jungle”. 
732 This opinion is also endorsed, for the same reasons, by MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 19 and KEMMEREN, E.C.C.M. (2001), 
p. 18. 
733 While tax jurisdiction originally emanates from the sovereignty of the State, we should clarify at this point that 
Constitutional Rule-of-Law States derive their power to impose taxes on the “social contract” subscribed with their 
sovereign population, or in other words their Constitutions, texts that may –and usually do- place further limitations to 
the way the States may exercise their tax jurisdiction. 
734 Judgment by the International Court of Justice 27th June 1986, case Nicaragua Vs. United States concerning the 
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, p. 108. 
735 These are the three modalities of jurisdiction distinguished by the American Law Institute. See AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE (1986), p. 232 et seq.  
736 ALLIX, E. (1937), p. 553-554.  
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of income? Is tax jurisdiction737 an absolute power that allows the States to tax anything they like? 
Or are there any constraints of legal nature in addition to the evident restrictions derived from 
the limited enforcement powers of States? 
As we depart from the acknowledgement that (tax) jurisdiction is an attribute of sovereignty and 
originally emanates from it, it does not look far-fetched to search for the answers to these 
questions in the very idea of sovereignty itself.  
Sovereignty seems to imply absoluteness, meaning that a State would be in principle free to 
legislate and enforce rules without opposition from any foreign power. Of course the problem 
comes with the fact that States do not live in a bubble but rather coexist with other Sovereign 
States, counterparts that enjoy the same status and thus this same freedom to legislate and 
enforce rules. This makes difficult the unregulated coexistence between States, since States 
cannot legally coexist for the purpose of law at the same time, in the same place, governing the 
same people, and regulating the same subject matter738. 
Public International law plays the role of arbitrator, setting the rules to make the coexistence 
among States sustainable. International law can be defined as a body of principles and rules whose 
essential function is to delimit the spheres of validity of domestic legal orders, that is to say, on 
whom, what and where the national laws of a Sovereign State may apply739.  
In conclusion, sovereignty is not synonym of absolute power, being rather a relative supreme 
power subject to law, concretely International Law, for the sake of an organized coexistence 
among Sovereign States. And tax jurisdiction, being an attribute of sovereignty, is subject to these 
same limits set by International Law.  
 
4.3.3. CONSTRAINTS POSED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE 
EXERCISE OF TAX JURISDICTION 
 
The next logical question is whether Public International Law places any limits to the way States 
exercise their own tax jurisdiction. There are mainly two schools of thought that maintain a 
different stand when responding to this question740.  
                                                          
737 There are three different modalities by which a State may exercise its tax jurisdiction. First, jurisdiction to formulate 
tax rules. Second, jurisdiction to enforce taxes, i.e. the competence to apply tax rules, if necessary by coercion, by 
administrative or judicial decisions. And finally, jurisdiction to spend, to assign the amount collected by taxes to support 
public needs. For a comprehensive study on the matter, see BILLE, S.F.W. (1958). 
738 DUPUIS, C. (1930), p. 130: “as long as States coexist, such coexistence necessarily implies material, positive and legal 
restrictions to their powers and enforcement rights”. 
739 KELSEN, H (1962), p. 178: “This limitation on the spheres of validity of the national legal orders is an essential function 
of the international legal order. For only insofar as the international legal order fulfills this function, the legal 
coexistence of several States, the simultaneous validity of several national orders becomes possible”. See also MARTHA, 
R.S.J. (1989), p. 24. 
740 QURESHI, A.H. (1994), p. 5. 
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Some scholars argue that there are no significant limitations to tax jurisdiction under public 
international law -apart from the undisputed ones related to the territoriality of the 
enforcement741- following the “Lotus presumption” envisaged in the renowned judgment by the 
ICJ742. On the other hand, others understand that Public International Law poses certain 
constraints to the way States may exercise their own tax jurisdiction743. 
In order to corroborate if the second theory contains some true, we will check whether the most 
widespread doctrines in this respect (namely, the “international tax regime”, the “genuine link” 
and the “minimum standard for foreigners”) have indeed a clear legal basis and if so, a precise 
content. To this end, we will review the different sources of Public International Law. 
Qureshi refers to the notion of “Public International Law of taxation” 744 and defines it as the 
branch of Public International Law that provides an international normative framework in fiscal 
matters. The sources of Public International Law are those enumerated by article 38 of the Statute 
of the ICJ, ratified by all 193 members of the United Nations (hereinafter UN): 
o International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting States. These are voluntarily agreed limits set by States on 
their exercise of their sovereignty. One must make a distinction at this point: 
 General conventions. They work as a framework that mainly regulates the 
negotiation, approval and interpretation of bilateral or multilateral treaties in tax 
matters. The most relevant source is the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
                                                          
741 This principle was acknowledged in the judgment by the International Court of Justice “S.S. Lotus” (see next 
footnote). The House of Lords made reference to it in the context of taxation: “a claim for taxes is but an extension of 
the sovereign power which imposed the taxes and… an assertion of sovereign authority by one State within the territory 
of another … is (treaty or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of independent sovereignties”. See Decision by the 
House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1955, “Government of India V. Taylor”. Over time, the increasing collaboration 
between tax administrations in the collection of taxes has made it unnecessary to recall this principle. Let us take as an 
example the EC Mutual Assistance in Recovery of Taxes Directive or the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters 
promoted by the OECD. 
742 Judgment by the International Court of Justice “S.S. Lotus” of September 7th 1927, p. 18-19: “The first and foremost 
restriction imposed by International Law upon a State is that –failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - 
it may not exercise its powers in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial”. 
We should add that the prohibition would stand in the absence of the consent of the Counterpart State. Immediately 
afterwards, the Court qualified its statement by saying that this did not mean that international law prohibits a State 
from prescribing laws concerning persons, property and acts outside its territory, since States enjoy a “wide measure” 
of discretion that is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules. This way, the Court was acknowledging that States 
could set rules for persons, property and acts outside their territory –and that restrictions upon such freedom could 
not be presumed – as long as the enforcement of such rules occurs within the territory of the State. Many authors 
supported the validity of the “Lotus presumption”, for example: WURZEL, H. (1938), p. 814: “Is there anything in the 
written or unwritten law of nations to indicate a universally recognized rule authoritatively assigning among nations, 
and thereby impliedly limiting the jurisdiction to tax? The answer is no”. NORR, M. (1962), p. 431: “No rules of 
international law exist to limit the extent of any country´s tax jurisdiction”. MUTÉN, L. (1964), p.77: “No rule of 
International Law, whether in the form of an internationally recognized principle or in the form of international custom, 
implies that the principle of territoriality should be observed in respect of all kinds of taxes”. KNECHTLE, A.A. (1979), p. 
37: “Every sovereign holder of the tax jurisdiction organizes the shape and field of application of his tax system 
autonomously on the strength of his territorial sovereignty (…) Modern tax legislations are not restricted in their national 
right to tax by any rules in the system of public international law”.  
743 Qureshi refers to article 38.1.2 of the Statute of the ICJ (“teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations” as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law) to suggest that the Lotus presumption  
may have become obsolete due to the critics of the majority of scholars. See QURESHI, A.H. (1987), p, 20-21. 
744 QURESHI (1994), p. 2. 
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Treaties of 1969, ratified by 113 States and merely signed but not ratified by other 
15.  
 Particular conventions. This category is comprised by bilateral or multilateral 
treaties concluded by States. Among them we can find a network of 3.000 
bilateral tax treaties worldwide that usually cover taxes on income and capital, 
which in turn coexist with the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax treaty 
related measures to prevent BEPS745. We can also find the EU treaties (EU primary 
law, including mainly the Treaty on the EU and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU) that constitute the institutions and the required legal framework for the 
creation of EU secondary law (regulations, directives, decisions, etc.), part of 
which deals with tax matters.  
o International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law. An international 
custom originates as a result of a general, consistent and virtually uniform practice of 
States (objective element) undertaken in a manner that demonstrates that they follow 
the custom because they feel they are legally bound by it (subjective element or opinio 
iuris)746.  
o General principles of law recognized by civilized nations.  
o Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
4.3.3.1. The fallacy of a supposed body of international customs: the 
“international tax regime” doctrine 
The existence of international customs in the tax field is certainly the most controversial issue that 
arises in the debate on whether – and if so, to what extent – Public International Law poses any 
constraints to the exercise of tax jurisdiction by a sovereign State.  Back in 1964, Frederik Mann 
wondered whether States had become somehow bound by the general patterns followed by tax 
treaties to the extent such treaties, 500 at that time, defined the limits of tax jurisdiction in a 
largely uniform manner, fact that may have resulted in the crystallization of such patterns in rules 
of customary international law747. 
A few academics have attempted to prove such general practice followed by the sense of opinio 
iuris. Perhaps the most ambitious doctrine in this matter is the so-called “international tax 
                                                          
745 http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-
beps.htm  
746 The requirements that an international custom must fulfill are discussed and described in detail in some judgments 
by the International Court of Justice, for example: “S.S. Lotus” of September 7th 1927 and “North Sea Continental Shelf” 
on February 20th 1969. 
747 See MANN, F.A. (1964), p. 109 et seq, where he wondered: “Is it possible to suggest, for instance, that royalties 
payable in respect of a patent are, for purposes of taxation, now beyond the reach of the State in which the patent is 
exploited? Or are capital gains made in a certain State by the residents of another State no longer within the fiscal 
jurisdiction of the former?” 
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regime”, notion that was conceived by Avi-Yonah and followed by other scholars748. Avi-Yonah 
states that widely accepted principles underlying international tax rules (both treaty and 
domestic-based) constitute, what he calls, an “international tax regime”, that is part of customary 
international law. According to him, these principles bind the States and limit their freedom to 
adopt international tax rules749. The so-called regime is integrated by common practices followed 
by the States when facing similar problems, one example being the general tendency to avoid 
double taxation by granting an exemption for foreign source income or a credit for foreign 
taxes750. More specifically, Avi-Yonah deduces a couple of widely accepted principles from the 
existing network of more than 3000 bilateral tax treaties:  
o Single tax principle: income from cross-border transactions should be subject to tax once: 
neither more nor less than once. The practical consequence of this is that the 
international tax regime would impede both double and double-non taxation, since both 
extremes lead equally to economic inefficiencies751. 
o Benefit principle: this principle allocates the right to tax active business income primarily 
to the source jurisdiction, while the right to tax passive investment income would be 
allocated to the residence jurisdiction752.  
Furthermore, he argues that the following four principles have also risen to the level of customary 
international law:  
o States lack jurisdiction to tax nonresidents on their foreign-source income. Avi-Yonah 
supports the existence of such supposed custom between the 1930s and 1960s. United 
States enacted a rule in 1937 enabling taxation of “controlled foreign corporations” 
(CFCs), that is, corporations controlled by residents, as if they were residents themselves. 
He believes that the United States considered at that time that taxing directly a foreign 
corporation on its foreign-source income would be a breach of international law, reason 
enough to come out with a rule that had the same economic effect while formally 
circumventing this supposed prohibition. And that was the “deemed dividend” rule: they 
would tax the US shareholders on a deemed dividend of the accumulated passive income 
of the CFC753. 
                                                          
748 More extensively AVI-YONAH, R. (2007).  But his doctrine has been also supported with reservations by other 
scholars, for example: BRAUNER, Y. (2003), AULT, H. J. (2001) or VANN, R.J. (2000). 
749 AVI-YONAH, R. (2007), p. 3. “I would argue that the freedom of most countries to adopt international tax rules is 
severely constrained, even before entering into any tax treaties, by the need to adapt to generally accepted principles”. 
This is the conclusion the author reaches just after setting out a hypothetical case consisting in advising a developing 
State to draft its income tax act for the first time in the case it aspires to a minimum chance to compete for foreign 
investment. 
750 Arnold Knetchle also agrees with Avi-Yonah in this regard. See KNECTHTLE, A.A. (1979), p. 137.  
751 AVI-YONAH, R. (2007), p. 8 et seq.  
752 See also GRAETZ, M. J. (2001), p. 262: “the 1920´s compromise is routinely characterized as allocation the taxation 
of business income to the country of its source and the taxation of portfolio income to the country of the capital supplier´s 
residence”. Curiously, Avi-Yonah himself recently dismantled his own thesis, advocating for the reversal of the benefit 
principle so that active income is taxed at residence and passive income at source, considering this perspective is better 
aligned with the challenges posed by globalization. See AVI-YONAH, R. (2015). 
753 See AVI-YONAH, R. (2007), p. 24-25. 
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o States cannot treat non-residents worse than their own residents (non-discrimination 
principle). He uses the abovementioned example to justify that the United States “felt” at 
that time that the non-discrimination rule was binding outside the treaty context, and this 
is the reason why, according to Avi-Yonah, they did not apply a different rule to residents 
of non-treaty States754. 
o States must follow the arm´s length standard. Avi-Yonah argues that this standard that 
has been governing the allocation of profits between related parties practically worldwide 
since the 1930s has also become an international custom.  He explains that the United 
States were pioneers in the adoption of transactional profit methods that went beyond 
the search of comparables. Faced with the fear that such methods could be seen as out 
of the arm´s length standard, the United States placed considerable emphasis on the fact 
that those methods were perfectly consistent with it. This fact was read by some scholars 
as the proof that the United States felt that the standard had become part of customary 
international law755. 
o States are obliged to correct double taxation either through credit or exemption method. 
Avi-Yonah believes that States usually feel reluctant to switch from their method in force 
to a different one, considering that this may result from the feeling that such method has 
become part of customary international law756. 
However, it is undeniable that most scholars believe that there are no such international customs 
limiting tax jurisdiction757. Particularly, there seems to be a strong consensus on the idea that 
double taxation is not strictly forbidden by customary international law and thus States are not 
obliged by public international law to correct double taxation, no matter how undesirable it is 
considered to be758.   
From our point of view, the “international tax regime” doctrine is unsubstantiated and lacks legal 
basis. This is so, first of all, because the point of departure is already mistaken. Avi-Yonah aspires 
to advocate for the existence of a worldwide tax regime, comprised by the abovementioned 
general principles, which presumably bind each and every State, or at least those that have 
concluded tax treaties following the usual patterns759. However, one cannot simply claim the 
existence of various supposed universal international customs without undergoing the 
overambitious and endless task of carefully assessing whether the objective and subjective 
requirements set out by the Statute of the ICJ -as developed by its case law- are in fact fulfilled in 
                                                          
754 AVI-YONAH, R. (2007), p. 6. 
755 AVI-YONAH, r. (2007), p. 6-7 and LEPARD, B.D. (2000). 
756 AVI-YONAH, R. (2007), p. 7. 
757 For example, MANN, F.A. (1964), p. 109 et seq.: “The existence of any principles of customary international law 
limiting fiscal jurisdiction has, it is true, been denied altogether”. Many scholars have also opposed to the existence of 
a supposed international tax regime, for example GRAETZ, M. J. (2001) and ROSEMBLOOM, D. (2000). 
758 See KNECHTLE, A.A. (1979), p. 37, QURESHI, A.H. (1987) p. 16 et seq. and VOGEL, K. (1997), p.12. The latter one 
states: ”double taxation, resulting from the interaction of the domestic laws of two (or more) States, will be consistent 
with international law as long as each individual legislation is consistent with international law”. 
759 AVI-YONAH, R. (2007). We draw such general conclusion from many statements spread across the book, for example 
“countries are not free to adopt any international tax rules they please but rather operate in the context of the regime” 
(p.1) or “the network of two thousand or more bilateral tax treaties that are largely similar in policy, and even in 
language, constitutes an international tax regime, which has definable principles that underlie it and are common to 
the treaties” (p. 3).  
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each one of the States and in relation to each one of the aforementioned principles. Customs 
should certainly be proved on a case by case basis, following the thorough exercise made by the 
ICJ every time it has encountered an alleged international custom760. Naturally, there is no trace 
of such in-depth analysis in this 213-pages book. In our opinion, there does not seem to be other 
way to rigorously uphold that various principles have become part of a worldwide customary 
international law. 
Although only this exhaustive analysis would serve to properly argue for or against the existence 
of such worldwide customs, it is our opinion that, on a general basis, the supposed principles 
emanated from the so-called “international tax regime” seem to fail to fulfill both the objective 
and the subjective requirements necessary to reach the status of international custom according 
to the ICJ case law761.  
With regards to the objective element, which is the general and uniform practice of States, its 
presence is highly questionable, since we should not mistake the repetition of certain ambiguous 
and not self-defining patterns with a consistent practice followed by States. As Rosenbloom 
explains, it would be “amazing” if there was a greater uniformity across national boundaries, and 
it is in fact “fairly amazing” that the taxing jurisdictions have reached a point of sufficient 
understanding in matters of law and taxation that the concepts of “residence”, “corporation” and 
“stock” are generally comprehensible almost everywhere. But the sad truth is that beyond these 
general and wide patterns which tend to exist in most corporate income tax systems, it is difficult 
to find uniformity and consistency in the legislation of States, no matter how attractive the idea 
may appear to be762. Not to mention the cases in which the supposed widespread practice is 
constantly contravened by a great number of States. For example, the taxation of PEs for the 
worldwide income attributable to them (irrespective of its sources)763 effectively contradicts the 
alleged practice according to which States lack jurisdiction to tax nonresidents on their foreign-
source income. 
Furthermore, the analysis undertaken by Avi-Yonah appears to be excessively focused on US 
practice. As all his examples and arguments depart from the US practice, he fails to provide 
evidence to support the assertion that a consistent and uniform practice of States actually exist 
in relation to the abovementioned principles764.  
                                                          
760 For example, the following judgments by the International Court of Justice: “S.S. Lotus case” (September 7th 1927) 
and “North Sea Continental Shelf Case” (February 20th 1969). The conclusion is that a customary rule of international 
law can bind only those subjects as regards whom it may be presumed that they have recognized it, as confirmed by 
WOLFKE, K. (1964), p. 86 
761 See for example judgment of the International Court of Justice “North Sea Continental Shelf Case” of February 20th 
1969, p. 3. 
762 ROSEMBLOOM, D. (2000), p. 139. He also provides various examples to support his view: “No one in the United 
States should be surprised that other jurisdictions have addressed these matters on their own terms and established 
rules that do not always match our own. The Germans do not have an exquisitely subdivided limitation on the foreign 
tax credit. The British assign corporate residence according to where an entity is managed and controlled, not only 
according to where it is organized. Japan does not have anything like the intricate US rules for determining when a trust 
constitutes a taxpayer independent of eithers its grantor or its beneficiary. And few countries other than the United 
States are likely any time soon to draw the line between a taxable entity, on the one hand, and one whose income is 
taxable to its owners, on the other, on the basis of a choice exercised by the entity on a piece of paper” 
763 Section 3.3.4. 
764 QURESHI, A.H. (2015), p. 199. 
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With regards to the subjective element, the opinio iuris, the ICJ requires such consistent and 
uniform practice to be accompanied with the evidence that States have so acted because they 
have felt legally compelled765. Beyond this sense of legal duty, there are many other reasons why 
States may behave uniformly, for example “courtesy, convenience or tradition”766. In the field of 
taxation, we see that States may tend to repeat certain patterns and principles driven by purposes 
other than the awareness of being following a legal duty767.  
First and foremost, States collect taxes in order to raise revenue for public expenditure, with the 
purpose of providing quality public services to their citizens768. In order to ensure the collection 
of sufficient tax revenue, States need to be and stay competitive in relation to their neighbors to 
be able to maintain and attract foreign direct investment. It is thus understandable that States 
would feel tempted to follow rules and principles that have been successfully consolidated in tax 
treaty models or foreign tax regulations, as a way to offer a well-known legal framework to current 
and potential taxpayers who seek standardized rules whose drafting do not differ much from 
other rules they have been previously in contact with. This is why the tendency to integrate these 
widely accepted rules is not so decisive in States who enjoy a stronger economic power, namely 
the United States -with their own tax treaty model- or the emerging economies, since they can 
afford to draft their rules more freely without sacrificing much tax revenue. On the other hand, 
less-privileged States have naturally a more limited room for maneuver to the extent they wish to 
stay competitive769. Avi-Yonah himself provides a very good example in this regard, although for 
the purpose of upholding his own thesis: if we were to advise a developing country to adopt an 
income tax for the first time, how free would we be to do so “assuming the State wished to attract 
foreign investment”? It is true that a developing country would not be entirely free to depart from 
widespread standards set by its neighbors or international organizations, but such freedom is not 
constrained but an opinion iuris of any sort but by its own wish to be competitive and attract 
foreign investment770. For these reasons, it seems that it is not opinio iuris what is driving States 
to adopt certain widespread standards but rather their desire to survive in the market.  
Furthermore, States may also find the reproduction of the neighbors´ rules even convenient and 
cost-effective. Why not benefit from the experience of the neighbors in the interpretation and 
application of their own rules? Why not trust the rules drafted and the methods recommended 
by a technocratic international organization which exerts a great influence worldwide and even 
provides a full package of soft law guidelines? On the other hand, States may not always 
                                                          
765 Judgment of the International Court of Justice “North Sea Continental Shelf Case” of February 20th 1969, p. 44. “The 
States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency or 
even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough”.  
766 Judgment of the International Court of Justice “North Sea Continental Shelf Case” of February 20th 1969, p. 44.  
767 See also judgment of the International Court of Justice “S.S. Lotus Case” of September 7th 1927, p. 28: “The alleged 
fact does not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having such a duty; on the other hand, as will presently 
be seen, there are other circumstances calculated to show that the contrary is true”. 
768 Along with two other purposes: the redistribution of wealth among their citizens to mitigate inequality and the 
regulation of private economic activity. See AVI-YONAH, R. (2006). 
769 BIRD, R. (2002), p. 198: “The worldwide prevalence of a particular variety of corporate tax – the corporate income 
tax –makes it difficult for a relatively small country to deviate very far from this norm without incurring penalties in the 
form of loss of investment or loss of tax revenue, or both. The conventional corporate income tax undoubtedly has many 
defects, but so long as most countries most countries should likely have one”. Bird states that the dominance of the 
United States in their commercial relation with Canada makes the latter more limited to draft a corporate tax system 
that diverge from that of the United States.  
770 AVI-YONAH, R. (2007), p. 3. 
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reproduce these standards for convenience sake but rather as a political price to get a reward. 
Avi-Yonah himself provides various illustrative examples of States who have abandoned rules that 
diverged from those recommended by the OECD just to gain access to the organization771. And 
again, we should not confuse this with the sense of following a legal duty. 
We can conclude that States do not seem to implement the principles that have supposedly 
reached the status of international customs in such a way as to be evidence of a belief that this 
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. We should not base 
the presence of the opinio iuris requirement solely on mere assumptions772 but rather on more 
convincing facts from which we could infer that the State was clearly feeling legally compelled to 
behave this way773. On the contrary, the considerations expressed above suggest that there seem 
to be many other reasons – such as tax competition, convenience and practicability or political 
purposes – behind the standardization of tax rules conducted by States. 
This conclusion is particularly relevant for the purposes of our work. By dismantling the legal basis 
of Avi-Yonah´s international tax regime, the ALS (part of this alleged set of international customs) 
ceased to be a carved-in-stone principle but rather as a commonly used standard that may be 
subject to changes.  
The considerations exposed above as regards the objective and subjective elements required for 
an international custom to arise also enable us to conclude that there is no reason to believe that 
neither domestic corporate residence tests or the definition of PE have reached this status. The 
comparative overview on domestic residence tests provided by Section 3.2.1 revealed that the 
diversity of residence tests is considerable and the understanding of seemingly identical tests 
differ between States774. As for the PE clause, States have negotiated countless modalities of PE 
clauses in their respective treaties775 and have adopted an equally infinite number of variations 
of the PE clause at the domestic level776, not to mention those which directly rely on a completely 
different standard777. In this context, there is little doubt that the “consistent and virtually 
uniform” practice of States in both scenarios is clearly absent, thus breaching the objective 
                                                          
771 For example, Mexico abandoned its long tradition of applying formulas in transfer pricing and adopted rules modeled 
after the OECD guidelines, South Korea similarly had to change its broad interpretation of what constitutes a permanent 
establishment under pressure from the OECD, Bolivia abandoned its attempt to adopt a cash flow corporate tax because 
it was ruled not creditable in the United States and even the United States is not immune to pressures if we compare 
the 1993 proposed transfer pricing regulations with the ones that were approved in the end, which reflect the OECD 
guidelines. See AVI-YONAH, R. (2007), p. 4. 
772 QURESHI, A.H. (2015), p. 198-200: “The thesis is heavily reliant on an interpretation of a voluntary fiscal State 
practice, namely the use of the Controlled Foreign Company and related legislation (…) With respect to the US CFC and 
related legislation, Avi-Yonah attributes to the US the belief that the US entered into this anti-avoidance device because 
the US considered that it could not directly tax foreign situated corporation under International Law. Extrapolating from 
this voluntary anti-avoidance mechanism the basis for the binding nature of an obligation not to double tax, not to under 
tax, indeed to tax in a certain manner, is a questionable leap in logic that involves the construction of fundamental and 
overarching principles in international taxation. This is a false transplantation of an opinio juris, from the State practice 
of establishing CFC legislation (…) This is the opinio juris that has to be demonstrated and not the opinio juris that Avi-
Yonah claims is attributable to State practice in relation to CFC legislation”.  
773 The ICJ always conducts a careful assessment of the practice of the State seeking indicators of opinio iuris. See the 
judgment by the International Court of Justice on “S.S. Lotus Case” of September 7th 1927, p. 27-31. 
774 This was particularly the case of tests relying on the governance of the Company (section 3.2.1.1.2).  
775 We make reference to some of this modalities when analyzing the content of the clause in Section 3.3.5. For a more 
comprehensive evaluation of these deviations from the OECD MC, see GADZO, S. (2016), p. 157-165. 
776 GADZO, S. (2016), p. 95-102. 
777 GADZO, S. (2016), p. 102-116, where he highlights the illustrative cases of the US, India and Brazil. 
 
175 
 
requirement required by the Statute of the ICJ and its case law. Further, even assuming the 
compliance with the objective condition, the subjective one would be missing taking into account 
the observations made throughout the present section. Either way, it appears to be clear that 
none of these paradigms conform customary international law778,  
 
4.3.3.2. The legal basis and the ambiguous content of the “genuine link” 
and the “minimum standard for foreigners” doctrines 
There is another school of thought, the so-called “genuine link” school, composed by scholars who 
argue that Sovereign States cannot exercise their tax jurisdiction over persons, property or 
situations that are not somehow connected to the sovereignty of the State. In other words, they 
believe Public International Law demands a reasonable, genuine and sufficient link between the 
taxing State and the taxable subject or object, and only the presence of such bond would allow 
the State to exercise its tax jurisdiction in accordance with Public International Law779. This 
doctrine has not only become deeply rooted in the academia but it is also common to find 
references to it in judgments by the ICJ780 and some domestic Courts, particularly in the context 
of Federal States781. 
                                                          
778 As regards the PE clause, see HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 16: “even if one conceded that the PE is a regular 
feature of international tax law, this would not necessarily lead to conclude that it constitutes the expression of a kind 
of customary international tax law (…) it is not persuasive to argue that there is an unwritten obligation in the sense of 
an opinio iuris according to which taxation of non-resident enterprises should be limited to cases in which a PE is given”. 
As far as corporate residence is concerned, we have not found any references indicating its hypothetical consideration 
as an international custom. 
779 Here are some advocates of the “genuine link” doctrine. MANN, F.A. (1984), p. 28 reproducing a statement made by 
himself in 1964: “A State has legislative jurisdiction if its contact with a given set of facts is so close, so substantial, so 
direct, so weighty, that legislation in respect of them is in harmony with international law and its various aspects 
(including the practice of States, the principles of non-interference and reciprocity and the demands of interdependence). 
A merely political, economic, commercial or social interest does not in itself constitute a sufficient connection”. 
KNECTHLE, A.A. (1979), p. 35: “The legislator should only impose a tax liability if a power relationship exists between 
him and the individual (…) Submission of the legal subject to territorial sovereignty, and thus to the fiscal jurisdiction, 
arises where the legal subject is connected with the tax-claiming body politic by special factual and legal relationships 
of personal or economic nature”. VOGEL. K. (1997), p.11: “Current international law permits taxation of foreign 
economic transactions when a sufficient connection exists between the taxpayer and the taxing State”. BROWNLIE, I. 
(1998), p. 301: “A principle of substantial and genuine connection between the subject-matter of jurisdiction and the 
territorial base and reasonable interests of the jurisdiction sought to be exercised, should be observed”. LANG, M. (2010) 
p. 23: “In international law practice there are no significant limits on the tax sovereignty of States. In designing the 
domestic personal tax law, the national legislator can even tax situations when, for example, only a genuine link exists. 
It is only when neither the person nor the transaction has any connection with the taxing State that tax cannot be levied”.  
780 The International Court of Justice has referred at least twice to the notion of “genuine link”, albeit always in the 
context of diplomatic protection. We will later analyze the content of the two most relevant judgments ruled by the 
Court in this matter. 
781 For example, the Court of New South Wales (“Johnson V. Commissioner of Stamp Duties”) considered in 1956 that 
a State exceeds its fiscal jurisdiction if its tax legislation “has no relevant territorial connection whatever with the State”, 
if there is no “relevant nexus” between the taxed property and the State. For its part, the Supreme Court of the United 
States (“Miller Bros V. Maryland” in 1954 and similarly in “Scripto V. Carson” in 1960) expressed its view as well: “the 
course of decisions does reflect at least consistent adherence to one time-honored concept: that due process requires 
some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax”. 
More recently, the German Federal Constitutional Court took a stance on the issue on its judgment of March 22th 1983: 
“The imposition of taxes upon a foreigner living abroad, which is founded upon a set of facts wholly or partly 
implemented abroad, requires sufficiently appropriate points of contact for taxation by the taxing State to prevent 
interference, contrary to public international law, with the foreign State´s claims to sovereignty. These points of contact 
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However, despite the existence of a general agreement on the fact that Public International law 
requires such genuine link between the taxing State and the taxable subject, it is rare to find 
references to its specific legal basis under Public International Law. Some understand that States 
have been shaping their tax rules in harmony with the aforementioned principle with the belief 
of being following a legal constraint, thereby elevating it to the category of international 
custom782. Some others anchor this doctrine in certain general principles of Public International 
Law, such as the principle of non-intervention783, the mandate against arbitrariness784 or the 
principle of reasonableness785. 
In our opinion, the most evident legal foundation of such doctrine may be found in the very notion 
of sovereignty, which is inherently limited by nature786. As we noted above787, States do not live 
in a bubble but rather coexist with other States who similarly enjoy an equal sovereignty status, 
and Public International law serves the essential function of delimiting the spheres of validity of 
their respective domestic legal orders, thus making the coexistence among equally Sovereign 
States sustainable.  
The rules that perform the aforementioned function are commonly known as “juristic 
inevitabilities” or “a priori” principles – in the sense that they exist irrespective of the will of the 
States and are prior to statutory law –which are considered as natural law principles that emanate 
from the notion of sovereignty788. These principles mark out the time, space, people and matters 
                                                          
and their factual closeness must, from the point of public international law, satisfy a minimum of reasonableness (…) 
The legal possibility of imposing taxes upon foreigners is subject to clear limits by the necessity of contact, for instance, 
with nationality, establishment, residence or sojourn, the realization of a set of taxable facts or the achievement of a 
legally relevant result within the State”. 
782 AKEHURST, M. (1972), p. 179. “Customary international law permits a State to levy taxes if there is a genuine 
connection between the State and the taxpayer (nationality, domicile, long residence, etc.) or between the State and 
the transaction or property, in respect of which the tax is levied”.  
783 See Judgment by the German Federal Constitutional Court, March 22th 1983 and MANN, F.A. (1964), p. 28. 
784 KEMMEREN, E.C.C.M. (2001), p. 19: “The injunction against arbitrariness under international law must be taken into 
consideration. Arbitrariness is considered to be present if a sufficient relationship with the State concerned is absent and 
that State, nevertheless, imposes taxes”.  
785 The American Law Institute has claimed that the principle of reasonableness is a principle of customary law to the 
extent it has been widely followed by States in their exercise of their jurisdiction. In an attempt to provide a more 
precise content to the principle, they developed a number of factors to be considered by States when assessing whether 
they were exercising their jurisdiction in accordance with the aforementioned principle. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 
(1986), § 403, 421 and 431. Among the factors outlined by the Institute are, for example, the existence of a link between 
the activity and the territory of the regulating State (i.e. the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, 
or has substantial, direct and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory) or the connection (nationality or residence for 
example) between the regulating State and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated. 
786 MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989). His book is wholly based on the assumption that State sovereignty in international law is 
inherently constrained and, tax jurisdiction, being derived by sovereignty, is similarly constrained by extension. See also 
KNECHTLE, A.A. (1979), p. 34. “Tax jurisdiction (…) is internally as well as externally limited”. 
787 Section 4.3.2. 
788 Judgment by the International Court of Justice “North Sea Continental Shelf cases” of February 20th 1969, paras. 37 
et seq. Denmark and the Netherlands claimed that the rights of the coastal State to its continental shelf were based on 
its sovereignty over the land domain, of which the shelf area was the natural prolongation under the sea. Following this 
notion of appurtenance, they alleged that such coastal rights existed “ipso facto” and “ab initio” as they derived logically 
from the notion of sovereignty as “juristic inevitabilities” or expressions of “natural law”. The Court accepted this view, 
but finally dismantled the plea arguing that such principle did not guide a precise delimitation of the shelf as the 
applicants intended to demonstrate. 
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over which a Sovereign State may exercise its jurisdiction, thereby drawing the so-called “reserved 
domain” of the State jurisdiction789.  
Rutsel S.J. Martha derives the content of such principles from the competence theory of State790, 
according to which, a national legal order would only be valid as long as certain conditions are 
met.  
 
Table 30 - Impact of Kelsen´s competence theory of State in the way a State may exercise its tax jurisdiction 
Spheres 
of validity 
General Impact in tax matters 
Temporal Domestic rules derived by Sovereign 
States produce legal effects insofar 
sovereignty is maintained. 
 
States may impose taxes that would be 
valid as long as they maintain their 
sovereignty. 
 
Personal  Domestic rules are applicable to persons 
who belong to its personal supremacy791. 
States may levy taxes on persons who 
belong to their personal supremacy, i.e. 
their citizens and national legal entities; 
to the extent they maintain such 
status792.  
 
Spatial Domestic rules may be applicable to all 
alien persons and objects within the 
areas subject to its spatial supremacy. 
States may levy taxes on aliens, i.e. 
foreign individuals and legal entities, 
insofar as they are located within the 
territory of the State793. 
 
                                                          
789 BROWNLIE, I. (1998), p. 293: “Matters within the competence of States under general international law are said to 
be within the reserved domain, the domestic jurisdiction of States (…) The general position is that the reserved domain 
is the domain of state activities where the jurisdiction of the State is not bound by international law: the extent of this 
domain depends on international law and varies according to its development”. 
790 KELSEN, H. (1962), p. 307 and MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 33. 
791 MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 72-73.  A French national first acquired the US citizenship and then voluntarily relinquished 
it. The issue was brought to Court, who concluded that, from the moment a national legal order has determined that a 
subject is not a citizen any more, it consequently ceases to be entitled to fiscal jurisdiction based on personal 
supremacy. 
792 Personal jurisdiction is the authority asserted by a sovereign over individuals or entities on grounds of allegiance or 
protection, irrespective of other considerations as their physical location. Martha illustrates the issue with a real case 
that took place in Turkey. A Turkish expatriate who acquired the US citizenship complained to the United States 
Department of State because the Turkish government was imposing taxes and exacting duties for his account from his 
remaining relatives. The State Department declared that Turkey could not impose a personal tax on him since he had 
lost the nationality of Turkey and was not residing within its territory either, so he was clearly not subject to the personal 
supremacy of Turkey anymore. See MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 34. 
793 Territorial jurisdiction is the authority over a geographically defined portion of the surface of the Earth. See QURESHI, 
A.H. (1994), p. 5: “A State has considerable freedom in the exercise of its fiscal policy with respect to matters arising 
within its territory; even if the measures have or are designed to have an international impact”.  
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Material Domestic rules can only regulate matters 
which are not by nature exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of international 
law, nor positively regulated by general 
or specific international law. The 
domestic tax rule would remain valid 
insofar international law does not 
regulate the matter794. 
States are entitled to prescribe taxes 
since taxation is not by nature within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of 
international law. However, once an 
international rule regulating the matter 
exists, it would prevail over the 
domestic one. 
 
Once the “reserved domain” of the State has been outlined, from the principle of equality of 
Sovereign States derives the general prohibition of non-intervention in the area of exclusive 
jurisdiction of other States795. Furthermore, the principle “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas” 
(commonly known as principle of “good neighborliness”) goes even further, since its recognizes 
that the exercise of sovereign rights of a State over its “reserved domain” is not absolute but 
correlative and interdependent of the sovereign rights of other States, to the extent that such 
exercise may compromise them796.  
The implications of the aforementioned considerations in the way States may - or at least should 
- exercise their tax jurisdictions are nonetheless vague.  
What already appears evident is that the imposition of taxes over persons or things that are 
incontestably beyond the personal and territorial sovereignty would constitute a clear violation 
of Public International Law797, since such exercise of jurisdiction would be deemed to be 
arbitrary798, unreasonable, illegitimate and prone to undermine the sovereign rights of the 
                                                          
794 This idea is linked to both the “pacta sunt servanda” principle -considered an international custom until codified in 
article 26 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties- and the notion of primacy of EU Law over the domestic 
legislation of the Member States. See Judgment by the European Court of Justice “Costa/E.N.E.L” of 1964: “The transfer 
by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under 
the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of the sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act 
incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail”, p. 594. 
795 BROWNLIE, I. (1998), p. 289 and 293. The principle of sovereign equality of States is recognized in article 2.1 of the 
Charter of the UN signed on June 26th 1945. In respect with the non-intervention principle, see judgment by the 
International Court of Justice case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, of June 27th 
1986, p. 96: “The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without 
outside interference (…) expressions of an opinio iuris regarding the existence of the principle of non-intervention in 
customary international law are numerous and not difficult to find (…) It has moreover been presented as a corollary of 
the principle of the sovereign equality of States”. In p. 108: “A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing 
on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely”-  
796 These principles have originally arisen in the context of cross-border pollution. See HANDL, G. (1975), p.  55 et seq. 
“The emerging principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas constituted recognition of the fact that territorial 
sovereign rights in general were correlative and interdependent and were consequently subject to reciprocally operating 
limitations. This rejection of the absolute view of sovereignty was an acknowledgment of the fact that activity within a 
state's territorial bounds ceased to be within the exclusive competence of that state and became instead a matter of 
international concern, if such action caused transnational effects (…) In the context of an international society based on 
the sovereign equality of States, the exercise of a sovereign right is bound to conflict with similar rights of an equal rank, 
insistence on individual rights must be considered unreasonable and reprehensible”. This principle has been 
acknowledged by the judgment of the International Court of Justice “Corfu Channel Case” of April 9th 1949.  
797 See MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 70, who believes that “it becomes obvious that if a States promulgates a law affecting 
non-resident aliens, and their acts have no effect within its territory, such State would be violating international law”.  
798 KEMMEREN, E.C.C.M. (2001), p. 19 
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neighboring States. For example, Jiménez de Aréchaga, former president of the ICJ, suggested 
that from International Law we can only infer a “loose criterion of a purely negative character 
rather than a positive rule of public international law: a State is not entitled to exercise jurisdiction 
over matters, persons or things with which it has absolutely no concern”799. He strongly believes 
that the “genuine link” standard should have a negative character, considering it is better to 
challenge a particular exercise of jurisdiction by a State by demonstrating the total absence of 
connection with the facts and the grossly unfair consequences resulting therefrom800 rather than 
assessing and demonstrating the closeness of connection between the State and a given set of 
facts on a case by case basis, as suggested by supporters of the “genuine link” doctrine801. 
Perhaps less obvious has been the assessment of borderline cases in which there is indeed some 
sort of personal or territorial connection between the taxing State and the taxable subject but 
such connection is deemed to be weak, remote or insufficient, as a result of the freedom enjoyed 
by States to perceive the personal or territorial connection differently. While some scholars simply 
regard the situation as illegitimate or undesirable, Martha believes it would constitute an excess 
of fiscal jurisdiction or, in other words, an exercise of jurisdiction ultra vires. He illustrates the 
issue with some examples which reached the United States Board of Tax Appeals802. The Lord 
Forres case (1932) involved the personal taxation of a non-resident alien member of a US 
partnership on dividends paid by a foreign non-resident corporation to the partnership, 
considering the foreign corporation received part of its income from sources within the United 
States. For its part, in the Frank W. Ross case (1941), the IRS intended to impose taxes on Frank 
Ross, citizen and resident in Canada, for the dividends distributed by Ross Corporation, a Canadian 
company which, in turn, derived part of its income from the United States. Both taxpayers 
appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals claiming that, notwithstanding the imposition of both taxes 
was rightfully based in the Revenue Act of 1921, the United States lacked tax jurisdiction since the 
dividends fell outside its personal and territorial sovereignty. 
In the first case, the Board clearly acknowledged that the dividend income received by the 
taxpayer was “beyond the taxing power of the United States”803. However, the Board decided to 
omit the jurisdictional issue and simply rely on the domestic legal provision which regarded the 
source of such dividends as being within the United States. In the second case, the Board of Tax 
Appeals upheld once again the decision by the IRS manifesting that jurisdictional questions “were 
not of its concern”. This time a dissenting opinion by member Leech expressed that the Board 
                                                          
799 JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, E. (1978), p. 182.  
800 This stance is better aligned with the “Lotus presumption” of the International Court of Justice: “far from laying 
down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of 
their Courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of 
discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards, other cases, every State remains free to 
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable”. 
801 QURESHI, A.H. (1987), p. 16: “The impact of the reasonable link requirement (…) invites a State to address itself to 
the question whether a foreigner (or the property of) within the territory, is a national or not, is domiciled or not, is 
resident or not, or otherwise has a substantial connection or not, for the purposes of ascertaining whether or not it can 
exercise its fiscal jurisdiction”. It should be noted that Qureshi only intends to describe the rationale behind the “genuine 
link” doctrine, since he personally does not support it. 
802 MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 156 et seq. 
803 As cited by MARTHA, R.SJ. (1989), p. 158: “That these elements are all beyond the territorial limits of the United 
States seems clear!”. 
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should have assessed the jurisdictional basis for the tax imposition, which was, to say the least, 
doubtful.  
Undoubtedly, the Board knew that it was facing a jurisdictional problem, but simply decided to 
shelter behind the domestic tax code and disregard the implications international law had in both 
situations804. But we should bear in mind that the lawfulness of an action under domestic law does 
not prevent it from being contrary to international law805. And, according to some scholars806, the 
United States exceeded its tax jurisdiction on both occasions, since the dividends fell outside the 
personal and territorial sovereignty of the country, the consequence being that the imposition of 
such taxes should have been declared void for being in violation of International Law807. 
But International Law does not only demand a minimum attachment between the taxing State 
and the taxable subject in order to guarantee that the latter is within the personal and/or 
territorial sovereignty of the State, but it also requires a certain degree of reasonableness and 
proportionality in the extension of the tax liability that such link may trigger.  
For example, there seems to be a broad-based consensus in the fact that States cannot subject to 
taxation the worldwide income of aliens who are tourists or temporary visitors, even though such 
visitors could be deemed to be within the territorial sovereignty of the State in the first instance808. 
Perhaps the scholar who has gone deeper in the study of this boundary is Qureshi, who took the 
“minimum standard for foreigners” from general international law809 and extended it to the tax 
                                                          
804 RYNGAERT, C. (2007), p. 67-68. “In more recent times the territorial principle has not been grounded upon 
International Law but rather on Congress´ primary concern with domestic conditions (…) The bottom-line is, if Congress 
has deemed it wise to apply its laws abroad beyond what is customarily accepted in international law, the courts should 
not second-guess it: they should only ascertain the true intent of Congress”.  
805 BEALE, J.H. (1923), p. 243: “It is clear that the sovereign cannot confer legal jurisdiction on his courts or his legislature 
when he has no such jurisdiction according to the principles of international law. The question remains whether a 
judgment rendered in accordance with such a statute as has been described, attempting to confer a jurisdiction which 
the sovereign does not possess, is legally binding in the country where it is rendered”. 
806 MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 157 et seq. and MANN, F.A. (1964), p. 116-117. 
807 MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 156 et seq. Although we may agree with this conclusion, we should take into consideration 
that the judgment by the United States Supreme Court quoted by Martha can hardly be extended to the 
aforementioned cases since it deals with the imposition of taxes by a city (St Louis), whose tax jurisdiction is constrained 
not only but International Law but also - and specially - by the Constitution and the domestic legal order in the United 
States. See Judgment by the United States Supreme Court (“City of St. Louis V. Wiggins Ferry Company”, ruled in 
December 1870): “The authority extends over all persons and property within the sphere of its territorial jurisdiction (…) 
Where there is jurisdiction neither as to person nor property, the imposition of a tax would be ultra vires and void. If the 
legislature of a State should enact that the citizens or property of another State or country should be taxed in the same 
manner as the persons and property within its own limits and subject to its authority, or in any other manner whatsoever, 
such a law would be as much a nullity as if in conflict with the most explicit constitutional inhibition. Jurisdiction is as 
necessary to valid legislative as to valid judicial action”. 
808 JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, E. (1978), p. 182: “Everybody agrees, for instance, that a State could not subject to taxation 
the whole income of aliens who are tourist or temporary visitors”. This is so because he understands that, when the 
connection is so remote, the imposition of taxes would lead to “nonsensical and grossly unjust results”, offending 
“elementary notions of fair play and substantial justice”. See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1986), p. 259: “Jurisdiction 
to tax seldom raises issues between States, but an unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction to tax, for instance a tax on a 
resident alien temporarily present within a State, measured by his word-wide income, could be challenged as a violation 
of international law by both the taxpayer and the State of the taxpayer´s nationality”.  
809 SCHWARZENBERGER, G. (1967), p. 105 et seq. He states that the conclusion of innumerable treaties in which the 
contracting parties granted a minimum of rights to each other´s merchants and nationals while they sojourned in the 
territories of the other party has led to an “elastic but relatively objective standard” for the treatment of foreign 
nationals that has crystallized into a rule of international customary law. 
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field, with the consequence that States could not impose a tax on the worldwide income of an 
“unspecting transient visitor”810.  
Our interim conclusion to the preceding arguments is that Public International Law does not seem 
to pose a clear and precise limit to the way States may exercise their tax jurisdiction, as the 
genuine link school suggests. However, we do believe that some conclusions may be drawn after 
the analysis of the sources of International Law, notably two: 
1. The very notion of sovereignty, as an inherently limited power, poses restrictions to the 
States´ tax jurisdiction, to the extent that they can only tax realities that are within the 
scope of their territorial and / or personal jurisdiction. This means that States could only 
tax their nationals (individuals or legal entities) or persons or properties that are located 
or sufficiently linked to their territories. While a complete absence of connection is 
generally understood as an arbitrary taxation contrary to International Law, there is no 
such consensus on the degree of sufficiency in the connection that is required by 
International Law (“genuine link” doctrine). 
2. For its part, the minimum standard for foreigners, a generally recognized international 
customary rule, implies that States cannot tax temporary visitors who do not become 
sufficiently attached to the State for their worldwide income. In this case, what may be 
regarded as disproportionate and unreasonable is not the connection between the State 
and the taxpayer but rather the extent of the tax liability. 
As a consequence of the aforementioned assertions, we can conclude that the “genuine link” 
required by International Law simply consists on a de minimis rule rather than a rule with a 
positive clear content. This is due to the difficulties in proving the existence of an international 
custom with a positive clear content capable of going any further than this: it can hardly be argued 
that the relative uniformity in the way States have tended to configure their tax connecting factors 
fulfill the objective and subjective conditions to reach the status of international customs, for the 
same reasons already outlined in section 4.3.3.1. On the other hand, the “minimum standard for 
foreigners” seems to enjoy both a clearer legal basis under International Law and a more precise 
content. 
 
4.3.4. A PRINCIPLE TO ENSURE AN EXERCISE OF TAX JURISDICTION 
THAT IS MORE CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW: “THE 
SUFFICIENT CONNECTION” AND ITS APPARENT CONNECTION WITH 
THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE 
 
                                                          
810 QURESHI, A.H. (1987). In page 18 the author recognizes that the debate on the minimum standard is largely academic 
and unlikely to be a practical concern in real life since fiscal legislation with respect to these cases is likely to be difficult 
to enforce. 
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What has become clear from the previous Section is that no State imposes arbitrary taxes over 
persons or things with which they have absolutely no concern, just as no State charges taxes on 
transient visitors on their worldwide income. The reason behind this uniform behavior may well 
be the impracticability –or even the illegality - of the enforcement of such a tax811, but may also 
be the conviction of States that they lack jurisdiction to tax persons or objects that are clearly 
outside the limits of their sovereignty - or at least not “sufficiently” connected to it - or to impose 
an unreasonably wide tax liability to persons who are barely linked to them. 
Whilst it is true that International Law does not seem to establish a clear notion on the degree of 
connection between the State and the taxable subject that would be deemed to be “sufficient”, 
it is equally true that a relatively high degree of connection would certainly help to prevent 
concurrence of jurisdiction812 with other sovereign States that are also somehow linked to the 
taxable subject813. We should recall at this point the previously noted “sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas” principle, which implies that powers derived by the sovereignty of States - as taxing 
powers- are not absolute but “correlative and interdependent”; to the extent their exercise by a 
State may compromise the exercise of the respective powers of a neighboring State.  
For these reasons, when a State decides to impose taxes on taxpayers that are not sufficiently 
linked to it, the chances of an overlap of tax jurisdictions in the international sphere, resulting in 
double taxation, considerably increase. When, by contrast, States limit themselves to tax subjects 
that are sufficiently linked to them, these chances typically diminish.  
Having said this, it seems advisable to try to find the principles underlying the common 
understanding of “sufficiency” in the connection between the taxing State and the taxable 
subject.  Aligning the exercise of tax jurisdiction with such principles would certainly prevent the 
concurrence of jurisdiction and, more generally, it would promote the necessary coordination to 
ensure a better coexistence among sovereign States814.  
It is certainly not uncommon to find references to the notion of “allegiance” in the argumentation 
of scholars and courts when debating the basis of a tax liability and assessing the sufficiency in 
the connection between the territory and the fiscal subject or object. It has been advocated that 
                                                          
811 Impossible not only in the implementation sense but also in the legal one, since we must remember that it is general 
principle of International Law the prohibition of States to exercise its powers in any form in the territory of another 
State, at least in the absence of a permissive rule to the contrary. See judgment by the International Court of Justice 
“S.S. Lotus” of September 7th 1927, p. 18.  
812 MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 141 et seq. He defines concurrence of jurisdiction as the situation that arises when two or 
more States are legally entitled under international law to apply their laws to the same facts, leaving aside the cases in 
which a State is clearly exceeding its jurisdiction under International Law. 
813 BROWNLIE, I. (1998), p. 301-302. He states that there should be a substantial and genuine connection between the 
subject matter of jurisdiction and the territorial base and then he notes that such sufficiency in the connection is not 
generally considered a question of “basic competence” but rather an issue that is relative to the rights of other States. 
814 Let this serve as a warning that the exercise we are about to undertake should not be regarded as an attempt to 
prove any sort of custom or principle under International Law. As already anticipated we do not believe it is possible to 
uphold the existence of a “genuine link” under International Law that is capable of going beyond the content already 
expressed above. It should also be noted that General International Law is indifferent to the phenomenon of 
concurrence of (tax) jurisdiction so ideas as the “genuine link” or the ones we are about to present consist on simple 
attempts to “relieve us from the discomfort that may be caused by this indifference”, in the words of MARTA, R.S.J. 
(1989), p. 145 and 151. 
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the exercise of tax jurisdiction is justified by the allegiance owed by the taxpayer to the taxing 
State, which may take two different forms: 
a) Personal or political allegiance815. On one hand, fiscal jurisdiction may be justified on the 
basis of personal allegiance, meaning that States could impose taxes upon those 
taxpayers subject to their personal sovereignty, i.e. its nationals816, whether individuals 
or legal entities.  
b) Economic allegiance817. On the other hand, tax jurisdiction may also be justified on the 
grounds of the economic allegiance owned by a non-national taxpayer to the taxing State. 
The allegiance is typically measured in relation to the degree of economic involvement of 
the taxpayer with the State, assuming that such involvement is also proportionate to the 
benefits it gets from the State´s activities, since the enjoyment of such benefits becomes 
the ultimate justification of the tax imposed. This is the reason why it is often associated 
with the benefit theory, which was already covered in Section 4.2.1. The term “economic 
allegiance” as such was originally coined by the German economist George Schanz in 
1892818 and later developed by Benvenuto Griziotti819 and Edgard Allix820.  
Although we may still find substantial reminiscences of the former theory, as we will later outline, 
the latter one has undeniably become the prominent. This is because Gijsbert Bruins, Luigi 
Einaudi, Edwin Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp, commonly known as the “four experts”,  embraced 
the notion of “economic allegiance”, which inspired and influenced the draft they submitted to 
the League of Nations, which ended up becoming the first widely followed Model Tax Convention 
of all times821. They did not hesitate to express their preference for economic allegiance over the 
                                                          
815 Such sort of taxation would be in line with the previously discussed “personal sphere of validity” of a State 
jurisdiction. 
816 MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 66. 
817 Taxation on aliens is however exercised within the abovementioned “territorial sphere of validity“ of a State 
jurisdiction. 
818 SCHANZ, G. (1892), p. 372-373 as translated by HARRIS, P.A. (1996), p. 276: “Every person who is economically tied 
to this community, that is every person who would benefit from the obligations of the commune being fulfilled, also 
share the responsibilities (…) The inhabitants who, by necessity, are provided with internal and external security, roads 
for transport, sanitation, educational establishments, and are engaged with economic and cultural affairs, need to be 
taken account of just as much as those who live outside the community but who depend on the former for the protection 
of their property and who share in the consumption of the community´s efforts in the form of value increases, profit and 
safe revenues”. It is important to acknowledge that it was not the purpose of these scholars to revert to the 
“antiquated” benefit principle endangering the idea of progressive taxation in accordance with the ability to pay 
revealed by the taxpayer. On the contrary, Schanz proclaimed that the tax liability should be made dependent on an 
economic relationship and, “once the group of people liable for tax has been defined, then the degree of liability may 
be fixed on the basis of different norms”. Thus, once it has been determined to which States the taxpayers owe economic 
allegiance, each one of the aforementioned States would decide, in respect of their “economically bound persons”, 
whether they should be taxed – and if so, to what extent – or exonerated. See SCHANZ, G. (1892), p. 374 as translated 
in HARRIS, P. A. (1996), p. 277.  
819 GRIZIOTTI, B. (1929): “The duty to contribute is linked to the advantages that the taxpayer receives from his belonging 
to the collective whole, whether directly or indirectly, and receiving public goods and services which allow him or her to 
live in a territory such as that where he resides or where he accomplishes the taxable activity. There is no economic 
capacity, whether subjective or objective, whose typo of quantity does not (legitimately) imply the connection between 
the tax and the expense” 
820 See ALLIX, E. (1938).  
821 Although it has always been understood that the four experts tweaked Schanz´s theory, reaching conclusions and 
recommendations that were practically the opposite to those proposed by him. See VOGEL, K. (1988), p. 220 and 
HARRIS, P. A. (1996), p. 277. The latter one believes that the four experts did not acknowledge the connection between 
the doctrine of economic allegiance and the benefits theory. 
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political type: “In modern times, however, the force of political allegiance has been considerably 
weakened. The political ties of a non-resident to the mother country may often be merely nominal. 
His life may be spent abroad and his real interests may be indissolubly bound up with his new 
home, while his loyalty to the old country may have almost completely disappeared (…) In the 
modern age of the international migration of persons as well as of capital, political allegiance no 
longer forms an adequate test of individual fiscal obligation. It is fast breaking down in practice, 
and it is clearly insufficient in theory”822. 
The choice made by the four experts was not fortuitous but rather confirmed the increasing 
preponderance of territorial over personal jurisdiction on the grounds of International Law823. This 
primacy is generally premised on principles such as the sovereign equality of State or non-
intervention824. 
The success of the economic allegiance theory is such that it has led us to challenge the 
appropriateness of those tax connecting factors that are purely based on a political attachment, 
e.g. nationality. And it has not only propitiated the generation of such debate but it has also 
succeeded in influence the terms of the discussion on its suitability, which now gravitates around 
the benefit principle. Thus, it is argued that it is not justifiable to tax individuals and companies 
that are no longer economically or/nor socially involved with their National State on the grounds 
that we cannot assume the enjoyment of the services and benefits provided by their National 
State. 
Political allegiance has historically served as the basis to tax individuals on the sole basis of their 
nationality or citizenship. The United States is the only major country825 which reserves its right 
to tax the worldwide income accrued by its citizens irrespective of their place of residence. As 
noted above, the defense performed by the Supreme Court of the United States back in 1924 
revolves around the benefit argument: “the contention was rejected that a citizen's property 
without the limits of the United States derives no benefit from the United States. The contention, 
it was said, came from the confusion of thought in 'mistaking the scope and extent of the sovereign 
power of the United States as a nation and its relations to its citizens and their relation to it.' And 
that power in its scope and extent, it was decided, is based on the presumption that government 
by its very nature benefits the citizen and his property wherever found, and that opposition to it 
holds on to citizenship while it 'belittles and destroys its advantages and blessings by denying the 
possession by government of an essential power required to make citizenship completely 
                                                          
822 Economic and Financial Commission of the League of Nations (1923): Report on Double Taxation, p. 19. 
823 RYNGAERT, C. (2007), p. 39 and 47. He argues that the territoriality principle is the most basic principle of jurisdiction 
and that other grounds of jurisdiction should be considered as exceptional. In p. 46-95 he revises the historical relation 
between personal and territorial jurisdiction, acknowledging that the former one used to be the prevalent one until the 
17th century. See also SCHWARZENBERGER, G. (1967), p 92-93. 
824 Permanent Court of Arbitration, case Island of Palmas (United States V. Netherlands), April 4th 1928, paragraph 29: 
“Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to 
exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the function of a State. This development […] of international law 
[has] established this principle of the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its own territory in such a way as to 
make it the point of departure in settling most questions that concern international relations”. 
825 The US Tax Code stipulates the taxation of US citizens for their worldwide income, conclusion that derives from the 
reading of sections 61 (general definition of gross income) and 911-913 (earned income of citizens or residents of United 
States). The US Model Income Tax Convention of 2006 includes the so-called “saving clause” in article 1.4, by which the 
United States reserves the right to tax its citizens.  
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beneficial.'826. In 1959, at the height of the Cold War, the Way and Means Committee published a 
paper observing that income taxation based on citizenship was justified due to the large fraction 
of the total US budget assigned to military expenditures, considering “expenditures devoted to 
military and other foreign policy purposes are as important to US business abroad as they are to 
domestic business”827. 
However, the arguments put forward by the Court and the US government have not convinced 
the vast majority of scholars, who strongly disapprove nationality as a valid test for tax jurisdiction, 
who consider it as “undesirable”828, “insufficient”829, “unjustifiable”, “anachronistic”, 
“economically inefficient”830, contrary to horizontal equity and prone to provoke double 
taxation831. But if we were to draw a principle underlying most attacks towards the nationality 
principle, we would surprisingly encounter the very same principle used by the Court to justify its 
existence: the benefit principle. Since it seems evident that only individuals living in a country can 
benefit from governmental expenditures and utilize the services supported by those 
expenditures, it is difficult to believe the argument that an American overseas would still receive 
such benefits irrespective of his place of residence832. Patton argues that the arguments contained 
in Cook Vs. Tait are obsolete: “the days when United States citizens had need to call upon the 
                                                          
826 Judgment by the United States Supreme Court “Cook V. Tait” of May 5th 1924. The argument continues: “Or, to 
express it another way, the basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the 
property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States, nor was not and cannot be made dependent upon the 
domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen to the United States and 
the relation of the latter to him as citizen. The consequence of the relations is that the native citizen who is taxed may 
have domicile, and the property from which his income is derived may have situs, in a foreign country and the tax be 
legal—the government having power to impose the tax”. The benefits of being recognized as member of a community 
entitles the citizen to receive certain civil rights and privileges and, “in return to these rights and privileges, a citizen is 
obligated to pay taxes”. See CHRISTIE, J.H. (1982), p. 129.  
827 Report of the Committee on Ways and Means for a compendium on a tax reform in 1959 as cited by KIRSCH, M.S. 
(2007), p. 471. He also presents in the subsequent pages what may be the most exhaustive catalogue of benefits funded 
by the US government and available to their expatriates resident somewhere else. 
828 VON BAR, L. (1889), p. 319. He understood it is “undesirable to extract tax from non-residents“. 
829 KEMMEREN, E.C.C.M. (2001). p. 21: “Mere political allegiance is, in my view, an insufficient basis for fiscal jurisdiction 
with respect to the production of income and the possession of capital, because political allegiance does not produce 
income nor does it establish or preserve capital”. 
830 CHRISTIE, J.H. (1982), p. 138 et seq. It has been generally accepted that taxes would only be economically efficient 
to the extent they do not distort (or at least to the least possible degree) the decisions of the taxpayers. Naturally, the 
American rule strongly discourages Americans from accepting employment overseas. 
831 CHRISTIE, J.H. (1982), p. 131 et seq. He applies the horizontal equity test by comparing the American expatriate with 
all American citizens regardless of location and source of income, thus, “the American abroad should bear the same tax 
burden as an American residing within the United States who earns and equivalent income”. However, this principle is 
clearly not fulfilled. An American expatriate does not only incur in more general expenses (transportation costs, setting 
up a new household) but is also found liable to tax for his worldwide income in his National State. 
832 PATTON, B.L. (1975), p. 699 et seq. “He receives no benefit from United States police protection; he is not obtaining 
government aid in respect of his medical needs; he is not receiving pay as an employee of one of the many federal 
agencies: he is not working on federally funded projects and thus looking to the government indirectly for his livelihood; 
and he may never need the United States armed forces to protect himself or his property from aggression by any foreign 
power (…)It may be suggested that an American residing overseas benefits from embassy and consular services. 
Although there are United States Embassies and Consulates in most countries where United States citizens may be 
resident, their presence is of virtually no importance to those residents personally and, in fact, the typical American 
overseas will have little reason even to visit the Embassy other than for an audit of his United States income taxes by 
the Internal Revenue Service, or to renew his passport”. See also CHRISTIE, J.H. (1982), p. 135: “The American residing 
overseas is denied several federally funded benefits. The United States does not subsidize the education of American 
children abroad (…) Also the American abroad may be denied social security benefits even though he has contributed a 
substantial amount to the fund”.  
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government to come forth to protect their foreign personal and property rights are gone 
forever”833. 
Political allegiance has also persisted as a basis to tax in the field of legal entities834. While 
nationality of individuals is a self-evident legal fact, the question of whether a legal person can 
possess nationality has not always been positively responded. After the “Barcelona Traction case” 
ruled by the ICJ, it has been commonly understood that, under International Law, the nationality 
of legal persons is always that of the State under whose laws it has been incorporated835. Unlike 
citizenship, POI continue to be nowadays a common criterion to subject legal entities to 
worldwide taxation836. However, the fact that it is widespread does not exempt it from serious 
criticism. Apart from its evident manipulability and consequently its susceptibility to generate tax 
planning opportunities837, it gives rise to serious concerns once again from the perspective of the 
economic allegiance principle.  
“The unbearable lightness of being incorporated” constitutes a quite evocative expression, coined 
by Angelo Nikolakakis838, which perfectly sums up the decreasing importance of the POI in the life 
of a company. As in the case of individuals, who could be born in a State and end up residing and 
getting fully integrated from a social and economic point of view with another State, it also holds 
true that companies could be incorporated in a given State, sometimes purely for tax purposes, 
to end up spreading out its managing, economic and commercial activities in other territories. 
Would it be justifiable from the perspective of the economic allegiance theory and the benefits 
theory the imposition of taxes by the former State? The answer is highly dubious, to say the 
least839. 
Despite the consensus generated on the inappropriateness of the nationality as a nexus to tax 
both individuals and legal entities, it seems that nobody has seriously challenged yet its lawfulness 
under International Law840. And, if we are consistent with our previous statements, we should 
                                                          
833 PATTON, B. L. (1975), p. 700.  
834 See MAISTO, G. (ed.) (2009). 
835 Judgment by the International Court of Justice “Barcelona Traction case” of February 5th 1970. See MARTHA, R.S.J. 
(1989), p. 79, where he claims that, contrary to the case of natural persons, international law determines which legal 
persons pertain to the personal sphere of validity of a particular sovereign State. 
836 Section 3.2.1.1.5 and BEHRENS, P. (2009), p. 7-8.  
837 Section 3.2.1.1.1. SHAVIRO, D. (2011) and DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 101: “Where a country applies a formal test to 
determine corporate tax residence, such as the place of establishment of the company's registered office (but the same 
is true for the place of incorporation fiction) and that country has a beneficial tax regime, it attracts companies that are 
set up to enjoy the tax benefits but that do not necessarily have a genuine nexus with that country (letter box and base 
companies performing holding, passive investment  activities, etc.)” 
838 NIKOLAKAKIS, A. (2009), p. 903-927. 
839 See Section 4.2.3.2, where we concluded that the POI test could only be justified on benefit grounds if the residence-
based taxation resulting from its application is regarded as a compensation for the benefits derived from the 
incorporation (e.g. the granting of limited liability). Marian understands that, from the point of view of the benefit 
principle, a factual-based rule requiring a stronger nexus to the taxing jurisdiction would be preferable over the POI 
rule. See MARIAN, O. (2013). 
840 With the only exception of R.S.J. Martha, who suggests that taxation on nationals may not be in accordance with the 
principle of international law “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas”, also commonly known as principle of “good 
neighborliness”, to the extent the State of residence of the national may find its rights injured by the exercise of taxing 
rights conducted by the United States. See MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 67-68. We do not quite agree with this statement 
since we do not see how the taxing rights of the Residence State are perturbed. On the contrary, the Residence State 
can still exercise its tax jurisdiction, whose enforcement would be certainly easier due to the closer connection with the 
taxpayer. The only subject who would find his rights perturbed is the taxpayer, who would suffer a severe double 
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admit the absence of solid legal arguments to confront it on the grounds public international law 
either, since we have previously claimed that States are virtually free to exercise their tax 
jurisdiction the way they please to the extent the taxable object remains within their personal or 
territorial jurisdiction (which is self-evident in this case) and to the extent they comply with the 
principle of territoriality in enforcement and the minimum standard for foreigners841.  
The debate on the sufficiency in the connection, we should recall, departs from International Law 
literature but does not find a clear legal foundation in any of its sources. However, we understand 
that the efforts made by scholars and courts – including the ICJ itself842 - supporting a certain 
degree of connection between the State and the taxable subject should be not be diminished nor 
ignored. On the contrary, we have found common principles underlying their respective lines of 
reasoning; principles that may not reach the status of legal constraints to the way States may 
exercise their jurisdiction but still provide a useful insight on how States should exercise their tax 
jurisdiction in a way that would prevent situations of concurrence of jurisdictions and 
arbitrariness, and thus being better aligned with Public international law843. 
As we have anticipated above, a principle that is certainly recurrent in the discussions on the 
necessary connection between the State and its taxpayers is the principle of economic allegiance 
                                                          
taxation on his income as a result of the concurrence of two unlimited fiscal liabilities, the one imposed by the United 
States and the one imposed by the Residence State. 
841 Sections 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2. 
842 Firstly, the Court encountered a situation in which a national of Liechtenstein, Mr. Nottebohm, requested diplomatic 
protection from his National State against the State of Guatemala, where he had stronger economic and social ties. The 
Court did not question the validity of Mr. Nottebohm nationality under international law, observing that the conferral 
of the nationality status was an issue of strictly domestic nature. However, the Court ruled that Liechtenstein, the 
National State, could not grant diplomatic protection to Mr. Nottebohm against Guatemala, to the extent the latter 
State is more closely linked to him. See judgment “Nottebohm case” of April 6th 1955, p. 23: “According to the practice 
of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a 
social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of 
reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon 
whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely 
connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State. Conferred by a State, 
it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis-à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms 
of the individual's connection with the State which has made him its national”. The Court had the opportunity to express 
its view once again in a similar case, only this time it was related to legal persons. The question this time was whether 
a company´s national State, Canada, had the capacity to take action on its behalf. Again, the Court endorsed the 
nationality status of the company, which was Canadian for having being incorporated in accordance with the Canadian 
legislation. But before reaching such conclusion, the Court performed an analysis of facts and circumstances to verify 
the existence of a “close and permanent connection” between the company and the aforementioned State, to finally 
conclude that the entity had diverse links with Canada, albeit not commercial ones, for instance: the entity was 
incorporated in Canada, had its registered address there, celebrated their board meetings in Canadian territory, 
remained under the Canadian law for a period of over 50 years, kept its accounts and share registers within its territory 
and was listed in the records of the Canadian tax authorities. The Court finally concluded that “such connection is in no 
way weakened by the fact that the company engaged from the very outset in commercial activities outside the country 
of incorporation”. See judgment by the International Court of Justice “Barcelona Traction” of February 5th 1970, 
paragraph. 71. Although the cases in which references were made to such “close” and “genuine” link were all 
concerning diplomatic protection, it is the opinion of some scholars that the effective link criterion is commonly 
regarded as a more general principle that applies beyond the context of dual nationalities and diplomatic protection. 
See BROWNLIE, I. (1998), p. 411-412. 
843 As Christie suggests this may not be a question of lawfulness but a question of legitimacy: “There is no question as 
to whether the United States may tax its citizens on the basis of their allegiance to the State. The question is whether 
the United States should (emphasis added by the original author) assert its taxing power on the basis of citizenship”. 
See CHRISTIE, J.H. (1982), p. 131-132. 
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and the benefit theory844. Could we conclude that the benefit principle has succeeded to become 
a common yardstick when assessing the sufficiency in the exercise of tax jurisdiction? Is not it 
really the ultimate reason why a tax imposed on a temporary visitor, albeit enforceable, is deemed 
to be unjustified and even unlawful? And the main reason why citizenship, nationality and POI are 
not considered legitimate connecting factors anymore despite their apparent lawfulness? A 
considerable consensus has been reached on the fact that States are not legitimized to impose 
taxes to persons who are not de facto integrated in their community but rather maintain a merely 
nominal connection to it. And the only possible reason behind this consideration is that persons 
who are not sufficiently involved in a society of a State should not bear the responsibility of 
contributing to the public expenses of such State to the extent it is not possible to assume that 
those persons would be benefiting from the services provided. 
This notion of sufficiency, although quite entrenched in the academic doctrine and case law, may 
not have reached the status of principle or custom under General International Law, as evidenced 
by the recurrent exercise of tax jurisdiction by the States in the absence of such sufficient and 
genuine connection with the taxpayer845. However, we cannot deny that the imposition of taxes 
on persons who are sufficiently attached to the territory and the economic life of a given State is 
certainly more justifiable and at the same time more consistent with principles of Public 
International Law as territoriality, non-intervention or good neighborliness. And neither can we 
deny the general consensus reached by scholars on the undesirability and illegitimacy of tax 
connecting factors that barely ensure a weak and remote connection between the State and the 
taxable subject.846. Accordingly, these “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists”847 may 
eventually plant the seeds of principles de lege ferenda that originally do not manifest enough 
                                                          
844 Eric Kemmeren´s thesis, which was similarly aimed at reconsidering current tax connecting factors, also shares this 
view: “to assess whether a sufficient connection point for the assignment of tax jurisdiction is present, a linkage should 
be made from the territory principle with the direct benefit principle”. See KEMMEREN, E.C.C.M (2001), p. 22 and 
SAMPAY, A.E. (1951)”: “as it is known that the legitimacy of a tax resides in its contribution to the community whereat 
the individual receives his services, whether personally or through the benefits of his property or assets”. We also find 
this same line of reasoning in the context of distribution of taxing powers within Federal States. The US Supreme Court 
developed the doctrine of “substantive due process of law” in relation to interstate double taxation, doctrine based on 
the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution “nor shall any State deprive any person of (…) property without due process 
of law”. See judgments Farmers Loan & Trust V. Minnesota (January 6th 1930), First National Bank V. Maine (January 4th 
1932) and Wisconsin V. J.C. Penney Co. (December 16th 1940). The latter dealt with a the “privilege dividend tax” 
imposed by Wisconsin on dividends paid out of income derived from property located and business transacted in the 
State, irrespective of the residence of the payer and payee. The Court stated: “A state is free to pursue its own fiscal 
policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if, by the practical operation of a tax, the state has exerted its power in 
relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the 
fact of being an orderly, civilized society (…) That test is whether property was taken without due process of law, or, if 
paraphrase we must, whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities, 
and benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it 
can ask return”. The Court ruled in favor of Wisconsin considering that the “substantial privilege” of carrying on business 
in Wisconsin “clearly supports the tax”.  
845 For example, the imposition of taxes on citizens (Section 5.2.2.3.1) and companies incorporated in a given State 
(Section 3.2.1.1.1) irrespective of their present relationship with the State concerned.  
846 Article 38.1.d of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Brownlie points out that the influence of the writers 
over the International Court of Justice is evidenced by the recurring references and citations mainly observed in 
dissenting and separate opinions. He also warns about the dubious relevance of the opinions given by publicists who 
“see themselves to be propagating new and better views rather than providing a passive appraisal of the law”. See 
BROWNLIE, I. (1998), p. 24-25.  
847 We should remember at this point that academic writings are regarded as “subsidiary means for the determination 
of the rule of law” pursuant to article 38.1.d of the ICJ Statute.  
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practice supported by opinio iuris but in the end contribute to the development of a true custom 
once States feel induced to follow such principles848. 
4.4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We started in Section 4.1 by questioning the very existence of corporate income taxation. We 
departed from the assumption that CITs are inefficient, lead to distortions and discourage 
economic activity. Then, we argued that these disadvantages were not compensated by the 
supposed benefit that CITs entail (their wealth redistribution role) inasmuch such benefit is a mere 
myth. We then provided various arguments to uphold the idea that CITs do not necessarily help 
to redistribute wealth the way we expect them to do. This being so, we concluded that the 
existence of CITS is unfounded and unjustified and thus share the position that the abolishment 
of the tax and its replacement for a mechanism that would turn the company into a mere 
withholding agent could be desirable. 
As the abolishment of CITs is today an unrealistic alternative, we tried to lay dawn the basis for its 
reform by first identifying the principle(s) that should ideally inspire their content and structure 
(Section 4.2).  
We analyzed the role that the benefit principle should theoretically play in income taxation to 
reach the conclusion that it should help to identify the members of the community that ought to 
contribute to the financial support of the government, while ability to pay principle is confined to 
the measurement of the tax liability (Section 4.2.1). This being so, we then determined the specific 
manner in which the benefit principle could be complied with in the context of corporate income 
taxation (Section 4.2.2). Thereupon, we concluded in Section 4.2.3 that the benefit principle does 
not play its alleged role in current CITs, as it does not seem to underlie the rules that serve to 
identify the taxpayers that would become subject to a certain State´s tax jurisdiction (the so-called 
“tax connecting factors”). Finally, we reached the conclusion that the amendments of the 
paradigms underlying CITs that would later be proposed in Chapter 5 should ideally we inspired 
by the benefit principle (Section 4.2.4).  
Finally, in Section 4.3 we posed to question as to whether Public International Law could 
eventually limit or condition to some extent the reform proposal of the tax connecting factors in 
CITs we intend to put forward in Chapter 5. 
We departed from the widespread assumption that tax jurisdiction derives from (and is justified 
by) the principle of sovereignty (Section 4.3.1). We then argued that sovereignty (and by extension 
tax jurisdiction) is not absolute power, as it is constrained by Public International Law, which 
operates as a sort of “arbitrator” aimed at making the coexistence among sovereign States 
sustainable, marking out the time, space, people and matters over which the power of each State 
is supreme (Section 4.3.2) 
                                                          
848 For example, Massey states that the reasonableness principle was not a rule of customary law at the time the 
American Law Institute published the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law in 1986 but the principle progressively 
succeeded to pervade the reasoning of the US government and courts to the point of being regarded as a rule of 
customary law. See MASSEY, D.P. (1997). 
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To better address the question as to whether Public International Law places any substantive 
limits to the way States exercise their tax jurisdiction, we presented and critically analyzed some 
of the theories elaborated by the different schools of thought, particularly the “international tax 
regime”, the “genuine link” and the “minimum standard for foreigners” doctrines. Such analysis 
was conducted by carefully reviewing the different sources of the so-called “Public International 
Law of taxation” (Section 4.3.3)  
In the first place, we provided numerous arguments to dismantle the theory known as 
“international tax regime”, according to which certain widely accepted principles underlying 
international tax rules (both treaty and domestic-based) have in fact crystallized as international 
customs pursuant to article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ (Section 4.3.3.1). 
Secondly, we analyzed the “genuine link” doctrine -much more widely accepted- to explore 
whether it had both a specific legal basis and a clear content (Section 4.3.3.2). As regards the first 
issue, we concluded that the genuine link doctrine may find its foundation in the very notion of 
sovereignty, which is inherently limited by nature. In this context, we referred to the so-called 
“juristic inevitabilities”, which are natural law principles that mark out the “reserved domain” of 
each Sovereign State, that is, the time, space, people and matters over which a Sovereign State 
may exercise its jurisdiction.  As regards the second issue (the content of the theory), we arrived 
at the conclusion that the genuine link doctrine only had a relatively clear content from a negative 
perspective, as it would impede States from exercising their tax jurisdiction over matters, persons 
or things which bear no relation whatsoever to them. On the contrary, we noted the difficulties 
that a positive delimitation of the doctrine would entail, particularly in cases in which there is 
indeed a certain connection with the State concerned but it is weak or remote.  
On the other hand, we discovered that Public International Law does not only demand a minimum 
connection between the taxing State and the taxable subject (the “genuine link” doctrine), it 
equally requires a certain degree of reasonableness and proportionality in the extension of the 
tax liability that such link may trigger (the “minimum standard for foreigners” doctrine).  
Departing from the fact that the constraints posed by Public International Law to the way a 
sovereign State may exercise its tax jurisdiction lack a certain legal basis and have a vague content, 
we tried to put forward a general principle that could contribute to ensure that the exercise of 
taxing rights is better aligned with the content and objectives of Public International Law (Section 
4.3.4). We tried to infer such principle from the ICJ case law and various other principles 
underlying Public International Law (e.g. “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas” or “good 
neighborliness”, non-intervention, territoriality, reasonableness and mandate against 
arbitrariness) and we finally came up with the notion of “sufficient connection”. We then 
discovered that the discussions around the notion of “sufficiency” tended to revolve around the 
benefit principle, which brings back to the conclusion reached in Section 4.2.  
In short, we concluded in Section 4.3 that States imposing taxes solely on taxpayers that are 
“sufficiently” connected to them (to the extent they are in a position to enjoy the benefits 
provided by such State) are exercising their tax jurisdiction in a way that may be regarded as 
consistent and aligned with the principles underlying Public International Law and the ICJ case law 
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and, as a consequence, such States are less likely to generate situations of concurrence of 
jurisdictions and arbitrariness. 
The second most important conclusion we may derive from Section 4.3 is the fact that none of 
the paradigms underlying corporate income taxation analyzed in Chapter 3 have materialized as 
international customs, thereby granting the States the possibility to introduce the amendments 
we intend to suggest in the following Chapter without any concerns from the perspective of Public 
International Law. 
 
5. PROPOSALS FOR THE A CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
REFORM IN THE LIGHT OF THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE  
 
In Chapter 4, we reached the conclusion that the benefit principle should ideally underlie the tax 
rules that identify the taxpayers that would become subject to a State´s tax jurisdiction (the tax 
connecting factors) for both policy and legal (public international Law) reasons (sections 4.2 and 
4.3 respectively). This means that tax connecting factors should ultimately be based on factors or 
indicia revealing that the corporate taxpayer finds itself in the position to use/enjoy the State´s 
services and infrastructures to some extent. We concluded that this assumption could be made 
wherever the company is effectively carrying on an economic activity within the borders of the 
State or else is able to access its market by either remote or physical means (section 4.2.2.2). In 
this context, we observed that, in general terms and except for a few notable exceptions, the 
benefit principle does not seem to underlie tax connecting factors present in current CITs (section 
4.2.3). In fact, they have occasionally become instrumental in detaching taxable profits from the 
jurisdictions where corporate taxpayers are in position to use and enjoy the public benefits, as 
chapters 2 and 3 revealed. This being so, we called for a reconsideration of these rules and 
expressed our willingness to propose a few amendments to this effect in Chapter 5. After all, as 
rightly noted by Bird, the presumed rationale of the CIT should govern its design849. 
In Section 5.1, we will make a preliminary evaluation of the BEPS project. Firstly, we will first 
identify its objectives and evaluate their consistency with the policy considerations exposed in the 
previous Chapter. Then, we will assess the theoretical scope of the Project and its suitability to 
reach its alleged purposes.  
Subsequently, we will submit a few policy proposals at the domestic and treaty level. Such 
proposals are generally intended to bring taxable profits closer to the jurisdictions where the 
company´s economic activities are taking place, departing from the assumption that these 
jurisdictions are effectively or potentially providing the services and infrastructures from which 
the corporate taxpayer is presumably benefiting. These proposals seek to narrow the current gap 
                                                          
849 BIRD, R. (2002), p. 201: “what are the implications for the design of corporate tax? That is, to what extent does the 
why govern the how, and just how should the tax designed be influenced by the presumed rationale of the tax being 
designed?”. 
 
192 
 
(evidenced in the Apple case back in Chapter 2) between the economic and the tax presence of 
the companies throughout the world.  
The set of proposals are grouped in Section 5.2. They all respect and maintain the current status 
quo, i.e. the maintenance of the paradigms underlying CITs under review in the present study. 
This means that they accept the separate entity approach, the ALS as a generally valid corrective 
against profit shifting risks (at least in most cases), the fact that a company should continue to be 
considered as resident of one State for tax purposes and be subject to an unlimited tax liability 
therein and, finally, the fact that the PE threshold should continue to determine whether a non-
resident company should be taxed in a host jurisdiction or not. However, adaptations to these 
paradigms will be suggested. Some of them will be intended to enhance the corresponding legal 
rule in light of the conclusions reached in Chapter 3. Most of them will though seek to ensure a 
better consistency with the benefit principle, as claimed by Chapter 4. In this context, we will also 
assess the impact of the proposals derived from the BEPS project and to what extent they may be 
considered as consistent with the benefit principle.  
Finally, we will briefly mention two proposals that involve the departure from these three 
paradigms in Section 5.3. The decision not to invest much efforts in these proposals lies in the fact 
that their implementation is today a political utopia.   
 
5.1. A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE BEPS PROJECT´S 
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 
5.1.1. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE BEPS PROJECT AND ITS APPARENT 
CONSISTENCY WITH THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE 
In 2013 The G20 mandated the OECD to lead the project today known as “BEPS”850. The 
description of the “base erosion and profit shifting” phenomenon was followed by the 
promulgation of the two general objectives that the project wished to pursue. The first objective 
was the elimination of double taxation without giving rise to double-non taxation opportunities851 
while the second and primary objective was to provide domestic and international instruments 
“aiming at better aligning rights to tax with real”852 or “actual” economic activity853 (hereinafter 
the “BEPS mantra”). Later on, the Action Plan confirmed this intention: “existing domestic and 
international tax rules should be modified in order to more closely align the allocation of income 
with the economic activity that generates that income”. The document does not only not define 
                                                          
850 The contents of Section 5.1 are largely based on the ideas presented in a paper we published elsewhere (ESCRIBANO, 
E. (2017), p. 250 – 252). 
851 BEPS report, p. 53 
852 BEPS report, p. 51. 
853 BEPS report, p. 15 and 20. 
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the expression “economic activities that generate that income” but also alludes to the same idea 
in different (and confusing) ways854. 
The question arises as to whether the “BEPS mantra” may be regarded as consistent with the 
benefit principle. We believe that the theoretical foundation underlying this claim can be no other 
than the presumption that the State in which the corporate taxpayer carries on its economic 
activity is very likely to be the State whose services and infrastructures have contributed to the 
profitability of the activity and thus the generation of income, i.e. the benefit principle. This means 
that the BEPS project may be considered to be implicitly endorsing a tax reform that is consistent 
with the benefit principle855. 
When we suggest that the benefit principle appears to be the ultimate leitmotiv of the BEPS 
project, we are not merely referring to intentions of the 43 States that belong to the OECD, the 
G20 or both organizations. The BEPS project extended its scope by welcoming all countries and 
jurisdictions to work on developing BEPS standards and review their implementation on an equal 
footing within the so-called “BEPS inclusive framework”856. To date, 94 countries and jurisdictions 
have joined the framework857 and, most importantly, when doing so they had to “commit to the 
comprehensive BEPS package”858. This suggests that all these countries endorse the objective set 
out by the BEPS project with the implications we just noted. Accordingly, there seems to be a 
broad consensus as to how the future corporate income tax reform should look like and how the 
benefit principle should play a significant role in it.  
 
 
5.1.2. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE BEPS ACTION PLAN 
As one would expect, the ambitious task entrusted to the OECD got complicated when the time 
came to identify the causes contributing to the so-called BEPS phenomenon and further delineate 
the scope of the Action Plan to counteract it. 
                                                          
854 E.g. “Economic activities creating those profits” (BEPS Action Plan, p. 10), “economic activities” in general (BEPS 
Action Plan, p. 11), “economic activities that produce that income” (BEPS Action Plan, p. 19) or even “relevant 
substance” (Action plan p. 13). What is more, in the context of transfer pricing, the alleged objective is to align transfer 
pricing outcomes with “value creation”, i.e. that the taxable bases should end up wherever the value creating activities 
occur (BEPS Action Plan, p. 20-21). We will later refer to this latter expression is Section 5.2.1.1. 
855 In fact, final report on Action 1 explicitly endorses the benefit principle as a valid conceptual basis for the allocation 
of taxing rights, see OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, 
p. 24-26. 
856 OECD (2017): Background brief: inclusive framework on BEPS. 
857 http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-composition.pdf Nonetheless, the number of States 
decreases when it comes to the signature of the Multilateral Instrument to implement treaty related measures to 
prevent BEPS 
858 OECD (2017): Background brief: inclusive framework on BEPS, p. 7. 
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Although the BEPS report had promised to take a holistic approach rather than ad-hoc measures 
and further seek imaginative and ambitious solutions859, the Action Plan failed to meet these 
expectations for the reasons we are about to explain.  
At first sight, the Action Plan left us an awkward sense of déjà vu. The reason is that many of its 
Actions seem to merely dust off old OECD reports for the occasion860. This is for example the case 
of Actions 2861, 5862, 6863, 7864 and 12865. Conclusive evidence that the BEPS Project had retrieved 
old measures to address the challenges identified in the report is the fact that virtually all the 
amendments that are expected to be introduced in the post-BEPS OECD MC are based on 
preexisting Commentaries to the OECD MC which are, in turn, the result of old OECD reports. This 
is particularly the case as regards the proposed changes to articles 1.2 (application of the treaty 
to entities that are regarded as transparent for tax purposes)866, 1.3 (saving clause in favor of the 
Residence State)867, 4.3 (tie-breaker rule for determining the residence for treaty purposes of 
dual-resident persons other than individuals)868, 5.4 (anti-fragmentation provision)869, 5.5 
(refinement of the agency-PE to address its loopholes)870, 10.2 (the need to retain the ownership 
of shares for a certain period of time to be entitled to reduced withholding tax)871, 13.4 (extension 
of the concept of shares)872 and X (limitation-on-benefits rule)873.  
Besides this visible lack of originality, we believe the Action Plan committed two major mistakes 
that thwarted the opportunity to engage in a deep reform capable of achieving the ambitious 
policy objectives set forth by the Report and the Action Plan. 
Firstly, the point of departure could be no other than an upfront acknowledgment that we were 
confronting a clear crisis of rules. While the initial report on BEPS seemed to share this view874, 
                                                          
859 These guidelines may be inferred from the BEPS report, p. 60-62. All of them were welcomed by Brauner in 
BRAUNER, Y. (2014), p. 58.  
860 Brauner was not mistaken when he warned against the potential risk that a tight 2-years deadline could lead the 
OECD to resort to the arsenal of ad-hoc measures already proposed in previous reports. See BRAUNER, Y. (2014), p. 60. 
861 OECD (1999): The application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to partnerships, OECD (2011): Corporate loss 
utilization through aggressive tax planning and OECD (2012): Hybrid mismatch arrangements: tax policy and compliance 
issues. 
862 OECD (1998): Harmful tax competition: an emerging global issue. 
863 OECD (1986): Double taxation and the use of conduit companies, OECD (2003): Restricting the entitlement to treaty 
benefits, OECD (2008): Tax treaty issues related to REITs and OECD (2010): The granting of treaty benefits with respect 
to the income of collective investment vehicles. 
864  OECD (2002): Issues arising under article 5 (permanent establishment) of the model tax convention. 
865 OECD (2011): Tackling aggressive tax planning through improved transparency and disclosure and OECD (2013): Co-
operative compliance: a framework from enhanced relationship to co-operative compliance. 
866 Commentary to article 1 of the OECD MC, paragraph 5. Retrieved by Action 2. 
867 Commentary to article 1 of the OECD MC, paragraphs 6.1 and 23 and Commentary to article 7, paragraph 14. 
Retrieved by Action 6. 
868 Commentary to article 4 of the OECD MC, paragraph 24.1. Retrieved by Action 6. 
869 Commentary to article 5 of the OECD MC, paragraph 27.1. Retrieved by Action 7. 
870 Commentary to article 5 of the OECD MC, paragraph 32.1. Retrieved by Action 7. 
871 Commentary to article 10 of the OECD MC, paragraphs 16 and 17. Retrieved by Action 6. 
872 Commentary to article 13 of the OECD MC, paragraph 28.5. Retrieved by Action 6. 
873 Commentary to article 1 of the OECD MC, paragraph 20. Retrieved by Action 6. 
874 BEPS report, p. 5: “While there clearly is a tax compliance aspect, as shown by a number of high profile cases, there 
is a more fundamental policy issue: the international common principles drawn from national experiences to share tax 
jurisdiction may not have kept pace with the changing business environment”. In the same vein, see p. 28: “Beyond 
cases of illegal abuses, which are the exception rather than the rule, MNEs engaged in BEPS comply with the legal 
requirements of the countries involved”.  
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the Action Plan deviated to some extent from this approach. Without ignoring the imperative 
need to revise the rules, the Action Plan redirected its focus to the taxpayers once again to hold 
them accountable for what was happening875. As a result of this, the document made an 
inaccurate and certainly inappropriate use of certain legal terms as “artificiality” or “abuse”876, 
while referring to vague expressions as “aggressive tax planning”877 that are devoid of any legal 
basis. In short, the Action Plan gave the impression that it sought to raise the standard required 
to the taxpayer from the mere compliance with the letter and spirit of the laws to some sort of 
“exemplary” behavior that would satisfy some sense of justice or morality878. We believe that this 
approach is unfortunate and prone to generate severe problems from a legal certainty 
perspective. Besides, it seems apparent that the majority of the cases involving renowned MNCs 
which gave rise to BEPS concerns (Apple is no exception)879 do not pose problems from a tax 
compliance perspective, as their tax situation tend to be the natural consequence of the rules in 
place.   
Secondly, a truly genuine revision of the international tax legal framework needs to be conducted 
necessarily without any prejudices. Even though the BEPS report promised to deliver innovative, 
ambitious and holistic solutions880, we soon discovered with disappointment that the Action Plan 
had pushed out of the negotiation table a few principles of notorious importance. Firstly, the 
discussion on the separate tax treatment of the entities belonging to the same group (the so-
called “separate entity approach”) together with the standard that has traditionally served as a 
corrective to counteract the profit shifting risks that arise in these scenarios (the ALS) was 
rejected881. Secondly, the discussion on the distribution of tax jurisdiction between residence and 
source was equally dismissed, as the Action Plan chose not to question the residence-source 
relationship or the traditional configuration of these principles, confining itself to “restore” 
taxation at both levels882. In a nutshell, the OECD seemed to believe in the possibility to lead a tax 
reform that could effectively achieve the “BEPS mantra” (i.e. “align the allocation of income with 
the economic activity that generates that income”) without first assessing to what extent these 
omnipresent paradigms are responsible for the possibility to shift taxable profits out of the 
jurisdictions where economic activities occur and, if necessary, propose amendments to these 
paradigms in order to ameliorate these risks.  
                                                          
875 This is at least what we infer from the reading of Actions 6 (prevent treaty abuse), 7 (prevent the artificial avoidance 
of PE status) and 12 (require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements) of the BEPS project. 
876 For example, the consideration of the behaviors depicted in Action 7 as “artificial” is, to say the least, debatable.  
877 An undefined expression that is present in a great part of the BEPS reports. 
878 Inasmuch as the BEPS Action Plan intends to attribute some sort of legal repercussions to the behaviors covered by 
the expression “aggressive tax planning”, it seems to demand the taxpayers to structure their business operations in a 
way that the consequent tax liabilities lead to a proper contribution to the public expenditure of the countries 
concerned. 
879 Section 2.2 provided several arguments to sustain that the shift of profits carried out by Apple was not the 
consequence of breaches to the letter or spirit of the laws. On the contrary, its tax planning strategy seems to fully 
comply with the tax legislation of the countries involved with no trace of abusive behaviors. 
880 BEPS report, pp. 60-62. 
881 BEPS Action Plan, p. 14: “There is consensus among governments that moving to a system of formulary 
apportionment of profits is not a viable way forward; it is also unclear that the behavioral changes companies might 
adopt in response to the use of a formula would lead to investment decisions that are more efficient and tax-neutral 
than under a separate entity approach”. In fact, Actions 8 to 10 were precisely aimed at updating the interpretation of 
the arm´s length standard. 
882 BEPS Action Plan, p. 11: “while actions to address BEPS will restore both source and residence taxation in a number 
of cases (…) these actions are not directly aimed at changing the existing international standards on the allocation of 
taxing rights on cross-border income”. Action 1 was the only exception to this rule, as we will later see. 
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We have good reasons to believe that leaving these paradigms out of the scope of the project 
constitutes an error. In Chapter 3 we provided numerous arguments to demonstrate how the 
three of them have contributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to allow corporate taxpayers to 
book their profits in jurisdictions other than those where their economic activities take place883. 
Or, in line with the conclusions reached in Chapter 4, how they have become instrumental in 
enabling companies to shift their profits out of the jurisdictions where they have presumably been 
in the position to use, enjoy or indirectly benefit from the public services, contrary to what the 
benefit principle would suggest884. 
Even though the OECD chose not to question the convenience of maintaining these paradigms in 
effect nor substantially modifying their content to better achieve the ultimate objective of BEPS, 
it was indeed willing to introduce a few minor amendments to these standards and rules for these 
purposes. In particular, the BEPS Action Plan entrusted the accomplishment of the “BEPS mantra” 
to a specific group of Actions, most notably to Actions 6 (treaty abuse), 7 (artificial avoidance of 
the PE status) and 8-10 (transfer pricing)885, and implicitly to Action 1 (digital economy)886. These 
work streams gave rise to the recommendation of a few minor amendments to these paradigms 
which we will later review throughout the present Chapter.  
 
5.2. ENHANCEMENT OF CURRENT PARADIGMS 
 
The BEPS project appears to be the perfect breeding ground to pursue the amendment of the 
paradigms underlying CITs in the light of the benefit rationale, as we believe that the BEPS project 
is implicitly pointing in this same direction (section 5.1.1). 
In this Section we will evaluate the appropriateness and impact of the BEPS proposals, in particular 
those related to transfer pricing rules and the ALS (Actions 8-10, Section 5.2.1), corporate 
residence (Action 6, Section 5.2.2.4.3) and the PE threshold (Actions 1 and 7, Section 5.2.3). In 
addition, we will also consider the possibility of introducing further amendments we believe 
would be more appropriate and effective to enhance these paradigms and, where appropriate, 
ensure their consistency with the benefit principle as suggested in Chapter 4. 
 
                                                          
883 See in special the final conclusions exposed in Section 3.4. 
884 See Section 4.2.3, where we reached the conclusion that the benefit principle did not seem to underlie any of these 
three paradigms underlying corporate income taxation 
885  BEPS Action Plan, p. 18. All these Actions belong to the second group of actions that are aimed at restoring the “full 
effects and benefits of the international standards” in accordance with the aforementioned goal.  
886 Action 1 was conceived as a transversal stream within the Project whose aim was to “identify the main difficulties 
that the digital economy poses” in international taxation (BEPS Action Plan, p. 14). However, one of its objectives was 
precisely to evaluate “the ability of a company to have a significant digital presence in the economy of another country 
without being liable to taxation due to the lack of nexus under current international rules”.   
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5.2.1. PROPOSALS WITHIN AND BEYOND THE ARM´S LENGTH 
STANDARD  
 
Both the separate entity approach and the ALS find themselves among the most essential 
paradigms underlying corporate income taxation. 
In view of the phenomenon illustrated in Chapter 2, we raised the question as to whether the 
separate-entity approach and the ALS play indeed some role in this regard. That is, we wondered 
whether these principles indeed enable corporate taxpayers to detach taxable profits from the 
jurisdictions where they are generated and instead book them in the jurisdiction of their 
convenience. We will now briefly note some of the most relevant conclusions we reached in 
Chapter 3 to the extent they may serve as a starting point for the proposals we intend to put 
forward in the present Section. 
We first concluded that the separate-entity theory per se poses significant profit shifting risks, as 
entities belonging to the same group may easily shift taxable profits to selected jurisdictions 
(where the economic activity may well be scarce or simply nonexistent) by the simple expedient 
of manipulating the conditions of intra-group transactions in a way that results in the transfer of 
profits to subsidiaries resident in such jurisdictions (section 3.1.2). The ALS comes into play 
precisely to counteract the profit shifting risks derived from transfer pricing manipulation, 
although we soon discovered that the ALS has proven to be far from infallible in the 
accomplishment of such task for the reasons we will now briefly mention (section 3.1.3). 
We departed from the acknowledgment that the ALS is as an eminently subjective parameter. 
This subjectivity potentially results in the acceptance of a wide range of transfer prices, as all of 
them could arguably be considered as equally consistent with the ALS. This is best illustrated by 
the asymmetries generated by the choice of the relevant transfer pricing method. Indeed, we 
demonstrated back in section 3.1.3 that each one of the available transfer pricing methods may 
potentially lead to uneven transfer pricing outcomes that are significantly distant from each other, 
most notably in the case of transactions involving intangibles. 
In this context, corporate taxpayers can lawfully and legitimately pick up the transfer pricing 
method that best serves their interests, move within the wide range of “acceptable” transfer 
prices in the desired direction and finally get the most convenient pricing. Naturally, resourceful 
and wealthy taxpayers will be better equipped to formulate solid transfer pricing assessments 
that are likely to convince tax administrations and courts.  
The inherently subjective nature of the ALS has eventually made the ALS an instrument to shift 
profits rather than a corrective to this phenomenon. Corporate taxpayers are increasingly capable 
of making use of the ALS to shift profits out of the jurisdictions where the economic activities take 
place and instead book them in the jurisdictions of their choice. This was best illustrated by the 
examples provided in section 3.1.3 and the particular case of Apple (section 2.2.2).  
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Insofar transfer pricing rules following the ALS may be instrumental in shifting taxable profits out 
of the jurisdiction where the economic activities that give rise to them take place, they cannot be 
regarded as necessarily consistent with the benefit principle (as interpreted in the present study), 
as we concluded in Section 4.2.3.1. 
So, departing from the aforementioned conclusions reached in Chapter 3 and 4, we will now 
proceed to analyze in Section 5.2.1.1 whether the new OECD approach on transfer pricing 
resulting from the BEPS project contributes to ameliorate the gap between the economic and the 
tax presence of the companies in the word. The proposals suggested by the BEPS project would 
be considered to be aligned with the benefit principle insofar they effectively help to bring the 
taxable bases closer to where the economic activities are located, in line with the considerations 
exposed in Chapter 4. Subsequently, in Section 5.2.1.2, we will examine whether this new 
approach is compatible with the current legal configuration of transfer pricing rules following the 
ALS or, on the contrary, demands the amendment of the latter. 
 
5.2.1.1. The merits of the “value creation” approach on transfer pricing 
fostered by the BEPS project and its apparent consistency with the 
benefit principle 
In this section we intend to briefly describe and then critically analyze the approach chosen by the 
BEPS project as regards the interpretation and application of the ALS. In particular, we will 
evaluate whether the proposals put forward within the BEPS project are consistent with the 
benefit principle according to the role we attributed to this principle in Chapter 4. In other words, 
do the BEPS proposals on transfer pricing effectively contribute to place the taxable bases in the 
jurisdictions where the relevant economic activities take place contrary to the recent trends 
illustrated in Chapter 3? 
In principle, the main purpose of the BEPS project was no other than to “provide countries with 
instruments, domestic and international, aiming at better aligning rights to tax with real economic 
activity”887. As we noted in Section 5.1, the Action Plan entrusted this task to a group of Actions, 
including Actions 8 to 10, related to transfer pricing. The document departed from the recognition 
that MNCs “have been able to use and/or misapply those rules (transfer pricing rules based on the 
ALS) to separate income from the economic activities that produce that income and to shift it into 
low-tax environments”888. The word “use” indeed presupposed the implicit recognition that the 
ALS, in its current form and by its own nature, may give rise to transfer pricing outcomes that are 
not aligned with the location of the relevant economic activities. Curiously enough, the final 
report on Actions 8-10 deviated from the assertion made by the Action Plan, claiming that such 
outcomes did not derive from the “use” of transfer pricing rules but rather from their 
“manipulation”889, thus rejecting the view that the ALS was inherently troublesome in this regard. 
                                                          
887 We referred to the objectives of the project in Section 5.1.1. 
888 BEPS Action Plan, p. 19. 
889 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 9: “the 
existing guidance on the application of the principle has also proven vulnerable to manipulation. This manipulation can 
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We believe the first position is more realistic, as we had the chance to demonstrate in Sections 
2.2.2 and 3.1.3 that the results derived from the application of the ALS (and perfectly consistent 
with such standard) may not necessarily place the relevant taxable bases wherever the economic 
activity that gives rise to such profit take place.  
In this context, the Action Plan expressed its commitment to the present status quo and further 
specified the objective of the Actions related to transfer pricing regulation: ensuring that transfer 
pricing outcomes are aligned with “value creation”890, i.e. that the taxable bases should end up 
wherever the value creating activities occur. To this end, the Action Plan proposed to address the 
“flaws” of the current system, especially with respect to areas that were identified as particularly 
risky, i.e. transactions dealing with intangible assets, risk and over-capitalization891.  
At first sight, one may intuitively presuppose that the post-BEPS transfer pricing regulation based 
on the ALS should be better aligned with the benefit principle than the current regulation in place, 
insofar the objective of Actions 8-10 was precisely to use the ALS to bring the taxable bases 
wherever the “real” “value creating” economic activities take place and we concluded in Section 
4.2.2.2 that the presence of economic activities within a territory of a State allows us to assume 
that the company carrying out such activities may be in the position to effectively or potentially 
use the benefits provided by such State. The OECD assimilated value creation to the performance 
of functions, use of assets and assumption of risks, thereby neglecting the role that the market 
may arguably be considered to play in the process of value creation892. From the perspective of 
the benefit principle, this position entails the outright rejection of the assumption that a company 
would also be in a position to enjoy or use some of the services and infrastructures provided and 
defrayed by the State in which the company has its market, as suggested in Section 4.2.2.2.2. 
Grosso modo, the intention of the BEPS package on transfer pricing893 is to ensure a more 
significant share on the profits for the group entities which are deemed to add value. In the 
context of intangible assets894, such entities would be the ones that perform functions, use assets 
and/or assume risks in the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation 
of intangibles (hereinafter DEMPE)895, placing a greater weight in the performance of functions896. 
                                                          
lead to outcomes which do not correspond to the value created through the underlying economic activity carried out by 
the members of a MNE”.  
890 BEPS Action Plan, p. 20. 
891 BEPS Action Plan, p. 20. 
892 SCHOUERI, L.E.; GALENDI, R.A. (2017): “this mantra is far from being able to determine in any and every case where 
value is created and works rather as a formula to deny the importance of demand (market) for value creation even 
though, as mentioned above, taxation where consumption occurs was the very reason for the whole BEPS movement”. 
893 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, along with 
the previous discussion drafts and interim reports published in the precedent years. 
894 Defined as “something which is not a physical asset or financial asset, which is capable of being owned or controlled 
for use in commercial activities, and whose use or transfer would be compensated had it occurred in a transaction 
between independent parties in comparable circumstances”. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – 
Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 67 and 69-90 for a classification of the different kinds of 
intangibles (Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.6 and 6.15 - 6.17). 
895 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 77-84 
(Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par.6.47-6.72).  
896 Navarro observes that the new parameter grants a greater weight to functions over assets and risks both in the 
framework of functional analysis and when the time comes to select the “most appropriate” method. See NAVARRO 
IBARROLA, A. (2017), p. 136.  
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We will now review these three categories of activities that would deserve appropriate arm´s 
length compensation. 
As regards the performance of functions related to DEMPE activities897, the legal owner of the 
intangible may either physically perform all the functions through its own personnel or outsource 
the functions to either related or unrelated parties898. In case it is a related party the one who 
ends up performing such functions, it should be compensated on an arm´s length basis 
considering the availability of comparable uncontrolled transactions, the importance of the 
functions performed to the creation of value and the realistically available options of the 
parties899. In case the performance of functions is outsourced to either a related or an unrelated 
party, the legal owner or any other group entity exerting control over such outsourcing would also 
be entitled to compensation900. The relative importance of each one of the functions performed 
in relation to DEMPE activities would greatly depend on the specific circumstances of the case901.  
With regard to the use of assets in DEMPE activities, this may include the use of intangibles for 
research, development or marketing purposes (e.g. know-how, customer relations, etc.), physical 
assets or funding902. In relation to the latter, any group entity providing funding would only be 
entitled to a risk-adjusted return on its funding unless it also exerts control over the risks or 
performs other functions associated with the funded activity or asset. An entity will be considered 
to exert control over risks to the extent it has the ability to both make decisions to take on, lay off 
or decline a risk-bearing opportunity and make decisions on whether and how to respond to the 
risks associated with the opportunity and further performs such decision-making functions903. As 
regards the scope of such risks, the entity will have to assume and control both the financial risk 
(the one that is inherent in the funding provided) and the “operational risk” (the one linked to the 
operational activities for which the funding is used)904. For example, when funding is provided for 
the development of an intangible, the financier is expected to have control and make decisions 
                                                          
897 The nature of the “important functions” will greatly vary depending on the particular facts of the case. In the case 
of self-developed intangibles, such functions may include: design and control of research and marketing programs, 
direction of and establishing priorities for creative undertakings, control over strategic decisions regarding intangible 
development programs and management and control of budgets. For any kind of intangible (either self-developed or 
acquired), functions may include defense, protection and ongoing quality control over functions performed by related 
or unrelated enterprises. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with 
value creation, p. 80 (Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par.6.56). 
898 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 78-79 
(Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par.6.51-6.58). 
899 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 79 (Post-
BEPS OECD TPG, par.6.52). 
900 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 79 (Post-
BEPS OECD TPG, par.6.53). 
901 The report provides various examples in this regard. For example, a fully developed and currently exploitable 
intangible may require no development at all and little or no maintenance and protection while contributions on its 
exploitation would acquire great significance (p. 78). 
902 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 81-82 
(Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par.6.59-6.64). 
903 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 23 (Post-
BEPS OECD TPG, par.1.65). 
904 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 81-82 
(Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par.6.61-6.64). 
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concerning the development of the intangible to be entitled to get a compensation beyond a mere 
risk-adjusted return905. 
Lastly, in relation to the assumption of risks related to DEMPE activities, risks may include those 
related to the development of intangibles (e.g. the risk that costly R&D will prove to be 
unsuccessful or the risk related to the timing of the investment), those related to the product 
itself (e.g. its obsolescence, the fact the other competitors may launch competitive products), 
those related to IP rights (e.g. claims of infringement) or those related to the exploitation (e.g. 
how well the product is received by the market)906. The identity of the group entities assuming 
the risks related to DEMPE907 will determine who will bear the consequences if the risk 
materializes908. 
Once the identification of the group entities who have been deemed to add value (by either 
performing functions, using assets or assuming risks related to DEMPE activities) is over, the next 
step is to identify and determine the arm´s length price and conditions of the controlled 
transaction909. To do so, it should be taken into account the level and nature of the relevant 
activity and the compensation received by comparable uncontrolled entities performing similar 
activities910. 
Naturally, the allocation of a great share of profits to this first group of entities would be 
detrimental to other group entities. For example, the legal owner of the intangible911, despite 
being legally  entitled to all the returns derived from the intangible, will not per se be entitled to 
any portion of the return resulting from the exploitation of the intangible for transfer pricing 
purposes other than the arm´s length compensation (if any) for holding title912. Similarly, an entity 
whose role is limited to the provision of funding (along with the control of its inherent financial 
risk), will merely be compensated by a “risk-adjusted return” to be calculated on the basis of the 
cost of capital or the return of a realistic alternative investment with comparable economic 
                                                          
905 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 82 (Post-
BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.64). According to Brauner, however, the financial risk may be considerably larger than other 
risks, thus giving rise per se to a significant compensation: “some co-financing arrangements occur in market conditions, 
and such arrangements may often represent financial risks that are agreeably larger than other relevant risks in such 
transactions”. See BRAUNER, Y. (2016), p. 123. 
906 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 82 (Post-
BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.65). 
907 The process of identifying the persons assuming risks is described in OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-
10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 22 (Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par. 1.60). 
908 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 83 (Post-
BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.66). 
909 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 85 (Post-
BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.73-6.74). 
910 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 85 (Post-
BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.754). 
911 In case it is impossible to identify the legal owner of the intangible under applicable law or governing contracts, the 
group entity that, based on the facts and circumstances, “controls decisions concerning the exploitation of the intangible 
and hast the practical capacity to restrict other from using the intangible” will be considered the legal owner of the 
intangible from transfer pricing purposes. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing 
outcomes with value creation, p. 76 (Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.40). 
912 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 76 (Post-
BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.42). Unless the legal owner physically performs functions related to DEMPE or controls the 
outsourcing of such functions to either related on unrelated parties (see p. 79). 
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characteristics913. Neither the legal owner or the financier would be entitled to an arm´s length 
compensation beyond the aforementioned amounts unless they are regarded to contribute to the 
value-adding process in the line expressed in the previous paragraphs.  
The “value creation” approach on transfer pricing rules promoted by the OECD has been 
welcomed by some scholars for various reasons. For example, Tavares notes that this new 
approach is much more consistent with contemporary economic theories that seek to identify the 
most significant features that contribute to the success of an enterprise, most notably the 
knowledge-based theory of the firm914. This theory can be traced back to Penrose, who suggested 
that the access and use of information through management decision-making is what makes a 
difference and creates value915. Later on, advocates of this theory argued that enterprises 
essentially learn and grow on the basis of technological and organizational knowledge916. Thus, 
firms serve as “repositories” of valuable knowledge that can be easily and “cheaply” learned 
through continuing association917. In the words of Tavares, these ideas seem to be “strikingly 
consistent” with the direction of the BEPS value creation approach918. 
The OECD puts forward some mechanisms that contribute to put into effect the profit allocation 
process inspired by the principle of “value creation”, most notably, the choice of the relevant 
transfer pricing method (with a particular focus on the TPS method) and a proposed new approach 
on CSAs. 
As regards the choice of the transfer pricing method, the BEPS project chooses to promote 
methods that are less reliant on comparability analysis919, i.e. transactional methods and most 
notably the TPS method in transactions involving intangibles920. The TPS method is found to be 
the most appropriate one in cases in which the business operations are highly integrated921 and 
the parties of the transaction make unique and valuable contributions (e.g. unique intangibles)922 
in such a way that there does not seem to be any reliable comparables. Be that as it may, it has 
                                                          
913 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 81 (Post-
BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.61-6.62) 
914 Tavares argues that the “value creation” approach (reflected in a number of outcomes derived by the BEPS project, 
e.g. the modified nexus approach –action 5-, the activity exception to the LOB clause – action 6- and the DEMPE 
approach on transfer pricing – actions 8 to 10) captures the “knowledge-based” views of the firm. See TAVARES, R.S.J. 
(2016), p. 271-272. “ 
915 PENROSE, E.T. (1959). 
916 FOSS, N.J. (1996), p. 470: “the essential thing about the firm is not only its ‘contractualness’ but just as much its 
function as a repository of distinct productive (technological and organizational) knowledge, and as an entity that can 
learn – and grow – on the basis of this knowledge (…) Such knowledge stocks are associated with differential efficiencies, 
and are accumulated in a path-dependent way. Thus they not only help explain why some firms realize competitive 
advantage while other firms do not, they also help in addressing issues relating to diversification and innovation”. For 
more literature on the topic, see the footnotes in TAVARES, R.S.J. (2016), p. 272. 
917 TAVARES, R.S.J. (2016), p. 273. 
918 TAVARES, R.S.J. (2016), p. 272. 
919 PETRUCCI, R. (2016), p. 25. 
920 In Section 3.1.3 we provided a general overview on the different transfer pricing methods. 
921 The report itself notes that all MNC seem to enjoy such integration, so it seems to be unclear how the criterion 
should be applied. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value 
creation, p. 58. 
922 The report does not provide further guidance on the significance of “unique” and “valuable” contributions, although 
commentators on the previous discussion draft suggested that “unique” contributions should be defined as those “that 
cannot be benchmarked by reference to uncontrolled transactions” while “valuable” contributions should be defined 
as those which are expected to yield future economic benefits. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – 
Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 58. 
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been noted that the TPS method is likely to become “the rule rather than the exception for 
transactions involving intangibles”923.  
This method does not assess transactions separately but rather departs from the “combined 
profits” that arise from the relevant controlled transactions in which the related parties are 
engaged924 to further split the outcome between the parties on an “economically valid basis” that 
approximates the allocation of profits that would have been reflected in an agreement made at 
arm´s length925. It is precisely at this point that the BEPS approach comes into play, as it would 
promote a selection of profit splitting factors that are indeed aligned with the activities that are 
regarded in the final report as true “value-adding” activities926. Consequently, the TPS method 
would become instrumental in achieving the profit allocation desired by the BEPS project and, by 
extension, the ultimate goal of the BEPS Actions on transfer pricing (i.e. the alignment between 
transfer pricing outcomes and value creation)927. 
The empowerment of the transactional transfer pricing methods method, and most notably the 
TPS, has been applauded by numerous scholars, even before the advent of the BEPS project. In 
general, it is commonly regarded as a “pragmatic solution” in between transfer pricing and 
formulary apportionment928 and the most dignified manner to deal with the inherent constraints 
of the ALS without pleading for its formal abandonment929. Schoueri regards the increasing use of 
this method as a piece of evidence of the failure of the ALS930. 
The preeminence of transactional transfer pricing methods has been accompanied by the 
devaluation of certain traditional methods, particularly the C+ method in the context of 
transactions involving intangibles. The report acknowledges that compensation based on the 
reimbursement of costs plus a modest mark-up is not appropriate to reflect value creation931. For 
example, such remuneration is unlikely to reflect the anticipated value (or the arm´s length price 
                                                          
923 BRAUNER, Y. (2016), p. 106. 
924 OECD TPG, par. 2.108 and most notably 2.124-2.131. 
925 OECD TPG, par. 2.108 and most notably 2.132-2.145. The pre-BEPS TPG state that the selection of the relevant factors 
should not be predetermined but rather selected in accordance with the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, 
and subsequently, provides a few examples of factors based on assets, cost, etc. Schoueri argues that the TPS method 
intends to simulate the “profit split” that would have been agreed by independent parties. See SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), 
p. 693. 
926 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 80 (Post-
BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.57): “it may be necessary to utilize transfer pricing methods not directly based on comparables, 
including transactional profit split methods and ex ante techniques to appropriate reward the performance of those 
important functions”.  
927 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 59: 
“transactional profit split methods could make a contribution to achieving this aim (aligning transfer pricing outcomes 
with value creation)”. 
928 Schön describes the TPS method as a “limited fractional apportionment” and Avi-Yonah and Benshalom regards it as 
a “quasi-formulary” method, while Tavares argues that it is a “middle ground” between the OECD guidelines and 
formulary apportionment. In fact, the two only significant differences between the TPS method and a formulary solution 
are, on the one hand, the fact that the former departs the profit derived by a sole transaction while the latter departs 
from the overall profit obtained by group and, on the other hand, the fact that the former does not establish the profit 
split criteria (which would be established on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case) while the latter does 
indeed predetermine them in the rule. See SCHÖN, W. (2010), p. 235 and AVI-YONAH, R.; BENSHALOM, I. (2011), section 
4.3 and TAVARES, R.S.J (2016), p. 273-274. Formulary apportionment is briefly mentioned in Sections 3.1.2 and 5.3.   
929 On the contrary, see BRAUNER, Y. (2016), p. 106: “(the TPS method) is somewhat widely accepted as the best way 
for the OECD to abandon arm´s length in the transfer pricing of intangibles without losing too much face” 
930 SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 699. 
931 NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2017), p. 136. 
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for) of the contributions for the entities performing R&D functions932. This is particularly true 
where significant residual profits arise (i.e. profits well above the return on capital)933, a scenario 
that may be quite common in transactions involving intangible assets, as these are precisely 
characterized by their potential to generate income that is disproportionally higher that the costs 
incurred in their development934. 
The new approach on transfer pricing also has a significant impact on the regulation of CSAs935. In 
fact, the report intends to ensure consistency between the new guidance on CSA and the other 
proposed changes to the OECD TPG, particularly those related to intangibles936, the reason being 
that CSAs are commonly used for the development of intangibles. In essence, it is claimed that 
independent parties would only consent to enter into a CSA to the extent they expect “mutual 
and proportionate benefit”, meaning that they would demand the value of each participant´s 
share of the overall contributions to the CSA to be consistent and proportionate with the 
participant´s share of the overall expected benefits to be received.  
The first step of the process entails the identification of the “true” participants in a CSA. A party 
of a CSA will only be considered a participant of the agreement for transfer pricing purposes 
insofar it has a “reasonable expectation that it will benefit from the objectives of the CSA 
activity”937. Subsequently, it should be ascertained whether the value of the contribution made 
by the participant and its share of the expected benefits derived from the CSA are in fact 
consistent and proportionate. This makes it necessary to make the following two determinations: 
a) Value of the contribution. Contributions made by participants in a CSAs may take many 
forms, such as the provision of pre-existing assets or intangibles (e.g. the contribution of 
a patented technology whose value must be determined at arm´s length) or the 
performance of services (e.g. development activities)938. The report notes that the 
valuation of this latter type should be based on the “value of the functions performed”939. 
This being said, the report warns that a valuation based on costs plus a mark-up will not 
generally be appropriate, as it will not conveniently reflect the real value of the 
contribution940.  
                                                          
932 The OECD argues that the C+ method will rarely be appropriate in the context of transactions involving R&D 
contributions, also in the context of CSAs. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing 
outcomes with value creation, p. 86 and 170 (Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.79 and 8.26). 
933 NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2017), p. 136. 
934 See the explanation and examples put forward in Section 3.1.3. The Apple case is no exception to this, see table 3 in 
the section 2.1.1.3 (Research and Development) 
935 We defined CSAs back in Section 2.2.2, where we also explained the role that CSAs play in the Apple´s tax planning 
scheme. 
936 BRAUNER, Y. (2016), p. 111. OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes 
with value creation, p. 161. The new guidance on CSA may be consulted in pages 161-181. 
937 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 167-168 
(Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par. 8.14-8.18). 
938 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 170 
(Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par. 8.8.24-26). 
939 To this end, the report makes a reference to the guidance in Chapters I-III, VI and VII of the Post-BEPS OECD TPG. 
940 In cases in which the difference between the value and the costs is “relatively insignificant”, the value of the 
contribution may be measured at cost (e.g. services CSAs). On the contrary, the measurement of contributions to 
development CSAs at cost will “generally not provide a reliable basis for the application of the arm´s length principle”. 
OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 170-171 
(Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par. 8.27). 
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b) Share of the expected benefits. The report first notes that a significant part of the benefits 
derived by the CSA may not arise immediately but rather after some time. As regards the 
allocation of the benefits among the participants in the CSA, it is often guided by certain 
“allocation keys”, such as sales (turnover), profits, units used/produced/sold, number of 
employees and so forth941. As a matter of principle, the selection of the relevant factor(s) 
should serve to ensure a certain degree of consistency between the value of the 
contribution and the share of the benefits. Where participants merely provide funding, 
they cannot expect a benefit that goes beyond an arm´s length risk-adjusted return on its 
funding942. 
The new approach on CSAs confirms the trend of the new BEPS approach on transfer pricing 
(whose features were identified above), as it underlines once again the importance to allocate a 
significant portion of the taxable bases to related parties performing relevant functions 
considering the value of their respective contributions (whose valuation should not generally be 
made at cost) at the expense of those which merely provide funding or holds the legal ownership 
of the asset.  
It seems obvious than the US regime on CSAs943, which plays such a significant role in the Apple´s 
tax scheme, clearly contradicts these premises944. In essence, the US regime makes the shares of 
the expected benefits derived from the CSA dependent upon the financial contribution made by 
the participant to cover the costs for developing the relevant intangible irrespective of whether 
they actually perform any relevant function related to this activity. As we concluded in Section 
2.2.2, these agreements do not commonly entail any sort of functional contribution in the form 
of the provision of services or activities. As it happens, the signature of the CSA between Apple 
Inc. and the Irish-incorporated subsidiaries did not prompt the transfer of any sort of R&D 
activities to Ireland945.  
We started the present section with the hypothesis that the BEPS approach on transfer pricing 
seemed to be consistent with the benefit principle at first sight.  Once the new approach and its 
corresponding new proposed guidance has been analyzed, we are in a better position to confirm 
the hypothesis.  
We believe the BEPS proposal on profit allocation in the context of transfer pricing rules (in 
relation to transactions involving intangibles) could be regarded as consistent with the benefit 
principle considering the role we suggested for such principle back in Chapter 4.  Back then, we 
argued that the imposition of taxes by a State to a corporate taxpayer should ideally be based on 
the benefit principle946 and then we noted that it could only be assumed that a company finds 
itself in a position to benefit from the State´s services and infrastructures to the extent it is 
                                                          
941 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 168-169 
(Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par. 8.19-8.22). 
942 BRAUNER, Y. (2016), p. 123. 
943 We described this regime back in Section 2.2.2. 
944 BRAUNER, Y. (2016), p. 124. 
945 In the case of Apple, Apple Inc., ASI and AOE (parties of the CSA) agreed to share the R&D costs of Apple´s IP in 
exchange for sharing the profits derived by such IP worldwide. 
946 Section 4.2.1. 
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effectively carrying on an economic activity within its borders947. This being so, we believe it could 
be presumed that related parties performing the “significant value-adding functions” (in relation 
to DEMPE activities) referred to in the BEPS report would find themselves in the position to use 
and enjoy the State´s services and infrastructures948. Consequently, insofar the post-BEPS OECD 
TPG intend to grant a greater share of profits to such entities, we may conclude that the new 
approach on transfer pricing appears to be consistent with the benefit principle and therefore 
with the ideas here exposed.  
Even though the new approach on transfer pricing should be welcome from a theoretical 
perspective for the reasons outlined above, it is evident that it will continue to be subject to 
manipulation. The OECD wishes to allocate taxable bases to the jurisdictions where value is 
deemed to be created (i.e. where significant value-adding functions are performed) and, naturally, 
nothing prevents MNCs to transfer employees performing such functions to the jurisdictions of 
their choice, thereby indirectly selecting the jurisdiction where their profits will be ultimately 
taxed according to the post-BEPS OECD TPG. Wittendorff draws attention to this risk, warning that 
low-tax jurisdictions with a “mild and sunny climate” will be favored over cold and rainy ones 
when the time comes to relocate the relevant people949. Naturally, this scenario is to be expected 
and should further be accepted, as it would nonetheless be consistent with the benefit principle. 
On the contrary, the lack of acceptance of this plausible scenario would denote that the reasons 
behind the new approach (whether the “value creation” approach endorsed by the OECD or the 
“benefit” principle in our case) are not transparent and sincere but rather entail a hidden agenda 
according to which taxation should ideally occur in high-tax jurisdictions or, to put it bluntly, in 
the territories of the OECD Member States.  
Lastly, the question remains at to whether the new BEPS approach on transfer pricing, and 
particularly its expression in the form of the proposed post-BEPS OECD TPG, is in fact consistent 
with the current legal configuration of the ALS or, on the contrary, either goes beyond its 
theoretical scope or leads to limit it. We will try to provide an answer to this question in the next 
section.  
 
5.2.1.2. The doubtful compatibility of the “value creation” approach and 
the current legal configuration of transfer pricing rules following the 
ALS 
 
In the present section we will first raise the question as to whether the ALS is a suitable instrument 
to pursue the “profits follow value creation” objective as set out by the OECD. Secondly, we will 
evaluate whether the new proposed guidance on transfer pricing (the post-BEPS OECD TPG) that 
                                                          
947 Section 4.2.2.2. 
948 The same cannot be said, however, of related parties which do not perform any function and confine themselves to 
merely using assets and/or assuming and controlling risks in relation to DEMPE activities, as it cannot be presumed that 
these parties would have a potential access to benefits. However, the new guidance on transfer pricing does not allocate 
to these parties as much profits as to the parties effectively performing the relevant functions.   
949 WITTENDORFF, J. (2016), p. 332-333. 
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results from the empowerment of the so-called “value creation” approach is indeed consistent 
with the current legal configuration of transfer pricing rules following the ALS. 
As regards the first question we first need to identify the supposed rationale and objective of the 
ALS. This matter is not free of controversy. To begin with, and to the best of our knowledge, rules 
that contain the ALS have never made explicit their specific purpose. This means that we can only 
infer the presumable purpose of the rule from its literal wording and from the effects of its 
application. In this context, it is commonly argued that two alternative principles seem to underlie 
the ALS: either ability to pay or anti-avoidance. We will now proceed to analyze whether we can 
consistently uphold any of these theories. 
As a matter of principle, the ALS intends to ensure equal tax treatment between independent and 
dependent parties to further avoid the creation of tax advantages in favor of the latter that would 
distort competition950. As Schoueri suggests, behind such rationale we may find the principles of 
ability to pay and equity951. The reason is that dependent parties enjoy a de facto power to 
misprice their transactions to reduce their overall tax liabilities and transfer pricing legislation 
precisely intends to re-establish equality among taxpayer by allocating income according to their 
ability to pay irrespective of such power952. According to Navarro, however, the application of the 
rule does not always generate outcomes that may be deemed as consistent with the 
aforementioned goal953. Firstly, the ALS can never be considered to grant homogeneous tax 
treatment between related and unrelated parties to the extent its application necessarily entails 
the imposition of additional (indeed quite significant) compliance and administrative costs to the 
former group of entities in relation to the latter954. And secondly, even if we disregard these costs 
and conclude that the ALS ensures equal tax treatment between these groups of entities, the 
question that remains is: do they find themselves in comparable situations? The response is likely 
to be negative955, the consequence being that the ALS would not only not ensure equality: it would 
generate discrimination. 
The other most common rationale that is supposedly behind the ALS is the anti-avoidance 
purpose. The reason is that the practice commonly followed by related parties to “misprice” their 
transactions is often labelled as “abusive”956. Navarro equally rejects this stance for various 
reasons957. Firstly, the ALS does not make any reference to criteria that are traditionally used in 
the context to anti-avoidance rules, e.g. artificiality, valid commercial reasons, the existence of a 
tax saving or the existence of results beyond such tax saving. This being so, transfer pricing rules 
following the ALS could potentially apply irrespective of any of these considerations.  Secondly, 
                                                          
950 OECD TPG, pars. 1.8: “the arm's length principle provides broad parity of tax treatment for members of MNE groups 
and independent enterprises. Because the arm’s length principle puts associated and independent enterprises on a more 
equal footing for tax purposes, it avoids the creation of tax advantages or disadvantages that would otherwise distort 
the relative competitive positions of either type of entity”.  
951 Section 4.2.3.1. and SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 695-696. 
952 SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 695. 
953 NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2016), p. 59-61. 
954 HAMAEKERS, H.M.A.L. (1998), P. 297-298. 
955 According to him, the situation of related and unrelated parties is not equivalent neither from an economic nor an 
organizational perspective. See NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2016), p. 60. 
956 OECD (2011): Transfer pricing legislation: a suggested approach, p. 3, BAKER, P. (2011), 9B.05 and BAISTROCCHI, E. 
(2005), p. 950 among others.  
957 NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2016), p. 62-63. 
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the fact that the application of transfer pricing rules may lead to counteract the avoidance of taxes 
solely indicates that this is indeed one of the probable consequences of their application, it does 
not have to be necessarily its purpose958. And finally, the fact that MNCs shift profits to low-tax 
jurisdictions by means of their transfer pricing policy is not, on its own, indicative of an abusive 
behavior. Otherwise, this would imply the equation between the existence of a tax saving and the 
existence of abuse, an approach that is inadmissible959. All these considerations suggest that the 
anti-avoidance purpose should not be regarded as the rationale and justification of the ALS. 
As a consequence of the aforementioned, it seems that none of these traditional rationales is 
consistent with neither the literal wording nor the final outcome of the ALS. On the contrary, 
Navarro concludes that the ALS lacks a specific objective and is merely a legal convention that 
serves as a pattern to attribute profits to related parties960. This means that the application of the 
ALS should be conducted in an “aseptic way”, i.e. assigning the profits to the relevant related 
parties as if they were unrelated, irrespective of any further consideration deriving from the 
supposed rationale(s) behind the ALS961. Otherwise, States may feel tempted to deviate from the 
possible meaning of the transfer pricing provision precisely to satisfy its supposed objective962.  
This being said, one may interpret the fact that the OECD entrusts the ALS with the task of aligning 
its outcomes with value creation in the context of the BEPS project as a way to confer a brand 
new objective to the ALS963. In fact, this is implicitly recognized in the BEPS Action Plan: “transfer 
pricing rules serve to allocate income earned by a multinational enterprise among those countries 
in which the company does business”964. The problem is that, once again, this “new” objective is 
far from evident and cannot be logically nor naturally inferred from the literal wording of the rule 
nor its final outcomes. What is more, the ALS as it currently stands is likely to bring outcomes that 
are not aligned with such objective965. 
These observations suggest that the ALS may not be the most suitable instrument to satisfy the 
BEPS mantra on transfer pricing966. Indeed, pursuing this objective by means of the ALS entails a 
clear risk: it could eventually give rise to interpretations of the rule that substantially deviate from 
                                                          
958 OECD TPG, par. 1.2: “the consideration of transfer pricing should not be confused with the consideration of problems 
of tax fraud or tax avoidance, even though transfer pricing policies may be used for such purposes”.  
959 BIZIOLI, G. (2014), p. 692. 
960 NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2016), p. 65 and OECD (2011): Transfer pricing legislation: a suggested approach, p. 2: “at 
the theoretical level, the challenge (…) in the development of transfer pricing legislation is in essence (…) protecting their 
tax base”.  
961 NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2016), p. 65-66. 
962 BRAUNER, Y. (2012), p. 168. 
963 BRAUNER, Y. (2016), p. 101: “the OECD expressed an intent to shift transfer pricing practice (…) to a more pragmatic 
business focused approach relying on the principle that profits should follow action or value creation” and in p. 107: 
“BEPS introduced a new principle: profits must follow value creation”.  
964 OECD (2013): BEPS Action Plan, p. 19. 
965 Section 2.2.2 and 3.1.3. Wittendorff notes that profit allocation in line with value creation may not be equal to profit 
allocation in line with third-party behavior. See WITTENDORFF, J. (2016), p. 333. 
966 Schoueri notes that transfer pricing has incidentally become the “battleground” for broader reforms of the 
international tax regime. In fact, new approaches or suggested modifications to transfer pricing rules are more focused 
on “shifting taxing powers” than on solving real feasibility issues of transfer pricing. See SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 702. 
For his part, Wittendorff argues that the OECD should have retained the traditional ALS and combated BEPS by means 
other than transfer pricing rules, particularly by BEPS action 5 on harmful tax competition. See WITTENDORFF, J. (2016), 
p. 333. 
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its literal scope, just as it has historically happened in the past with the other alleged objectives 
of the standard967.  
Now we will proceed to evaluate whether the aforementioned risk has indeed materialized. In 
other words, we will assess whether the new guidance on transfer pricing resulting from the new 
“value creation” approach (i.e. the post-BEPS OECD TPG) can generally be regarded as consistent 
with the current legal configuration of transfer pricing rules following the ALS. 
In essence, the ALS requires taxpayers and tax administrations to price transactions carried out 
between related parties as if such parties were unrelated, operating at arm´s length and engaging 
in comparable transactions under similar conditions and economic circumstances. Taxpayers are 
the first ones that get to undertake this exercise and, in doing so, they enjoy a certain degree of 
freedom to choose the most appropriate methodology, set a transfer price for the transaction 
and further demonstrate that such price is consistent with the ALS.  
In this context, transfer pricing methods are not expected to determine the price at which related 
parties would have indisputably traded but rather provide the price at which they would have 
presumably traded968. In other words, the methods may be regarded as establishing a rebuttable 
(legal) presumption that unrelated parties would have considered such transfer prices if they had 
found themselves in such situation. In principle, tax administrations could only contradict such 
presumption insofar they have convincing evidence that unrelated parties would most likely 
determine other prices969.  
This being so, when related parties properly apply a transfer pricing method and derive from it a 
transfer price, such price would be presumably consistent with those that unrelated parties would 
have agreed upon in comparable circumstances, and therefore such parties should be 
theoretically protected from subsequent tax adjustments of the administration insofar the latter 
is not able to demonstrate that unrelated parties would most likely determine other price. As we 
noted elsewhere970, the inherent subjectivity of the mandate based on the ALS gives rise to a wide 
range of prices that are “acceptable” from the perspective of the ALS971, a range within which 
taxpayers are theoretically entitled to move freely and legitimately without the interference and 
the subsequent tax adjustments of the administration.  
The new approach on transfer pricing, resulting from the proposed new OECD TPG, intends to 
effectively limit the inherent subjectivity of the ALS by narrowing the afore mentioned range of 
acceptable prices on the grounds of the “profits must follow value creation” principle. In other 
words, the new guidance uses this principle to justify the restriction of the freedom to select the 
methodology that the taxpayer believes to be more appropriate considering the circumstances of 
                                                          
967 BRAUNER, Y. (2012), p. 168. 
968 SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 697. He argues that it is impossible to know how an independent party would have reacted 
in a specific transaction.  
969 SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 697-698. 
970 See Section 3.1.3 and the introduction to Section 5.2.1. 
971 The OECD TPG defines arm´s length range in its glossary as “a range of figures that are acceptable for establishing 
whether the conditions of a controlled transaction are arm’s length and that are derived either from applying the same 
transfer pricing method to multiple comparable data or from applying different transfer pricing methods”. See OECD 
TPG, p. 23. This notion reinforces the idea that there is not a single and indisputable arm´s length price.  
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the case and further set a transfer price that could be regarded as compliant with the ALS. In our 
opinion, this scenario appears to contradict the literal meaning of rules following the ALS.  
This “restrictive effect” derived from the new OECD approach on transfer pricing is the logical 
outcome of the empowerment of certain transfer pricing methods (most notably the TPS) at the 
expense of others (e.g. C+) resulting from the post-BEPS OECD TPG972. 
In the first place, the preeminence of certain transfer pricing methods over others appears to 
contradict the guideline enshrined in the OECD TPG according to which the selection of the 
relevant method should always aim at finding the “most appropriate method” considering the 
facts and circumstances of the case, a guideline that lies at the very heart of the ALS973. The OECD 
itself raised the question as to whether the preeminence of the TPS method constitutes an 
exception to the “most appropriate method” rule, as it use is recommended in certain scenarios 
without having to consider whether the use of the method is itself appropriate974. 
The predetermination (and imposition) of the methodology to be used irrespective of the relevant 
circumstances not only confronts the “most appropriate method” rule, it leads to effectively 
restrict the freedom that the ALS supposedly grants the taxpayer to select the method he believes 
to be more appropriate and further demonstrate that the transfer prices resulting from such 
method are indeed consistent with the ALS.  
For example, by predetermining the TPS as the most suitable method in certain scenarios975 
irrespective of other circumstances, the OECD is in fact indirectly conditioning and limiting the 
range of acceptable transfer prices beyond what the ALS theoretically suggests. This position 
seems to contradict the literal meaning of rules following the ALS and the very raison d´être of 
the standard976. 
On the other hand, the outright rejection of the C+ method in certain cases977 indirectly entails 
the dismissal of transfer prices that could arguably be within the ALS range of prices for the sole 
reason that they are based on a specific methodology that is deemed to inappropriate. Again, this 
stance is, to say the least, hard to reconcile with the ALS978. 
Beyond the problems derived from the predetermination and rejection of certain transfer pricing 
methods (resulting in the so-called “restrictive effect”) from the perspective of the ALS, it should 
                                                          
972 The same could be said of the American regime on CSA (section 2.2.2), which may be also regarded as inconsistent 
with the spirit of the ALS itself insofar it predetermines the use of a methodology based on C+. 
973 OECD TPG, par. 2.2. The validity of this guideline is not only due to its presence in the OECD TPG and a great number 
of domestic transfer pricing regulations, it could be argued that it may be logically inferred from the own ALS.  
974 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 58. 
975 Where the business operations are highly integrated and the parties of the transaction make unique and valuable 
contributions, in such a way that there are no reliable comparables. See Section 5.2.1.1 and OECD (2015): Final Report 
on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 58. 
976 NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2017), p. 139. 
977 In cases in which what is being remunerated is the performance of R&D activities, particularly where significant 
residual profits are expected to arise. See Section 5.2.1.1 and OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning 
transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 86 and 170 (Post-BEPS OECD TPG, par. 6.79 and 8.26). 
978 Brauner argues that the plain rejection of the C+ method when the time comes to value the contributions to a CSA 
is troublesome: “viewed from the literal arm´s length perspective, it does not make sense since it would be easy to 
demonstrate that market ventures are often accounted for based on costs”. See BRAUNER, Y. (2016), p. 124.   
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be noted that the TPS method itself raises concerns in this regard. Although it is commonly 
regarded as a halfway solution between the ALS and formulary apportionment979, some scholars 
have questioned whether the method either goes beyond the scope of the ALS980 or may at least 
prompt an application of the rule that is inconsistent with the standard981.  
In short, it seems that the intent of the OECD to counteract the subjectivity of the ALS by means 
of the ex-ante predetermination of the relevant method in fact collides with the ALS itself, the 
reason being that subjectivity is an inherent feature of this standard982. 
Beyond the aforementioned concern, there are further aspects of the post-BEPS OECD TPG that 
may also be regarded as hard to reconcile with the ALS itself983, in the sense that the new 
guidelines may well give rise to outcomes that differ from those that may have presumably 
occurred in the market984. This is attributed to various reasons. First, the fact that contractual risk 
allocation is disregarded985. Second, the overestimation of the market value of functions986. And 
third, the possibility to undertake ex post transfer pricing adjustments based on the ex post 
outcomes derived by the exploitation of the intangible987. 
The aforementioned risks would however only materialize in practice to the extent tax 
administrations go as far as to reject the pricing provided by the taxpayer (assuming it could 
arguably be within the ALS range of prices and this is in fact verifiable) on the sole grounds that it 
would not be consistent with the considerations comprised in the post-BEPS OECD TPG (e.g. the 
pricing is not based on the methodology that is regarded as appropriate by the guidelines)988. Of 
                                                          
979 Section 5.2.1.1.  
980 BRAUNER, Y. (2016), p. 110: “(the TPS method) is somewhat widely accepted as the best way for the OECD to 
abandon arm´s length in the transfer pricing of intangibles without losing too much face”. Schoueri believes that the 
TPS method is intended to be ALS-based method, as it intends to “mimic the allocation of profits that would be observed 
in a relation between independent parties if a comparable contribution to the success of the activity would occur” but 
has considerable doubts whether the method is ultimately compatible with the ALS. Indeed, he argues that the adoption 
of a consolidated approach rather than an entity approach may jeopardize the comparative exercises. See SCHOUERI, 
L.E. (2015), p. 693, 695 and 696.  
981 Ashley notes the tendency to use “formulary” concepts” in disputes that are supposedly based on the TPS method 
in the context of transfer pricing rules. See ASHLEY, S. (2013), p. 18. 
982 As it was already pointed out back in Section 3.1.3. 
983 Robillard argues that the BEPS approach on transfer pricing denotes that the ALS is now “slowly but surely being 
related to the back seat” of the OECD TPG. See ROBILLARD, R. (2015), p. 474. 
984 Schoueri provides a very illustrative example in this regard. See SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 714-715. 
985 The approach was described in Section 5.2.1.1. See WITTENDORFF, J. (2016), p. 333. 
986 WITTENDORFF, J. (2016), p. 333. 
987 Such possibility appears to exist in scenarios involving hard to value intangibles. This is how the 2015 report on 
actions 8-10 explains the new approach: “tax administrations can consider ex post outcomes as presumptive evidence 
about the appropriateness of the ex-ante pricing arrangements, and the taxpayer cannot demonstrate that the 
uncertainty has been appropriately taken into account in the pricing methodology adopted”. See OECD (2015): Final 
Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 64. Schoueri believes that this 
may not be in accordance with the ALS. See SCHOUERI, L.E. (2015), p. 715. 
988 This will also depend on the domestic rules on the allocation of the burden of the proof. According to the OECD TPG, 
preface, par. 18: “in most jurisdictions, the tax administration bears the burden of proof, which may require the tax 
administration to make a prima facie showing that the taxpayer’s pricing is inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. 
It should be noted, however, that even in such a case a tax administration might still reasonably oblige the taxpayer to 
produce its records to enable the tax administration to undertake its examination of the controlled transactions. In other 
jurisdictions the taxpayer may bear the burden of proof in some respects”. 
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course, this is more likely to happen in jurisdictions that tend to grant the OECD TPG a sort of 
authoritative status989, as the OECD TPG themselves suggest990. 
Throughout the present section, we first demonstrated that the ALS is not the most suitable 
instrument to pursue the BEPS mantra on transfer pricing (i.e. the alignment between transfer 
pricing outcomes and value creation). And, even if we accept this premise as valid, we later 
confirmed that the proposed OECD TPG, inspired by the brand new “value creation” approach, is 
not consistent with the ALS itself, as it leads to effectively restrict its scope by narrowing the range 
of acceptable transfer prices that the taxpayer may provide in his transfer pricing assessment, 
particularly in cases in which the tax administrations blindly follows the guidance provided the 
OECD despite its soft law status.  
This leads us to reconsider whether the new OECD TPG and the current normative configuration 
of the ALS should continue to coexist despite their divergences or, conversely, the proposed 
“value creation approach” requires a new legal basis, making it necessary to adopt new transfer 
pricing rules that go beyond the ALS.  
This scenario was indeed envisaged by the OECD in the BEPS Action Plan991, explored in an interim 
discussion draft992 and finally discarded by the final report, the supposed reason being that “the 
goals set by the BEPS Action Plan in relation to the development of transfer pricing rules have been 
achieved without the need to develop special measures outside the arm’s length principle”993. This 
being so, the OECD pretended that the new guidance merely constitutes a clarification (rather 
than an overcoming) of the current transfer pricing rules following the ALS994. 
However, there are reasons to believe that the guidance on transfer pricing proposed by the OECD 
in fact goes beyond the raison d´être and the literal meaning of the rules following the ALS and, 
by extension, article 9 of treaties following the MCs995. This would make it necessary to, at least, 
                                                          
989 See Judgment by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, 2002, “Smithkline Beecham Animal Health Inc. v. The 
Queen”: “it appears to be common ground that the OECD Guidelines inform or should inform the interpretation and 
application of subsection 69(2) of the Income Tax Act. The OECD Guidelines state the principles for determining 
international transfer prices and, where possible, the agreement among OECD members with respect to the practices to 
be followed”. On the contrary, other courts do not share this view. See for example the judgment by the Australian 
Federal Court, 2011, “Commissioner of Taxation v SNF Australia Pty Ltd”: ): “the Guidelines are just that - guidelines […] 
The guidelines are not a legitimate aid to the construction of the double taxation treaties […] they are, in any event, not 
permissible materials for interpreting tax treaties”; and the judgment by the Canadian Tax Court, 2013,”McKesson 
Canada Corporation”: “OECD Commentaries and Guidelines are written not only by persons who are not legislators, but 
in fact are the tax collection authorities of the world. Their thoughts should be considered accordingly”. 
990 OECD TPG, preface, par. 15-16: “The Guidelines are intended to help tax administrations (of both OECD member 
countries and non-member countries) and MNEs by indicating ways to find mutually satisfactory solutions to transfer 
pricing cases, thereby minimizing conflict among tax administrations and between tax administrations and MNEs and 
avoiding costly litigation (…) OECD member countries are encouraged to follow these Guidelines in their domestic 
transfer pricing practices, and taxpayers are encouraged to follow these Guidelines in evaluating for tax purposes” 
991 BEPS Action Plan, p. 20: “special measures, either within or beyond the arm’s length principle, may be required with 
respect to intangible assets, risk and over-capitalization to address these flaws”. 
992 OECD (2014): BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10: Discussion draft on revision to chapter I of the transfer pricing guidelines 
(including risk, characterization and special measures), p, 38-45. 
993 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, p. 12. 
994 WITTENDORFF, J. (2016), p. 333. 
995 Wittendorff states that the new OECD approach on transfer pricing, being out of the ALS, cannot be applied under 
existing tax treaties and may also require legislative action to incorporate it into domestic law. See WITTENDORFF, J. 
(2016), p. 333. 
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explore the adoption of domestic transfer pricing rules that are better aligned to the new alleged 
objective of transfer pricing rules and their new proposed guidance. For examples, the adoption 
of domestic rules that in fact predetermine the use of certain transfer pricing methods in a 
transparent manner where certain conditions are met. 
The adoption of domestic special measures in the context of transfer pricing rules may also need 
to be accompanied by the amendment of article 9 of the tax treaties following the ALS.  Such 
amendment would be necessary to ensure the potential application of these domestic rules in 
scenarios covered by tax treaties insofar we regard article 9 of the treaty as a rule that demands 
the contracting States to respect the ALS insofar the conditions to apply the article are met996 
 
5.2.2. RECONSIDERATION OF THE CORPORATE RESIDENCE 
DEFINITION FOR TAX PURPOSES 
 
The tax residence of taxpayers is a paradigm of paramount importance in international taxation. 
It generally triggers a comprehensive tax liability that encompasses the worldwide income 
obtained by the taxpayer regardless of its sources, albeit this is typically mitigated by foreign tax 
credits or foreign income exemptions. Besides, it generally grants access to the benefits of the 
State´s tax treaty network.  
Section 3.2 demonstrated three facts regarding the traditional stance towards corporate tax 
residence. Firstly, the absence of a true reflection on the particular role that corporate tax 
residence tests should play in the framework of CITs, considering the policy purposes the latter 
intend to achieve. Secondly, the fact that traditional tests do not generally guarantee a sufficient 
connection between the corporate taxpayer and its Residence State. And finally, as a direct 
consequence of the previous conclusion, the fact that traditional residence tests are highly 
susceptible to manipulations, thereby generating the so-called “residence electivity” 
phenomenon along with treaty shopping opportunities.  
We will depart from these three conclusions reached in section 3.2 to put forward in the following 
sections a few proposals. In particular, our ultimate goal would be to ensure a better consistency 
between the notion of corporate tax residence and the benefit principle in line with what was 
exposed in Chapter 4.  
 
                                                          
996 NAVARRO IBARROLA, A. (2016), p. 99. This is the result of considering tax treaties as instruments that restrict the 
application of the relevant domestic tax rules (VOGEL, K. (1997), p. 467). 
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5.2.2.1. The imperative need to rethink the corporate tax residence tests 
and align them with the policy purposes of the corporate income tax 
(whatever they are) 
 
The analysis of the most common types of corporate residence tests used in domestic tax 
legislations and their respective origins and alleged rationales revealed various significant findings 
that were pointed out in section 3.2. In general, we noted that the inception and subsequent 
development of these residence tests have not been driven by clear policy purposes and lacked a 
thorough consideration on the supposed goals they were supposed to achieve in the framework 
of the CITs.  
In the first place, section 3.2.1.2.1 demonstrated that these tests were inherited from private 
international law. While they seemed perfectly suited for private international law purposes, 
considering the particular purpose and rationale of this legal order, we noted that that the mere 
extrapolation of terms from this legal order to tax law was troublesome insofar each legal order 
serves different purposes. This implies that current corporate residence tests were not originally 
conceived bearing in mind the particular objectives and specificities of tax law.  
Secondly, sections 3.2.1.2.2 and 3.2.1.2.3 revealed that the adoption of new corporate residence 
test has not generally been motivated by clear tax policy purposes. The first of these sections 
demonstrated that jurisdictions tend to implement new residence tests with the sole purpose of 
counteracting the shortcomings of their preexisting ones. In other words, the adoption of 
residence tests is mostly driven by the urge to address the situations in which the previous tests 
are circumvented and not by clear policy goals.  
This fact was further confirmed by section 3.2.1.2.3, where we reached the conclusion that 
jurisdictions are frequently reluctant to accept the logical outcomes of their respective residence 
tests, particularly where they lead to consider a State where the corporate taxpayer is not 
sufficiently linked to as its Residence State. When faced with such situations, jurisdictions tend to 
resort to anti-avoidance measures as a way to counteract them. We then argued that this was the 
natural consequence of the fact that jurisdictions had adopted residence tests without really 
knowing, understanding and accepting their respective supposed rationales. Instead, they tend to 
regard these tests as a sort of sign of a deep bound between the company and the jurisdiction, 
even though the tests do not generally guarantee per se such bound. Consequently, they are 
willing to accept the outcome of the test only to the extent the corporate taxpayer is genuinely 
linked to the jurisdiction concerned. Otherwise, they are likely to resort to anti-avoidance rules in 
order to neutralize the “undesired” (albeit logical) effect of the test. 
In a nutshell, all these reflections lead us to conclude that not much thought has been given to 
how corporate tax residence should be defined for tax law purposes. It seems that few have 
wondered why a company incorporated in a jurisdiction should be taxable therein for its 
worldwide income. Or why a company whose directors regularly meet within its jurisdiction 
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should be equally liable to tax for its worldwide income in such jurisdiction997. Or similarly, why a 
company should be taxable in the territory in which the majority of its shareholders live or where 
its business activity is mainly located.  
It is true that we tried to provide an answer to these questions and point out the supposed 
rationales behind each one of the categories of residence tests998. However, we observed that 
these considerations were largely absent from the explanatory memoranda to the bills, the 
governmental policy reports or the case law that supported the respective choice of the State 
concerned. Couzin arrived at the sad conclusion that “residence-based taxation of corporations 
was not designed having regard to any policy analysis”999, while Marian attributed to the failure 
of corporate tax residence to the fact that “the discussion on corporate tax residence is disengaged 
from the discussion of the policy justifications for the taxation of corporate entities”1000. In the 
same vein, and after analyzing the most common residence tests, Nikolakakis concluded that “it 
remains unclear in policy terms why any of these connecting factors really justifies taxation”1001. 
Considering all the above, it seems appropriate to stop for a while and reconsider whether current 
residence tests make any sense at all. In the first instance, efforts should be made to rethink the 
residence tests bearing in mind the particular nature and specificities of tax law and the functions 
it performs. That is to say, residence tests ought to define a bond between the taxpayer and the 
jurisdiction concerned that proves to be appropriate, meaningful and purposeful in the context of 
taxation. 
Subsequently, once this is done, States should ask themselves a few questions of a more 
fundamental nature regarding corporate income taxation. In particular, they should consider why 
they are taxing companies for in the first place. That is, the policy objectives they pretend to 
achieve by means of their CITs and the role these are expected to play in their jurisdictions. In 
other words, they should face the exercise we performed back in Section 4.2. Once the States 
                                                          
997 According to SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 103: “the basic concept of decision making as a starting point for tax allocation is 
a flawed one. Decisions are mental processes which do not lend themselves to a territorial fixation. Thus, it makes no 
sense to focus on the location of the person making that decision”. 
998 See Section 3.2.1.1 and more specifically the subsections entitled “the rationale behind them”. 
999 COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 17. More generally, Bird expressed his pessimistic view in this respect: “tax policy, like all public 
policy, is the product of attempts to achieve often partly conflicting goals in a heavily constrained and changing 
economic, political and institutional context”. See BIRD, R. (2002), p. 201. 
1000 MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 475. What he intends to do in this article is precisely to force such engagement by means 
of proposing a different definition or definitions of corporate tax residence for each one of the four traditional policy 
purposes of corporate income taxes. 
1001 NIKOLAKAKIS, A. (2009), p. 917-918. Then, he posed the question as to whether the location of the meetings of the 
directors should justify taxation, insofar the company´s income does not really belong to the directors: “why the location 
of the meetings of the directors should justify taxation? It is simply not their income! That is, the directors are not the 
economic beneficiaries of the corporation´s income (…) and the directors will presumably be paid for the value they add 
to the enterprise and that income will presumably be taxed where they are resident or perform their functions”. Although 
Nikolakakis and some other scholars have been perfectly aware of this fact, some others have contributed to perpetuate 
this problem by promoting changes in the residence tests intended to counteract the manipulation of the preexisting 
ones but without considering their respective policy purposes. For example, Shaviro suggested the adoption of a new 
tax residence test in the US domestic legislation, alternatively: place of central management and control, place of listing 
(the treatment of companies publicly traded in prominent US securities markets as resident companies) or place of 
residence of the company´s shareholders. However, we miss in his presentation a careful consideration on the purposes 
he expected to achieve with each one of these tests. Instead, his sole objective was to make the US residence rules 
“harder and costlier to avoid”. See SHAVIRO, D. (2011), p. 137-139. 
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have defined the policy purposes of their respective CITs (whatever they are) they will be in a 
better position to design their CITs accordingly. 
For the purposes of the current section, the policy objectives of the CIT should inspire the 
delimitation of its subjective scope and thus the identification of the companies that should be 
subject to it. This way, the definition of corporate tax residence will be appropriately aligned to 
the objective of the CIT and will thus contribute to serve its purposes. 
We will provide a few examples departing from the tax residence tests analyzed in Section 3.2.1.1, 
although we will equally make reference to other categories of tests. When a State regards its 
own CIT as a compensation for the benefits derived from the incorporation (the granting of limited 
liability, the transferability of interests, the centralization of management, etc.), it would certainly 
be coherent to adopt a POI test whereby all companies incorporated in accordance with the 
domestic laws will be subject to tax therein1002. On the other hand, when a State intends to exert 
control over the accumulation of power held by the managers by means of its CIT, it would be 
logical to implement the POEM as a residence test and thus subject the company to tax wherever 
its managers meet to take decisions1003. In the case a State regards its CIT as a vehicle for reaching 
the pockets of the individual shareholders that are behind the corporate veil, it seems only natural 
to link the tax residence status to the place where most of the shareholders reside1004. On the 
contrary, if the State deems its CIT as a fee for the use or the enjoyment of public services by the 
corporate taxpayers, granting the tax residence status to the companies that effectively carry out 
their business within its territory would seem consistent with the purpose of its CIT1005. Lastly, 
“place of listing” would be the most appropriate test for States which regard their CIT as an 
instrument to either charge for the access to liquidity in the domestic market1006 or to reduce 
                                                          
1002 See section 3.2.1.1.1 (in particular the “rationale behind them” part) and AVI-YONAH, R. (2004), p. 1205-1206. This 
idea seems equally present in Prof´s Shaviro discourse, where he refers to the US taxation imposed upon foreigners 
incorporating a company in the US as “a fee for US incorporation”, enumerating some of its advantages. Besides, he 
points out that some companies may consider that the US incorporation “brands them legally, reputationally, and 
otherwise as real company with high standards”. See SHAVIRO, D. (2011), p. 130-132. In the same vein, Avery Jones 
provided an example to justify this sort of tests: “if Italian subjects, who may not think their investments are safe in 
Italian companies, become shareholders in a company and receive an income under the protection of the laws of this 
country, I do not know why they should not be under the obligation of paying the tax”. See AVERY JONES, J.F. (2009), p. 
451. On the other hand, Marian does not believe that formal tests are consistent with the policy purposes of CITs, and 
he warns that they “pose the risk of defeating the policy purpose for which we seek to tax corporations in the first place”. 
See MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 473 and 476. 
1003 See section 3.2.1.1.2 (in particular the “rationale behind them” part). Avi-Yonah has traditionally defended that CITs 
assists in curbing undesirable power accumulations by corporate management: “the imposition of the corporate tax will 
enable the government, the shareholders, and the public to obtain information that will serve as the basis for restricting 
such managerial abuses of power”. See AVI-YONAH, R. (2007b), p. 383 and, in the same vein, AVI-YONAH, R. (2004) and 
MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 477. 
1004 See section 3.2.1.1.3 (in particular the “rationale behind them” part). Kleinbard stated that “the strongest 
justification for the existence of a corporate income tax is that it serves as a substitute for the imposition of current tax 
on the firm´s owners”. See KLEINBARD, E.D. (2012b), p. 684, AUERBACH, A. J. (2006), BANK, S.A. (2007), p. 393, MARIAN, 
O. (2013), p. 1628 and MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 474 and 477. In this latter article, Marian states that “assuming that 
corporate taxation is intended to reach shareholders´ pockets, the logical functional residence test is a residence-of-
majority-of-shareholders rule”.  
1005 See section 3.2.1.1.4 (in particular the “rationale behind them” part) and ANTONINI, M. (2008), p. 153. 
1006 MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 479: “Liquidity provides a significant benefit, and corporate tax can be justified as a fee on 
liquidity”.  
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agency costs arising out of the nonalignment of interests between managers and shareholders in 
publicly traded companies1007. 
A genuine alignment between the policy objectives behind the CIT and the tax residence tests 
would bring significant advantages. First of all, residence tests will become instrumental in 
reaching the policy objectives pursued by the State by means of its CIT and will thus greatly 
contribute to achieve them. Secondly, States will be at last willing to accept the logical outcomes 
of their respective residence tests, as they will be perfectly consistent with what they expect for 
their CITs. Therefore, the problem identified in section 3.2.1.2.3 is likely to be finally overcome, 
as States will certainly be far less inclined to resort to anti-avoidance measures to correct the 
outcomes of their tests. 
In a nutshell, what we advocate for is to stop adopting traditional residence tests by inertia and 
instead conceive a test or a set of test that departs from the specific policy purposes pursued by 
each State by means of its CIT, whatever these policy purposes are. This way, corporate tax 
residence would serve as an instrument to support the policies underlying CITs1008. 
 
5.2.2.2. The appropriateness of abandoning residence tests that merely 
require a weak connection between the company and the State 
 
For the purposes of this section, we are referring to the tests that do not demand a truly close 
connection between the company and the State concerned. This is particularly the case of the 
formal tests analyzed in Section 3.2.1.1.1, as the POI (the incorporation of a company in 
accordance with the domestic legislation of such jurisdiction), the registered office or the 
legal/statutory seat (as indicated in the bylaws of the company). However, some of the 
considerations presented here will similarly apply -to some extent- to the tests based on the place 
where the company is ultimately run (Section 3.2.1.1.2).  
From our perspective, the only valid argument to support the subsistence of a formal test as the 
POI would be the fact that the State in question regards its CIT as a “fee” for the benefits derived 
from the incorporation (the granting of limited liability, the transferability of interests, the 
centralization of management, etc.) in line with the arguments exposed in Section 5.2.2.1. Still, 
the prize for the scarce benefits that incorporation entails would seem disproportional at first 
sight, as the residence status generally triggers an unlimited tax liability on the worldwide income 
of the company. 
Beyond the policy considerations that could eventually uphold the subsistence of these tests, 
there are compelling reasons not to maintain tests that do not require a substantial, genuine and 
                                                          
1007 MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 478-479: “In the absence of corporate-level tax, a corporate manager who also holds equity 
in the corporation is likely to prefer her own tax interest when making corporate-level decisions that shareholder-level 
tax consequences. Once a tax is imposed at the entity level, it creates alignment of interests, because managers and 
shareholders alike have an interest in reducing entity-level tax, regardless of their individual tax interests”.  
1008 This is the objective pursued by scholars as Marian and Loomer. See MARIAN, O. (2013b) and LOOMER, G.T. (2015). 
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sufficient connection between the corporate taxpayer and the State concerned. Such a policy 
option will be desirable from the three different perspectives that will be exposed below.  
 
5.2.2.2.1. A greater consistency with Public International Law   
A progressive abandonment of the so-called “weak” residence tests will also be desirable from a 
Public International Law perspective. At this point we should remember some of the conclusions 
drawn in Section 4.3.  
We then departed from the so-called “Lotus presumption”, i.e. the general assumption that, as a 
matter of principle, Public International Law does not pose any legal constraints as to how States 
should exercise their (tax) jurisdiction beyond the interdiction of exerting their sovereign powers 
in any form in the territory of other State without its permission1009. Following this line of 
reasoning, States would be a priori entirely free to determine which legal entities will hold the 
status of tax residents in their territories for the purposes of their respective CITs. In other words, 
they would be free to draft their own corporate residence tests the way they wish, demanding 
either a weak or formal link with the State or a substantial one.  
Although we took the “Lotus presumption” as a valid starting point, we argued that Public 
International Law indeed places two additional constraints to the way States can exercise their 
respective tax jurisdiction.  
Firstly, we concluded that the imposition of taxes over persons or things that are incontestably 
beyond the personal and territorial sovereignty of a State would constitute a clear violation of 
Public International Law, as such exercise of jurisdiction would be deemed to be arbitrary, 
unreasonable, illegitimate and prone to undermine the sovereign rights of neighboring States1010. 
Consequently, a State would be acting in violation of Public International Law if it confers the 
residence status to companies that have no connection whatsoever to its jurisdiction1011. This 
scenario is however unprecedented and indeed very unlikely to happen, as the potential 
enforcement of such taxes would be extremely difficult. Naturally, all the corporate residence 
tests analyzed in Section 3.2.1.1 require without exception at least a minimum level of connection 
between the company and the territory, so none of them would be troublesome in this respect. 
Secondly, we observed that International Law does not only demand a minimum attachment 
between the taxing State and the taxable subject, it seems to equally require a certain degree of 
reasonableness and proportionality in the extent of the tax liability that such link may trigger. 
According to the so-called “minimum standard for foreigners”, a broad-based consensus that is 
                                                          
1009 Judgment by the International Court of Justice “S.S. Lotus” of September 7th 1927. See Section 4.3.3. 
1010 See Section 4.3.3.2.  
1011 See Section 4.3.3.2 and MARTHA, R.S.J. (1989), p. 70, who believes that “it becomes obvious that if a States 
promulgates a law affecting non-resident aliens, and their acts have no effect within its territory, such State would be 
violating international law”. He thereupon illustrates the idea with a fictitious example: the imposition of an income 
tax by Germany to all males in the word. He argues that, even though Germany could effectively impose such tax on a 
male resident in Curaçao visiting Heidelberg for vacations, Germany would still lack tax jurisdiction over him. 
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sometimes regarded as an international customary rule1012, a State would not be allowed to tax 
the worldwide income of aliens who are mere tourists or temporary visitors1013, however much 
they are deemed to be within the territorial sovereignty of the State concerned in the precise 
moment in which the tax is enforced. We believe this principle could have some impact in our 
discussion on corporate tax residence tests. Departing from the fact that the tax resident status 
usually triggers an unlimited tax liability, we may conclude that this principle would preclude 
States from granting the tax resident status to a company who is only temporarily and occasionally 
linked to them. The analysis of the most widespread corporate residence tests reveals that a few 
of them may lead to situations in which a company that is only incidentally linked to a State may 
found itself subject to an unlimited tax liability therein. This would be the case of a company 
whose only relation to the State where it is tax resident is the fact that it was incorporated therein 
decades ago. As a consequence of the aforesaid, we believe that formal tests may potentially 
compromise the aforesaid standard.  
However, beyond this last observation, all residence tests analyzed in Section 3.2.1.1 seem to 
formally comply with Public International Law. 
The question remains as to whether certain corporate residence tests may be more consistent 
than others with the principles and rules envisaged in Public International Law and the very notion 
of sovereignty itself in line with the ideas exposed in Section 4.3.4. In other words, we wonder 
whether some residence tests may be more desirable and acceptable from the perspective of this 
legal order. 
Back in section 4.3.3.2, we referred to the principle “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas” 
(commonly known as principle of “good neighborliness”), which recognizes that the exercise of 
sovereign rights of a State over its “reserved domain” is not absolute and unlimited but correlative 
and interdependent of the sovereign rights of other States, to the extent that such exercise may 
compromise them.  
Following this reasoning, “weak” residence tests that lead to the imposition of an unlimited tax 
liability to a corporate taxpayer that is not sufficiently linked to the State concerned increases the 
chances of an overlap in the exercise of the tax jurisdictions of two or more States, resulting in 
multiple residence issues and the consequent double taxation they entail. This is so because these 
tests tend to attract companies indiscriminately, beyond those that are deeply and effectively 
entrenched in its community1014.  By contrast, States using “strong” residence tests limit 
                                                          
1012 See Section 4.3.3.2 and SCHWARZENBERGER, G. (1967), p. 105. 
1013 See Section 4.3.3.2 and more particularly QURESHI, A.H. (1987). JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, E. (1978), p. 182: 
“Everybody agrees, for instance, that a State could not subject to taxation the whole income of aliens who are tourist or 
temporary visitors”. This is so because he understands that, when the connection is so remote, the imposition of taxes 
would lead to “nonsensical and grossly unjust results”, offending “elementary notions of fair play and substantial 
justice”. See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1986), p. 259: “Jurisdiction to tax seldom raises issues between States, but 
an unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction to tax, for instance a tax on a resident alien temporarily present within a State, 
measured by his word-wide income, could be challenged as a violation of international law by both the taxpayer and 
the State of the taxpayer´s nationality”.  
1014 Couzin refers to this “overshooting” effect in COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 266. We already referred to this effect back in 
Section 3.2.4.5.  
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themselves to tax subjects that are appropriately linked to them and the chances of multiple tax 
jurisdictions concurring tend to diminish.  
Therefore, even accepting the compatibility of formal tests with the previously mentioned 
“minimum standard” and with Public International Law in general, we could still reach the 
conclusion that their adoption is likely to lead to concurrence of tax jurisdictions and thus disturb 
the exercise of taxing rights of their neighbor States. As a result, the resort to this sort of tests 
may be regarded as undesirable, as they are prone to compromise -to a certain extent- Public 
International Law principles as “good neighborliness”, territoriality or non-intervention.  
 
5.2.2.2.2. A better alignment with the benefit principle as proposed in Chapter 4.  
An assessment of current corporate tax residence tests from the perspective of the benefit 
principle1015 should lead us to reject all test that become instrumental in detaching taxable profits 
from the jurisdictions where the economic activities giving rise to them take place and instead 
book them in the jurisdiction of choice. 
We already evaluated the profit shifting risks that each category of tests poses in Section 
3.2.1.11016. We then reached the conclusion that two categories were particularly troublesome in 
this regard: formal tests and those relying on the place where the company is run. This is so for 
two main reasons.  
Firstly, both sets of tests rely on factors that are within the direct control of the taxpayer, so they 
enable him to basically select the jurisdiction in which it wishes to be tax resident irrespective of 
the place(s) where its real ties are. One may think at first glance that formal tests pose greater 
risks than substantive tests as the POEM, but this is not necessarily true. The truth is that 
companies may establish their board meetings in the jurisdiction of their choice and, what is more, 
they are free to transfer it somewhere else at a later point. As we warned back in Section 3.2.1, 
jurisdictions relying on these tests should be prepared to accept that any genuine transfer of 
managerial functions would effectively cause the end of the residence status in their country. 
Therefore, as long as the jurisdictions concerned follow this sort of tests, companies may easily 
capture the tax residence status wherever they wish, either from its inception or at a later point 
in its life.  
Secondly, both categories of tests rely on factors that bear no relation whatsoever to the place 
where the company is carrying out its economic activities1017. The fact that the company conducts 
its economic activities in the same jurisdiction where it was incorporated, keeps its registered 
office or where its board of directors meets would be purely coincidental. As a result, the 
Residence State of the company may not necessarily be the State in which it carries out its 
activities. 
                                                          
1015 According to the role we proposed for this principle back in Chapter 4. 
1016 See Section 3.2.1.1 (in particular the “potential profit shifting risks they pose” part). 
1017 In Section 3.2.1.2.3 we noted that most residence tests, by their own nature, do not specifically require an economic 
attachment between the company and the country concerned.   
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For all the reasons outlined above, we believe that the progressive abandonment of both sets of 
tests may contribute to ameliorate the opportunities for profit shifting risks and effectively narrow 
the gap between the economic and the tax presence of the companies. Thus, such a decision 
would be welcome as a positive step towards a greater consistency between corporate residence 
tests and the benefit principle according to the considerations exposed in Chapter 4. 
Although our claim seems to be sufficiently substantiated, it is true that neither the OECD nor any 
other international organization has traditionally got involved in the decision of the jurisdictions 
regarding their corporate residence tests1018. In fact, when analyzing the causes allowing BEPS to 
happen, the OECD/G20 chose not to evaluate the role played by corporate tax residence tests, 
despite its evident contribution to the phenomenon. In this respect, the BEPS Monitoring Group 
expressly pointed out the profit shifting risks that both sorts of tests tend to pose1019, requesting 
the OECD to revise these tests and suggest and standardization.   
5.2.2.2.3. Mitigation of treaty shopping risks 
Residence tests that do not demand a close link to the State are equally prone to pose problems 
from a “treaty shopping” perspective. As we know, article 1 of the MCs makes the application of 
the tax treaty to a taxpayer subject to its condition of tax resident of one of the Contracting States. 
However, jurisdictions observe that taxpayers that formally comply with domestic tax residence 
rules may be entitled to treaty benefits in circumstances in which they are not sufficiently 
attached to their Residence State. As we warned back in Section 3.2.3.2.3, this was the direct 
consequence of the weakness of most residence tests.  
Consequently, a progressive abandonment of “weak” corporate residence tests along with a 
greater reliance on “strong” tests would lead to diminish the opportunities for treaty shopping 
and the dependency on anti-treaty shopping measures as the LOB clauses1020.  
 
                                                          
1018 LOOMER, G. (2015), p. 99: “The OECD says very little about corporate residence formulations or their potential for 
exploitation (…) In my view, corporate residence is one matter that should be addressed, not least because it underlies 
many of the avoidance strategies and necessary responses that the OECD has identified”. The only exception to this 
trend may be found in the report on Harmful tax competition, where the OECD called for a revision of the corporate 
residence rules to “better address harmful tax competition”.  It then suggested extending the domestic definition of 
corporate residence to cover companies incorporated abroad but effectively controlled by domestic taxpayers. In a 
nutshell, the OECD advocated for the adoption of corporate residence tests based on the residence of the shareholders 
(a category analyzed in Section 3.2.1.1.3) in lieu of international transparency regimes as the CFC rules, even though 
both approaches produce similar outcomes. See OECD (1998): Harmful tax competition: an emerging global issue, p. 
60. 
1019 See https://bepsmonitoringgroup.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/ap5-htps-modified-substance.pdf “For those 
jurisdictions that include one or more forms of management and control within their residency definition, it is fair to say 
that the combination of taxpayers’ abilities to factually control where they take various corporate actions, and the 
difficulty for tax authorities to look for and identify indices of management and control for companies organized 
elsewhere, means that many companies established in convenient jurisdictions can practically escape residency in any 
country where they might have operations or from which their operations are directed (…) For those jurisdictions that 
use solely the place of incorporation to establish residency (most notably the U.S.), multinationals have blatantly 
conducted significant operations through tax haven subsidiaries while openly managing those operations from within 
the U.S”.  
1020 WHEELER, J.C. (2011), p. 294: “In the current treaty framework the policy clash in respect of the place of 
incorporation as a connecting factor has led to the adoption of limitation-on-benefits provisions in an increasing number 
of treaties”.  
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5.2.2.3. The convenience of adopting corporate residence tests that 
ensure a close connection between the company and the State 
 
In the previous section we advocated for the progressive abandonment of “weak” corporate 
residence tests (primarily those relying on formal criteria). Such decision should be however 
accompanied by the adoption of corporate tax residence tests that, by contrast, ensure a 
substantive, genuine and sufficient connection between the corporate taxpayer and the State 
concerned. It goes without saying that, as a general rule, “strong” corporate residence tests would 
effectively overcome the risks that “weak” tests tend to pose, particularly those we identified in 
section 5.2.2.2.  
Firstly, “strong” residence tests would undoubtedly comply with the “minimum standard for 
foreigners” and would be more consistent with the principles underlying Public International Law, 
as “good neighborliness”, territoriality and non-intervention. As a result, one could expect fewer 
cases of concurrence of tax jurisdictions and thus fewer cases of multiple residence and double 
taxation.  
Secondly, tests requiring a sufficient connection would be less prone to give rise to profit shifting 
risks. Typically, these tests tend to rely on factors that reveal a profound, enduring and deeply-
rooted connection between the company and the jurisdiction concerned. These factors are 
normally beyond the direct control of the taxpayer, but even if they were under its control, they 
would rarely be susceptible to overnight alterations and manipulations. 
And lastly, insofar residence tests demand a close, long-standing relationship between the 
company and the territory concerned, treaty shopping opportunities would tend to diminish and, 
by extension, measures to counteract them would be less and less necessary.  
Naturally, the biggest challenge is how to define such connection and, above all, how to translate 
it into an efficient and easy to administer rule. The next two subsections intend to put forward a 
few suggestions to this effect. 
 
5.2.2.3.1. Reinventing the notion of corporate tax residence from the principles underlying 
personal tax residence rules 
The search of the origins of the notion of corporate tax residence brings us directly to personal 
income taxation. The reason is that, as anticipated in Section 3.1.1, CITs borrowed from PITs many 
of their structural principles. 
By the time income taxation extended its scope to companies, these inherited from individuals 
the ability to “reside” in a certain jurisdiction for tax purposes1021. However, we should depart 
                                                          
1021 The example of the UK explained in Section 3.2.1.1 is particularly illustrative. British courts were asked to apply the 
British Income Tax Act (designed for individuals) to corporations long before the introduction of a statutory corporate 
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from an undeniable fact: companies are mere legal fictions and, contrary to individuals, do not 
reside anywhere. The residence of individuals is an inherent aspect of its nature and may be 
deduced from its own circumstances: it is the place where the person develops his life, where he 
ordinarily lives, works and sleeps. Naturally, the same cannot be said about companies. In the 
words of Huddlestone B: “the use of the word residence is upon the habits of a natural man and 
is therefore inapplicable to the artificial and legal person whom we call a corporation”1022.  
As a consequence of this fact, jurisdictions face the challenge of conceiving an artificial notion of 
residence that could be assigned to these artificial persons for the purposes of applying their 
income tax systems to them1023. This way, every time a company fulfills the requirements set in 
the corporate residence test, it would automatically be deemed to “reside” within the frontiers 
of the State concerned and, consequently, it would find its worldwide income subject to tax 
therein, just as it occurs with individuals. 
The exercise of extrapolating the notion of residence from individuals to companies is certainly 
tricky. The process is aptly described by Graetz as “an effort to put flesh into fiction”, an attempt 
to “find economic and political substance in a world occupied by legal niceties”1024. The reason is 
that companies do not only not reside anywhere: they may develop deep bonds with different 
jurisdictions simultaneously and thus be present in different territories at a time1025. In this 
context, defining a nexus between a company and a territory that is analogous to the level of 
connection that an individual maintains with the territory where he resides constitutes a major 
challenge.  
We intend to take up the challenge of extrapolating the notion of tax residence from individuals 
to companies, but to do so we will depart from the analysis of personal tax residence tests and, 
most notably, the principles underlying them. We will begin by analyzing the most widespread tax 
residence tests for individuals thanks to the comparative study conducted by the OECD on 58 
different countries1026. Once this evaluation is over, we will proceed to infer the principles that 
supposedly underlie these tests. After that, we will question current corporate residence tests in 
the light of such principles and we will try to derive a few practical guidelines that may be useful 
to rethink and (eventually) redefine such tests. 
The analysis of the most widespread residence tests leads us to distinguish between two broad 
categories: substantive and formal ones. 
                                                          
tax residence test in 1988. In the meantime, they had no other option but to force the application of the notion of 
“residence” to corporations. See COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 28-33 and LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 102. 
1022 Judgment by the UK High Court (Exchequer Division), 1876, “The Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd V. Nicholson” and “The 
Calcutta Jute Mills Co Ltd V. Nicholson”. 
1023 In the same vein, see KLEINBARD, E.D. (2012), p. 517: “Because a corporation in the first instance exists only as a 
legal construct, not a natural one, the concept (of residence) piles one false analogy on top of another”. 
1024 GRAETZ, M.J. (2001), p. 320.  
1025 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 520: “multinationals are not part of a single society and their income does not belong to 
any particular society for distributive purposes” and ZORNOZA PÉREZ, J. (2013), p. 7. 
1026 http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/tax-residency Another 
comparative study of the residence tests in place in 12 countries may be consulted in NIKOLAKAKIS, A. (2010), p. 75-83. 
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The vast majority of tests can be regarded as “substantive”, as they tend to reflect a present close 
relationship between the person and the State concerned, either stable or temporary. They may 
be classified in four different subcategories: 
o Physical presence. 90% of the countries reviewed follow purely quantitative residence 
tests that rely on the number of days that the taxpayer physically spends within the 
territory of the country concerned at a given period of time1027.  The time threshold is 
almost invariably set to 183 days or 6 months within a 12-months period1028. However, a 
small number of countries demand either a shorter1029 or a longer1030 period of physical 
presence. 
o Availability of a dwelling that is habitually and/or currently in use with or without the need 
to demonstrate the intention to keep using it in the future. 47% of the surveyed countries 
grant the resident status to the individuals that have their home1031, dwelling1032, principal 
or habitual abode1033, domicile1034 or residence1035 within the territory of the State. All 
these tests seem to require, either explicitly or tacitly, an actual use of the dwelling during 
the corresponding tax period or, at least, the intention to return to it in the near future.  
o Center of vital interests. 43% of the surveyed countries grant the residence status to 
persons that are regarded as sufficiently attached to them by reason of their economic, 
                                                          
1027 50 out of the 58 countries reviewed. 
1028 This is the case of 40 out of the 50 countries following this sort of tests. Although Turkey finds itself in this group, 
the rule does not apply in cases in which the person´s stay exceeds a period of 183 days as a consequence of a 
professional mission (scientists, businessmen, specialists, press), medical treatment, studies, rest, travel, detention, 
conviction or illness. 
1029 This is the case of Switzerland (30 days in case the taxpayer participates in a gainful activity and 90 days in the 
remaining cases), South Africa (91), Isle of Man and Jersey (visits exceeding an average of 90 days in a period of 4 years), 
United States (183 days in 3 years’ time), Chile (183 days in 2 years’ time), Faroe Islands (180), Hong Kong (180) and 
India (182). Strangely enough, Isle of Man grants the tax resident status to any person who has the “intention” to visit 
the country for more than 90 days per year on average, irrespective of the fact that they eventually do so. 
1030 Only Argentina, China, Japan require a longer period of time, as all three countries establish a 12-months threshold. 
1031 Czech Republic (permanent home and intention to permanently stay at it), Faroe Islands, Mexico, Portugal (home 
with the intention to occupy it as the taxpayer´s permanent residence, the rule does not explicitly demand its effective 
use but it does require the physical presence in Portugal for a period of time) and South Africa (the taxpayer has his 
“real” home in the country, in the sense that he will, naturally and as a matter of course, return to it after his 
wanderings).  
1032 Germany (indicia that the taxpayer maintains and uses the dwelling). 
1033 Austria, Canada (“where the individual regularly, normally or customarily lives in the usual mode of life”), Croatia 
(“place in which the taxpayer stays under circumstances based on which it may be concluded that he does not reside 
in that place only temporarily”), Finland, France (“main place of abode”), Greece, Italy (“habitual abode”), Japan 
(“where he ordinarily resides”), Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, New Zealand (“permanent place of abode”), San Marino, 
Slovenia. 
1034 Domicile is interpreted differently depending on the country: Austria (having a dwelling under circumstances that 
show that the taxpayer will keep and use the dwelling), Chile (current residency in Chile and the intention to keep it, as 
deduced from the taxpayer´s activities and relationships), Belgium (having the actual residence or living quarters 
located in Belgium), China (habitual residence on account of domiciliary registration, family ties or economic interests) 
, Luxembourg (permanent home available to the person that he uses and intends to maintain) and Switzerland (place 
where the person currently lives with the intention of staying permanently). For Luxembourg see 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/tax/lu-en-wp-essentialguideindividuals-
18062014.pdf  
1035 Croatia (habitual residence), Hungary (permanent residence) and Liechtenstein (person resides in a place at 
Liechtenstein with the intention of staying there permanently). 
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personal and/or social circumstances1036. Most tests seek a balance between the different 
spheres of life of the individual, but a few of them only regard either the economic1037 or 
the personal1038 connections with the State concerned irrespective of the other. These 
tests are of a purely qualitative nature, granting the resident status to persons that 
maintain close ties to the State. Even though they do not demand a minimum physical 
presence in the State concerned1039, one could expect that the taxpayer makes frequent 
visits (despite not complying with a minimum time threshold at the moment the test is 
applied) or will return to the State in the near future as a consequence of the close ties 
that link him to it.  
o Public employment. At least 14% of the surveyed countries1040 confer the tax resident 
status to the individuals (sometimes only nationals) employed by the government of the 
country regardless of the fact that they may be temporarily or permanently residing 
abroad, as it may be the case of diplomatic, consular, government and military personnel. 
Just as in the previous case, these tests do not demand a minimum period of physical 
presence but still allow us to assume that the taxpayer is likely to visit or eventually return 
to the territory of the country for which he works. Furthermore, in the cases of diplomats 
and consuls, if the taxpayer was also treated as tax resident in the State where he actually 
works and lives (highly likely), tax treaties following the OECD MC would only regard the 
Employer State as its Resident State for the purposes of the treaty1041. 
On the other hand, formal tests merely rely on factors that do not reveal a present nor a strong 
relationship with the State concerned1042. In most cases, these tests operate as “deeming 
provisions”, meaning that they do not automatically grant the tax resident status in all 
circumstances but instead establish a legal presumption that that may be rebutted in case the 
taxpayer do not effectively reside in the country or is not sufficiently attached to it (in the sense 
                                                          
1036 The most common factors that are taken into account the residence of the family members, the place of work and 
the location of the property or assets. Occasionally, tests make reference to other minor indicators as the place of birth 
(e.g. Malta), where the taxpayer attends the doctor, where his kids´ school is or where he has his insurance (e.g. 
Netherlands). 
1037 A third of the countries following this sort of test only regard the economic ties the taxpayer has with the territory 
concerned, irrespective of its personal circumstances. This is the case of Andorra, Belgium (seat of wealth), Brazil (hired 
by a resident company), France (carrying on a professional activity therein, salaried or not), Italy (principal place of 
business), Mexico (deriving more than 50% of the income from its territory or having its main center of professional 
activities therein), Slovenia (location of the property and financial/economic interests) and Spain (main center of 
economic activities and interests). 
1038 Only Switzerland limits itself to the assessment of facts that pertain to the personal life of the taxpayer, as their 
personal relationships, the place where he spends its non-working hours, where he fosters friendships and family ties 
and where they take part in the social life of the community. On the other hand, the place of work is not considered as 
a relevant factor for the purposes of this rule.  
1039 In fact, the Italian test expressly states that an individual will be considered as Italian resident to the extent it has 
his place of business or interests therein irrespective of its effective presence within the Italian territory. 
1040 This is for example the case of Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Turkey among 
others, although we have reasons to believe that the number of countries is much greater. 
1041 The reason is that article 4.1 of the OECD MC denies residence under the treaty to taxpayers that are only liable to 
tax on income from sources in that country, and diplomats/consuls have their official salary and offshore income 
exempt under article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and article 49 of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (article 28 of the OECD MC respects the fiscal privileges granted by International Law to these 
collectives. See DIRKIS, M. (2010), p. 149-150. 
1042 NIKOLAKAKIS, A. (2010), p. 76: “civil law countries do tend to rely more than common law countries on certain 
somewhat formalistic conceptions of residence”. 
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that he is not expected to make frequent visits or return soon)1043. Only occasionally, these tests 
will grant the tax resident status to the individual straightaway regardless of his present 
circumstances. As a consequence, we will only regard as purely “formal” the tests that fall under 
the scope of this latter type, as they assign the tax resident status on the sole basis of a formal 
attachment to the State concerned, regardless of the fact that the taxpayer may well be physically 
present and/or have stronger personal/economic ties with any other State. These are the four 
subcategories of formal tests:  
o Domicile without demanding its actual use. 10% of the surveyed countries make use of 
tests that require the existence of a dwelling or domicile within the territory of the State 
concerned without requiring, either explicitly or tacitly, the taxpayer to effectively use 
it1044. 
o Personal or domicile registration. For their part, 5% of the surveyed countries grant the 
tax resident status to individuals that are either registered as inhabitants or have an 
address registered in a public registry of the State concerned. The rule would apply 
irrespective of any other considerations of a substantive nature1045. 
o Nationality. Only 2 States (representing just a 3% of the surveyed ones) automatically 
confer the tax residence status to its citizens regardless their present circumstances and 
the territory where they ordinarily live. The most paradigmatic example may be found in 
the US legislation. For its part, the Hungarian rule uses an “escape clause” according to 
which dual citizens without a permanent or habitual residence in Hungary will not be 
regarded as residents for tax purposes therein.  
o Reliance on other formal documents. Brazil treats any individual with a Brazilian 
permanent visa as resident for income tax purposes without explicitly requiring the 
                                                          
1043 We will now enumerate and briefly comment the “deeming provisions” we observed in the OECD survey: 
i) Domicile. The Australian rule grants the resident status to individuals having their domicile in Australia unless they 
have their “permanent place of abode” outside the country. 
ii) Personal and domicile registration. Belgium confers the tax residency to any individual listed in the National Registry 
of Individuals “unless evidence to the contrary con be provided”.  
iii) Nationality. There are three countries that depart from the presumption that their nationals are tax residents, but 
allow evidence to the contrary. For example, Argentine citizens lose their resident status when they become permanent 
residents in the foreign country or when they stay uninterruptedly in a foreign country for at least 12 months. On the 
other hand, Colombian citizens will only be treated as tax residents to the extent further substantive requirements are 
met (e.g. underage children resident in Colombia, 50% of the income sourced in Colombia, 50% of the assets 
administered in Colombia, etc.). Finally, Finland establishes that Finnish citizens who leave the country and its main 
abode therein will continue to be treated as tax residents for 3 more years unless there is evidence that they do not 
maintain substantial ties with Finland any more.  
1044 This is the case of Croatia (the taxpayer must own or have “in his possession” an apartment for at least 183 days in 
one or two calendar years, but the actual use of the apartment is not required), Jersey (the taxpayer maintains a “place 
of abode” in Jersey although he merely needs to stay therein for one night per year), Slovak Republic (the taxpayer 
must have a “permanent address” in the country) and the United Kingdom (the assessment of the UK domicile often 
requires the consideration of a person´s life story and long-term intentions rather than his actual stay in the country). 
For their part, Greenland and Turkey require the presence of a “domicile” in the State without expressly requiring the 
taxpayer to effectively use it. The meaning of “domicile” for UK tax purposes is explained in: LEMOS, M. (2010), p. 611. 
1045 This is the case of Italy (individuals registered in the municipal population registry for a certain period of time will 
be deemed to be residents in Italy), Latvia (individuals having the registered place of residence in Latvia) and San Marino 
(its test demands a registered residency in San Marino for most of the tax period). 
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taxpayer to be physically present or at least have a dwelling available for him in the 
country. 
Table 31 - Criteria used by 58 jurisdictions to establish personal tax residence in their respective domestic legislations.  
The source of the information belongs to the OECD1046. Physical presence tests requiring a period 
shorter or longer than 183 days are marked with an (*). Vital interests´ tests that focus on 
economic links are marked with an (E) and those focusing on personal ones with a (P). Boxes 
marked with a (RP) mean that the rule operates as a mere rebuttable presumption. 
                                                          
1046 http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/tax-residency  
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SUBSTANTIVE TESTS FORMAL TESTS
Physical Habit. Abode/ Vital Public Domicile/house
presence home in use  interests employm. not requiring use Registration Nationality Other
Andorra X X (E)
Argentina X (*)
Australia X X RP
Austria X
Belgium X X (E) RP
Belize X X
Brazil X X (E) X
Bulgaria X X
Canada X X X X
Chile X (*) X
China X (*) X X
Colombia X RP
Costa Rica X
Croatia X X X
Czech Republic X X
Denmark X X
Estonia X
Faroe Islands X (*) X
Finland X X
France X X (E)
Germany X X
Gibraltar X
Greece X X X X
Greenland X X
Hong Kong X (*) X X
Hungary X X X X X
Iceland X
India X (*)
Ireland X (*)
Isle of Man X (*)
Israel X (*) X 
Italy X X (E) X
Japan X (*) X 
Jersey X (*) X 
Korea X X 
Latvia X X X
Liechtenstein X X
Lithuania X X X
Luxembourg X X
Malta X X X 
Mexico X X (E)
Netherlands X X
New Zealand X X
Norway X (*)
Poland X X
Portugal X X X
San Marino X X X X
Singapore X
Slovak Republic X X
Slovenia X X X (E)
South Africa X (*) X
Spain X X (E)
Sweden X X
Switzerland X (*) X X (P)
Turkey X X X
United Kingdom X X X
United States X (*) X
Uruguay X X
TOTAL 52 27 25 8 6 3 2 1
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Once the most common tests have been analyzed and classified, we will try to draw some 
preliminary conclusions.  
I. All States, without exception, rely on “substantive” tests. What is more, 81% of the surveyed 
countries solely use this sort of tests1047: either one of them1048 or a combination of two 
or three. On the other hand, there is no single country that follows solely purely formal 
tests. The remaining 19% combine both sorts of tests1049.  
II. What the substantive tests have in common is that the fulfillment of their requirements 
normally reveals the effective presence of the taxpayer in the territory or, at least, allows 
us to assume his frequent visits and/or his imminent return to the country concerned after 
a temporary absence (the habitual abode, center of vital interests and public employment 
tests)1050. In any case, they all require an ongoing substantial and intimate relation 
between the individual and the State concerned, in a way that one could assume that, 
during the period concerned, the person finds himself in a position to effectively benefit 
from the relevant public goods and services provided by the State1051. This is particularly 
evident in the case of an individual spending the greater part of the taxable year in the 
territory of the State1052.  But it also holds true, although to a lesser extent, for individuals 
who do not meet the minimum physical presence threshold but either keep their family, 
social relations, job, habitual abode and/or other important properties in the territory of 
the State or work as public servants for such State. In these latter cases, the taxpayer is 
still likely to make use of the public services of the State concerned either directly (as a 
result of his visits during the tax year concerned) or remotely. For example, diplomats or 
members of the military are generally entitled to benefits under their country´s social 
program irrespective of its temporary or permanent absence. On the other hand, formal 
tests do not seem to have this conception in mind, as we cannot infer from them an 
effective enjoyment of benefits, neither remotely or directly. Naturally, the fact that the 
individual keeps an unused dwelling in the territory of the State, maintains his citizenship, 
is listed in a national or municipal registry or has visa does not per se imply that he would 
be in the position to effectively enjoy the public benefits granted by the State, at least in 
                                                          
1047 Sometimes such tests may be accompanied by formal tests that operate as “deeming provisions”. This is the case 
of Australia or Colombia. 
1048 For example, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Estonia, Iceland, India, Isle of Man, Norway and Singapore only use 
physical presence tests, while countries as Austria and Belgium only use the “habitual abode” test.  
1049 Countries following purely formal tests (Brazil, Croatia, Greenland, Italy, Jersey, Latvia, Luxembourg, San Marino, 
Slovak Republic, Turkey and the United States) always accompany them with substantial tests. 
1050 Nikolakakis believes that most conceptions of residence that are currently in use share a common feature: “they all 
tend to put the spotlight on elements of personal physical presence”. While the physical presence tests do so directly, 
habitual abode and center of vital interests tend to cover certain gaps in physical presence and seek to cover situations 
involving physical presence in multiple locations. See NIKOLAKAKIS, A. (2010), p. 78. 
1051 See Decision by the King´s Bench Division, 1904, “Goerz & Co V. Bell”: “A person who is resident in the United 
Kingdom takes the benefit of the government of the country, of the security afforded to his life and liberty, and of the 
opportunity of conducting his business in the way in which the government of a settled and civilized country enables it 
to be conducted; he accordingly has to pay, like other inhabitants of the country, his full share towards the expenses of 
that government”.  
1052 And therefore complying with the physical presence or the habitual abode tests.  
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the tax year concerned. In fact, the most common and powerful argument against formal 
tests is precisely this one1053.  
III. The combination of conclusions I and II leads us to make the next assertion: all States, without 
exception, have personal residence tests in place whose fulfillment allows us to assume 
that the tax resident finds himself in a practical position to effectively benefit from the 
relevant public goods and services provided by the State, either directly (as a result of his 
actual physical presence or his frequent visits) or remotely1054. In other words, all States 
have personal residence tests that are perfectly consistent with the benefit principle 
pursuant to the considerations exposed back in Section 4.2. In a nutshell, the benefit 
principle seems to underlie the vast majority of the personal tax residence tests that are 
currently in place1055. 
Once the principle underlying personal tax residence test has been ascertained, we will now 
proceed to question corporate residence tests in the light of such principle. In short, could we 
assume that a company complying with a particular corporate residence test always finds itself in 
the position to effectively benefit from the relevant public services provided by the State directly 
or indirectly? Do these tests have the same significance than the personal residence tests, upon 
which they are presumably based? The answer obviously differs from one category of tests to the 
other: 
o Tests relying on the creation of the company and its registered seat. It seems clear that 
the fact that a company was incorporated pursuant to the domestic legislation of a State 
or maintains its registered/statutory seat/office therein does not necessarily mean that 
the company has kept an ongoing relationship with such State and the enjoyment of its 
services is within its reach. The same conclusion may be reached in the case of formal 
personal residence tests as nationality or registration. 
o Tests relying on the governance of the company. A company whose board of directors 
regularly meet within the territory of one State in order to take the relevant decisions to 
run the company may not necessarily be in the position to access the benefits provided 
by such State.  
o Tests relying on the residence of the shareholders. In this case, the fact that the majority 
of the company´s shareholders are residents for tax purposes in a particular State does 
not automatically put the company in the position to use and enjoy the public services 
provided by such State. Only if we regard the shareholders behind the corporate veil as 
                                                          
1053 We already made reference to the arguments for and against the American residence test relying on citizenship in 
Section 4.3.4: all of them revolved around the idea that an American citizen residing overseas could (or could not) 
benefit from the public services provided by the American government. 
1054 Nikolakakis states that individual residence tests would only be “appropriate” to the extent they rely on proxies 
that allow us to assume that the individual concerned is in the position to enjoy the services and benefits provided by 
his Residence State. Sensu contrario, he states that “non-residents are either not entitled or not in a practical position 
to enjoy the same public benefits as residents”. See NIKOLAKAKIS, A. (2010), p. 81-83.  
1055 Schön argues that the benefit principle does not only justify source-based taxation but also residence-based 
taxation, at least in the case of individuals, as “an individual taxpayer will also in his or her private life take advantage 
of some of the amenities provided for by government institutions (schooling, public security, cultural institutions, etc.)”. 
See SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 75. 
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the ultimate taxpayers of CITs, we could reach the conclusion that the majority of them 
are in fact in the position to enjoy the services provided by the State of Residence of the 
company they own.  
o Tests relying on the location of the business activity. Contrary to the previous scenarios, 
one could assume that a company conducting a significant business activity within the 
territory of a State will generally have the chance to effectively make use the public 
services provided by such State.  
From the above mentioned considerations the following general conclusion may be drawn: it 
seems that, in the adaptation of the notion of personal tax residence to corporate income 
taxation, the principle that theoretically inspired such notion (the benefit principle) has been 
completely neglected.  The reason is that only one category of corporate residence tests (those 
relying on the location of the business activity of the company) may be regarded as consistent 
with such principle. This is perhaps best illustrated by the following revealing fact: while 100% of 
the States make use of personal residence tests according to which the (resulting) resident may 
find himself in the position to use and enjoy the services provided by the State1056, only 4% of the 
States do likewise in the context of corporate income taxation1057.  
 
5.2.2.3.2. Suggestions for a corporate residence test based on the location of the economic 
activity of the company 
In the previous section we confronted current corporate residence tests with the principle that 
supposedly underlie the vast majority of personal residence tests (the benefit principle). We 
reached the conclusion that only one category of corporate residence tests, namely those that 
grant the resident status to companies which carry on business activities within their territory, is 
consistent with this principle. 
The objective of the present section is to analyze the advantages and disadvantages that the 
implementation of such tests in the domestic tax legislations may entail to further make a few 
suggestions. Firstly, we will briefly make reference to the background in which they arose. 
Secondly, we will refer to the general advantages that the implementation of these tests bring, 
particularly from the perspective of the policy considerations exposed in Chapter 4. Thirdly, we 
will point out a few general challenges that this sort of tests tends to pose considering the 
experience in Italy and Australia. Fourthly, we will put forward a few suggestions that could help 
to overcome the identified risks and challenges. 
Background 
In the IFA general report on the fiscal residence of companies, Rivier raised the following question: 
where is a company´s center of vital interest? Subsequently, he ventured to provide an answer to 
                                                          
1056 As we noted above, all surveyed countries without exception follow one or more of the so-called “substantial” 
personal tax residence tests.  
1057 See table 27 in Section 3.2.1.1.5. Only two States (Italy and Australia) follow this sort of tests. 
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it:  “(It) consists of a combination of elements which all contribute to its existence and smooth 
running: corporate status consented by the law of a State, management and administration, 
operational activity, running of the business, shareholders”1058. Naturally, there is no doubt that a 
company has its vital interests in the country where all these elements coexist. The problem 
comes when these elements are spread among different territories and different States are in the 
position to claim, on different grounds, that they are the State of Residence of a particular 
company1059.  
Tests granting the residence status to companies whose economic activities take place within the 
territory of the State concerned are rare1060 and relatively new. However, it was surprising to learn 
that the debate that resulted in the birth of the tests relying on the POEM (that took place in the 
British courts back in the second half of the 19th century) was on the verge of concluding that that 
the residence status should be conferred instead on the basis of the location of the economic 
activity. At this point we should go back to Section 3.2.1.1.2, where we explained that the UK 
courts faced a private international law rule according to which the UK had jurisdiction over 
persons dwelling or carrying on a business on the UK. The House of Lords concluded in Cesena 
that the rule referred to the place where “the real trade and business is carried on” or “le centre 
de l´enterprise”1061. Indeed, the House of Lords observed in its subsequent decisions that the term 
“resident” was exceedingly unsuited to describe a legal entity, as companies do not have to ability 
to reside at a certain place as individuals do1062. In both De Beers and Egyptian Delta, the House 
of Lords concluded that the only possible way to extrapolate the notion of residence to companies 
was to look at the place where they were conducting their business1063. However, and against all 
odds, the House of Lords finally concluded that this expression should be interpreted as the “place 
of intellectual control of the business”1064, i.e. the place where the central management and 
control is found instead of the place where the productive operations take place1065. For instance, 
Lord Loreburn stated in De Beers that “a company resides where its 'real' business is carried on 
                                                          
1058 RIVIER, J-M- (1987), p. 74 and LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 100. 
1059 RIVIER, J-M- (1987), p. 74 
1060 Only Italy and Australia follow this category of tests. See Section 3.2.1.1.4. 
1061 Judgment by the High Court (Exchequer Division), 1876, “The Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd V. Nicholson” and “The Calcutta 
Jute Mills Co Ltd V. Nicholson”. 
1062 Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1928, “Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. Ltd. V, Todd 
(Inspector of Taxes)”, p. 12-15. 
1063 Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1905, “De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. V. Howe (Surveyor 
of Taxes”), p. 458: “in applying the conception of residence to a company we ought, I think, to proceed as nearly as we 
can upon the analogy of an individual”. Lord Loreburn recognized that companies do not eat or sleep at any place, but 
they do indeed “keep house and do business”. Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1928, “Egyptian 
Delta Land and Investment Co. Ltd. V, Todd (Inspector of Taxes)”, p. 12-15: “the only analogy that is really possible 
between a natural person and a company is that of carrying on a business at a place”. 
1064 AVERY JONES, J.F. (2009), p. 129. 
1065 Huddlestone B explained the reason behind the decision: “No doubt the manufacturing part was done in Italy, and 
the company might have found sulphur in another country, and carried on the manufacturing part of the business in 
that other country, but the administrative part were carried on at the place from which all the orders flowed, where 
officers and agents were appointed and recalled, where their powers were granted and revoked, where whatever money 
was sent was received, and where the dividends were declared and were payable” (Judgment by the High Court 
(Exchequer Division), 1876, “The Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd V. Nicholson” and “The Calcutta Jute Mills Co Ltd V. Nicholson”, 
see excerpt in  AVERY JONES, J.F. (2009), p. 136) In the same vein, Lord Halsbury argued that, even though the company 
dealt with land, goods and clients in another country, “the person who governs the whole commercial adventure (and) 
makes the profits by his skill or industry, however distant may be the field of his adventure” is the manager (See Decision 
by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1895, “San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Company Limited V. Carter (Surveyor 
of Taxes)”). 
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and that the real business is carried on where the central management and control actually 
abides”1066. 
We should however read these judgments in the context in which they arose. First of all, in the 
age of British colonialism (19th and 20th century), the approach taken helped the UK to retain its 
taxing rights on profits derived by companies that were majority-owned by local investors but 
operating offshore. As Loomer points out, the prevalence of “head and brain” over “hands and 
feet” was logically defensible, albeit not theoretically ideal in his opinion1067. Secondly, the 
wording of the income tax regulations of that time did not permit the courts to equate residence 
with the notions of “trade” or “business” to the extent this would have conflated residence-based 
and source-based taxation as understood at that time1068. 
Australia pioneered the implementation of a test of this nature back in 19361069 and was later 
followed by Canada in 19611070 and Italy in 19861071. Back in Section 3.2.1.1.4 we referred to the 
specific content and scope of the only two tests of this nature that remain in place, namely the 
Italian and the Australian rules. The experience in these States will undoubtedly help us to better 
identify the advantages and challenges that this sort of tests tends to pose to further make a 
proposal to this effect. 
General advantages 
The potential adoption of residence tests relying on the location of the corporate business activity 
in the domestic legislations would pose notable advantages on many levels.  
First and foremost, we analyzed back in Chapter 4 the principles we believe should inspire the 
rules that ultimately identify the taxpayers that would become subject to a State´s tax jurisdiction, 
residence tests among them. From our point of view, this sort of residence tests would be 
perfectly consistent with those principles due to the reasons we will now proceed to note.  
In the first place, we concluded that the benefit principle should guide the identification of the 
members of the community that ought to contribute to the financial support of the 
government1072. This being so, corporate tax residence tests should cover companies which find 
themselves in a position to (effectively or potentially) use and enjoy the State´s services and 
infrastructures that are in fact susceptible to be used and enjoyed by them1073.  
                                                          
1066 Decision by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 1905, “De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. V. Howe (Surveyor 
of Taxes)”. 
1067 LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 113. 
1068 COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 28-29. 
1069 KASHYAP, A.; SHAFLENDER, L. (2004), p. 189, footnote 2. 
1070 Canada amended its domestic legislation in 1961 to deem a company to be resident in Canada if it was incorporated 
in Canada and if it “carries on business” in Canada at any time of the year. This latter requirement was later removed 
in 1965. See LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 107. 
1071 Apparently Japan also used to have a test relying on the “principal place of business” but it no longer does. See 
MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 473 (footnote 10). 
1072 Section 4.2.1. 
1073 Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.1. Couzin suggests that residence tests should ideally require a strong connecting between 
the person and the State concerned, a connection that “warrants, indeed, demands a high level of contribution to the 
public finances”. See COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 2. 
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The idea that corporate residence-based taxation should be inspired by the benefit principle is 
not entirely new. In fact, many scholars have actively advocated for it1074, although they do not 
seem to agree on how best this could be achieved1075. Surprisingly, the OECD itself, despite its 
well-known neutral position towards the configuration of domestic tax residence tests, literally 
stated back in 2001 that “it could be argued that if the State provides certain facilities and 
infrastructure for its residents, those who benefit most from such facilities and infrastructure 
ought to contribute to the State via residence-based taxes”1076. 
In our opinion, residence tests ought to rely on certain indicia or factors whose presence in the 
territory concerned is visible and easily ascertainable and further allows us to assume that the 
company complying with those factors is in fact in the aforementioned position1077. We concluded 
back in Chapter 4 that we could only assume that a company would only find itself in such position 
to the extent it is effectively carrying on an economic activity within the borders of the State 
concerned (either physically or remotely)1078. Accordingly, only this sort of tests would be 
perfectly consistent with the benefit principle1079 (in line with the vast majority of personal 
residence tests), as they are the only ones that effectively contribute to bring the taxable bases 
wherever the economic activities take place1080.  
                                                          
1074 Couzin suggests that residence tests should ideally require a strong connecting between the person and the State 
concerned, a connection that “warrants, indeed, demands a high level of contribution to the public finances” (COUZIN, 
R. (2002), p. 2). See also MÖSSNER, M. (2006), p. 505 and ZORNOZA PÉREZ, J. (2013), p. 5, who share the idea that the 
unlimited taxation of residents is better justified by the benefits principle, taking into account the actual or potential 
benefits that the taxpayers attain from government-supplied goods and services. In the same vein, Musgrave argues 
that the home country´s taxation of worldwide income may be justified by the benefit theory as a payment for 
productivity enhancing benefits provided by the country of residence to its own factors of production prior to transfer 
abroad” (MUSGRAVE, P.B. (1997), p. 450). For his part, Loomer understands that residence-based taxation can only be 
justified as “a sort of residual home source”, that is, “if it represents a substantial economic interest in the home State”. 
See LOOMER, G.T. (2015), p. 95 and LOOMER, G.T. (2011), chapters 2 and 3 (his thesis). For his part, Brown makes the 
general assumption that the State of residence (he does not refer to specific residence tests) provide public benefits to 
its taxpayers, as a legal system that governs its rights and obligation, a court system, military protection and agencies 
that are responsible for relationships with other nations, etc. See BROWN, F.B. (2011), p. 611. 
1075 Couzin, who departs from the benefit rationale, puts forward several alternatives. Firstly, the adoption of tests 
relying on the location of the main business operations but also tests relying on the governance of the company, 
particularly those that refer to the effective management (rather than strategic one). Secondly, the strengthening of 
source-based taxation at the expense of residence-based taxation. See COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 262-263 and 268-269. For 
his part, Loomer advocates for “a test or a series of tests that focuses on where the practical, daily management or 
principal business operations exist (…) or where the real centre of management is situated”. See LOOMER, G.T. (2015), 
p. 132. Marian believes that all substantive tests (including POEM and tests relying on the location of employees and 
assets) serve the benefit rationale. See MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 473. Finally, Bird argues that residence-based taxation 
as such should not be inspired by the benefit principle, but companies should however pay taxes in accordance with 
the public benefits they have access to by means of “user charges” of a local character and a low rate and, at the most, 
a small registration fee in consideration for the benefits that incorporation entails (e.g. limited liability, perpetual life, 
easy transfer of ownership, access to capital markets, etc.). See BIRD, R.M. (2002), p. 196-197. 
1076 The OECD reaches this conclusion when discussing new tie-breaker rules in the context of article 4.3 of the OECD 
MC. See OECD (2001): The impact of the communications revolution on the application of “place of effective 
management” as a tie breaker rule (Discussion Paper), p. 12.  
1077 Section 4.2.1. 
1078 Section 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.3.2.  
1079 In fact, when discussing the Italian residence tests, Antonini pointed out that “the ratio of this connecting factor is 
the fact is justified by the greater use of the economic, legal, finance and infrastructure resources of the State in which 
the activity is carried out”. See ANTONINI, M. (2008), p. 153 and Section 3.2.1.1.4 (the “rationale behind them” part).  
1080 And therefore contribute to ameliorate the gap between the economic and the tax presence of the companies, a 
gap we illustrated by means of a real case in Chapter 2. 
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Secondly, as regards the implications that International Law set in Section 4.3, we concluded that 
States imposing taxes solely on taxpayers that are “sufficiently” connected to them (in the sense 
that they are in a position to enjoy the benefits provided by such State) are exercising their tax 
jurisdiction in a way that may be regarded as consistent and aligned with the ICJ case law and 
certain principles underlying Public International Law as non-intervention, good neighborliness 
and territoriality.  
Beyond their consistency with the principles enunciated in Chapter 4, we believe that these tests 
would be appropriate and desirable from other perspectives.  
To begin with, these tests deserve to be labeled as “strong” insofar they demand a substantive, 
close and ongoing connection between the company and the State concerned. Therefore, they 
offer the advantages that are commonly inherent in any sort of strong tests, advantages that were 
already enumerated in the introduction of the Section 5.2.2.3. In short, they are unlikely to cause 
multiple residence (and double taxation) issues, profit shifting risks and treaty shopping 
opportunities. 
Furthermore, Rust noted that the normative concept of residence should ideally be equitable, 
difficult to manipulate and administrable1081. We believe that this sort of tests could easily comply 
with the first two conditions. As regards the first one, it is clear that these tests tend to produce 
fair outcomes for all reasons mentioned above. As regards the second, they would be difficult to 
manipulate insofar they cannot be easily given up in one country and established in another 
one1082 unlike other categories of tests (most notably, the formal ones). With respect to the third 
one, we will subsequently refer to the risks that these tests may pose in this regard and then 
proceed to make a few suggestions to minimize such risks. 
Major challenges 
Despite the evident benefits that the adoption of this residence test would bring, it poses 
significant challenges and risks that should be taken into consideration and, when possible, 
minimized. Some of these challenges have already become visible in the States using these tests 
(Italy and Australia) while some others are merely intuitively foreseeable.  
Firstly, we will note the difficulties arising from the application and administration of the tests. 
Secondly, we will refer to their natural tendency to distort the taxpayer´s behavior. And finally, 
we will highlight their troublesome coexistence with other rules, most notably residence tests 
based on the governance of the company and the PE threshold.  
In the first place, we will proceed to discuss the issues related to the application and manageability 
of this sort of tests. Rust argues that a test would be administrable insofar it is easy to apply and 
furthermore the residence State disposes of the necessary information to assess the worldwide 
income of the taxpayer and is furthermore able to collect the tax revenue1083. As regards the first 
question, the response would greatly depend on the specific wording of the test. Section 3.2.1.1.4 
                                                          
1081 RUST, A. (2010), p. 85. 
1082 RUST, A. (2010), p. 86. 
1083 RUST, A. (2010), p. 86. 
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demonstrated that the interpretation of the Italian and the Australian tests (“oggetto principale 
dell´attività” and “carries on business” respectively) was far from unambiguous, thereby granting 
the administrative and judiciary bodies a great power (and by extension a wide margin of 
discretion) to interpret the rule with the consequent high degree of legal uncertainty. Naturally, 
this problem could be minimized if the wording of the rule was more univocal. As regards the 
second question, we believe that the adoption of these tests should be necessarily accompanied 
by the imposition of formal obligations, such as certain documentation requirements and 
disclosure obligations. This being so, the resulting residence State would have the necessary 
information entirely at its disposal. 
As for the second aforementioned challenge, the domestic implementation of these tests would 
entail a hidden risk. By granting the residence status on these grounds, jurisdictions face the risk 
of distorting the taxpayer´s economic behavior, as taxpayers may feel tempted to place their 
economic activities in certain territories for reasons other than purely business ones1084. This being 
so, companies may decide not to establish a business activity in an otherwise optimal jurisdiction 
for the simple fact that they wish to avoid the tax residence status therein and conversely do so 
in other jurisdiction which follows other categories of tests despite the fact it does not provide 
the perfect environment for their business in terms of workforce, infrastructures or legal system. 
Although CITs, by their very nature, always generate distortion in the taxpayer´s economic 
decisions1085, we fear that these residence tests are prone to exacerbate such distortions. We 
therefore believe that the potential significance of this risk justifies a careful assessment of their 
possible impact, a task that goes beyond the scope of the present study. 
Finally, we will note the challenges derived from the coexistence between this category of tests 
and other preexisting rules, most notably the residence tests based on the governance of the 
company (e.g. POEM tests) and the PE threshold, due to the evident risk of overlap and confusion. 
We will start with their coexistence with the first set of rules, namely the residence tests relying 
on the governance of the company. As these problems have already become visible in the States 
having these tests in place, we will illustrate them by means of real cases decided by the courts in 
both States. We should recall that both States follow a wide interpretation of “oggetto principale” 
and “business”1086, thus integrating activities of control and management of assets, immovable 
property or stock portfolios among others. What happens in case it is established that the 
functions of management and control carried out by a company constitutes precisely its “oggetto 
principale” or main business?  Would not these tests produce the same outcome than POEM tests 
do? This scenario may be more frequent than expected, particularly as regards holdings, real 
estate investment trusts (REITs), investment funds and a long etcetera. As we will now 
demonstrate, each State has addressed the issue differently. 
                                                          
1084 On one hand, companies may decide not to establish a business activity in an otherwise optimal jurisdiction for the 
simple fact that they wish to avoid the tax residence status therein. On the other hand, taxpayers may choose to bring 
their business in a jurisdiction which follows other categories of tests despite the fact it does not provide the perfect 
environment for their business in terms of workforce, infrastructures or legal system.  
1085 Section 4.1.  
1086 Section 3.2.1.1.4. 
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For its part, Italy departs from the fact that concept “oggetto principale dell´attività” covers 
management and control activities and therefore may produce the same effects than residence 
tests as the POEM. The Italian Supreme Court concluded that a real estate management company 
did not have its “oggetto principale dell´attività” in Italy insofar it carried out its management 
functions outside the country, irrespective of the fact that all its immovable assets were located 
in Italy. In the same vein, the Italian Tax Administration reached the conclusion that a holding 
company which managed its portfolio in a country other than Italy did not have its “oggetto 
principale dell´attività” in Italy even though it owned Italian subsidiaries. This approach was 
heavily critized by De Broe, as these lines of reasoning lead, in his view, to subordinate the 
“oggetto principale” test to the place of management test1087. 
The case of Australia is certainly more complicated. The reason is that its residence test relies on 
two supposedly separate requirements: the company must both carry on a business in Australia 
and have its central management and control therein. From the wording of the rule and the use 
of the conjunction “and” it may be inferred that both conditions should be given different 
meaning and effects.  
This is the reason why the renowned “Malayan Shipping” judgment ruled by the High Court of 
Australia1088 was so controversial at the time. The Court concluded that Malayan Shipping could 
be regarded as tax resident in Australia for concentrating both its central management and 
business in Australian soil: “if the business of the company carried on it Australia consists of or 
includes its central management and control, then the company is carrying on a business in 
Australia and its central management and control is in Australia”1089. Accordingly, it appeared 
that, provided that a company´s central management and control was deemed to be in Australia, 
it would automatically follow that the company was equally carrying on a business therein. This 
redundant interpretation essentially lead to render the phrase “carrying on business” 
superfluous1090 and hence significantly broaden the scope of the test1091.  
In order to put an end to the discussion, the ATO decided to issue a draft tax ruling in 20041092 
where it intended to provide a separate meaning to both requirements as a way to ensure a more 
consistent interpretation of the wording of the rule1093. By means of an example, the ruling 
concluded that the functions of management and decision-making are included within the 
                                                          
1087 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 119. 
1088 Judgment by the High Court of Australia, 1946, “Malayan Shipping Company Limited V. Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation”. The judgment is commented and analyzed by KASHYAP, A.; SHAFLENDER, L. (2004). Basically, the company 
(Malayan Shipping) was incorporated in Singapore upon the instructions of Mr. Sleigh, who carried on business in 
Australia as an importer, shipping agent and general merchant. Mr. Sleigh owned 2500 shares, while the 2 remaining 
shares where owned by two nominees in Singapore which were also appointed as directors of the company. The only 
business carried out by the company was to charter a Norwegian tanker and sub-charter it to Mr. Sleigh on ten voyage 
charters. 
1089 The Court concluded that “the essence of the business was (Mr. Sleigh´s) decision in Melbourne to charter and sub-
charter the tanker. It was this decision which in every substantial sense gave rise to the profits which the company made 
out of the sub-charters”. See KASHYAP, A.; SHAFLENDER, L. (2004). p. 186. 
1090 KASHYAP, A.; SHAFLENDER, L. (2004). p. 186. 
1091 Opinion of the Australian Treasury in consultation paper quoted by KASHYAP, A.; SHAFLENDER, L. (2004). p. 186. 
1092 Australian Taxation Office (2004): Draft Taxation Ruling: “Residence of companies not incorporated in Australia – 
carrying on business in Australia and central management and control”. 
1093 Australian Taxation Office (2004): Draft Taxation Ruling: “Residence of companies not incorporated in Australia – 
carrying on business in Australia and central management and control”, par. 6. 
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ordinary activity of the Board, but do not necessarily take part of the business of the company as 
such1094. Further, the ATO revisited the “Malayan Shipping” case to confirm its conclusion but 
clarify the rationale behind it1095. It stated that the judgment could not be interpreted as setting 
the general principle that if a company´s central management and control is located in Australia 
then this necessarily means that the company is equally carrying on a business therein. Instead, 
the ATO considered that, in the case concerned, the two separate requirements happened to be 
incidentally fulfilled by “the same set of facts and activities”, the reason being that “the nature of 
the business and the managing director's complete management and control over the business 
operations and internal administration of the company resulted in a situation where his powers 
and actions evidenced CM&C (and) the carrying on of a business”1096. 
As regards to the second challenge that these test pose (i.e. their coexistence with the PE 
threshold), we have noted that the issue has been generally overlooked by the consulted 
judgments and academic papers. We nonetheless believe it deserves further study. 
In our opinion, a partial overlap is expected to happen between the terms “oggetto principale” / 
business and the domestic definition of PE.  The degree of overlap would depend on the precise 
scope of the terms concerned in the corresponding domestic legislation and case law. However, 
we are in a position to put forward a few general considerations on this regard taking the PE 
concept of the OECD MC as a reference point1097. 
Firstly, both the Australian and Italian tests are wide enough to cover certain business activities 
that go beyond the ordinary meaning that may be assigned to the terms of the PE clause. For 
example, we stated back in Section 3.2.6.2.2 that the PE clause largely equates physical and stable 
presence with taxable presence, a common pattern shared by all the four modalities of PEs set 
out in the MCs. We then noted that this fact automatically leads to leave untaxed all other 
significant business activities that occur in the source jurisdiction either physically (but without 
reaching the necessary level of temporal permanence and geographical stability) or remotely. This 
would be the case, for example, of commercial activities and/or sales conducted through remote 
means (call centers, websites, smartphone “apps”) or the remote provision of services. On the 
other hand, one may argue that this sort of activities may eventually fall under the scope of the 
both Australian and Italian tests.  
                                                          
1094 Trade Co is incorporated in Papua New Guinea, its board of directors holds its meetings in Australia (where decisions 
on contracts entered by the company, finance, major policies and strategic directions are made) and all its trading 
activities are undertaken in Papua New Guinea. As a consequence of the ATO´s approach to both tests, it concluded 
that Trade Co was not carrying any of its own business activities in Australian soil and therefore could not be regarded 
as tax resident therein. See Australian Taxation Office (2004): Draft Taxation Ruling: “Residence of companies not 
incorporated in Australia – carrying on business in Australia and central management and control”, par. 68. 
1095 Australian Taxation Office (2004): Draft Taxation Ruling: “Residence of companies not incorporated in Australia – 
carrying on business in Australia and central management and control”, par. 30-38. 
1096 Australian Taxation Office (2004): Draft Taxation Ruling: “Residence of companies not incorporated in Australia – 
carrying on business in Australia and central management and control”, par. 33. Even though the Australian courts and 
the ATO may coincide in the resolution of the “Malayan Shipping” case, it is still true that their reasoning may be 
interpreted as divergent. So, to the extent they may potentially lead to contradictory outcomes, the amendment of the 
Australian residence rule seems to be the only way to clear the uncertainty and clarify the distinct content of both tests. 
See KASHYAP, A.; SHAFLENDER, L. (2004). p. 187. 
1097 Article 5 of the OECD MC. 
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Secondly, none of these clauses would a priori enable a State to tax the profits of a controlling 
company incorporated and managed from another State whose only attachment to the State 
concerned is the fact that it controls a subsidiary that is resident therein1098. As we noted above, 
neither Italy nor Australia would consider that the controlling company has an “oggetto principale 
dell´attività” or a business in their respective territories to the extent the management functions 
are exercised elsewhere. On the other hand, the controlling company would not necessarily be 
considered to have a PE in such State on the sole ground that it controls a company that is resident 
therein. As a matter of principle, a subsidiary would only be deemed to be its parent´s PE to the 
extent it carries out the parent´s business besides its own one1099.  
Thirdly, in case the activities of a company fall under the scope of both the corporate residence 
test and the PE clause, the question arises as to whether the company should be subject to tax by 
the State concerned as a resident taxpayer or as a PE. We believe that, as a matter of principle, 
the application of the residence test should prevail and hence the company should be treated for 
tax purposes as a resident of the company. The reason is that, typically, only non-resident 
taxpayers would be in a position to have a PE in a territory and therefore a company that fulfills a 
residence test would not be in such position. In any case, the definitive answer to this question 
necessarily depends on the precise content of the domestic tax legislation of the State concerned.  
Lastly, we would like to point out the distinct effects of considering that the company is a resident 
taxpayer or have a PE in the State concerned. The definitive response would again depend on the 
domestic tax regime. However, we noticed in Section 3.3.4 a visible (and increasing) general 
tendency to grant PEs with a tax treatment equivalent to that of resident taxpayers, partly due to 
the effect of the non-discrimination principles established in both tax treaties and EU Law. 
Nonetheless, we then reached the conclusion that equivalent treatment did not mean absolute 
neutrality and homogeneity.  
Suggestions for a proposal 
Now that we have gone through some of the risks and challenges that these residence tests may 
potentially pose (some of them are already visible in Australia and Italia), we are in a better 
position to put forward a few recommendations for States that choose to adopt a similar 
corporate residence test. 
In essence, these tests are (and should continue to be) factual-based. However, it is reasonable 
to depart from paper-based indicia, as the corporate purpose reflected in the act of incorporation 
or the bylaws1100. Such an approach would certainly contribute to save time and efforts, as the 
activities of the company are likely to be consistent with them. However, paper-based factors 
                                                          
1098 ANTONINI, M. (2008), pp. 154-156 referring to the Italian Supreme Court case law. 
1099 At least this is the logical consequence of article 5.7 of the OECD MC: “The fact that a company which is a resident 
of a Contracting State controls or is controlled by a company which is a resident of the other Contracting State, or which 
carries on business in that other State (whether through a permanent establishment or otherwise), shall not of itself 
constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other”.  
1100 This is the case of both the Italian and the Australian tests (see Section 3.2.1.1.4). The Italian rule specifically 
indicates that the assessment should start from the object of the entity as determined on the law, the act of 
incorporation or the bylaws. The oggetto principale dell´attività is presumed to be the one that may be regarded as 
“essential to directly achieve the primary goals of the company as laid down in the law, act of incorporation or bylaws”. 
For its part, Australian courts equally begin with the statutory definition of the corporate business. 
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should solely operate in the form of rebuttable presumptions, in a way that they could be easily 
overcome by the observation of the business activities that are effectively carried out by the 
company within the territory of the State. 
One way to mitigate the high degree of legal certainty that these tests tend to pose (as any other 
substance-over-form approach) is to come up with a test that relies on quantitative factors. The 
selection of the relevant factor(s) would be up to the State concerned. However, the fulfillment 
of the factors included in the test should reveal the performance of significant business activities 
(either physically or remotely) in the territory of the State and, at the same time, should ideally 
enable us to assume that the company finds itself in a position to enjoy and use the public services 
provided by the State in accordance with the benefit rationale1101. Examples of factors might 
include (but are not limited to) the presence of a large number of infrastructures and assets in the 
territory, the presence of an important number of employees therein, a significant level of 
revenue obtained from sources present in the State concerned1102 or the supplies of a notable 
level of goods or services to local customers1103. The selection of the corresponding proxy (or 
group of proxies) should be preceded by a careful assessment on its manageability and potential 
implications, a study that, once again, goes beyond the scope of the present research.  
Irrespective of the selected factor, we believe it would be convenient to demand a very significant 
amount of economic activity in the territory concerned. One way to achieve this is to adopt a 
quantitative threshold in the form of a percentage. Requiring the presence of a high percentage 
of the relevant factor(s) within the territory concerned would guarantee the presence of an 
adequate relative weight of the corresponding factor(s) in relation to the global figures of the 
company. This option would however pose an important challenge: the gathering of the relevant 
information to apply the test (e.g. the worldwide revenue obtained by the company or its global 
number of employees). As a general rule, States are likely to have domestic disclosure 
requirements already in place that cover (or may potentially cover) this sort of information. In 
addition, the country-by-country report is expected to provide a great amount of relevant 
                                                          
1101 In line with the ideas expressed primarily in Section 4.2.2.2 and also in Sections 4.3 and 5.1.2.4.1. We then admitted 
that the benefit principle justifies the imposition of taxes by the State where the company´s economic activities take 
place and also by the State providing the market, although to a lesser extent in this latter case. This is the reason why 
the market factor should ideally be given a relatively inferior weight in the proposed residence test. 
1102 This idea was originally put forward by the OECD in the context of the new nexus based on “significant economic 
presence”, which was theoretically intended to coexist with the current PE threshold in the tax treaties. See OECD 
(2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 107-108: “as a general 
matter, revenue that is generated on a sustained basis from a country could be considered to be one of the clearest 
potential indicators of the existence of a significant economic presence”. The selection of this factor (and the next one) 
would be consistent with the considerations exposed in Section 4.2.2.2.2, where we concluded that the presence of a 
considerable number of customers in one State allowed us to assume that the company could be in the position to 
benefit from its services and infrastructures irrespective of the presence of a physical economic activity in that territory. 
According to GADZO, S. (2016), p. 270: “the total amount of revenue taxpayer derives from a specific country is probably 
a good proxy for both public benefits related to the market access therein and for the amount of value created for the 
enterprise on the demand side”. We should recall at this time that Mexico follows a personal tax residence test according 
to which a person would be considered as tax resident in Mexico to the extent more than 50% of his total revenue 
arises from sources within the country. See http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-
assistance/tax-residency/Mexico-Residency.pdf  
1103 This is the position followed by the UK in its so-called “Diverted profits tax”, in force since April 2015. It led to subject 
to tax the profits derived by a non-resident company carrying on an activity in the UK “in connection with the supply of 
goods, services or other property”. See British HM Revenue & Customs (2015): Guidance on the Diverted Profits Tax, 
pp. 17-18. 
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information (both consolidated and broken down separately by jurisdiction)1104 on MNCs 
exceeding a certain revenue threshold1105.  
The reasons why we believe the residence test should demand a very significant amount of 
economic activity in the territory concerned (revealed by the presence of a high relative quantity 
of factors therein) are many and varied. However, the most powerful argument in favor of this 
approach rests on the benefit principle itself. We argued elsewhere1106 that this principle should 
theoretically help us to identify which companies ought to become subject to a State´s tax 
jurisdiction while it should not get involved in the calculation of the resulting tax liability. This does 
not mean that we should forget about the fact that the residence status commonly triggers an 
unlimited tax liability that encompasses the worldwide income obtained by the company 
irrespective of its source (albeit generally mitigated by foreign tax credits or foreign income 
exemption). This being so, we believe that the effective presence of the company required by the 
test in the territory concerned should be of such magnitude that it could on its own justify the 
generation of an unlimited tax liability on the grounds of the supposed high quantify of public 
benefits that the company would be, presumably, in a position to enjoy. This means that the test 
should preferably cover only the companies whose business activities are concentrated solely or 
mostly in the territory concerned, as opposed to those which spread their activities between 
different countries. Otherwise, residence tests would capture companies that are economically 
present in a considerable number of States, thus giving rise to an unjustifiable high level of 
taxation in the State concerned and multiplying the risk of double taxation1107. In these cases, 
residence tests based on the location of the economic activity should not come into play, and the 
State should rely instead on the eventual tax liabilities it could impose to the non-resident 
company by means of source-based taxation. 
We also warned above about the probable overlapping effects between other rules, most notably 
residence tests based on the governance of the company and the PE threshold. Naturally, the 
possibility of an overlap would depend on the specific wording of the corresponding rules.  
As regards the possible overlap with residence tests based on the governance of the company, it 
would occur insofar States adopt residence tests that resemble the ones already in place in Italy 
and Australia and furthermore follow a broad interpretation of the notion of economic activity 
for the purposes of their residence tests, thus covering the mere management of activities, assets, 
immovable property, stock portfolio, etc. This being so, a company may well be regarded to 
conduct its business or economic activity wherever it performs its management functions, in a 
way that both sets of test would lead to the same outcome. Contrary to the opinion of certain 
                                                          
1104 The country-by-country report template includes information on revenue, number of employees, tangible assets, 
stated capital, etc. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 13 - Transfer pricing documentation and country-by-
country reporting, p. 29-30. 
1105 Groups with annual consolidated group revenue in the immediately preceding fiscal year of less than EUR 750 
million or a near equivalent amount in domestic currency as of January 2015. OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 
13 - Transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting, p. 21. 
1106 Section 4.2.1.  
1107 Double taxation that could be the consequence of either multiple residence issues or the overlap between residence 
and source-based taxation. 
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scholars1108, we believe that this result is not troublesome and should be accepted1109. The only 
alternative to prevent such overlap would be to deny that passive activities may qualify as 
economic activities, an alternative that we do not consider as appropriate. 
As regards the coexistence between these residence tests and the PE threshold, we warned about 
the fact that the potential implementation of corporate residence tests based on the location of 
the economic activities is likely to generate an overlap between the “new” residence-based 
taxation and the “traditional” source-based taxation in its current form: the PE. Hence, a company 
conducting a substantial economic activity in State X may well fall under the scope of both the 
domestic tax residence test and the PE clause. We do not perceive this overlap as a problem but 
rather as an opportunity to finally overcome the inherent limitations of the PE clause1110, in 
particular the fact that it is solely fitted to encompass economic activities that entail a physical 
presence that is stable over time and takes place in a particular (tangible) geographical spot. As 
we noted above, a wide corporate tax residence test of this sort would cover significant business 
activities that occur in the territory of the State either physically (but without reaching the 
necessary level of temporal permanence and geographical stability required by the PE clause) or 
remotely (e.g. remote provision of services or conclusion on sales).  
Beyond the few general suggestions pointed out above, we believe we are not yet in the position 
to provide a definitive legislative proposal. It seems clear that this matter deserves a more 
thorough study due to the enormous impact that a change of the residence paradigm might have 
and the significant risks and challenges it poses. We limited ourselves to intuitively foresee some 
of these risks and challenges but we believe a study should be carried out to better identify these 
issues (most notably, distortions in the economic decisions the taxpayer, an expected high degree 
of legal uncertainty and the troublesome coexistence with other tax rules), try to minimize or 
neutralize them when possible and furthermore assess whether the benefits of these tests 
compensate for such problems.    
In case such study does not conclude that it is possible to draft a residence test of these 
characteristics that is equitable, manageable and precise and furthermore does not cause 
significant distortions, we should begin to conceive residence as a residual and secondary 
proxy1111 that does not absorb a significant amount of taxable base and instead devote ourselves 
to strengthening and updating source-based taxation to ensure that the benefit principle is 
effectively observed and complied with by means of this latter form of taxation1112. This is 
precisely what we will intend to do later in Section 5.1.3. In any case, the next two proposals 
related to corporate residence in the context of tax treaties can still be set into motion irrespective 
of the decision of the States as regards the amendment of their domestic tests. 
                                                          
1108 DE BROE, L. (2009), p. 119. 
1109 We do however understand the concerns this overlap generates in Australia (commented above), as the Australian 
rule encompasses both a “carry on business” and a POEM test, tests with a supposedly different meaning and effects. 
1110 Section 3.3.6.2.2. 
1111 Based on other residence tests, either those already in place that were analyzed in Chapter 3 or new ones. In any 
event, we suggest States to take into consideration the observations we noted back in Section 5.2.2.1.  
1112 GRAETZ, M.J. (2001), p. 323: “the fragility and manipulability of the residence of corporations suggests to me that 
US international tax policy, to the extent possible, should reduce the tax consequences of determinations of residence 
for corporations. There are several policy implications that flow from this judgment. First and foremost, it implies priority 
of taxation of business income at source”. See also SHAVIRO, D. (2011), MARIAN, O. (2013b), p. 474 
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5.2.2.4. The denial of treaty benefits to companies that do not show a 
sufficient connection with the State concerned 
 
As we noted elsewhere, treaty shopping arises as a direct consequence of the weakness of 
residence tests1113. Indeed, the first line of defense against treaty shopping is precisely the 
residence status of the taxpayer in at least one of the contracting States (art. 1 of the MCs)1114, a 
line of defense that has proven to be insufficient, since traditional corporate residence tests do 
not per se guarantee a sufficient and substantive connection between the taxpayer and the 
relevant State1115. As a consequence, jurisdictions observe that taxpayers that formally comply 
with their respective tests may be entitled to treaty benefits in circumstances in which they are 
not sufficiently attached to their State. 
This being so, there are two possible strategies to counteract treaty shopping opportunities. The 
most straightforward and optimal way to proceed is to amend the domestic residence tests in line 
with the suggestions exposed in the previous Sections1116. This option is described as optimal 
because it will not only reduce treaty shopping risks but also bring significant further 
advantages1117. In case States reject these solutions and instead choose to keep their “weak” 
residence tests and/or renounce to adopt residence tests based on the location of economic 
activity, treaty shopping problems will continue to exist. In this context, States may opt for an 
alternative strategy to neutralize treaty shopping that does not entail the amendment of domestic 
tests and instead relates to the denial of the treaty benefits at the level of the treaty itself.  
The aforementioned strategy to counteract treaty shopping may take the form of three 
alternative solutions. The first two subsections lead to deny the treaty benefits to corporate 
taxpayers that qualify as residents of a contracting State for domestic tax purposes, but they do 
so as a consequence of “weak” residence tests. On the other hand, the last subsection leads to 
deny treaty benefits to companies that do not show a sufficient economic connection with the 
State concerned. While the first subsection does not involve the amendment of tax treaties, the 
second and the third do.  
 
5.2.2.4.1. Interpretation of the expression “any other criterion of a similar nature” comprised 
in article 4.1 of tax treaties (patterned after the OECD MC) 
Article 1 of all three MCs makes the application of the treaty subject to the fact that the taxpayer 
is resident of one or both of the contracting states. The definition of “resident” for the purposes 
                                                          
1113 Section 3.2.3.2.3, COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 264 and BRAUNER, Y. (2009), p. 901.  
1114 FLEMING, J.C. (Jr.) (2012), p. 248. 
1115 Section 3.2.1.2.3. 
1116 That is, the abandonment of weak tests (Section 5.2.2.2) and/or the adoption of tests relying on the location of the 
economic activity (Section 5.2.2.3).  
1117 We exhaustively described these advantages in such Sections. 
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of the tax treaty is contained in article 4.1, an article whose wording is almost identical in the 
three MCs except for a few details that may have a great impact for the present discussion.  
Table 32 - Comparison of article 4.1 in the three MCs 
Words in bold and strikethrough indicate the variations from the OECD Model Convention 
 
OECD Model Convention 
(2014) 
UN Model Convention (2011) US Model Convention (2016) 
For the purposes of this 
convention, the term 
“resident of a Contracting 
State” means any person 
who, under the laws of that 
Sate, is liable to tax therein by 
reason of his domicile, 
residence, place of 
management or any other 
criterion of a similar nature 
(…) This term, however, does 
not include any person who is 
liable to tax in that State in 
respect only of income from 
sources in that State or capital 
situated therein” 
For the purposes of this 
Convention, the term 
“resident of a Contracting 
State” means any person 
who, under the laws of that 
State, is liable to tax therein 
by reason of his domicile, 
residence, place of 
incorporation, place of 
management or any other 
criterion of a similar nature… 
This term, however, does not 
include any person who is 
liable to tax in that State in 
respect only of income from 
sources in that State or capital 
situated therein” 
For the purposes of this 
Convention, the term 
"resident of a Contracting 
State" means any person who, 
under the laws of that State, is 
liable to tax therein by reason 
of his domicile, residence, 
citizenship, place of 
management, place of 
incorporation, or any other 
criterion of a similar nature 
(…) This term, however, does 
not include any person whose 
tax is determined in that 
Contracting State on a fixed-
free, forfeit or similar basis, 
or who is liable to that in that 
Contracting State in respect 
only of income from sources in 
that Contracting State or of 
profits attributable to a 
permanent establishment 
situated therein or capital 
situated therein” 
 
The question that now arises is whether the expression “or any other criterion of a similar nature” 
that follows the enumeration of criteria could be interpreted in a way as to restrict the 
admissibility of certain residence tests for the purposes of granting access to treaty benefits. In 
other words, does article 4.1 give the Contracting States an unconditional carte blanche and thus 
accept any type of residence test irrespective of its nature and content insofar it triggers an 
unlimited tax liability? Or does article 4.1 solely admit the residence tests explicitly enumerated 
in the article along with “any other criterion” that could be regarded as substantially equivalent?   
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While the Commentaries to article 4 of the OECD Model Convention and some scholars seem to 
point to the first scenario1118, the literal wording of the rule leads us to the second one. 
Consequently, we could conclude that the treaty would not grant benefits to any person that is 
considered resident for domestic tax purposes but would solely grant benefits to those that 
comply with domestic residence tests that match those explicitly mentioned in article 4.1 or that 
are, at least, substantially equivalent to them.  
This conclusion is particularly relevant in tax treaties that follow literally article 4.1 of the OECD 
MC. This model provision makes an explicit reference to three residence tests: domicile and 
residence for individuals and POEM for legal entities. All these three tests have something in 
common: they demand a substantive and close link between the taxpayer and the territory of his 
allegedly residence State1119. Accordingly, it could be argued that only residence tests that equally 
ensure a material connection of a factual nature between the taxpayer and its Residence State 
would qualify as criteria “of a similar nature”1120. On the other hand, purely formal tests of a 
bureaucratic nature (e.g. nationality, POI or registered office) would not qualify as such and 
therefore would not be sufficient to gain access to treaty benefits1121.  
Naturally, this discussion transcends the academic field. Many jurisdictions seem to have 
interpreted article 4.1 in the same way and have acted accordingly to ensure that persons 
identified as residents according to formal tests are still entitled to treaty benefits. For example, 
Turkey, the United States and Estonia made express reservations to the OECD Model Convention 
to reserve their respective rights to use formal residence tests as the POI or the registered office 
for treaty purposes1122. As reservations placed by representatives of the tax administrations in 
soft law instruments do not give rise to any sort of legal effect, some jurisdictions choose to make 
an express reference to these criteria in article 4 of their treaties1123. In fact, both the UN and the 
                                                          
1118 Commentaries to article 4 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 4: “conventions (…) do not normally concern 
themselves with the domestic laws of the Contracting States laying down the conditions under which a person is to be 
treated fiscally as resident (…) they do not law down standards which the provisions of the domestic laws on residence 
have to fulfill in order that claims for full tax liability can be accepted between the Contracting States  (…) States take 
their stand entirely on the domestic laws”. For his part, Couzin understands that the expression “any other criterion of 
a similar nature” refers to the universe of all connecting factors for tax liability under the laws of the particular state, 
because he believes that the OECD included this residual category to ensure that any criteria chosen by the contracting 
state would be taken into account to the extent it triggered an unlimited tax liability. Furthermore, he refers to some 
Indian rulings that follow this approach. See COUZIN, R. (2002), p. 143. 
1119 WIDRIG, M. (2009), p. 280, VOGEL, K. (1997), p. 233, VEGA BORREGO, F.A. (2004), p. 225-227 and SHANNON, H.A. 
(1988), p. 206. As Shannon states, “criteria expressly listed in the OECD Model all are based on some sort of physical 
relationship between the taxpayer and the taxing State. They all refer to the place where the taxpayer in some sense 
is”.  
1120 For example, Widrig believes that this requirement would be met in the case of the Italian residence test (which 
relies on the location of the company´s business activity) insofar it is equally a substantive criterion based on facts. See 
WIDRIG, M. (2009), p. 281. 
1121 Widrig, Vogel, Vega and Shannon agree that neither nationality nor POI tests are covered by the expression 
“criterion of a similar nature”. According to Widrig the reason is that they lack “the effective personal attachment to a 
territory (…) contrary to the connecting criteria of residence, domicile or place of management”. In Vogel´s view, none 
of them are covered by article 4.1 because they are not "locality-related”, unlike the three criteria contained in article 
4.1.  For his part, Shannon believes that these tests “do not indicate where the taxpayer is, they describe a political or 
legal relationship existing between the taxpayer and the taxing States”. See WIDRIG, M. (2009), p. 281, VOGEL, K. 
(1997), p. 233, VEGA BORREGO, F.A. (2004), p. 225-227 and SHANNON, H.A. (1988), p. 206. 
1122 Commentaries to article 4 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraphs 30, 31 and 34.  
1123 Indeed, Couzin recommends the explicit inclusion of the POI test in article 4.1 for a greater clarity. See COUZIN, R. 
(2002), p. 142. This is the practice followed by the US and Canada among others. 
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US Models explicitly include the POI test in the non-exhaustive list of criteria so as to close 
potential discussions1124. 
In short, the literal wording of article 4.1 of the OECD MC, as interpreted in this section, reveals a 
profound mistrust towards residence tests of a purely formal nature. The underlying idea is that 
these tests do not guarantee a sufficient and appropriate connection between the taxpayer and 
the relevant contracting State and therefore, while the taxpayer may well be liable to unlimited 
taxation on these grounds, it would still not deserve to be entitled to the benefits provided by tax 
the treaties signed by such state. 
 
5.2.2.4.2. The express exclusion of formal tests as valid domestic tax residence rules for the 
purposes of the treaty in article 4.1 
The interpretative approach suggested in the previous subsection is not accepted by all scholars 
and courts1125. It may therefore be advisable to undertake a more straightforward approach that 
also provides a greater degree of legal certainty. 
We thus call for the explicit rejection of domestic residence tests of formal nature as valid 
qualifying criteria for a company to be regarded as a “resident of a Contracting State” for the 
purposes of articles 1 and 4 of the tax treaty.  
Proposed wording for article 4.1 of the tax treaties. Words in bold indicate the variations from the 
OECD MC.  
 
For the purposes of this convention, the term “resident of a Contracting State” means any 
person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, 
residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature, thereby excluding 
those that merely rely on formal factors as place of incorporation or registered office (…) This 
term, however, does not include any person who is liable to tax in that State in respect only of 
income from sources in that State or capital situated therein” 
 
 
This alternative would allow States to keep their formal corporate residence tests (contrary to the 
recommendations exposed in Section 5.1.2.2) for the purposes of subjecting to tax the worldwide 
income obtained by companies incorporated in accordance with their domestic legislation or 
having their legal/statutory/registered seat/office within their territory. However, the adoption 
of the proposed wording for article 4 in their respective tax treaties would at least prevent the 
most straightforward and elementary treaty shopping cases: those involving the incorporation of 
                                                          
1124 Logically, the question whether POI is a criteria of a similar nature does not arise neither in the UN and the US 
Models. According to Shannon, the expression “criterion of a similar nature” in the US Model would include “any 
criterion establishing worldwide income tax liability under domestic law”. See SHANNON, H.A. (1988), p. 207. 
1125 RIVIER, J-M. (1987), p. 135 and VOGEL, K. (2004), p. 3. Vogel explains a case decided by the Delhi High Court, which 
ruled that incorporation followed by registration is a “criterion of a similar nature” although it is not locality-related like 
the criteria explicitly mentioned on article 4.1 of the India-Mauritius tax treaty. 
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a shell company devoid of substance in a State with the purpose of accessing the benefits of its 
tax treaty network. Consequently, treaties following this approach would be less dependent on 
anti-treaty shopping measures as the beneficial owner or the LOB clauses. 
 
5.2.2.4.3. The denial of treaty benefits to companies that do not show a sufficient economic 
connection with the State concerned  
The present alternative proposal goes one step further. It does not settle for the denial of benefits 
to companies that are only incidentally linked to the corresponding Contracting States, it prefers 
instead to make the granting of benefits to the company conditional on further requirements that 
effectively ensure a sufficient connection between the company and the State concerned. 
Throughout the present study, we have defended countless times that, in our view, the most 
appropriate way to define a sufficient and strong connection between a company and a State is 
to demonstrate the presence of a significant economic activity carried out by the company within 
the territory of the State concerned. So, to be consistent with our previous lines of reasoning, we 
would suggest making the entitlement to treaty benefits conditional on the existence of a 
significant economic activity in one of the Contracting States. There are a priori two ways this 
could be achieved.  
Firstly, tax treaties could simply withdraw the remission to the domestic legislation of the 
Contracting States contained in article 4.1 of the MCs and instead adopt an autonomous definition 
of (corporate) resident for the sole purposes of the treaty, as some scholars have already 
suggested1126, relying on the presence of the company´s economic activity in one of the 
Contracting States. However, we prefer to directly discard this alternative due to the potential 
problems it could eventually pose. In the first place, this clause would de facto reduce the 
potential scope of tax treaties, so its widespread implementation would lead to numerous and 
severe cases of double taxation. Let us take, for example, a corporate taxpayer that is fully liable 
to tax in one State (e.g. by reason of its incorporation or POEM) and derives income from the 
other State. Insofar it does not reach the threshold established by the treaty, such taxpayer would 
not be granted access to the treaty signed between those States and would therefore have no 
alternative but to rely on the domestic double taxation relief methods. Secondly, this clause could 
lead to situations in which the State that considers the company as resident for domestic tax 
purposes (e.g. by reason of its incorporation of POEM) and thereby imposes a full tax liability 
would play the role of the source State for the purposes of the treaty while the State that 
considers the company as a non-resident taxpayer for domestic purposes would play the role of 
the resident State for treaty purposes. For all these reasons, we believe this approach is 
inappropriate and should not be put into effect.  
                                                          
1126 Sanghavi proposes an autonomous definition of resident based on the POEM test or “any other substantive 
connecting criterion” irrespective of the domestic residence tests. He finally suggests the following wording for article 
4 of the OECD MC: “a person other than an individual is resident of the Contracting State in which its place of effective 
management is situated”. See SANGHAVI, D. (2016), p. 523-525. 
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Alternatively, States may maintain the remission to domestic legislation in article 4 of their 
treaties as it currently stands and instead resort to anti treaty-shopping measures that lead to 
impose additional requirements (beyond the residence status at the domestic level) for the 
entitlement to treaty benefits. We already analyzed the purpose and content of the LOB clauses 
taking the US MC and the BEPS proposals as a reference point1127 and discovered that one of these 
clauses (the so-called “activity clause”) precisely demands the taxpayers to conduct an active 
trade or business within the territory of its residence State in order to be eligible for treaty 
benefits1128. This clause is therefore the one that is better aligned with the considerations exposed 
in the present study. 
Table 33 - “Activity clause” in the LOB provision comprised in the US MC (article 22.3) 
 “a) A resident of a Contracting State shall be entitled to benefits under this Convention with 
respect to an item of income derived from the other Contracting State, regardless of whether 
the resident is a qualified person, if the resident is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or 
business in the first-mentioned Contracting State, and the income derived from the other 
Contracting State emanates from, or is incidental to, that trade or business. For purposes of this 
Article, the term “active conduct of a trade or business” shall not include the following activities 
or any combination thereof: i) operating as a holding company; ii) providing overall supervision 
or administration of a group of companies; iii) providing group financing (including cash 
pooling); or iv) making or managing investments, unless these activities are carried on by a 
bank, insurance company or registered securities dealer in the ordinary course of its business as 
such.  
b) If a resident of a Contracting State derives an item of income from a trade or business activity 
conducted by that resident in the other Contracting State, or derives an item of income arising 
in the other Contracting State from a connected person, the conditions described in 
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be considered to be satisfied with respect to such item 
only if the trade or business activity conducted by the resident in the first-mentioned Contracting 
State to which the item is related is substantial in relation to the same or complementary trade 
or business activity carried on by the resident or such connected person in the other Contracting 
State. Whether a trade or business activity is substantial for the purposes of this paragraph shall 
be determined based on all the facts and circumstances.  
c) For purposes of applying this paragraph, activities conducted by persons connected to a 
resident of a Contracting State shall be deemed to be conducted by such resident”. 
Along the same lines, Kemmeren put forward a similar proposal in his thesis, thus limiting the 
entitlement of treaty benefits to persons other than individuals who are considered as residents 
for domestic tax purposes by one of the Contracting States and additionally “pursue or have 
pursued a substantial income-producing activity within the territory of that State; and the income 
or capital concerned has to be attributed to that activity on the basis of a functional resident, i.e. 
                                                          
1127 Section 3.2.3.2. The BEPS proposal for a new LOB may be found in OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 6: 
Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances. 
1128 Section 3.2.3.2.2.  
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the income or capital is or has been functionally connected with that substantial income-producing 
activity”1129. 
Beyond the aforementioned proposals, we would like to put forward a couple of more general 
suggestions to overcome some of the problems related to LOB clauses that we identified in 
Chapter 31130. We then concluded that, while “treaty shopping” has been typically perceived as a 
problem, there is no accurate or clear delimitation of what can be indeed regarded as such, the 
consequence being that LOB provisions lack a coherent and uniform purpose and thus tend to 
draw a sort of arbitrary and inconsistent dividing line between the resident taxpayers that deserve 
access to treaty benefits and those who do not1131. This being so, we would first invite States to 
thoroughly reconsider what they regard as improper or inappropriate access to treaty benefits or, 
in other words, in which cases a resident taxpayer should be denied entitlement to treaty benefits. 
As a second step, and once the problem has been better identified and delimited, States should 
rethink the specific LOB clauses in accordance with their response to the first question.  
 
5.2.2.5. New tie-breaker rule to resolve double residence issues 
considering the economic presence of the company in both contracting 
States 
We observed in Section 3.2.4 that the great variety of domestic residence tests used by States, 
along with the different ways to interpret them, is likely to generate situations in which the same 
company is regarded as resident for domestic tax purposes in two or more jurisdictions.  
In cases in which two of those residence States have signed a tax treaty patterned after one of 
the most influential MCs, the double residence issue (and by extension the double taxation this 
entails) would be a priori solvable by means of the “tie-breaker” rules contained in the treaty, 
whose function is to discern which contracting State will perform the role of “residence State” 
and which one would eventually perform the role of the “source State” for the purposes of the 
application of the treaty.  
After analyzing the tie-breaker rules contained in the MCs and their supposed respective 
justifications1132, we concluded that there does not seem to be a clear rationale behind the choice 
of the corresponding tie-breaker rule1133. In other words, there does not seem to be a clear 
principle underlying the criteria according to which the residence status of a company in one State 
should prevail over its residence status in the other contracting State for treaty purposes. 
In this context, we would like to put forward a proposal to amend the tie-breaker rule concerning 
the double residence status of persons other than individuals. We have defended throughout the 
                                                          
1129 KEMMEREN, E.C.C.M. (2001), p. 260-261 and 537. The definition of “income-producing activity” may be consulted 
in KEMMEREN, E.C.C.M. (2001), p. 35-45. 
1130 Section 3.2.3.2.3.  
1131 Section 3.2.3.2.3. Observations shared by scholars such as AVI-YONAH, R.; PANAHI, H.J.I. (2010), p. 21-25, FLEMING, 
J.C. (Jr.) (2012), JIANG, Q. (2015), p. 139 and BATES, J.D. (et al.) (2013), p. 401. 
1132 Sections 3.2.4.1 to 3.2.4.4. 
1133 Section 3.2.4.5. 
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present study that the most appropriate way to define a sufficient and strong connection between 
a company and a State is to demonstrate the presence of a significant economic activity carried 
out by the company within the territory of the State concerned on the basis of the benefit 
principle. Accordingly, we propose that the tie-breaker rule indeed tips the balance in favor of the 
residence State to which the corporate taxpayer is more closely connected in terms of economic 
presence. A rule that may be compared to the “centre of vital interest” tie-breaker rule that tax 
treaties provide for cases of double residence concerning individuals1134. 
This is not new, as the OECD itself alluded to the idea of amending article 4.3 in this same direction 
back in 20011135. They justified such proposal precisely on the grounds of the benefit principle: “it 
could be argued that if the State provides certain facilities and infrastructure for its residents, those 
who benefit most from such facilities and infrastructure ought to contribute to the State via 
residence-based taxes. So, if a company uses the legal infrastructure, consumes or uses the 
facilities in that State, there is a case that it ought to be treated as a resident”1136.  
Table 34 - Proposed article 4.3 of tax treaties 
Words in bold and strikethrough indicate the variations from article 4.3 of the OECD and the UN 
MC. 
Proposed article 4.3 and 4.4 for tax treaties 
“3. Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 a person other than an individual is a 
resident of both Contracting States, then it shall be deemed to be a resident only of the State in 
which its place of management is situated the competent authorities of the Contracting States 
shall endeavor to determine by mutual agreement the Contracting State of which such person 
shall be deemed to be a resident for the purposes of the Convention, considering the State to 
which the person maintains a strongest economic connection”. 
We choose to adhere to the general tendency, revealed by the recent practice followed by a great 
number of States1137, according to which the tie-breaker rule directly leaves the resolution of the 
dual residence issue in the hands of the competent authorities of the Contracting State, albeit 
listing the factors they must necessarily consider when the time comes to fulfill their task1138. This 
should ideally be accompanied by an arbitration clause which establishes the submission of the 
                                                          
1134 OECD (2001): The impact of the communications revolution on the application of “place of effective management” 
as a tie breaker rule (Discussion Paper), p. 12.  
1135 OECD (2001): The impact of the communications revolution on the application of “place of effective management” 
as a tie breaker rule (Discussion Paper), p. 11-12. The OECD did not provide a specific wording for its proposal, but did 
suggest that the tie-breaker should tip the balance in favor of the contracting State “where the economic nexus is 
strongest”. 
1136 OECD (2001): The impact of the communications revolution on the application of “place of effective management” 
as a tie breaker rule (Discussion Paper), p. 12. 
1137 Section 3.2.4.3. 
1138 However, as Sanghavi points out, the explicit reference to the mutual agreement procedure provides no guarantee 
that a taxpayer´s dual residence would be resolved, as it is possible that the authorities are unable to reach an 
agreement. In fact, he argues that this reference is redundant, as article 25.3 of the OECD MC already obliged the 
competent authorities to “endeavor to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties of doubts arising as to the 
interpretation or application of the Convention” (e.g. the case of the tie-breaker of article 4.3.). See SANGHAVI, D. 
(2016), p. 522. 
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case to an arbitrator in case the competent authorities are unable to reach an agreement within 
the given time period1139. 
The current proposed wording is deliberately broad. The OECD suggested that the economic 
connection may be characterized by “the extent that land, labor, capital and enterprise (the 
factors of production) are used by the company in deriving its profits”1140. However, we believe 
the definitive wording should be much more precise than the OECD suggests, and should ideally 
specify as much as possible the criteria that should guide the competent authorities when the 
time comes to fulfill their duty. The selection of the relevant criteria should be assessed in a more 
profound study that goes beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
 
5.2.3. RECONSIDERATION OF THE PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
THRESHOLD 
 
The permanent establishment has become the most widespread threshold allowing source-based 
taxation of business profits in both domestic law and tax treaties. Its relevance should not be 
underestimated, as the presence of a PE within the territory of a State generally triggers its 
entitlement to tax all the worldwide profits that could arguably be attributed to such PE under 
conditions equivalent to those taxpayers that are deemed to be tax resident therein1141. 
Chapter 2 revealed that the PE has played a significant role in the Apple´s tax planning scheme 
insofar it has failed to ensure a “proper” level of taxation in the jurisdictions where Apple had its 
market, thus contributing to general phenomenon of misalignment between the economic and 
the tax presence of the company in the world1142.  
In Chapter 3 we had the opportunity to analyze the PE concept in greater detail1143 and further 
dissect the causes allowing the above mentioned phenomenon to happen1144. We then reached 
the conclusion that a literal interpretation of the PE clause prevented States from taxing profits 
obtained by non-residents in cases in which they have a significant economic activity therein due 
to a number of reasons, some derived from deficiencies in its wording and some others of a more 
fundamental nature concerning the scope of the clause. In this context, we strongly opposed the 
propensity of States to address these deficiencies by means of either eccentric or substance-based 
interpretations or an overuse of anti-avoidance rules, a tendency that has been further promoted 
                                                          
1139 As the one proposed in the BEPS project, see OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 14 – Making dispute 
resolution mechanisms more effective, p. 41 and OECD (2016): Multilateral convention to implement tax treaty related 
measures to prevent base erosion and profit shifting, p. 29.  
1140 OECD (2001): The impact of the communications revolution on the application of “place of effective management” 
as a tie breaker rule (Discussion Paper), p. 11. 
1141 The reasons and rationale behind this assertion may be found in Section 3.3.4 and 3.3.6.1. 
1142 Section 2.2.4. 
1143 Sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.4. 
1144 Section 3.3.5. 
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by the OECD itself via its soft documents1145. Instead, we advocated for the direct amendment of 
the rule as the best and most straightforward way to address its inherent shortcomings, an 
approach we intend to explore in the present Section1146. 
We will first evaluate the objectives of the BEPS project as regards the permanent establishment 
concept and their consistency with the benefit principle (section 5.2.3.1). Subsequently, we will 
assess the PE clause resulting from the aforementioned project, particularly in the light of the 
alleged objectives of the project and the benefit principle (section 5.2.3.2). Lastly, we will explore 
the possibility of altering the scope of the clause so as to ensure a better consistency with the 
benefit principle (section 5.2.3.3). A few conclusions will finally be drawn. 
5.2.3.1. A preliminary evaluation of the purpose of BEPS as regards the 
permanent establishment concept:  inconsistent with the PE clause in its 
current form but consistent with the benefit rationale 
 
We already made reference to the general policy objective pursued by the BEPS project in Section 
5.1.1 (the so-called “BEPS mantra”: i.e. the alignment between the allocation of taxable income 
and the economic activity that generates that income) and further noted that Actions 1 and 6 to 
10 were entrusted with the task to achieve it. However, the BEPS mantra does not remain static 
and unaltered throughout the different work streams, as it is rather subject to specifications when 
the time comes to put forward the particular objectives and scope of each of these work streams. 
For example, we already noted that the purpose of Actions 8-10 was to ensure that transfer 
pricing outcomes were aligned with “value-creating activities”1147. The same occurs with the 
actions concerning the permanent establishment concept (Actions 1 and 7), as we will now 
proceed to explain. 
A closer look at the Action Plan and the corresponding reports on Actions 1 and 7 reveals that 
BEPS does not intend to bring the tax bases to wherever the “economic activities” take place by 
means of the PE, as one may intuitively presuppose. Instead, it seems that the OECD intends to 
use the PE to bring the taxable profits to wherever the market is. Such an objective was not made 
explicit but could be easily inferred from the wording used in the Action Plan as regards Actions 
11148 and 71149 and, most clearly, from the final reports, where the OECD came to recognize that it 
                                                          
1145 Section 3.3.6.2.1. The reason is that this approach is prone to compromise the principle of legal certainty and the 
respect for the rule of law 
1146 Section 3.3.6.2.2. 
1147 Section 5.2.1. 
1148 For example, one of the functions of Action 1 was to assess “the ability of a company to have a significant digital 
presence in the economy of another country without being liable to taxation due to the lack of nexus under current 
international rules” (BEPS Action Plan, p. 14). In other words, the objective was to consider whether the scope of the 
PE clause could be modified to further cover the “digital presence” of non-resident companies in their respective market 
jurisdictions. 
1149 The Action Plan expressed its concern about the recurrent replacement of distributors with “commissionaires”, as 
it allegedly resulted in a “shift of profits out of the country where the sales take place without a substantive change in 
the functions performed in that country” (BEPS Action Plan, p. 19). 
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sought to ensure taxation at the level of the market jurisdiction and that Actions 1 and 7 were 
instrumental for these purposes1150.  
This sudden desire to bring the PE threshold closer to where the consumers are constitutes a 
major novelty in the discourse of the OECD, even though it is not presented as such1151. In fact, 
the OECD has historically disdained the significance of the market when the time comes to 
determine the source of profits and legitimize the potential tax claims of the State providing the 
market (at least before the advent of the BEPS project)1152, contrary to the position held by certain 
scholars for a long time1153. 
We nonetheless find a discrepancy between the new alleged objective of the PE and the current 
form of the clause. We believe that the PE clause was not originally conceived to ensure taxation 
at the level of the market jurisdiction, it was rather designed to encompass situations in which the 
non-resident company was carrying out a significant (value-adding) economic activity within the 
territory of a State, measured in terms of physical presence and continuity in time1154. The fact 
that the PE-State and the market State tended to coincide was casual or, to be more precise, it 
was the natural consequence of the economic context in which the PE arose. An economic context 
in which the physical presence, continuous in time –precisely that required by the PE clause - was 
critical to reach the market. Changes in business models, communications and technology have 
resulted in the increasing possibility to reach the consumers resident in a certain jurisdiction by 
remote means1155. In these scenarios, the State where a PE arises and the State providing the 
market are less likely to coincide1156. This confirms our hypothesis: the PE clause as it currently 
stands in inherently unable to ensure taxation at the level of the market jurisdiction since it does 
not necessarily bring the taxable bases wherever the consumers are, even though this may have 
incidentally occurred (more frequently in the past). 
                                                          
1150 There are constant references (a total of 34) to the “market jurisdiction” along the 202-pages final report on Action 
1. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 88: “the 
treaty definition of PE may limit the application of domestic law rules applicable to the taxation of the business profits 
of non-resident companies derived from sources in the market country. The work done with respect to Action 7 was 
aimed at preventing the artificial avoidance of the treaty threshold below which the market country may not tax”. The 
report acknowledged that the structures addressed in Action 7 (e.g. commissionaire arrangements, fragmentation of 
operations to qualify for the PE exceptions, etc.) precisely resulted in the avoidance of tax liabilities at the level of the 
market jurisdiction (see p. 79, 80, 86 and 88). 
1151 ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 11. 
1152 OECD (2003): Are the current treaty rules for taxing business profits appropriate for e-commerce? Final report, p.14: 
“economic literature suggests that there are two possible approaches to determining a proper allocation of business 
profits: the supply-based and supply-demand based views. Under the supply-based approach, profits originate from 
where the factors that produce the profits operate (…) Under the “supply-demand” view, however, the interaction of 
supply and demand is what creates business profits (…) The TAG’s approach was therefore in line with the supply-based 
approach of considering that business profits should be viewed as originating from the location of the factors that allow 
the enterprise to realize business profits. It therefore rejected the suggestion that the mere fact that a country provides 
the market where an enterprise’s goods and services are supplied should allow that country to consider that a share of 
the profits of the enterprise is derived therefrom”. 
1153 See for example SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 23 and VOGEL, K. (1988c).  
1154 See Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.6.2.2. See HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 9-10 and 15 for a very divergent opinion. 
1155 Section 3.3.6.2.2. 
1156 McLure notes: “increasing amounts of sales being made by firms that lack a permanent establishment in market 
nations”. See MCLURE, C.E. (Jr) (2000), 6:2 
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In addition, we have good reasons to believe that the current methodology to attribute profits to 
the PEs promoted by the OECD (the so-called AOA) 1157 was not designed either to allocate taxable 
profits to the market jurisdictions. The reason is that the allocation of profits between the head 
office and the PE (i.e. the resident and the host State) is fundamentally guided1158 by the 
determination of who performs the “significant people functions”, that is, the functions1159 carried 
out by people1160 which may be regarded as significant, in the sense that they are economically 
relevant and prone to generate profits1161. This means that the AOA will ultimately allocate profits 
to wherever the persons carry out the relevant economic activity (either in the Residence or the 
PE-State), irrespective of place where automated functions are performed (e.g. servers)1162 or 
where the customers are1163. 
In short, we may conclude that the “new” mission assigned to the PE in the context of BEPS is not 
intrinsic in the PE in its current form, as it cannot be inferred from either the literal wording of the 
clause or the methodology to attribute profits. This means that the OECD seems to be once again 
pursuing an objective by means of an instrument that is unsuitable for this purpose1164. 
The question now arises as to whether the new OECD approach towards the PE may be considered 
as consistent with the benefit rationale. We reached the conclusion that tax connecting factors 
would be aligned with the benefit principle insofar they make companies carrying on economic 
activities (physically or remotely) within a given territory subject to taxation therein, since one 
could infer from this fact that they would be in a position to effectively or potentially use and/or 
enjoy the services and infrastructures defrayed by the taxing State. This being so, the new OECD 
approach on the PE would be considered to be in line with such principle to the extent the position 
expressed in Section 4.2.2.2.2 is shared. 
Once the objective of the BEPS project as regards the PE threshold has been identified and 
evaluated, the time comes to review the conclusions reached in the two work streams dedicated 
to this clause, namely Actions 1 and 7.  
                                                          
1157 See Section 3.3.4 and OECD (2010): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments. 
1158 The reason is that the attribution of risks and assets, along with the remuneration they trigger under the ALS, will 
depend on this first exercise. In other words, the identification of these functions ultimately condition the level of profits 
that could arguably be attributable to the PE. See section 3.3.4. 
1159 Kamphuis argues that a function encompasses at least three elements: the duty to perform the assigned tasks 
(responsibility), the allocation of decision-making powers (authority) and the competencies (e.g. knowledge and skills) 
required to perform the task. See KAMPHUIS, E. (2008), p. 302. 
1160 As opposed to non-people functions, as automated ones performed by robots or machines, which would be 
insignificant for the purposes of profit attribution. See KAMPHUIS, E. (2008), p. 302. 
1161 KAMPHUIS, E. (2008), p. 302. 
1162 We made reference to the potential existence of server-PEs in Section 3.3.6.2.1. According to the OECD “the 
automated nature of the functions means that the assets or risks attributed to the PE are only likely to be those directly 
associated with the server hardware. In fact, since a server-PE will not be carrying out any significant people functions 
relevant to the attribution of economic ownership of assets and/or the assumption of risks in the absence of personnel 
acting on behalf of the enterprise, no asset or risk could be attributed to it under the authorized OECD approach, 
supporting the conclusion that little or no profit would be attributed to such a PE” (OECD (2010): Attribution of profits 
to permanent establishments, p. 26). 
1163 The Spanish courts have sometimes attributed to a PE located in Spain all the income derived from sales in the 
country (see the last part of Section 3.3.6.2.1, concerning the “PE Spanish approach”) but this outcome results from a 
non-orthodox interpretation of the rules for attributing profits to PEs. Schön notes that the place of physical presence 
(as required by the PE clause) and the place where the “significant people functions” are performed may well bear no 
relation at all with the place where the customers are (SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 103).  
1164 Just as we denounced above in the context of the BEPS Actions concerning transfer pricing rules, see Section 5.2.1.2. 
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First of all, we believe that the willingness of the OECD to finally amend the PE clause should be 
welcomed in any case, as it implies the final abandonment of its longstanding and unfortunate 
tendency to force the interpretation of the clause beyond the literal meaning of its terms1165. 
The BEPS project wished to address the reform of the PE at two different levels. On the one hand, 
it devoted Action 7 to preventing the use of certain common “tax avoidance” strategies resulting 
in the circumvention of the clause1166. On the other hand, Action 1 explored the possibility to 
reconsider the scope of the clause in the light of the challenges posed by the digital economy1167. 
We will first refer to the measures proposed by Action 7, where consensus was indeed reached. 
 
5.2.3.2. The advantages and shortcomings of the amendments to the PE 
clause recommended by Action 7 
In the present section we will first briefly describe the proposed changes to the PE clause 
comprised in the final report on Action 7. Subsequently, we will evaluate their actual impact in 
terms of tax revenue by hypothesizing the expected profits that could be attributable to the new 
PE clause resulting from Action 7. Finally, a few conclusions will be drawn.  
5.2.3.2.1. The strengthening of the agency clause 
In Chapter 3 we identified three important weaknesses in the agency clause that are prone to 
generate profit shifting risks1168. The first two arise due to the relative ease with which two 
expressions of article 5.5 of the OECD MC may be circumvented, as they rely on objective formal 
concepts that make the threshold very vulnerable to tax planning1169. 
Firstly, the “conclusion of contracts” requirement was avoidable by the simple expedient of 
authorizing or finalizing the contract in a jurisdiction other than that in which the agent 
substantially negotiated it. In this context, the OECD added an alternative requisite according to 
which an agent who has played “the principal role leading to the conclusion” of a contract1170 
would still constitute a DAPE to the extent the principal limits itself to routinely conclude it 
without material modification (the so-called “rubber-stamp” approvals).  
Secondly, the requirement to conclude contracts “in the name of the enterprise” was also easily 
avoidable by means of a commissionaire arrangement (as evidenced in the Apple case)1171. In view 
                                                          
1165 This approach was described and severely critized back in Section 3.3.6.2.1. 
1166 BEPS Action Plan, p. 19 and OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of 
permanent establishment status. 
1167 BEPS Action Plan, p. 14-15. We will later make reference to some of the proposals (see Section 3.2.3.3), 
1168 Section 3.3.5.3. 
1169 EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 487. 
1170 This wording replaces the “negotiates the material elements of contracts” expression originally suggested by the 
OECD (2015): Revised Discussion Draft on BEPS Action 7: prevent the artificial avoidance of PE status. See OECD (2015): 
Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, p. 19-20 (Post-
BEPS Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD MC, par. 32.5-32.6). 
1171 Section 2.2.4 and, more generally, section 3.3.5.3. A commissionaire arrangement may be defined as “an 
arrangement through which a person sells products in a given State in its own name but on behalf of a foreign enterprise 
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of this, the OECD decided to add two new alternative requisites which did not relate to a formality 
in the contract but rather to its effects, in both cases demanding the subsequent performance of 
the principal, either by providing a service or transferring the ownership or the right to use a 
property. This being so, the agency clause would apply to contracts that create rights and 
obligations that are legally enforceable between the principal and the third party (for being 
concluded “in the name” of the former) but also to contracts that create obligations that will 
effectively be performed by the principal (as results from the addition of the new two 
requirements)1172. Accordingly, a commissionaire would typically constitute a DAPE under the new 
agency clause, thus finally overcoming the unjustified disparate treatment of commissionaires in 
common and civil law jurisdictions1173. However, it should be noted that other much simpler 
alternatives could have been selected in order to cover these scenarios, most notably the agency 
clause comprised in the US MC1174 or other proposals that were discarded in the course of the 
BEPS project1175. 
The basic premise upon which both proposals are based is that “where the activities that an 
intermediary exercises in a country are intended to result in the regular conclusion of contracts to 
be performed by a foreign enterprise”, such enterprise should be deemed to have a DAPE in the 
jurisdiction where the activities of the intermediary take place1176. In view of this, it could be 
concluded that the intention of the new article 5.5 goes far beyond counteracting the 
aforementioned “rubber-stamp” approval cases and commissionaire arrangements1177. On the 
contrary, the proposals result in a substantial extension of the scope of the clause that may 
potentially encompass a variety of diverse activities in the source State. For example, scenarios in 
which the agent limits itself to convince the customer to accept a predetermined contract that 
the agent is not authorized to negotiate nor modify, or where a marketing service companies 
provides local marketing and sales support to the principal, ultimately leading to the conclusion 
of contracts even though it lacks the authority to conclude them1178.  
                                                          
that is the owner of these products” according to OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial 
avoidance of permanent establishment status, p. 15. 
1172 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, 
p. 20 (Post-BEPS Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD MC, par. 32.7). Martín Jimenez states that, what is now relevant 
is whether the actions of the commissionaire end up with a factual effect on the principal to sell gods or services to the 
client. See MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2016), p. 468. 
1173 This disparity has never been justified on the basis of the alleged rationale behind the agency PE (see section 3.3.5.3) 
as the question whether or not the foreign principal is legally bound becomes conceptually irrelevant where the agent 
has the authority to involve the principal in local business activities. See EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 489 and 492, SKAAR, 
A.A. (1991), P. 487-490 and OYAMA, H. (2014), P. 1167-1168. 
1174 The American clause refers to contracts “that are binding on the enterprise” irrespective of the name that appears 
in the contract. We already noted the reasons behind the divergence in both MCs in Section 3.3.5.3 (see AVERY JONES, 
J.F.; LÜDICKE, J. (2014), p. 206). 
1175 The BEPS discussion draft considered two other proposals that referred to contracts “which, by virtue of the legal 
relationship between that person and the enterprise are on the account and risk of the enterprise”. See OECD (2014): 
BEPS Action 7: public discussion draft: preventing artificial avoidance of the PE status, p. 13 and 14. 
1176 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, 
p. 15. 
1177 HOOR, O.R.; O´DONNELL, K. (2015), p. 933 and 936: “the proposals regarding commissionaire arrangements seem 
overbroad and would undermine the current rules on dependent agents”. 
1178 CUNNINGHAM, K. M. (2016), p. 506, EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 489, HOOR, O.R.; O´DONNELL, K. (2015), p. 933 and 
post-BEPS Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD MC, par. 32.6. According to Eisenbeiss, the latter case should be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, as it may not always give rise to a PE. For his part, Cunningham believes that sellers 
of goods may rapidly be found to have a taxable presence in countries where they deploy marketing teams. Lastly, Hoor 
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Table 35 - Proposed change to article 5.5 of the OECD MC 
Words in bold and strikethrough indicate the variations from article 5.5 of the OECD MC. 
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 but subject to the provisions of 
paragraph 6, where a person other than an agent of an independent status to whom paragraph 
6 applies is acting in a Contracting State on behalf of an enterprise and has, and habitually 
exercises, in a Contracting State, an authority to conclude contracts, in doing so, habitually 
concludes contracts, or habitually plays the principal role leading to the conclusion of 
contracts that are routinely concluded without material modification by the enterprise, and 
these contracts are 
a) in the name of the enterprise, or 
b) for the transfer of the ownership of, or for the granting of the right to use, property owned 
by that enterprise or that the enterprise has the right to use, or 
c) for the provision of services by that enterprise, 
that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent establishment in that State in respect of 
any activities which that person undertakes for the enterprise, unless the activities of such 
person are limited to those mentioned in paragraph 4 which, if exercised through a fixed place 
of business, would not make this fixed place of business a permanent establishment under the 
provisions of that paragraph. 
The third weakness we identified was the fact that companies could easily avoid the application 
of the agency clause by resorting to a related entity to which the exception of article 5.6 of the 
MC applies to the extent it carries on a business as an independent agent and is in fact acting in 
the ordinary course of that business. The OECD chose to presume that agents who are “closely 
related” to the principal and furthermore act “exclusively or almost exclusively” on its behalf1179 
would never have independence status without admitting  evidence that could eventually 
demonstrate that such agent in fact complies with the definition of independent agent 
considering the specific facts and circumstances of the case1180. However, establishing a 
rebuttable presumption of dependence would have been a more coherent approach1181.  
                                                          
and O´Donnell believe that all local support services may potentially constitute a PE regardless of the pricing of the 
support services, a fact that demonstrates that the BEPS proposal goes far beyond commissionaire arrangements.  
1179 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, 
p. 26 (Post-BEPS Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD MC, par. 38.8): “this means that where the person’s activities 
on behalf of enterprises to which it is not closely related do not represent a significant part of that person’s business, 
that person will not qualify as an independent agent. Where, for example, the sales that an agent concludes for 
enterprises to which it is not closely related represent less than 10 per cent of all the sales that it concludes as an agent 
acting for other enterprises, that agent should be viewed as acting “exclusively or almost exclusively” on behalf of closely 
related enterprises”. The only apparent reason behind this amendment does not seem to go beyond the apparent ease 
to circumvent the clause in the context of corporate groups. 
1180 Even though the final report refers to the amendment as a mere assumption (“independent status is less likely if 
the activities of the person are performed wholly or almost wholly on behalf of only one enterprise”), neither the new 
proposed article 5.6 nor its Commentaries seems to admit evidence to the contrary. See OECD (2015): Final Report on 
BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, p. 25-26 (Post-BEPS 
Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD MC, par. 38.7). According to Pleijsier, the non-rebuttable presumption is correct, 
to the extent these agents could hardly be considered as “economically independent” from the principal. See PLEIJSIER, 
A. (2015), p. 152. 
1181 Suggestion made by Collier and the International Bar Association. See COLLIER, R. (2015), p. 63-64 and OECD (2015): 
Comments received on the Revised Discussion Draft on BEPS Action 7: prevent the artificial avoidance of PE status, p. 
196. 
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Table 36 -  Proposed change to article 5.6 of the OECD MC 
Words in bold and strikethrough indicate the variations from article 5.6 of the OECD MC. 
6. An enterprise shall not be deemed to have a permanent establishment in a Contracting State 
merely because it carries on business in that State through a broker, general commission agent 
or any other agent of an independent status, provided that such persons are acting in the 
ordinary course of their business. 
a) Paragraph 5 shall not apply where the person acting in a Contracting State on behalf of an 
enterprise of the other Contracting State carries on business in the first-mentioned State as 
an independent agent and acts for the enterprise in the ordinary course of that business. 
Where, however, a person acts exclusively or almost exclusively on behalf of one or more 
enterprises to which it is closely related, that person shall not be considered to be an 
independent agent within the meaning of this paragraph with respect to any such enterprise. 
b) For the purposes of this Article, a person is closely related to an enterprise if, based on all 
the relevant facts and circumstances, one has control of the other or both are under the 
control of the same persons or enterprises. In any case, a person shall be considered to be 
closely related to an enterprise if one possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of 
the beneficial interest in the other (or, in the case of a company, more than 50 per cent of the 
aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the 
company) or if another person possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the 
beneficial interest (or, in the case of a company, more than 50 per cent of the aggregate vote 
and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) in the 
person and the enterprise. 
5.2.3.2.2. The enhancement of the PE exemption clause 
Article 5.4 of the OECD MC includes a list of exceptions according to which a PE is deemed not to 
exist where a POB is used solely for the activities listed in the paragraph. In Chapter 3 we already 
mentioned and briefly described the two profit shifting risks resulting from this clause1182, both 
addressed by the OECD in the context of Action 7 of the BEPS project. 
Firstly, current article 5.4 presumes that all the activities listed in the paragraph are of preparatory 
or auxiliary nature without admitting evidence to the contrary1183. Consequently, a POB would 
never be treated as a PE for the purposes of the treaty insofar it only carries one of the listed 
activities irrespective of any further considerations. This gives rise to the question as to whether 
such activities, in the context of certain recent business models, may play a prominent role in 
                                                          
1182 Section 3.3.5.1. 
1183 This conclusion may be inferred from the current wording of article 5.4 of the OECD MC. The OECD itself confirmed 
it in 2012. See OECD (2012): OECD Model Tax Convention: revised proposals concerning the interpretation and 
application of article 5 (permanent establishment), p. 24 and 26: “the question was raised as to whether the activities 
that are mentioned in subparagraphs a) to d) of paragraph 4 are automatic exceptions or whether these exceptions are 
conditional on the activities being of a preparatory or auxiliary nature (…) the Working Party agreed that the wording 
of subparagraphs a) to d) did not support the view that the application of these subparagraphs was subject to the 
additional condition that the relevant activity be of a preparatory or auxiliary character, which was a condition that was 
expressly included in subparagraphs e) and f)”. 
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practice and may thus become significant in their respective value chains1184. This could be for 
example the case of a server intended to gather relevant information about a group of users 
(article 5.4.d of the OECD MC) or an Internet retailer which operates a warehouse to promptly 
deliver goods to its customers (article 5.4.a)1185. This being so, the OECD chose to subject the listed 
activities to the extra condition that they are of a preparatory or auxiliary character having regard 
to what may be regarded as the essential and significant part of the activity of the enterprise as a 
whole1186. 
This amendment is no trouble-free. In the first place, making all the exceptions subject to the 
“preparatory or auxiliary” condition reduces certainty and increases the number disputes, as 
exceptions would cease to apply automatically and rather require an individual assessment on a 
case-by-case basis1187. Furthermore, it could be argued that the addition of this supplementary 
requirement questions the sense of maintaining the list of exceptions (subparagraphs a through 
d) to the extent all kinds of activities would now need to pass this test1188, unless the listed 
activities are considered to be subject to some sort of presumption that they are in fact 
preparatory and auxiliary1189. 
 
Table 37 -  Proposed changes to article 5.4 of the OECD MC. 
Words in bold and strikethrough indicate the variations from article 5.4 of the OECD MC. 
4. Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Article, the term “permanent 
establishment” shall be deemed not to include: 
a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or 
merchandise belonging to the enterprise; 
b) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for 
the purpose of storage, display or delivery; 
c) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for 
the purpose of processing by another enterprise; 
d) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or 
merchandise or of collecting information, for the enterprise; 
e) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the 
enterprise, any other activity of a preparatory or auxiliary character; 
                                                          
1184 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, 
p. 28. 
1185 CUNNINGHAM, K.M. (2016), p. 507. 
1186 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, 
p. 30 (Post-BEPS Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD MC, par. 21.2). 
1187 These are the reasons why the OECD discarded this alternative back in 2012. See OECD (2012): OECD Model Tax 
Convention: revised proposals concerning the interpretation and application of article 5 (permanent establishment), p. 
24 “the alternative option to make all the exceptions subject to the “preparatory or auxiliary” condition would reduce 
certainty by subjecting the existing exceptions that currently apply automatically and therefore provide a bright line test 
to a condition that is inherently more subjective. The change would therefore increase the potential for disputes between 
taxpayers and tax authorities”. See also HOOR, O.R.; O´DONNELL, K. (2015), p. 934. 
1188 CUNNINGHAM, K.M. (2016), p. 507. 
1189 Which is clearly not the position of the OECD. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the 
artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, p. 34 (Post-BEPS Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD MC, 
par. 23): “the examples listed in subparagraphs a) to d) being merely common examples of activities that are covered 
by the paragraph because they often have a preparatory or auxiliary character”. 
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f) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities 
mentioned in subparagraphs a) to e), provided that the overall activity of the fixed place of 
business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or auxiliary character, 
provided that such activity or, in the case of subparagraph f), the overall activity of the fixed 
place of business, is of a preparatory or auxiliary character. 
 
Secondly, the OECD equally addressed the fragmentation of activities that deliberately or 
inadvertently results in the application of the exemption clause. MNCs may easily split their 
activities in a certain jurisdiction into geographically separate places of business (under the 
responsibility of either one enterprise or two or more related parties) which, on their own, qualify 
for the exemption envisaged in article 5.41190. The fact that such activities are not carried out 
altogether in the same POB but in separate ones would render ineffective article 5.4.f), as this 
subparagraph merely combines the activities of a sole POB for the purposes of evaluating whether 
the combination effectively exceeds the threshold. This phenomenon is typically referred to as 
“fragmentation of activities” and eventually allows MNCs to have a substantial economic 
presence in a jurisdiction without incurring in tax liabilities therein1191. In this context, the OECD 
suggested the adoption of a new proviso (article 5.4.1) that is precisely intended to deny the 
exemption of article 5.4 to a fixed POB (that would otherwise constitute a PE) where the activities 
carried on at that place and other activities of the same enterprise or of closely related 
enterprises1192 exercised at that place or another place within the relevant territory constitute 
complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation. Once again, the 
amendment is prone to multiply disputes between taxpayers and administrations and give rise to 
a certain degree of legal uncertainty1193, while its effectiveness may be questionable in certain 
cases1194.  
 
 
Table 38 – New proposed addition to article 5.4. 
4.1 Paragraph 4 shall not apply to a fixed place of business that is used or maintained by an 
enterprise if the same enterprise or a closely related enterprise carries on business activities 
at the same place or at another place in the same Contracting State and 
a) that place or other place constitutes a permanent establishment for the enterprise or the 
closely related enterprise under the provisions of this Article, or 
                                                          
1190 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, 
p. 39. The risk was already foreseen in the Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 27.1. 
1191 MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2014), p. 7. 
1192 The new rule combines both branch activities of various related enterprises taking place in the Source state and 
residence-based activities conducted by related subsidiaries. Cunningham warns that this position is likely to give rise 
to an explosion of PEs, as the combined activities will almost never be regarded as preparatory and auxiliary: “the 
affiliate´s activities will always fail to be preparatory and auxiliary and the affiliate will always have a PE). See 
CUNNINGHAM, K.M. (2016), p. 509. 
1193 HOOR, O.R.; O´DONNELL, K. (2015), p. 935. 
1194 Martín Jiménez observes that the new clause would not apply in case the MNC ultimately avoids the formation of 
a fixed POB in the territory concerned, as this is a necessary requirement to be able to accumulate the activities of the 
group in the territory. See MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2016), p. 470. 
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b) the overall activity resulting from the combination of the activities carried on by the two 
enterprises at the same place, or by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises at the 
two places, is not of a preparatory or auxiliary character, 
provided that the business activities carried on by the two enterprises at the same place, or 
by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises at the two places, constitute 
complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation. 
 
5.2.3.2.3. Rules for attributing profits to the new PE clause questions the actual impact of the 
proposals 
 
It is an undeniable fact that the BEPS project has effectively led to lower the PE threshold, in such 
a way that the number of PEs is expected to rapidly grow in the following years insofar the 
proposed amendments are finally implemented. However, the efforts of the OECD would be 
fruitless unless the amendment of the clause in fact prompts increased tax revenues in the States 
where the new PEs arise. 
This makes it necessary to evaluate the rules and guidelines that govern the attribution of profits 
to PEs -an exercise we already made in Chapter 3, with a particular focus on the AOA 
methodology1195- and further hypothesize their potential application to the new PE clause 
resulting from Action 7. We will refer to the attribution of profits to the new DAPEs resulting from 
article 5.5 of the post-BEPS OECD MC and, subsequently, to the attribution of profits to the new 
PE resulting from article 5.4 of the post-BEPS OECD MC1196. 
As regards the attribution of profits to DAPEs, we should first make reference to a long-standing 
discussion that dates back for decades, long before the advent of the BEPS project. The peculiarity 
of DAPEs, contrary to the rest of the PE fictions, is that they necessarily arise behind a person. In 
other words, it is always a person, either natural or legal, related or unrelated, the one performing 
the functions of dependent agent. This being the case, the host State would be a priori entitled to 
tax the profits of both that person (the dependent agent enterprise, hereinafter DAE), which may 
qualify as tax resident therein, and those attributed to the DAPE (i.e. the PE of the non-resident 
enterprise). In calculating the profits attributable to the DAPE it would be necessary to first 
determine and deduct an arm‘s length reward to the DAE for the services provided to the non-
resident enterprise1197. The question arises as to whether, once the arm´s length remuneration is 
deducted, there would remain any further profits to be attributed to the DAPE1198. On the one 
hand, it has been argued that the net profit attributable to the DAPE should be zero to the extent 
the compensation paid to the DAE is considered to adequately reward the agent for the functions 
                                                          
1195 Section 3.3.4. 
1196 The OECD itself is working on an update to the 2010 report on attribution of profits considering the amendments 
proposed to the PE clause. Up until now, it has published a discussion draft on the issue, see OECD (2016): Discussion 
Draft on BEPS Action 7 – Additional guidance on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments. 
1197 OECD (2010): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, par. 234. 
1198 This very same question has been recently addressed by DZIURDZ, K. (2014) and JIMÉNEZ-VALLADOLID, D.J. (2016) 
among many others. 
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performed, assets used and risks assumed under article 9 of the OECD MC1199. On the other hand, 
the OECD claims that the DAPE could be expected to obtain further profits under article 7.2 
beyond those corresponding to the DAE under article 91200.  
However, even if we adhere to the OECD´s position (i.e. the “dual taxpayer approach), the reality 
is that the amount of profits that would remain in the DAPE´s tax base will often be zero or 
virtually zero1201.  The same observations apply to the profits attributable to the new DAPEs 
resulting from article 5.5 of the post-BEPS OECD MC, as it may be inferred from the OECD draft 
itself1202.  This ultimately means that the expected increase in the number of DAPEs will not be 
necessarily accompanied by an increase in tax revenues in the PE-States. 
As regards the attribution of profits to the new PEs resulting from article 5.4 of the post-BEPS 
OECD MC, the situation would be very similar. The amendment to article 5.4 will result in a 
significant increase of PEs whereas only very limited profits would be attributable to such PEs on 
the basis of the AOA1203. The reason is that all the activities listed in this paragraph (as well as any 
other activity that may be labeled as “preparatory” or “auxiliary”) are low value adding activities 
                                                          
1199 This is commonly referred to as the “single taxpayer” or “zero-sum” approach. According to Dziurdz, the reason 
behind this position is that there would no other functions performed, assets used and risks assumed in the source 
State, therefore no further profits could be attributable (DZIURDZ, K. (2014)). In this context, the host State would not 
be entitled to any additional revenue as a result of the presence of a PE (HOOR, O.R.; O´DONNELL, K. (2015), p. 933). 
An argument against this approach is that it would render article 5.5 meaningless and thus infringe the principle that 
one should not assume law to be redundant (EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 500). See the observations exposed in this regard 
on Section 2.2.4 concerning the Apple case. 
1200 This is called “dual taxpayer approach”. See OECD (2010): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, part 
I, par. 234 and DZIURDZ, K. (2014), p. 137-138. Jiménez-Valladolid notes three arguments to uphold the OECD´s position. 
In the first place, an employee may act as a dependent agent of its own firm and his remuneration is very likely to be 
inferior to that he would have obtained in an arm´s length scenario considering he functions performs, the assets he 
uses and the risks he assumes. This circumstances justifies on its own the fact that they may be two separate taxable 
bases: that of the employee and that of the DAPE. Secondly, the principal may deploy its own or subcontracted staff to 
the PE and this fact would also give rise to the possibility to attribute profits to the PE beyond those attributed to the 
DAE. And thirdly and most importantly, in the context of transfer pricing rules, functions may not necessarily be 
accompanied with the assumption of risks and the use of assets, as these concepts may well be dissociated. This being 
so, remuneration under article 9 may only compensate for the function performed but not for the other concepts. On 
the contrary, under article 7.2 (as interpreted by the AOA), risks and assets necessarily follow functions. In this context, 
the profit attributable to the PE would not be zero, as it would include compensation for the risks assumed and the 
assets used, concepts that were excluded from the arm´s length remuneration of the subsidiary under article 9. See 
JIMÉNEZ-VALLADOLID, D.J. (2016), p. 27-34. The OECD provides one example as regards the third scenario noted by 
Jiménez-Valladolid. From a strictly legal perspective, both the inventory risk and the credit risk in respect of the 
customer receivables are necessarily assumed by the non-resident enterprise. However, it might be the case that the 
DAPE effectively performs the significant people functions relevant to the assumption and/or management of these 
risks, reason why the DAPE would be attributed the economic ownership of these risks under the AOA and thus the 
profits derived from those risks. These profits would not be attributable to the DAE but only to the DAPE. See OECD 
(2010): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, part I, par. 243-245 and OECD (2016): Discussion Draft on 
BEPS Action 7 – Additional guidance on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 14-18. Under the so-
called PE Spanish approach, DAPEs were also attributed a significant amount of profits as a result of a complete 
disregard of the functional analysis required by article 7.2 of the OECD MC and the AOA. See Section 3.3.6.2.1 and 
MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, A. (2016), p. 468-469. 
1201 JIMÉNEZ-VALLADOLID, D.J. (2016), p. 34. 
1202 The 2016 Draft on the topic provided four examples involving the attribution of profits to new DAPEs. In the first 
case, the profit of the DAPE after the payment of an arm´s length remuneration to the DAE, is zero. In the next three 
examples, the DAPE is merely attributed a minimal profit. See OECD (2016): Discussion Draft on BEPS Action 7 – 
Additional guidance on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 7-26. 
1203 HOOR, O.R.; O´DONNELL, K. (2015), p. 935. 
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that could hardly expect a significant remuneration at arm´s length, this being precisely the reason 
why they were originally excluded from the scope of the PE in the first place1204. 
 
5.2.3.2.4. Preliminary conclusions 
In view of the above, we will now proceed to draw a few general conclusions.  
First of all, the proposed amendments respect the original sense of the clause. They do not entail 
a substantial alteration of the scope of the clause but rather the introduction of a number of 
patches with the idea of restoring its alleged original effects, in line with the expectations set out 
by the Action Plan1205. 
Secondly, the title given to Action 7 (i.e. “preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent 
establishment status”) is erroneous and misleading. The reason is that the practices and 
structures addressed by the Action can hardly be regarded as cases of “artificial avoidance”1206. 
For example, in the context of the agency clause, it should not be presumed that the replacement 
of distributors with commissionaires is necessarily artificial or abusive, as the latter offer notable 
(non-tax) advantages over the former ones1207. It should neither be assumed that the “rubber-
stamp” approval of contracts - previously negotiated by an agent-  by the non-resident principal 
necessarily constitute abuse1208. The same is true for the use of a closely related company as an 
agent, whose dependent character is now presumed1209.   
Thirdly, the proposed amendments to article 5.5 of the OECD MC entails the replacement of 
objective and formalistic criteria with substance-focused ones. This new agency clause has the 
virtue of making the threshold less vulnerable to tax planning1210, although this comes at a 
relatively high price. The new clause is now comprised by more subjective and broader criteria, 
thus giving rise to a wider scope of discretion when the time comes to interpret and apply the 
rule1211. This ultimately results in a decreased degree of clarity and legal certainty1212, a higher 
number of PEs and a proliferation of disputes1213 and an increment of administrative costs1214 
                                                          
1204 This may be inferred from the Commentaries to the OECD MC on article 5.4, par. 21-30. 
1205 See Section 5.1.2 and BEPS Action Plan, p. 11: “actions to address BEPS will restore both source and residence 
taxation in a number of cases”. 
1206 We already denounced this tendency in Section 3.3.6.2.1. 
1207 For example, commissionaire arrangements allow MNCs to reduce costs where operations in the market jurisdiction 
are small as well as compliance costs (TP documentation or VAT filing), while they allow the centralization of the control 
over the value chain and the delegation of the authority. See EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 492, HOOR, O.R.; O´DONNELL, K. 
(2015), p. 931 and PLEIJSIER, A. (2015), P. 152. 
1208 PLEIJSIER, A. (2015), P. 147.  
1209 Eisenbeiss notes that the amendment to article 5.6 goes beyond the “narrow goal” of preventing artificial avoidance 
of PE status. See EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 493. 
1210 Indeed, these amendments put an end to the most obvious PE-related tax planning techniques commonly used by 
MNCs. 
1211 EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 487 and CUNNINGHAM, K.M. (2016), p. 508 (“the PE analysis was always factual by nature 
and after those changes will become even more factual”).  
1212 EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 489 and 495. 
1213 CUNNINGHAM, K.M. (2016), p. 510. 
1214 HOOR, O.R.; O´DONNELL, K. (2015), p. 935. 
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together with a probable increased sense of legitimacy for “creative” PE assertions1215. It is 
essential to acknowledge and accept these costs before taking a decision on the implementation 
of the amendments.  
Fourthly, the potential adoption of the amendments suggested by Action 7 would finally put an 
end to a long history of unfortunate interpretations of the PE clause. In Chapter 3, we identified 
the habit of certain States to counteract the weaknesses of the PE clause by resorting to either 
eccentric interpretations, substance-over-form approaches and anti-avoidance rules, being the 
“PE Spanish approach” the greatest exponent of this tendency1216. We then recognized that the 
outcome of these approaches may be regarded as desirable and legitimate, but denounced that 
the means employed were unacceptable, as they led to compromise the principle of legal 
certainty and the respect for the rule of law. In this context, we advocated for the direct 
amendment of the PE clause, and Action 7 has finally provided a response to our pleas. It should 
be noted that the proposed amendments do not come out of thin air, as they were clearly inspired 
by either preexisting Commentaries to the OECD MC1217 or certain interpretations followed by 
domestic tax courts1218. And lastly, we would like to draw attention to the elimination of most of 
the Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD MC that promoted interpretations of the PE clause 
either contradicting or going beyond the literal meaning of its terms1219; although we still find a 
few reminiscences of this unfortunate habit in the new proposed Commentaries1220.  
Fifthly, the ultimate impact of the recommendations suggested by Action 7 can only be measured 
by quantifying the increase (or decrease) of tax revenues that the PE-States are expected to collect 
as a consequence of the adoption of such recommendations. In the previous subsection, we 
reached the conclusion that article 5 of the post-BEPS OECD MC will undoubtedly give rise to a 
greater number of PEs but this will probably not result in an increment of tax revenues in the PE-
States. This discovery ultimately calls into question the practical relevance of the measures 
recommended by Action 7, unless the methodology to attribute profits to PEs along with article 
7.2 of the OECD MC is revised1221. For the time being, it could be argued that the implementation 
of these measures would hardly pass a cost-benefit test, considering the great administrative 
                                                          
1215 Also favored by the strong “anti-tax planning” rhetoric that has been present in the BEPs project. EISENBEISS, J. 
(2016), p. 494. 
1216 Section 3.3.6.2.1. 
1217 We noticed the tendency of the BEPS project to upgrade Commentaries to the MC into the MC itself (see section 
5.1.2). For example, one of the changes proposed to article 5.4 was retrieved from the Commentary to article 5 of the 
OECD MC, paragraph 27.1, while one of the changes suggested for article 5.5 was already present in the Commentary 
to article 5 of the OECD MC, paragraph 32.1. 
1218 Martín Jiménez demonstrated that there are good reasons to regard the PE Spanish approach as a prequel of Action 
7 (see MARTÍN JIMÉNENZ, A. (2016), p. 467-472), although he anticipates that such approach is likely to survive in the 
post-BEPS world, as it has “more far reaching effects” than the changes brought by Action 7 (see p. 473).  
1219 A tendency we identified and denounced also in Section 3.3.6.2.1. 
1220 See the post-BEPS Commentaries to the OECD MC. In particular, see paragraphs 32.9 (“the reference to contracts 
in “the name of” in subparagraph a) does not restrict the application of the subparagraph to contracts that are literally 
in the name of the enterprise; it may apply, for example, to certain situations where the name of the enterprise is 
undisclosed in a written contract”) and 33 (it leaves certain contracts out of the scope of article 5.5, even though they 
may be regarded as technically covered by the clause). 
1221 In fact, Hellerstein proposed back in 2014 a set of amendments to the PE clause (similar to that recommended in 
Action 7) coupled by the “force of attraction” principle (in line with that followed by the UN in its Model), intended to 
capture any profits obtained by the non-resident company from digital activities within the PE-State. See HELLERSTEIN, 
W. (2014), p. 348-349. 
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burden for both taxpayers and tax administrations and the scarce additional profits that could be 
attributable to the new PEs1222.  
Last but not least, the effectiveness of the proposed amendments should be also evaluated in the 
light of the alleged objective of Action 7, i.e. ensuring taxation at the level of the market 
jurisdiction. We noted above that the PE clause (along with the methodology used to attribute 
profits to it), at least before the advent of BEPS, was inherently unable to ensure this outcome1223. 
The adoption of the recommendations suggested by Action 7 does not change this situation much, 
as they do not alter the scope of the clause but rather introduce a number of patches intended to 
restore its alleged original effects. It is true, however, that the expected increased number of PEs 
may incidentally bring taxable bases to the market jurisdictions1224. 
All in all, the amendments to the PE clause recommended by Action 7 should be welcomed, as 
they provide normative solutions to many of the weaknesses present in the clause, as opposed to 
the unfortunate past tendency to force its interpretation beyond reasonable limits, thus ensuring 
a greater degree of legal certainty. However, it should not be forgotten that governments must 
acknowledge and accept the risks that their implementation entail, and also understand that the 
practical effect of these changes is expected to be minimal in terms of tax revenues (unless the 
methodology to attribute profits to PEs is revised) and that they do not effectively ensure taxation 
at the market jurisdiction. 
 
5.2.3.3. Reconsideration of the scope of the PE clause in the light of the 
benefit principle: BEPS Action 1 and beyond 
In chapter 4, we suggested to assign a very specific role to the benefit principle, as a principle that 
should ideally underlie the tax rules that ultimately identify the taxpayers that would become 
subject to a specific State´s tax jurisdiction. To this end, we argued that the principle should 
materialize itself in the form of tax connecting factors relying on indicia whose presence in the 
territory concerned is visible and easily ascertainable and further allows us to assume that the 
taxpayer is in a position to (effectively or potentially) use and enjoy the State´s services and 
infrastructures1225. Subsequently, we concluded that a company carrying out an economic activity 
within a sovereign territory may be regarded as a potential beneficiary of the public services and 
infrastructures provided by such State. What is more, we argued that a company selling goods or 
providing services by remote means to the market of a certain State may equally be regarded as 
                                                          
1222 HOOR, O.R.; O´DONNELL, K. (2015), p. 933 and 937.  
1223 Section 5.2.3.1. 
1224 New PEs are likely to result from the revision of article 5.4 and 5.5 and, insofar the location of the new PEs coincide 
with the location of the market of the non-resident enterprise, the objective of the BEPS project may incidentally be 
achieved. For example, online retailers are likely to use storage facilities for a quick delivery of products to their 
customers. This being so, if these facilities are deemed to constitute a PE (e.g. for not being preparatory or auxiliary), a 
PE will arise in the market jurisdiction and profits that may arguably be attributed to it will fall under the scope of the 
market State´s tax jurisdiction.  
1225 Section 4.2.1. 
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a potential beneficiary of the benefits of such State, even though the number of benefits within 
its reach and its effective use is expected to be lower in these scenarios1226.  
It has been argued that the PE was born precisely with this aim, as a manifestation of the benefit 
principle in the form of a tax connecting factor1227. However, we then reached the conclusion that 
the PE rule in its current form does not seem to effectively accomplish its original mission, as it 
does not exhaust all possible situations in which access to public benefits may be assumed1228. In 
other words, it does not appear to be as consistent with the benefit principle as it may be expected 
to be. 
The previous section demonstrated that the amendments to the clause suggested by Action 7 do 
not have any true impact in this regard, however desirable their adoption may be considered to 
be for other reasons. In particular, they proved to be useless in ensuring taxation at the level of 
the market jurisdictions despite their legitimate demands under both the benefit principle and 
the postulates of the BEPS project1229. 
This ultimately demonstrates that any attempt to ensure a better consistency between the rule 
and the principle necessarily demands a more profound reconsideration on the current scope of 
the clause. This is precisely what we intend to do in the present Section, departing from the 
considerations we have exposed in the present study regarding the role that the benefit principle 
should play as well as the implicit objective of the BEPS project as regards this rule. To do so, we 
will first raise the question as to whether all the situations comprised within the current clause 
indeed allow us to assume the potential access to the benefits provided by the PE-State by the 
corporate taxpayer (section 5.2.3.3.1). Subsequently, we will ask ourselves the opposite question: 
are there situations beyond those explicitly covered by the PE clause in which the potential access 
to public benefits by the company may be presumed? (section 5.2.3.3.2). As the response will be 
positive, we will discuss a specific proposal in the following subsections (sections 5.2.3.3.3 – 
5.2.3.3.5). 
 
5.2.3.3.1. Do all the situations covered under the PE clause allow us to assume the potential 
accessibility to benefits? 
It has often been argued that the PE was originally conceived as a piece of evidence of the 
potential access by the non-resident enterprise to the public benefits provided by the PE-State, 
thereby justifying the imposition of taxes by the latter on the profits obtained by the non-resident 
taxpayer that could arguably be attributed to such PE. However, the question remains as to 
whether all the situations comprised in the clause1230 truly allow us to make this assumption. 
                                                          
1226 Section 4.2.2.2.3. 
1227 We found the benefit principle among the most common theoretical principles supposedly underlying source-based 
taxation (section 3.3.2) and, most notably, the permanent establishment threshold (section 3.3.3). See also 
DOERNBERG, R.L.; HINNEKENS, L.; HELLERSTEIN, W.; JINYAN, L. (2001), p. 349. 
1228 Section 4.2.3.3 and SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 559: “a PE is merely a piece of evidence of economic allegiance”. 
1229 Section 5.2.3.2.4. 
1230 We analyzed the content of the clause back in Section 3.3.5. 
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We believe the question should be responded positively with respect to most of the scenarios 
covered by the PE concept. This is for example the case of the fixed POB through which the non-
resident enterprise carries out a business in the host jurisdiction on a relatively permanent basis 
(article 5.1 of the MCs). In fact, it is not difficult to presuppose that a non-resident company 
carrying out a business activity through any of the examples of POB given by article 5.2 (i.e. places 
of management, branches, offices, factories, workshops, mines, oil or gas wells, quarries and 
other places of extraction of natural resources) would be in a position to use and/or enjoy, to a 
greater or lesser extent, the public services and infrastructures present in the State concerned. 
The assumption remains valid (not to say stronger) in scenarios involving the presence of a 
building site or a construction/installation project in the host jurisdiction for a certain time period, 
as envisaged in article 5.3 of the MCs.  
For its part, the automatic exclusion of the activities listed in article 5.4 of the MCs from the scope 
of the PE clause on the basis that they are deemed to be “of a preparatory or auxiliary nature” is, 
strictly speaking, untenable from the perspective of the benefit principle. The reason is that all 
the listed activities involve the use of a physical POB in the host jurisdiction, a fact that per se 
allow us to assume the potential access to public benefits irrespective of the nature of the 
activities that the non-resident company carries out through it. 
We do however believe that there are situations comprised within the scope of the PE clause 
which do not per se justify the taxation of the profits obtained by the non-resident therein on the 
grounds that there is a presumable enjoyment and/or use of public benefits.  We refer to the 
situations in which the PE arises behind a person or group of persons that are resident in the host 
jurisdiction, either natural or legal, either related or unrelated with the non-resident company. 
This is, for example, the case of a subsidiary providing a fixed POB through which the non-resident 
enterprise carries on its own business (article 5.1 of the MCs), an individual acting as its dependent 
agent (article 5.5 of the MCs)1231 or a team of in-house or outsourced workers engaged by the 
non-resident company to provide services therein (article 5.3.b of the UN MC).  
It is true that the person(s) through which the PE arises (PE-person) is presumably in the position 
to access the benefits provided by such State. However, to the extent it is considered as tax 
resident in this State, it will already be subject to tax therein irrespective of its consideration as a 
PE. Furthermore, its tax liability will commonly encompass its worldwide income, including an 
arm´s length remuneration for the service provided to the non-resident, whether unrelated or 
related with the PE-person (by virtue of the applicable transfer pricing rules following the ALS). 
At this point, we would like to raise two questions. The first one is whether the PE-person could 
be attributed any profit pursuant to the AOA beyond the arm´s length remuneration received 
from the non-resident for its service. We already referred to this issue above in the context of the 
attribution of profits to the new DAPEs resulting from BEPS1232 and the observations made therein 
also apply in the present discussion. That is, the profits that could arguably be attributed to the 
person-PE are likely to be zero or minimal. The second question is whether, in case the PE-person 
could be attributed profits by virtue of its status as a PE, the taxation of the income obtained by 
                                                          
1231 SCHOUERI, L.E.; GÜNTHER, O-C (2011) and article 5.7 of the OECD and US MCs and 5.8 of the UN MC. 
1232 See the considerations on the “single taxpayer” and “dual taxpayer” approaches in Section 5.2.3.2.3. 
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the non-resident company in the PE-State may be justified in benefit terms. Considering that the 
State presumably providing the public benefits (the PE-State) already exerts tax jurisdiction over 
the person-PE for its worldwide income (including the remuneration for its service to the non-
resident company), the answer is likely to be negative. 
All in all, the benefit principle has led us to question the PE clause in its current form, in particular 
the sense of keeping the PE- exemptions in article 5.4 of the MCs as well the sense of considering 
the presence of PEs behind resident taxpayers that are already subject to tax in the host 
jurisdiction. This latter observation would also entail the revision of tax treaties so as to exclude 
these scenarios from the scope of articles 5 and 7.2 and instead rely on the ALS of article 91233. 
We believe the proposals suggested above ensure a better consistency between the PE clause 
and the benefit principle. However, they would be desirable only to the extent States regard this 
rule as an instrument at the exclusive service of the benefit principle. On the contrary, when States 
intend to achieve other or additional policy objectives by means of the PE, this reform may not 
make sense any more. For example, States may wish the PE to encompass only significant value-
creating activities, an approach that would be consistent with the current methodology promoted 
by the OECD to attribute profits to PEs1234. This being so, article 5.4 of the MCs should undoubtedly 
be kept. It may also be the case that States wish the PE to represent a considerable degree of 
involvement of the non-resident company in the economic life of the host jurisdiction1235, thus 
justifying the distinction between dependent and independent agent (articles 5.5 and 5.6 of the 
MCs)1236 as well as the possibility that a person resident in the host jurisdiction constitutes a PE of 
the non-resident company to which profits could be attributed1237. This latter possibility is also 
typically justified on equity grounds1238.   
                                                          
1233 The application of the AOA (most notably its first phase) could be regarded a justifiable only in cases in which the 
PE lacks legal personality and is thus inherently unable to own assets, assume risks, possess capital or conclude 
contracts, thus making it necessary to hypothesize the PE as if it were a “separate and independent enterprise”. To the 
extent the PE materializes in these scenarios under the wing of a person (which, on the contrary, has such capacities), 
we could arguably conclude that article 9 of the MC would apply and the ALS contained in such article could therefore 
help to adjust (if necessary) the relevant remuneration without the need to resort to the economic analysis suggested 
by the AOA. In these cases, article 9 by itself would ensure an appropriate arm´s length remuneration for the subsidiary 
considering the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed and, by extension, an appropriate tax revenue for 
the host State.  
1234 Pursuing this objective by means of the PE would be consistent with the AOA, whose analysis departs from the 
identification of the “significant people functions” (see Section 3.3.4)  
1235 This is actually the supposed rationale behind article 7 (and by extension article 5) of the OECD MC. See 
Commentaries to article 7 of the OECD MC, paragraph 11: “until an enterprise of one State has a permanent 
establishment in another State, it should not properly be regarded as participating in the economic life of that other 
State to such an extent that the other State should have taxing rights on its profits”. 
1236 Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD MC, paragraph 32: “such treatment (that of a DAPE) is to be limited to 
persons who in view of the scope of their authority or the nature of their activity involve the enterprise to a particular 
extent in business activities in the State concerned” as opposed to paragraph 36: “such an agent (the independent one), 
representing a separate enterprise, cannot constitute a permanent establishment of the foreign enterprise”. On the 
contrary, such a distinction cannot be upheld in benefit terms. 
1237 See ARNOLD, B.J. (2011), p. 65 on the PE service of the UN MC: “a source country should be entitled to tax income 
from services only if the involvement of the non-resident service provider in the commercial life of the source country is 
significant”.  
1238 The fact that an enterprise conducting business directly in the source jurisdiction (through a POB) should not be 
taxed differently from an enterprise choosing to conduct business through a separate legal person (e.g. acting as a 
dependent agent, providing a POB for the enterprise, etc.). See EISENBEISS, J. (2016), P. 482-483.  
 
269 
 
Be that as it may, States should reflect on the policy objective(s) they wish to pursue by means of 
the PE threshold. In cases where they merely seek consistency between the PE and the benefit 
principle, the suggestions made in the present section should be at least explored. On the 
contrary, in cases where States regard the PE clause as a means to achieve other or additional 
policy purposes1239, they should first identify them and subsequently reflect on how best the 
wording of the clause may contribute to their accomplishment.  
5.2.3.3.2. Are there situations beyond those covered by the PE clause which allow us to 
assume the potential accessibility to benefits? 
The PE clause merely covers the economic activities that express themselves in the terms required 
in the PE clause. In particular, a common pattern that we found in the four different modalities of 
PEs is that the clause largely equates stable and physical presence with taxable presence1240. The 
question remains as to whether we may think of activities that do not comply with these two 
requirements but whose presence in the territory of a State similarly allows us to presume that 
the non-resident company finds itself in the position to use and/or enjoy the public infrastructures 
or benefits provided by such State1241. 
As regards the stability and permanency requirements, the PE clause leaves out its scope the 
conduction of certain activities insofar the time threshold (explicitly or implicitly) required is not 
reached1242. It is true that a non-resident company conducting an economic activity in the host 
jurisdiction for a period of time not exceeding such threshold may well be in the position to benefit 
from the services provided by such State1243, but it is equally true that shorter periods of presence 
are likely to result in a lower number of benefits within its reach or a reduced degree of use and/or 
enjoyment of them. This being so, the existence of these thresholds should not be considered as 
troublesome from the perspective of the benefit principle. Additionally, its use is also advised 
from a compliance perspective, as an excessive proliferation of PEs in different jurisdictions is 
undesirable. In any event, States should reflect upon the pertinence of having lower or higher 
time thresholds, considering the policy purposes they intend to achieve through the PE clause. 
                                                          
1239 For example, those referred in the previous paragraph or in section 3.3.2. 
1240 Section 3.3.6.2.2 and ESCRIBANO, E. (2015), p. 8. 
1241 This very same question was equally put forward by GADZO, S. (2016), p. 247. 
1242 Indeed, the Commentaries to the OECD MC themselves recognize that “the underlying principle in Article 5 that the 
presence which an enterprise maintains in a Contracting State should be more than merely transitory if the enterprise is 
to be regarded as maintaining a permanent establishment, and thus a taxable presence, in that State” (Commentaries 
to article 5 of the OECD MC, par. 33.1). As regards the fixed POB, the time threshold is not stated explicitly and the 
interpretation of the “permanence” criterion by domestic courts is not entirely consistent, but the Commentaries 
recognize that “permanent establishments normally have not been considered to exist in situations where a business 
had been carried on in a country through a place of business that was maintained for less than six months” 
(Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD MC, par. 6). For its part, the temporal requirement in the construction PE varies 
per treaty (e.g. the OECD and the US MC sets a 12-months period while the UN MC sets a 6-months period). Lastly, the 
agency PE, the clause demands the agent to “habitually exercise” its authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the 
non-resident enterprise (or else, “habitually maintains” a stock of goods or merchandise in the host jurisdiction under 
the UN MC). The Commentaries intend to shed some light on the interpretation of the term “habitually”: “the extent 
and frequency of activity necessary to conclude that the agent is “habitually exercising” contracting authority will 
depend on the nature of the contracts and the business of the principal. It is not possible to lay down a precise frequency 
test” (Commentaries to article 5 of the OECD MC, par. 33.1). 
1243 SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 559-560: “the circumstance that short-term business operations may accumulate substantial 
profits from domestic sources indicates on the contrary that the taxpayer benefits substantially from the infrastructure 
of the host country, even though no PE exists”.  
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As regards the need to be physically present in the host jurisdiction, the PE excludes economic 
activities that do not any entail a physical presence in the territory however much they allow the 
company to reach its market by the remote supply of goods and services1244. Back in Chapter 4, 
we provided numerous arguments to sustain that a company trading remotely with customers 
residing in a State without being physically present in its territory would still be in a position to 
use, enjoy or, at least, indirectly benefit from the State´s services and infrastructures1245. This fact, 
coupled with the undeniable increasing ability to conduct business remotely1246, makes it 
necessary to broaden the scope of the PE so as to accommodate these situations.  
In a nutshell, the abovementioned considerations reveal that PE has ceased to be the only valid 
indicator of the potential accessibility of the non-resident company to the benefits provided by 
the host State1247.  
In the next section we will proceed to suggest a normative proposal intended to ensure a greater 
level of consistency between the PE and the benefit principle, in the light of the considerations 
exposed above. In doing so, we will incidentally contribute to achieve the objective of the BEPS 
project as regards the PE threshold, i.e. taxation at the level of the market jurisdiction1248. 
 
5.2.3.3.3. Exploring the possibility of an additional PE-fiction in the form of a quantitative 
threshold 
The finding that the current PE clause may generally be regarded as consistent with the benefit 
assumption (Section 5.2.3.3.1) leads us to advocate for the preservation of the current threshold 
at both the treaty and the domestic level (i.e. the traditional relationship between articles 5 and 
7 of the MCs). Incidentally, it cannot be denied that the PE has historically served well in 
transactions involving cross-border scenarios, having given rise to an already established and 
consolidated 120-years history doctrine and jurisprudence enlightening its interpretation, along 
with a variety of tailor-made methodologies to attribute profits to it. This results in the direct 
rejection of proposals involving the replacement by current article 5 with an entirely brand new 
standard1249.  
                                                          
1244 Section 3.3.6.2.2 
1245 Section 4.2.2.2.2. 
1246 Section 3.3.6.2.2. 
1247 Eisenbeiss states that “countries increasingly come to the realization that economic allegiance, and thus a justified 
tax claim, can exist in situations outside the scope of the current PE threshold” and that the PE “does not provide a fair 
allocation of taxing rights and thus violates the notion of inter-nation equity”, a principle we linked with the benefit 
principle back in Section 4.2.1. See EISENBEISS, J. (2016), p. 496. In the same vein, see SKAAR, A.A. (1991), p. 559: “a PE 
is merely a piece of evidence of economic allegiance”. 
1248 Section 5.2.3.1. 
1249 Most notably, the “significant presence test” suggested by the OECD itself in the course of the BEPS project. The 
proposal sought to replace the existing PE concept with a new test based on three possible alternative proxies: a) 
relationships with customers or users extending over 6 months combined with a certain degree of physical presence 
(through a POB or a DAPE); b) sale of goods or services to customers in the country, e.g. through a website in local 
language; and c) supplying goods or services to customers in the country resulting from or involving systematic data-
gathering or contributions of content from persons in the country. See OECD (2014): BEPS Action 1: addressing the tax 
challenges of the digital economy, p. 146. Along the same lines, Schön suggests the replacement of the PE clause by a 
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In the present section we will assess the advisability (along with the technical feasibility) of 
adopting a new PE deeming rule aimed at supplementing the current threshold, thus adding a 
new paragraph to current article 5 of the MCs. This approach is consistent with the traditional 
tendency to respond to structural changes in international business by aggregating new fictions 
to the clause, i.e. deemed inclusions in the definition of a permanent establishment despite the 
basic conditions not being satisfied1250. 
We believe the new rule should ideally target remote sales made by a supplier resident in one of 
the Contracting States to customers located in the other contracting State in scenarios where the 
gross annual receipts derived from such sales exceed a certain quantitative threshold. To date, 
this approach has already been explored and advocated by a considerable number of scholars1251 
and organizations1252. While our proposal is undeniably inspired by the ideas expressed by this 
notable group of academics, we intend to identify their respective shortcomings and further 
provide with a few possible solutions to counteract them.  
Justification under the benefit principle 
The primary objective we intend to pursue by means of this new PE fiction is a better consistency 
between the benefit principle and the PE threshold in the light of the conclusions reached 
throughout the present study. 
The proposed rule essentially relies on the level of revenues derived by remote transactions 
which, by their own nature, do not require physical presence for their conclusion.  As we argued 
elsewhere1253, having a market in a certain State automatically makes the non-resident supplier a 
presumable beneficiary to the benefits defrayed by such State, either directly or indirectly. A 
presumption that tends to be stronger as revenues get higher1254.  
The proposal may be challenged on the basis that it grants distinct tax treatment to e-commerce 
and traditional commerce, thus compromising the principle of neutrality and giving rise to 
                                                          
quantitative threshold based on gross revenues obtained from sales and provision of services to customers in a given 
jurisdiction (SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 99-104. 
1250 SKAAR, A. (1991), p. 15-16 and PINTO, D. (2003), p. 80, 193-194. The most prominent examples being the clauses 
targeting construction projects (see section 3.3.5.2) or the petroleum-related industries. 
1251 Although the first comprehensive proposal may be found in AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), it has impregnated subsequent 
recommendations, e.g. HELLERSTEIN, W. (1997), p. 497-502 (US domestic income tax level), MCLURE, C.E. (Jr.) (2000), 
COCKFIELD, A. (2003), PINTO, D. (2003), p. 207-231, SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 92 and 99-104 (although he prefers the 
replacement of the PE clause by this test), AVI-YONAH, R.; HALABI, O. (2014) and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 289-302. 
1252 Although the OECD has not provided a definite proposal in this regard, its “significant economic presence” test may 
be regarded as somehow consistent with our approach, as it relies on factors we believe to be relevant. See OECD 
(2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 107-111. 
1253 Sections 4.2.2.2.2 and 5.2.3.3.2. 
1254 GADZO, S. (2016), p. 270: “the total amount of revenue taxpayer derives from a specific country is probably a good 
proxy for both public benefits related to the market access therein and for the amount of value created for the enterprise 
on the demand side” and p. 290: “the total amount of revenue non-resident derives from customers located in a country 
signals that he enjoys significant benefits linked with the existence of the market therein”. Along the same lines, albeit 
not mentioning explicitly the benefit principle, see OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax 
challenges of the digital economy, p. 107-108: “as a general matter, revenue that is generated on a sustained basis from 
a country could be considered to be one of the clearest potential indicators of the existence of a significant economic 
presence”. 
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distorting effects1255. The generation of distortions is inherent in any kind of tax and CITs are no 
exception, as they are likely to condition a considerable number of business decisions1256. 
Undoubtedly, either the adoption or the non-adoption of the new proposed PE fiction are prone 
to give rise to distortive effects, thus conditioning the choice as to how to approach the market 
of a certain State. 
The non-adoption of the new threshold along with the preservation of the PE clause as it currently 
stands entails the infringement of the neutrality principle, as the clause would merely affect 
companies reaching the market of a State by means of a physical presence therein, thus 
exempting from source-based taxation competing companies in a comparable situation which, on 
the contrary, choose to access the market by remote means1257. On the other hand, the adoption 
of the new fiction may equally infringe the principle, as it would ensure that both types of 
companies are subject source-based taxation but in a distinct manner. This is because the first 
company would immediately become subject to tax therein – irrespective of its level of sales - 
insofar any profits could have attributed to its PE, while the second one would only be subject to 
tax at source once its gross sales exceed a certain quantitative threshold.  
Departing from the self-evident fact that both options are likely to prompt distortions, the second 
one is preferable on the basis of the benefit principle. This principle does not only entitle the 
market jurisdiction to tax in both situations but also justifies the asymmetry identified above on 
the basis that the presumption of enjoyment of public benefits is weaker in cases the company 
access a market by remote means1258. This being so, it seems desirable to make traditional sellers 
subject to source-based taxation irrespective of its level of sales (on the basis that the presumable 
use and/or enjoyment of public benefits is always greater when the company is physically present 
in the State) while requiring e-sellers to reach a de minimis sales threshold (as e-sellers not 
reaching such threshold may have presumably enjoyed the benefits of the State to a very limited 
extent).  
 
Objective scope 
 
                                                          
1255 Back in 1998 the OECD included neutrality among a set of principles that should inspire a potential tax reform 
targeting e-commerce scenarios, along with efficiency, certainty/simplicity, effectiveness/fairness and flexibility. See 
OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 20: “taxation 
should seek to be neutral and equitable between forms of business activities (…) In this sense, neutrality also entails that 
the tax system raises revenue while minimizing discrimination in favor of, or against, any particular economic choice”.  
1256 Section 4.1. 
1257 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 42. 
1258 Sections 4.2.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.2.3. 
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The new PE fiction should ideally cover “remote transactions”1259 involving the conclusion of 
contracts for the sale of goods or services between two or more parties by remote means1260. 
These goods and services can be either tangible or intangible and thus be delivered through 
conventional channels (e.g. tangible goods ordered online) or completely electronically (e.g. 
digital goods or electronically supplied services)1261. The remote booking or order of services to 
be furnished physically will be left out of the scope of the clause for one main reason. The 
obligation to pay can be (in fact it is likely to be) postponed until the time the service is effectively 
provided, a fact that can generate unjustified distortions in the context of the tax collection 
system we will later propose.  
The expression should encompass transactions carried out by all sort of remote means, including 
but not limited to the Internet, telephone (e.g. conclusion of contracts through call centers) and 
ordinary mail (e.g. catalogue shopping)1262. The reason why all remote sales should equally fall 
under the scope of the new clause is the fact that the presumable accessibility to the benefits 
provided by the market States is equivalent in the three scenarios. In addition, a clause solely 
relying on digital transactions1263 gives rise to certain risks, as companies may feel tempted to 
circumvent it by using their digital platforms to display the products and further route their 
customers to make a call to perform the final purchase1264. 
The provision should be drafted in deliberately broad terms, thereby omitting further qualitative 
specifications intended to ring-fence its scope in an unjustified manner. We believe it is necessary 
to make this clarification due to the widespread tendency to include this sort of extra 
requirements of qualitative nature in the clauses proposed by both the academia and the 
OECD1265, commonly based on the belief that the volume of sales does not per se proves a regular, 
                                                          
1259 Avi-Yonah´s 2014 proposal explicitly refers to “remote sales”, although we believe the definitions suggested for 
article 3.1.f) and 3.1.o) of the MC are manifestly insufficient (“the term “remote sale” means a sale into a Contracting 
State (…) the term “a sale into a Contracting State” means a sale in which the location where the product or service sold 
is received by the purchaser, based on the location indicated by instructions for delivery that the purchaser furnishes to 
the seller, is within that Contracting State). See AVI-YONAH, R.; HALABI, O. (2014). For his part, Gadzo endorses Avi-
Yonah´s 2014 proposal but fails to provide any useful guidance on how to interpret the expression (GADZO, S. (2016), 
p. 289-302) 
1260 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 108. 
1261 The first phenomenon is commonly referred to as “indirect” or offline e-commerce while the latter is known as 
“direct” or “online” e-commerce. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of 
the digital economy, p. 55. The second one is gaining weight over the years: “through digitization of information, 
including text, sound, and visual images, an increasing number of goods and services can be delivered digitally to 
customers increasingly remote from the location of the seller”. A long list of examples of electronically supplied services 
may be found in EU Commission (2014): Explanatory notes on the EU VAT changes to the place of supply of 
telecommunications, broadcasting and electronic services that enter into force in 2015, p. 83-88. 
1262 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 107-108. 
1263 The following proposals only target digital/electronic transactions: AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 535-541, MCLURE, C.E. 
(Jr.) (2000) and PINTO, D. (2003), p. 207-231. 
1264 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 108. 
1265 HELLERSTEIN, W. (1997), p. 501, HINNEKENS, L. (1998), p. 195-199 (suggesting a facts-and-circumstances test), 
OECD (2014): BEPS Action 1: addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 143-145 (the “significant digital 
presence” test targeting solely enterprises engaged in “fully dematerialized digital activities”), OECD (2015): Final 
Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 109-111 (suggesting the 
supplementation of the quantitative threshold with digital and user-based factors) and HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. 
(2015), p. 23-26, among many others. 
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purposeful and sustained participation in the host jurisdiction1266. What the majority of these 
requisites do is predetermine the means through which remote sales ought to be conducted in 
order to fall under the scope of the PE fiction. We will now proceed to explain the three reasons 
why we believe this approach is unfortunate. 
Firstly, the only reason why we suggest the adoption of this new PE fiction is the fact that we 
believe market jurisdictions should be entitled to a share on the non-residents taxable income on 
the basis that the latter is presumably benefiting directly or indirectly from the government´s 
public investments. In this context, the means used to reach such market (e.g. website, software 
smartphone app, call center) are of no concern and thereby should not play any role when the 
time comes to draft the rule. While it is true that the use of certain communication systems may 
presumably entail a slightly greater use and/or enjoyment of public benefits than others, we 
believe this does not justify asymmetries in the rule.  
Secondly, the inclusion of references to certain traits of today´s digital business models may first 
give the impression that the clause is conveniently up-to-date. However, it goes without saying 
that the digital economy is an ever-evolving reality: what is popular today may fall into oblivion 
tomorrow. This means that references to these features may render the clause obsolete 
overnight. While domestic tax regulations may be amended with relative ease, the same cannot 
be said of tax treaties, which tend to remain in force for decades until further negotiations take 
place. In this context, it is important to draft an enduring rule that is capable of fulfilling its 
function for a relatively long period of time. These arguments bring us to advise against references 
to, for example, electronic applications (the “apps”)1267 or the existence of a website in local 
language and/or with local domain1268. 
Thirdly, the insertion of requirements of a qualitative nature in the clause entails a higher level of 
complexity when the time comes to interpret and apply the clause along with a higher expected 
number of tax disputes, while a quantitative threshold has the virtue of being straightforward and 
certain1269.  
Lastly, we would like to refer to a specific group of qualitative factors that are commonly used in 
the tests proposed by the academia and the OECD. We are referring to user-based factors, e.g. 
                                                          
1266 HINNEKENS, L. (1998), p. 197 and OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of 
the digital economy, p. 107 and 111 (“total revenue, however, may not by itself suffice to evidence a non-resident 
enterprise-s regular and sustained participation in the economic life of a country”).  
1267 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 25-26. Statistics reveal the unstoppable growth in cell phone usage, resulting 
in greater time spent in “apps” and increased expenditure in them. However, there is no guarantee that their popularity 
is going to last. See for example: http://www.smartinsights.com/mobile-marketing/mobile-marketing-
analytics/mobile-marketing-statistics/   
1268 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 109. The 
OECD departs from the assumption that having a website using a local domain, translated into local language, or 
displaying prices in local currency, etc. constitute sufficient evidence of an adequate level of integration of the non-
resident enterprise in the local market. The fact is that these factors may have lost their relevance over the decades. 
For example, in-built translation services in search platforms and websites (e.g. Google translate) make it increasingly 
unnecessary to make use of a local domain or translate the website. This reveals that reference to these sort of factors 
may be considered as already obsolete.  
1269 Cockfield critics Hinnekens´ facts-and-circumstances test on the basis that the US experience on a similar domestic 
test produced countless problems. See COCKFIELD, A. (2003), p. 10-11. 
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the number of users of a digital platform1270, the amount of time they spend in such platform1271 
or the volume data collected from them1272. This set of factors responds to one of the most 
lucrative business opportunities that the digital economy offers to enterprises: the ability to 
collect personal1273 and non-personal data about their users/customers and further monetize it 
by means of, inter alia, improving or customizing existing products and services, conceiving new 
ones that better suit the needs identified in the market or offering the possibility to place targeted 
digital advertising to potential advertisers1274.  
Data is often the invisible price users pay for seemingly free digital services. In this context, one 
may observe that this reality is in fact not much different from the sale of an electronically 
supplied service comprised in our proposed clause, the only difference being that the user is not 
paying directly for the service but rather providing his data, whose exploitation is very likely to 
ultimately end up in profits. Both situations may also be regarded as comparable from the 
perspective of the benefit principle, in the sense that the State where the users are located are 
not only providing a “market” (in a broad sense) but also the necessary infrastructures to facilitate 
the access to the relevant platform1275.  
However, while fully acknowledging this reality, we believe references to these factors should be 
left out of the wording of the clause for the time being, as the potential application and 
enforcement of a threshold relying on these factors is likely to generate countless practical issues.  
Subjective scope 
The proposed clause necessarily requires the identification of the two persons involved in the 
remote transaction, namely the supplier and the customer. This is one of the major challenges 
that the drafting of the new PE fiction poses, and we suspect this is reason why all the proposals 
on the table tend to be (either deliberately or inadvertently) particularly ambiguous in this 
respect. 
As regards the taxpayer, it must be a person resident in one of the Contracting States for the 
purposes of the relevant tax treaty and further carrying on a business activity1276, thereby 
excluding C2C transactions. The remote seller should be the person which concludes the remote 
sale of the good/service1277. The rule may be however easily circumvented by a number of 
strategies. Firstly, the taxpayer may fragment its selling activities with customers in a given State 
among a number of related parties resident in different States so as to ensure that the 
                                                          
1270 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 110 and 
HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 24-26.  
1271 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 25. 
1272 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 110-111. 
1273 Personal data may be provided voluntarily, observed or inferred. For further information, see OECD (2015): Final 
Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 40-41. 
1274 Task Force on Taxation of the Digital Economy (2013): Report to the French Minister for the Economy and Finance 
and the Minister for Industrial Recovery (popularly known as the Collin & Colin report), p. 33-60 and OECD (2015): Final 
Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 68-70. 
1275 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 25 and section 4.2.2.2.2. 
1276 Article 7 of the MCs applies to an “enterprise of a Contracting State”, which in turn mean, according to article 3, an 
enterprise/business carried on by a person (individual, company or any other body of persons) that is resident of a 
Contracting State. 
1277 Article 3.1.k) of the MC suggested in AVI-YONAH, R.; HALABI, O. (2014) (p. 11) defines “remote seller” as a “person 
that makes remote sales”.  
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quantitative threshold of the respective treaties is never surpassed1278. Secondly, the taxpayer 
may equally resort to a related party resident in a State with which the Market State has a treaty 
in force that lacks the new PE fiction, thus impeding the latter State to exercise its taxing rights1279. 
Thirdly, the taxpayer may also channel its sales through an unrelated entity acting as distributor 
or reseller1280.  
There are at least a couple of options to address the first scenario. Firstly, the clause can be 
applied on a related-group basis rather than on a separate-entity basis. The aggregation rule may 
operate in all circumstances1281, as a rebuttable presumption1282 or merely under specific 
conditions in the form of a SAAR1283. We believe the first option is preferable. Even though one 
could expect this would be unjustifiably burdensome, we believe the group will be in the position 
to calculate the consolidated amount of gross sales with relative ease assuming that one of the 
two proposed collection systems1284 is finally implemented. In the absence of an anti-
fragmentation rule of this kind, the recently suggested principal purpose test rule (article X of the 
post-BEPS OECD MC) is equally suited to confront these risks1285. 
As regards the customer, it is the person (either an individual or entity, business or final consumer) 
purchasing the good or service. Be that as it may, either the customer or the act of consumption 
should be somehow related to the territory of the other contracting State of the treaty. Proposals 
under review define this connection in different ways, inter alia, the place where the goods or 
services sold are consumed/used1286 or otherwise received by the purchaser1287, or where the 
consumer is physically present at the time of the consumption1288.  
                                                          
1278 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 108. 
1279 A situation that may, at best, be addressed by means of a LOB clause insofar the related party does not constitute 
a qualified person for the purposes of the treaty. See Section 3.2.3.2. 
1280 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 537. Some of these distributors have ultimately turned into huge cybermalls offering a 
vast catalogue of products provided by small-sized suppliers. Amazon, EBay and AliExpress find themselves between 
the major worldwide e-distributors.  
1281 PINTO, D. (2003), p. 215-216. 
1282 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 108: “this 
aggregation rule could be introduced as a rebuttable presumption, with the taxpayer being able to demonstrate that it 
did not artificially fragment the distance selling activities in order to manipulate the revenue threshold”.  
1283 Likewise, the BEPS project suggested the addition of an anti-fragmentation rule (article 5.4.1 of the post-BEPS OECD 
MC), intended to prevent an enterprise and its closely related enterprises from fragmenting a “cohesive business 
operation” into several small operations in order to qualify for the PE-exemption envisaged in article 5.4. The clause 
does not allow always allow the aggregation of activities, as it is restricted to cases where these enterprises conducted 
“complementary functions” part of a “cohesive business operations”. See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 7 
– Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status, p. 39. This is the option preferred by GADZO, 
S. (2016), p. 270. 
1284 See the subsection “compliance and enforcement”. 
1285 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate 
circumstances. The clause is drafted in p. 55 while example J in the Commentaries to the clause (p. 64) refers to a 
comparable situation that falls under the scope of the anti-abuse rule.  
1286 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 536. Hongler and Pistone use the term “domicile” but in fact intend to refer to the place 
where the user “uses” the relevant digital service. See HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 26 and footnote n. 55. 
1287 AVI-YONAH, R.; HALABI, O. (2014), p. 11. 
1288 This is the approach we infer from the proposals suggested by the OECD (“in-country customers”; “transactions 
concluded with customers in the country concerned”), Schön (“customers in a given jurisdiction”), Pinto (“country where 
a customer is located”) and Gadzo (“where the customer base for goods and services of an enterprise is located”). See 
OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 108, SCHÖN, W. 
(2009), p. 100, PINTO, D. (2003), p. 220-222 and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 290. 
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Although we believe the place where the consumer is located at the time of the purchase can be 
regarded as a reasonable starting point for our analysis, the explicit reference of this proxy in the 
PE proviso would technically entail the case-by-base assessment of the relevant facts and 
circumstances involving every separate remote transaction which, on top of this, tend to be 
numerous and relatively unimportant in amount1289.  
To avoid an unnecessarily high compliance burden, the clause should rely instead on an indicator 
which could guide us, to the extent possible, towards the State where the consumer is located at 
the time of the act of consumption while at the same being straightforward, manageable and 
relatively easy to enforce by the pertinent operator. In this context, we will put forward three 
indicators that should ideally apply in consecutive order: 
o Digital certificate of residence1290. Tax administrations may issue a digital ID card on 
an annual basis certifying the residence status of the relevant taxpayer. The card can 
initially trust the ordinary place of residence of the taxpayer as declared in its own 
annual tax return, although the tax Administration should always be entitled to rebut 
the presumption considering the domestic tax residence tests in place along with the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the case. This being so, the tax Administration 
may always revoke the digital certificate denying the residence status of the relevant 
taxpayer in its jurisdiction or else issue a new one with a different content.  
We believe this indicator should be the first to be considered, as it is in our view the 
most suitable one. The main reason is that the State of residence of the consumer is 
very likely to coincide, in the case of individuals, with the State where they are 
physically present at the time of the consumption1291 and, in the case of entities, with 
the State to which they are deemed to be somehow linked. Apart from this, the 
certificate is ultimately endorsed by a government and therefore will tend to be up-
to-date, relatively trustworthy and less susceptible to self-interested manipulations 
than other indicators we could use. The major challenge this rule would entail is 
certainly its implementation. In this regard, States adopting the new PE proviso in 
their treaties ought to mutually undertake to set up the necessary domestic 
administrative procedures to make it possible1292.  
In scenarios where States do not have this system in place or where customers lack a 
valid digital certificate (either due to its stateless status or other reasons), the 
following indicator would apply. 
                                                          
1289 See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 100. 
1290 Also suggested, albeit in different terms, by AVI-YONAH, R. (1997, p. 537 and PINTO, D. (2003), p. 221-222. While 
Avi-Yonah merely makes a general reference to this idea, Pinto argues that a trusted third party –as a government 
agency- should be responsible for ensuring its veracity.  
1291 Section 5.2.2.3.1 demonstrated that 90% of the 58 surveyed jurisdictions use residence tests in their PITs based on 
the effective physical presence of the individual within their respective territories. This means that an individual who is 
granted the residency status on these grounds is very likely to find himself in his State of Residence when he makes an 
online purchase throughout the year. 
1292 In case the new proviso is added to the Multilateral Convention to Implement tax treaty measures to prevent BEPS 
(promoted by the G20 and the OECD as a result of the BEPS project), these procedures may be discussed and negotiated 
on a multilateral basis. See http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-
related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf   
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o Address of the customer as specified in the payment instrument1293. Remote sales rely 
on a number of payment methods including, inter alia, bank credit/debit cards, 
PayPal, bank transfers and, less commonly, gift cards and cash on delivery.  
 
Table 39 - Most popular payment methods of online shoppers worldwide as of 2016  
Source: Statista1294.  
 
 
This table reveals that banks are behind a considerable volume of the payment 
methods used worldwide to purchase online. In other words, if we aggregate the 
percentages corresponding to credit/debit/prepaid cards, PayPal1295 and bank 
transfers, we shall conclude that the payment process of 94% of online purchases is 
ultimately run by a financial institution in which the customer has a bank account. 
Any person willing to open a bank account is commonly expected to supply certain 
personal information to do so, including its postal address. 
The customer´s address in the hands of the financial institution is certainly not as 
trustworthy and convenient as the first suggested proxy for various reasons. Firstly, 
                                                          
1293 Avi-Yonah and Halabi suggest using this indicator solely in scenarios where the seller has no other means to know 
the customer´s address (by means of, e.g. the billing address or the delivery address). See AVI-YONAH, R.; HALABI, O. 
(2014), p. 11. 
1294 https://www.statista.com/statistics/508988/preferred-payment-methods-of-online-shoppers-worldwide/ An 
overview of the preferred methods per region may be found here: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/676385/preferred-payment-methods-of-online-shoppers-worldwide-by-region/  
1295 PayPal and its competitors (e.g. Google Wallet or WePay inter alia) are platforms that allow the customer to use 
their funding sources (bank account and credit/debit card) to buy online in a streamlined and safe way. See 
https://www.paypal.com/uk/webapps/mpp/ua/servicedescription-full  
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it is unlikely to be up-to-date, as the client has few incentives to report its changes of 
address to the bank. Secondly, the day will come when the customer´s postal address 
will be literally of no concern to the banks, as their clients are increasingly demanding 
to be contacted online. This tendency may ultimately render this indicator obsolete 
in just a few decades.  
Lastly, a solution still needs to be found for the remaining 6% of remote sales which 
are conducted outside the radar of financial institutions and to which this indicator 
cannot apply. We are referring to cases where customers choose to pay in cash (4%) 
or by other means (2%), which may well be anonymous, e.g. gift cards1296 or virtual 
currencies as Bitcoin. It is in these scenarios where the following indicator comes into 
play. 
o Address explicitly provided by the customer to the remote seller1297. Customers are 
often required to submit a postal address when setting up a new user account in a 
website (where sales may eventually take place) and, most likely, during the purchase 
process (e.g. billing address or delivery address).  
This indicator is ideally suited for the so-called offline e-commerce, where tangible 
goods are ordered online and subsequently delivered by regular mail. In these cases, 
the indicator will fulfill its function perfectly, as it will guide us directly to the place 
where the customer is physically located.  The same cannot be said, however, for 
online e-commerce concerning digital goods and electronically supplied services, 
where the customer´s postal address has no relevance whatsoever. As a result, 
purchasers may not be required to provide a postal address at all or, even if they do, 
they will have little or no incentive to do it correctly1298. Yet, they will rarely feel 
tempted to give a false address either, as the application or non-application of the 
new PE proviso should have no impact on the price of the transaction and therefore 
should be tax neutral for the customer.  
The potential adoption of the new PE-deeming rule must be necessarily accompanied by 
adjustments in the remote purchase processes to guarantee its effective enforceability. In other 
words, States implementing this rule should strive to ensure, by means of the necessary domestic 
regulations, that purchase platforms effectively require the submission of the digital certificate of 
residence – where applicable – and, in any event, the customer´s postal address, as this latter 
indicator would operate as a sort of closing clause in cases where the first two indicators cannot 
apply. 
We are fully aware of the fact that these three indicators may not always guide us to the State we 
intend them to do, i.e. that where the customer is located at the time of the purchase. We 
                                                          
1296 A method that has been used by 23% of online shoppers in America and 8% in Australia/New Zealand, Africa/Middle 
East and Western Europe. See  https://www.statista.com/statistics/676385/preferred-payment-methods-of-online-
shoppers-worldwide-by-region/ 
1297 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 536, PINTO, D. (2003), p. 221 and AVI-YONAH, R.; HALABI, O. (2014), p. 11. 
1298 PINTO, D. (2003), p. 221-222. 
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however take this risk, as we feel compelled to sacrifice accuracy in favor of practicability and 
enforceability. 
States may wish instead to rely on more accurate indicators at the expense of compliance costs. 
In this context, proxies suggested by the European Commission in the framework of the new VAT 
regime on electronic services may well serve as inspiration1299.  
Table 40 – Proxies aimed at locating the customer for the purposes of the European VAT regime on 
telecommunications, broadcasting and electronic services 
Source: Explanatory notes provided by the European Commission before the 2015 
implementation of the new regime1300. 
 
                                                          
1299 EU Commission (2014): Explanatory notes on the EU VAT changes to the place of supply of telecommunications, 
broadcasting and electronic services that enter into force in 2015, p. 54-73 and 89-91. Lamensch notes that the new 
VAT rules on electronic services result in legal uncertainty and an unacceptable compliance burden for e-suppliers. See 
LAMENSCH, M. (2012). 
1300 EU Commission (2014): Explanatory notes on the EU VAT changes to the place of supply of telecommunications, 
broadcasting and electronic services that enter into force in 2015, p. 61. 
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Quantitative threshold 
The new PE fiction should apply only to the extent remote sales conducted between the above-
mentioned parties are significant from a quantitative point of view. This can be measured by 
means of a quantitative threshold written in absolute terms - e.g. a yearly minimum amount of 
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revenue1301 - or relative terms - e.g. a minimum percentage in relation to either the MNC´s 
consolidated sales1302 or a national macroeconomic factor1303.  
Either of these options appear to be equally consistent with the benefit principle, so we base our 
decision to opt for a fixed de minimis fixed revenue-based threshold primarily on simplicity 
grounds, as it is more straightforward than the rest of the options and further provides a 
considerable degree of legal certainty1304.  
The threshold should be expressed in gross revenue terms, irrespective of the fact that income 
taxation (and PE taxation is not an exception) is commonly imposed on a net basis1305. It seems 
unreasonable to compel all taxpayers conducting remote sales in a State to calculate the net 
profits derived from such in any event just to determine whether the relevant threshold is 
satisfied, as this involves a massive administrative burden. On the contrary, a gross revenue-based 
threshold would automatically exempt taxpayers not exceeding the threshold from the costs of 
complying with the market State tax regulations. This is not to say that the calculation of the tax 
liability derived from this clause should ultimately rely on the net profits obtained by the taxpayer, 
as it will be later discussed. 
The establishment of a monetary threshold in a treaty involves certain risks Arnold warns us 
about1306. Firstly, reciprocity may not always be desirable for policy reasons1307 and, even when it 
does, it may not always be easily achieved due to currency fluctuations1308. Secondly, monetary 
limits may soon lose their effectiveness due to the impact of inflation, unless adjustments are 
foreseen in the treaty itself. Thirdly and lastly, States should try to be as consistent as possible 
when negotiating the quantity of the threshold in their respective treaties so as to ameliorate 
                                                          
1301 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), HELLERSTEIN, W. (1997), p. 497-502, PINTO, D. (2003), p. 207-231 and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 
289-302, 
1302 This is the preferred approach of the Association Française de Femmes Fiscalistes. See OECD (2014): BEPS Action 1: 
comments received on public discussion draft, p. 7: “the PE definition could possibly be reviewed by introducing some 
materiality threshold based on the level of business of an MNE in a foreign country in which it has no reported corporate 
tax presence (subsidiary or branch). As an example, if more than x% of consolidated sales of an MNE headquartered in 
country A is realized in a foreign country B, and subject to meeting other criteria as per (revised) Article 5 of the OECD 
Model Convention, the MNE headquartered in country A could be deemed to have a permanent establishment in country 
B”. 
1303 Hongler/Pistone suggest a reference to the average income or a GDP in HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 25 
1304 ARNOLD, B.J. (2003b), p. 94, COCKFIELD, A. (2003), p. 12 and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 271-272. 
1305 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 536 and ARNOLD, B.J. (2003b), p. 94. Pinto warns against the risk that gross sales may not 
correlate with the net income ultimately allocable to a jurisdiction (PINTO, D. (2003), P. 215), while the OECD is of the 
opinion that gross revenue in a reliable proxy for net income in the context of the digital economy, as e-retailers often 
need to make a substantial up-front investment of resources (including capital and labor) at the beginning of their 
activities but, once this is done, the provision the products and services online frequently requires only limited marginal 
costs (OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, P. 114). 
1306 ARNOLD, B.J. (2003b), p. 94-95. 
1307 Treaties between developed and developing States may place asymmetric thresholds considering their relative 
economic positions and different standards of living.  
1308 Arnold refers to two thresholds comprised in the US-Canada treaty which illustrate two possible approaches in this 
regards. On one hand, the branch tax provision fixes an amount by reference to Canadian dollars when Canada is 
applying the treaty and by reference to the US equivalent of the Canadian dollar amount when the US is applying the 
treaty. This ensures reciprocity, although the amount relevant for the US will fluctuate from time to time. On the other 
hand, the thresholds for employees and entertainers apply irrespective of exchange rates, as amounts are expressed in 
both Canadian and US dollars.  
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risks derived from treaty-shopping practices and the potential application of the most-favored-
nation clause. 
The amount of revenue to be included in the new proviso should ideally be relatively high for 
various reasons. Firstly, this would ensure that income derived from the market jurisdiction 
exceeds the costs of complying with its tax laws1309. Secondly, it would be less prone to distort the 
business choices of the taxpayer1310. Last but not least, a relatively high amount of revenue would 
normally evidence a presumably greater direct/ indirect use and/or enjoyment of the public 
benefits defrayed by the market State. The definition of the exact threshold amount would be up 
to the States concerned, although there is some agreement among scholars that $ 1.000.000 
would be reasonable1311. 
Compliance and enforcement  
Beyond the abovementioned difficulties associated with the design of the new proviso, the most 
notable challenges surely rest in its enforceability. These challenges, if not conveniently 
addressed, can render the rule impracticable, no matter how desirable and theoretically 
justifiable is deemed to be1312.  
A remote seller is likely to lack any sort of physical presence in its market jurisdictions, a 
circumstance that can seriously endanger the effective implementation of the rule due to two 
important barriers the local tax authority is expected to face: information deficit and 
extraterritorial enforcement. 
As regards the first one, tax authorities need information to satisfactorily apply the rule. 
Information that would allow them to first identify the non-resident taxpayer along with its 
relevant remote transactions with in-country customers and, subsequently, assess its tax liability. 
However, tax authorities would face tremendous difficulties when the time comes to access such 
information. While the imposition of unilateral reporting obligations to taxpayers who have 
literally never set foot in its territory may prove to be laborious, if not illegal1313, tax authorities 
would rarely have the capacity and resources to obtain the information by their own means1314. 
On top of this, even assuming that tax authorities manage to gather the relevant information and 
thus are in the position to conclude that the threshold has been overrun, the problem arises as to 
how to collect the resulting tax due. One could expect that a remote seller will normally not have 
any assets in the territory of the market State (e.g. tangible property, bank accounts, etc.) that 
may be subject to confiscation1315. This being so, the only possible way forward is to serve notice 
                                                          
1309 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 536, PINTO, D. (2003), p. 213 and SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 104. 
1310 On the contrary, a low threshold creates a substantial incentive not to invest in a foreign country at all, a result 
which should be avoided at all costs according to SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 104.  
1311 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 536, AVI-YONAH, R.; HALABI, O. (2014), p. 15 and 18, GADZO, S. (2016), p. 293 (he suggests 
to express the amount in special drawing rights, whose value is determined with reference to the four major currencies, 
i.e. USD, GPR, EUR and JPY) 
1312 See HELLERSTEIN, W. (2014) on the importance to align both substantive and enforcement jurisdiction.  
1313 In the absence of international agreements on exchange of information (e.g. Intergovernmental agreements or 
IGAs), extraterritorial reporting requirements are prone to trigger serious conflicts of laws, see PARADA, L. (2016), 
section 2.6. 
1314 GADZO, S. (2016), p. 272. 
1315 DOERNBERG, R.L.; HINNEKENS, L. (1999), p. 341-342 and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 274. 
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of assessment wherever the taxpayer is and ultimately seize its assets located abroad, a practice 
that may potentially compromise the ICJ doctrine expressly prohibiting the extraterritorial 
enforcement of domestic rules1316. On the other hand, Hellerstein suggests a number of domestic 
actions of limited scope that market States can take to ensure, or at least induce, enforceability 
within their reserved domains1317. 
In this context, we will put forward two alternative courses of action. The first one entails the 
establishment of an ad-hoc collection system based on the practice of (refundable) withholding 
taxes while the second one relies on a greater level of bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
among States adopting the new PE proviso. 
The aforementioned ad-hoc collection system has been proposed by some scholars and the OECD 
itself as an effective way to cope with the difficulties associated with both access to information 
and enforcement1318. Withholding taxes play a double role in this regard: they ensure the effective 
monitoring of the covered transactions – along with the collection of the information involving 
those transactions that is relevant for the purposes of the new rule – while forcing the taxpayer 
to comply with the tax rules of a State where it is not physically present1319.  
We will now proceed to define the four different stages in which the process is divided: 
o Imposition of a refundable withholding tax. As a matter of principle, the withholding 
tax should be imposed on the gross amount paid in consideration for any remote 
purchase covered by the new proviso (either business to business -B2B- or business 
to consumers -B2C). This poses significant challenges, in particular those related to 
the determination of both the withholding agent and the applicable tax rate.  
As regards the selection of the withholding agent, it seems logical to first assess 
whether the payer could be entrusted with this task. As a general rule, businesses are 
required to register in many countries (often granted a number or code that identifies 
them as such)1320 and tend to be familiar with withholding tax liabilities. This being so, 
businesses located in the market State and making a remote purchase may 
reasonably be expected to serve as withholding agents in the context of the new 
proposed collection system1321. On the contrary, private consumers are typically 
inexperienced in recordkeeping obligations and withholding tax liabilities, not to 
                                                          
1316 See section 4.3.3 and the judgment by the International Court of Justice “S.S. Lotus” of September 7th 1927, p. 18-
19. 
1317 HELLERSTEIN, W. (2014), p. 348. For example, he wonders whether available technologies can block or interfere 
with the company´s virtual presence in the country if the company fails to comply with its tax obligations (China does). 
If the answer is positive, he wonders whether countries may be willing to employ such technologies to enforce 
compliance with country´s tax obligations. If the answer is negative, he raises the question as to whether companies 
are likely to comply with such obligations to avoid exposure to risk and unresolved tax debts. Alternatively, he suggests 
the imposition of indirect measures, such as withholding requirements, to induce compliance with the country´s tax 
obligations. 
1318 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 537-541, PINTO, D. (2003), p. 207-231, OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – 
Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 113-115 and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 276-282 and 293-294.  
1319 Indeed, withholding taxes are typically used to tax income derived by non-residents who lack a permanent presence 
within their borders. See SIMADER, K. (2013), p. 8-9. 
1320 BRAUNER, Y.; BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2015), p. 13. 
1321 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 114, GADZO, 
S. (2016), p. 293-294. 
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mention the logistical nightmare that the imposition of such obligation would 
undoubtedly entail, reasons why no proposal to date has pursued this approach any 
further1322. 
In view of the risks and disadvantages that the exclusion of B2C remote transactions 
of the proposed system would entail1323, alternatives involving third-parties as 
withholding agents started to be explored. In particular, it has been suggested that 
the agent should be an intermediary somehow involved in the purchase process, e.g. 
the financial institution behind the instrument of payment1324, the company 
ultimately operating the bank card (e.g. Visa, Mastercard, American Express)1325 or 
even the web browser1326.  
We believe financial institutions would be the least bad candidate to play this role for 
two main reasons. Firstly, they find themselves behind 94% of the online purchases 
(see table 40) and may be reasonably expected to be also behind the vast majority of 
the other remote (non-digital) transactions. Secondly, they have an extensive 
experience in complying with withholding tax obligations.  
The process should be as automated and streamlined as possible. The RTvat 
project1327, although originally conceived to counteract VAT carousel frauds, suggests 
the adoption of a technological process whose potential utility in the context of VAT 
online supplies has already been suggested1328.  We believe it could also be of help in 
this context.  
It is essential that the purchase platform allows the withholding agent to first check 
whether the payment falls under the scope of proposed clause and secondly, verify 
the residence of the remote seller and its status of business (e.g. via a digital 
certificate of residence) along with the presumable location of the customer 
according to the three indicators suggested above (i.e. the digital certificate of 
residence, the address linked to the payment instrument and the address explicitly 
provided to the seller). In this context, the secured payment area should contain the 
necessary functionalities to allow the submission of the aforementioned 
information1329.  
Once the relevant information has been communicated by both parties, the system 
would automatically determine whether a withholding tax ought to be imposed and, 
if so, calculate the tax rate by virtue of the applicable tax treaty in place (that signed 
                                                          
1322 There is a broad consensus on the fact that requiring withholding from a private customer is unreasonably 
burdensome and would give rise to an unimaginable level of costs of challenges (PINTO, D. (2003), p. 223, OECD (2015): 
Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 114, BRAUNER, Y.; BÁEZ 
MORENO, A. (2015), p. 17, GADZO, S. (2016), p. 282) that would very rarely pass a cost-benefit test.  
1323 This was indeed the decision taken by, for example BRAUNER, Y.; BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2015) and GADZO, S. (2016), 
p. 281-282 and 293-294, being fully aware of its downsides, most notably those related to the loss of revenue potentially 
suffered by the market State and the lack of neutrality between B2B and B2C comparable transactions (BRAUNER, Y.; 
BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2015), p. 17-18). While these outcomes were ultimately underestimated and even regarded as 
justified under the base-erosion approach in the case of Brauner/Báez, Gadzo viewed it as a clear policy-trade-off 
between the principles of equity and practicability.  
1324 PINTO, D. (2003), p. 223-224, BRAUNER, Y.; BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2015), p. 18 and OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS 
Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 
1325 PINTO, D. (2003), p. 223. 
1326 PINTO, D. (2003), p. 223-224. 
1327 http://www.rtvat.eu/  
1328 This is at least the thesis defended by LAMENSCH, M. (2015), summed up in LAMENSCH, M. (2012). 
1329 LAMENSCH, M. (2012), p. 89-90. 
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between the State where the remote supplier is resident and the market State, i.e. 
where the customer is presumably located) and the domestic tax law of the market 
State.  
The customer would always make one single payment. In case it is deemed to be 
subject to withholding tax, the bank would transfer the net price to the remote seller 
while retaining the withholding tax, which would be subsequently wired it to the 
relevant tax authority in an automated way. In both cases, the agent would send the 
money along with the information concerning the transaction that is deemed to be 
relevant for the purposes of the new proviso (i.e. residency of the seller, location of 
the customer, amount of the payment, etc.)1330. 
While it is true that the process is automatic and the financial institution’s 
cooperation would be minimal1331, certain implementation and compliance costs are 
expected to arise and may negatively impact the agent. This being so, we suggest the 
agent should be allowed to retain a fixed amount per transaction as a consideration 
for the costs of collecting and transferring the tax due, as these costs are expected to 
be correlated with the overall volume of transactions1332. Besides, such fee –if 
sufficiently high- may serve as a positive incentive to promote compliance by an 
otherwise disinterested institution. Either way, non-compliant financial institutions 
could also face monetary penalties. 
Lastly, the selected tax rate should ideally lie somewhere between a low/minimal rate 
and the corporate tax rate in the market State. While low rates appear to be more 
consistent with gross taxation1333, high rates have the virtue of ensuring that the 
taxpayer will have the incentive to effectively comply with the tax rules of the market 
jurisdiction with regard to this clause1334. We should recall at this time that the 
proposed withholding tax is not meant to be final but refundable, and its primary 
objective is no other but to ensure compliance. That said, we would advocate for a 
relatively high tax rate closer to the average effective net corporate tax rate in the 
market State. 
 
o Calculation of the annual remote sales. Once the tax period concerned is over, the 
taxpayer will be required to determine whether the quantitative threshold of the 
proposed proviso has been exceeded. To this end, the taxpayer will consult the 
information sent by the different withholding agents as regards the (covered) remote 
transactions conducted throughout the year with customers presumably located in 
each one of the relevant States and subsequently aggregate the gross revenues 
arising from such transactions. Tax authorities may easily cross-check the outcome of 
this calculation against the information they have at their disposal.  
                                                          
1330 LAMENSCH, M. (2012), p. 89. 
1331 LAMENSCH, M. (2012), p. 90. 
1332 In our view, this solution is more equitable than Pinto´s proposal (1% of the amount of the transaction) precisely 
because costs of compliance are correlated with the volume of transactions rather than their amounts. See PINTO, D. 
(2003), p. 223-224.  
1333 Pinto provides several arguments in favor of a relatively low rate while Brauner/Báez suggest rates of 10% and 15%. 
See PINTO, D. (2003), p. 217-219 and BRAUNER, Y.; BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2015), p. 19-20. 
1334 Avi-Yonah suggests a rate equal to the (nominal) corporate tax rate in the market jurisdiction while Gadzo proposes 
a “sufficiently high” rate as compared to the effective rates of CIT in the market State. See AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 
537-538 and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 281. 
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In case the taxpayer belongs to a MNC, the calculation must be done on a related-
group basis. To this end, one of members of the group (hereinafter the “qualifying 
taxpayer”) should be entrusted with the task of aggregating the gross amounts 
derived by all remote transactions carried out between entities belong to its group 
and customers presumably located in the relevant State. The “qualifying taxpayer” 
may be, for example, the one which obtained the greatest amount of gross revenues 
resulting from its remote sales1335. Again, the calculation should be relatively easy to 
make, as the remote sellers already have the information sent by the withholding 
agents at their disposal. 
Whenever the annual gross sales remain below the threshold, the qualifying taxpayer 
would be entitled to file a return in the Market State to claim for a full refund of the 
withheld amounts1336. In case the de minimis threshold is met, the following stage 
would come into play. 
 
o Submission of a tax return on a net basis1337. The qualifying taxpayer would be 
required to file a tax return on the basis of the net profits that are deemed to be 
attributable to the new PE fiction in accordance with the treaty in place and the 
domestic tax laws of the market State (pursuant to the guidelines we will put forward 
in the next subsection), deducting thereupon the withheld amounts. In view of the 
result, the taxpayer would be entitled to a refund or else be required to pay the 
remaining tax due.   
 
o Alleviation of double taxation at the level of the Residence State. The State where the 
taxpayer(s) reside(s) would be compelled to provide relief from double taxation by 
virtue of the relevant domestic and treaty provisions. 
Both the design of this collection system and its implementation procedure should be subject to 
negotiation at a bilateral level to ensure standardization and enforceability. Ideally, interested 
States could foster the inclusion of this discussion in the potential future negotiations of the 
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax treaty related measures to prevent BEPS1338.   
Beyond the unquestionable virtues of this proposed collection system, it entails great risks that 
should be identified and, eventually, accepted or addressed. Firstly, an approximate 6% of the 
remote sales occur outside the radar of financial institutions according to table 40. We are 
referring to payments made through gift cards, virtual currency or even cash at delivery. While 
the collection of the information relevant for the purposes of the new proviso may still be 
possible, the imposition of the withholding tax is likely to be severely compromised, not to say 
                                                          
1335 Hongler/Pistone argue that the qualifying company should never be a mere shelf company but one which is deemed 
to render “significant people functions” so as to avoid the risk of “accounting rules shopping” (see HONGLER, P.; 
PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 37-38). From our perspective, we believe it is much more straightforward and unambiguous to 
identify the qualifying company by reference to the total amount of gross revenues derived from their remote sales.  
1336 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 538, PINTO, D. (2003), p. 210, GADZO, S. (2016), p. 294. In case withholding taxes were 
imposed on the payments made to two or more related taxpayers, the qualifying company shall split the refund among 
them. 
1337 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 538, PINTO, D. (2003), p. 219-220, GADZO, S. (2016), p. 294. 
1338 http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-
beps.htm  
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impossible. Secondly, the identification by the withholding agent of the transactions that fall 
within the scope of the clause may prove to be troublesome1339.  Thirdly, domestic regulations of 
the market State are likely to prompt compliance obligations on financial institutions which are 
likely to be resident abroad1340, a fact that may hinder and endanger compliance and enforcement 
unless positive incentives and/or penalties prove to be effective. Fourthly, prices for the products 
and services displayed by the remote vendor will inexorably be subject to changes depending on 
the applicable withholding tax rate, thus creating an incentive for customers to manipulate the 
information concerning their postal address under the third proposed rule intended to indicate 
their presumable location. Fifthly, companies not reaching the threshold (e.g. SMCs) would bear 
the negative consequences of the imposition of withholding taxes, as they would have no 
alternative but to wait until the end of the tax period to receive the refund of the amounts 
withheld1341. 
The aforementioned risks may deter States from implementing the proposed collection system. 
In this context, challenges concerning information and enforcement would need to be addressed 
in some other ways. 
At this point, the alternative course of action would rely on a greater level of cooperation among 
States adopting the new proviso.  
States can commit to set up a register for resident taxpayers that wish to conduct remote sales1342. 
Registration should be compulsory and may be conceived as a prerequisite to acquire an official 
license as remote seller in the absence of which the taxpayer would face penalties. Upon 
registration, sellers would be required to identify their related parties (either resident or non-
resident ones) and open a domestic bank account whose sole function would be to accrue the 
revenues derived from their subsequent remote sales. Once the relevant tax period is over, the 
“qualifying taxpayer” (e.g. the one who obtained the greatest amount of gross revenues resulting 
from its remote sales throughout the year) would be expected to submit a form reflecting both 
the overall gross revenues derived from the consolidated remote sales conducted by the group 
and a breakdown of such revenues per market jurisdiction1343. The financial institutions where 
each of the related sellers have their account would disclose account movements to their 
respective tax authorities to enable them to challenge the calculations made by the qualifying 
taxpayer.  
Table 41 – Example of related remote sellers operating in various market jurisdictions 
 
 
                                                          
1339 OECD (2014): BEPS Action 1: addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 254 and OECD (2015): Final 
Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 114.  
1340 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 114. 
1341 PINTO, D. (2003), p. 225-226. 
1342 BRAUNER, Y.; BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2015), p. 13. For his part, Wagh recommends to establish a registry for websites 
through which sales are conducted. See WAGH, S. (2013), P. 12-15. 
1343 Remote sellers would apply the indicators suggested in the subsection “subjective scope” to identify the presumed 
location of their customers.  
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Market jurisdiction Seller X1 Seller X2 
M1 20  
M2 10 40 
M3 20 10 
M4  60 
M5  30 
M6  20 
Total per seller (as reflected 
in bank account) 
50 160 
Total per group 210 
 
Whenever the quantitative threshold is reached with respect to the customers located in a specific 
jurisdiction, the qualifying taxpayer would then need to file a tax return on a net basis and 
subsequently calculate the resulting tax due in the market State in accordance with the treaty in 
place and its domestic tax rules. Tax authorities of the residence State would collect this tax on 
behalf of the authorities of the market State and subsequently wire the payment to such State 
pursuant to a preexisting ad-hoc agreement to ensure assistance in tax collection1344. 
This alternative framework contributes to overcome the risks posed by the collection regime 
based on the withholding tax, but its primary downside is its heavy reliance on a close 
collaboration among States.  
 
                                                          
1344 The most notable precedent would be the Rubik agreements signed by Switzerland with Austria and United 
Kingdom, which establish collection and subsequent remittance of taxes due to the residence State to the source State. 
See HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 36-37 and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 274-275. However, there are already a number 
of legal instruments in place intended to foster cooperation in the collection of taxes, e.g. tax treaties (see article 26 of 
the OECD MC), regional instruments (e.g. EU Council Directive 2010/24/EU), the multilateral Convention on mutual 
administrative assistance in tax matters, etc. 
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Attribution of (deemed) profits to the new PE 
Once it has been ascertained that either a taxpayer or a group of related taxpayers have obtained 
annual gross revenues above the quantitative threshold as a result of the remote sales conducted 
with customers presumably located in a jurisdiction, the second question is how - and most 
notably to what extent - this latter jurisdiction should exert its taxing rights. In particular, how it 
should configure its domestic taxable base.  
It goes without saying that the market jurisdiction should not be entitled to impose taxes on the 
total amount of gross receipts derived from these sales, regardless of the fact that the new proviso 
is expressed in gross terms1345. Such a stance not only defies common sense but may also infringe 
the ability to pay principle, deeply rooted in the constitutional and legal framework of the 
international community (and most probably in that of the market jurisdiction). This principle, in 
its different modalities, typically compels the legislator to levy income taxes solely on the income 
that is genuinely at the disposal of the relevant taxpayer, i.e. its net income, which may be broadly 
defined as revenues obtained during a certain period less the expenses that enabled those 
revenues to be obtained1346. Indeed, net income is commonly regarded as the most direct 
measure of the taxpayer´s ability to pay and has thus become a widely-accepted yardstick by 
which taxpayers are compared for tax purposes to ensure inter-individual equity.  
This being so, we believe it is essential to confer the taxpayers exceeding the threshold the 
possibility to submit a tax return on a net basis, as we have suggested in both proposed 
enforcement regimes.  
The problem comes with the fact that the clause enables the eventual accumulation of gross 
revenues obtained by two or more related remote sellers resident in different States. Each of 
these related taxpayers may make separate expenses linked to their respective remote 
transactions (e.g. marketing initiatives, IT) which, in turn, are likely to receive a distinct tax 
treatment in their respective domestic tax regimes (e.g. as deductible or non-deductible). In this 
context, it does not seem reasonable to compel the “qualifying taxpayer” (i.e. the entity 
responsible for the submission of the consolidated tax return) to identify the different expenses 
incurred by each of the relevant parties and subsequently apply a distinct tax treatment to each 
one of them pursuant to the corresponding domestic legislation.  
This being so, it seems advisable to make use of a presumption method to arrive at a “deemed 
profit”. This would entail the application of a fixed ratio of presumed expenses to the taxpayer(s)´s 
gross revenue derived from the transactions covered by the new clause. The OECD itself evaluated 
the possibility of resorting to this mechanism in the context of the proposed significant economic 
                                                          
1345 AVI-YONAH, R. (1997), p. 537-540 and PINTO, D. (2003), p. 219-220. 
1346 There is however not a single, pure definition of net income, as it is rather an arbitrary figure resulting from a 
number of assumptions regarding revenues and expenses made by the legislator providing the definition (FERNÁNDEZ, 
P. (2015)). Herrera Molina argues that there a number of different techniques that States may use to reach this figure. 
For example: i) allowing the deduction of all expenses that are deemed to be necessary to obtain the revenue (the most 
widespread system); ii) allowing the deduction of all expenses resulting from the entrepreneurial activity or else; iii) 
making a direct remission to the accounting profit (HERRERA MOLINA, P. (1998), p. 96). The choice of the applicable 
technique responds to the specific policy objectives of the State concerned (BROOKS, J.R. (2017) and HERRERA MOLINA, 
P. (1998), p. 96) 
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presence test on the basis of the expected practical difficulties to audit expenses that are incurred 
overseas1347.  
The ratio should ideally reflect the reasonably expected level of expenses in an average market 
situation, which would in turn depend on a number of factors, inter alia, the industry/sector 
concerned, the degree of integration of the enterprise and the type of product or service 
provided1348. Under no circumstances should it mimic the ratio of expenses that would be 
appropriate for an equivalent traditional retail enterprise1349 for the simple reason that they do 
not find themselves in a comparable situation in terms of expected costs, as remote sellers are 
likely to bear an ostensibly lower level of expenses1350.  
The ratio(s) may be established either in the treaty or in the market State´s domestic legislation. 
While the first option ensures reciprocity and prevents the risk of unilateral revenue-motivated 
increases, the second alternative has the virtue of flexibility. The fact that the ratio should ideally 
be updated on a regular basis and should vary depending on the circumstances of the taxpayer 
may make it necessary to resort to the second alternative. Either way, the provision should ideally 
take the form of a rebuttable presumption to prevent flagrant breaches of the ability to pay 
principle, thus enabling the qualifying taxpayer to demonstrate, for example, that its/their actual 
amount of expenses was considerably higher than that presumed by the ratio or that it/they 
find(s) itself/themselves in a loss-making position1351. 
Once the deemed net income has been calculated (by discounting either a ratio or the actual 
amount of expenses incurred), the question arises as to how to split it between the residence and 
the market States. In this context, the benefit principle would a priori favor an equitable allocation 
between both States, considering that the former is presumably providing public benefits 
necessary for the taxpayer´s economic activity while the latter offers a market of consumers1352. 
                                                          
1347 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 108 and 112-
113. We should recall at this time that the OECD equally intended to apply its proposed test on a related-group basis. 
1348 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 112. 
1349 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 112: “one 
possible approach would thus be to regard the presence to be equivalent to a physical presence from which non-resident 
is operating a commercial business and determine the deemed net income applying a ratio of presumed expenses”.  
1350 The OECD argues that e-retailers often face a substantial investment of resources at the beginning of their activities 
but, once this is done, the provision the products and services online frequently requires only limited marginal costs. 
See OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 114. 
1351 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 113. 
HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 27. 
1352 Both situations allow us to presume that the taxpayer finds itself in the position to access the State´s public benefits 
as we argued back in Section 4.2.2. We are however assuming that the taxpayer is carrying out some sort of economic 
activity in its State of Residence, which may not be the case considering the nature of the most widespread corporate 
residence tests (section 3.2.1.1). For their part, Hongler/Pistone arrive at the same conclusion by means of the sourcing 
theory (HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 17-19 and 33-34). In the same vein, see COCKFIELD, A. (2003), p. 14. 
 
292 
 
Naturally, this involves the outright rejection of methods which lead to either deprive the market 
State of any profit at all1353 or else ensure its exclusive rights over it1354.  
Now the challenge lies in identifying an equitable balance between the legitimate taxing claims of 
the residence and the market States and further determining the most appropriate manner to 
translate it into a rule.  
At this point, there are two general courses of action. The first one involves the introduction of 
amendments to preexisting rules and/or guidance governing the allocation of profits to PEs while 
the second advocates for more ground-breaking measures.  
As regards the first alternative, adjustments may be made either in the first step of the attribution 
process (i.e. the functional analysis aimed at hypothesizing the PE as if it were a separate 
enterprise) and/or in the second (i.e. the determination of profits based on a comparability 
analysis)1355: 
o First step. The functional analysis departs from the identification of the functions 
(“significant people functions” according to the AOA) performed by the PE and 
subsequently proceeds to equip it with the enterprise´s assets, risks and capital it would 
have/need if it were a separate entity performing the same functions. This analysis would 
however be doomed to failure in the context of the proposed clause to the extent the 
resulting PE does not perform any significant function within the territory of the market 
State, which is indeed the most probable scenario.  
Two solutions have been proposed to overcome this obstacle and hence enable the 
allocation of certain functions to the new PE: either regarding automated functions as 
relevant ones for the purposes of this analysis or treating customers and users as 
performing certain functions on behalf of the enterprise1356. As for the first solution, it 
was explored by the OECD back in 2001 in the context of the potential attribution of 
                                                          
1353 Existing methodologies to attribute profits to PEs (and most notably the AOA referred to in section 3.3.4) tend to 
put emphasis on the functions performed, risks assumed and assets used by the PE. A remote seller will hardly ever 
perform functions, assume risks and use tangible assets – at least in the traditional sense-  in the market jurisdiction. 
Therefore, it follows that only minimal profits (if any) would finally be attributable to the remote-sales PE and, by 
extension, to the market State. Indeed, we noted back in Section 5.2.3.1 that this methodology was never meant to 
allocate profits to the market jurisdictions. See SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 103 (he notes that the place where the significant 
people functions are performed may well bear no relation at all with the place where the customers are), LI, J. (2014), 
p. 41, OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 111, 
HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 32 and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 295-296. For example, the adoption of Avi-
Yonah/Halabi´s first proposal of a remote-sales PE (AVI-YONAH, R.; HALABI, O. (2014), p. 15) would inexorably give rise 
to a PE completely devoid of profits insofar it is not accompanied by amendments to the methodology to attribute 
profits. 
1354 Avi-Yonah/Halabi´s second alternative proposal (AVI-YONAH, R.; HALABI, O. (2014), p. 18) leads to grant the full 
amount of profit to the State in which the remote-sales PE arises. This may be inferred from the suggested wording for 
article 7.1 of the treaties: “profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the 
enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein 
[Alternative 2 for Remote Sales] [or unless the income is of a remote seller, in whatever capacity, which has gross annual 
receipts in total remote sales in the other Contracting States in the preceding calendar year exceeding $1,000,000.] If 
the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits that are attributable to the permanent establishment in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2, [or the profits of a remote seller,] may be taxed in the other Contracting 
State”. This is also the approach defended by WAGH, S. (2013), p. 17-21. 
1355 The content of which was briefly outlined back in Section 3.3.4. 
1356 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 111. 
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profits to server-PEs1357 and rightly discarded later in 20101358. As for the second, it was 
never examined in depth beyond the brief observations made by the OECD on the fact 
that data collected from users and customers is likely to generate value for the 
enterprise1359. However, it should not take for granted that all remote sellers collect and 
monetize data from their customers, as the lucrative collection of data is more likely to 
occur in the context of “seemingly” free digital services1360.  
Lastly, Cockfield suggests to analogize the new PE with a traditional retail outlet 
conducting an equivalent business1361. Undoubtedly, this approach has its virtues. For 
example, it ensures a tax treatment that is concordant that to that conferred to traditional 
PEs. Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether we are somehow overusing the 
mechanism of fictions, as we would need to hypothesize the functions that a retail outlet 
in a comparable situation would perform and further attribute these nonexistent 
functions to the PE. We should recall at this time that this approach would entail adding 
a brand new fiction (i.e. treating the remote-sales PE as if it were a traditional retail outlet) 
on top of three preexisting fictions1362: the company (treating it as if it were a person), the 
PE itself (treating it as if it were a company), and the ALS (treating the PE and the head 
office as if they were separate and unrelated parties).  
Either way, once functions have been properly attributed to the new remote-sales PE (as 
a result of any of the aforementioned proposals) along with the corresponding assets, 
risks and capital, the second step of the process will come into play. That is to say, 
determining the profits that the hypothesized separate enterprise –the PE- would obtain 
in an arm´s length situation. 
o Second step. Alternatively, adjustments could be made in the second phase of the 
attribution process. In this context, it has been proposed to amend the TPS method in the 
OECD TPG so as to ensure an upfront allocation of profits to the market State wherever a 
remote-sales PE is deemed to arise therein1363. While the exact amount of such allocation 
should be a matter of further study and negotiation, it has been suggested to save one 
third of profits for the PE-State while splitting the remaining two thirds pursuant to the 
general principles envisaged in the OECD TPG. Its advocates claim that this solution is 
                                                          
1357 OECD (2001): Attribution of profit to a permanent establishment involved in electronic commerce transactions 
(Discussion paper). The paper made a huge effort to shoehorn this new reality into preexisting rules but, when doing 
so, incurred in numerous inconsistencies. See COCKFIELD, A. (2002) for further information and criticism.  
1358 In fact, no other conclusion could have been reached under the AOA, as automated functions carried out by the 
server-PE would hardly qualify as significant people functions insofar they are neither human (but performed by robots 
or machines) nor economically significant (i.e. prone to generate profits). See KAMPHUIS, E. (2008), p. 302 and OECD 
(2010): Attribution of profits to permanent establishments, p. 26: “the automated nature of the functions means that 
the assets or risks attributed to the PE are only likely to be those directly associated with the server hardware. In fact, 
since a server-PE will not be carrying out any significant people functions relevant to the attribution of economic 
ownership of assets and/or the assumption of risks in the absence of personnel acting on behalf of the enterprise, no 
asset or risk could be attributed to it under the authorized OECD approach, supporting the conclusion that little or no 
profit would be attributed to such a PE”. 
1359 OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 102-104 and 
HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 33. 
1360 As it was noted above in the subsection entitled “objective scope”. 
1361 COCKFIELD, A. (2003), p. 14. 
1362 PETRUCCI, R. (2010), p. 10, footnote 44. 
1363 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 34-35 and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 295-296. In both papers, the initiative is justified 
on the grounds that value creation occurs in the market jurisdiction. 
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consistent and compatible with the ALS as embedded in article 7.2 of tax treaties1364, but 
we have serious doubts about it for the following reasons. Firstly, the predetermination 
of a particular transfer pricing method (i.e. the TPS method) irrespective of the relevant 
circumstances confronts the “most appropriate method” rule and unjustifiably narrows 
the range of acceptable arm´s length prices contrary to what the ALS theoretically 
permits1365. Secondly, the predetermination of the result of applying the TPS method 
regardless of the specific circumstances of the case prevents the taxpayer and the tax 
administration from using other (equally) economically valid criteria to split the profits 
insofar they lead to a different outcome, even though this would be allowed under the 
ALS 1366. Thirdly, the upfront attribution of one third of the profits to the remote-sales PE 
on the basis that the market “adds value”1367 is incongruous and inconsistent with the 
ALS. It is evident that customers are of paramount importance for any business, as no 
profits would ultimately arise in their absence1368. But this does not mean that customers 
are per se in a position to add value and should thus be entitled to a remuneration in an 
arm´s length situation, as they merely place value on the offered product by way of its 
willingness to purchase it and its ultimate acceptance of the offer.  
The main advantage of the aforementioned proposals is that none of them involve the 
amendment of article 7 of current tax treaties but solely changes to the OECD´s soft law guidance 
(i.e. the OECD TPG and/or the AOA report), ideally complemented by changes in the domestic tax 
regulation of the relevant State(s). On the other hand, we believe these are illustrative examples 
of an unfortunate tendency noted by Graetz back in 2001. He argued that States struggle to keep 
their income taxes intact come what may, and further strive to shoehorn modern transactions 
into their preexisting regulations1369. Indeed, it seems that we are pushing preexisting rules and 
methodologies to attribute profits to PEs too far, as they are being used to face realities and 
pursue objectives other than those they were conceived for1370. As a result, these approaches are 
prone to give rise to outcomes that are inconsistent and/or even contrary to the literalism of the 
relevant rule in place. 
                                                          
1364 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 34-35 (“such approach should not be misunderstood as an introduction of a 
formulary apportionment and therefore the denial of the arm´s length principle. But it is the intention of the authors to 
bring more formula elements into the profit based methods endorsed by the PE”) and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 296. Art 7.2 
of the OECD MC: “the profits that are attributable (..) to the permanent establishment (…) are the profits it might be 
expected to make, in particular in its dealings with other parts of the enterprise, if it were a separate and independent 
enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions, taking into account the 
functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the enterprise through the permanent establishment and 
through the other parts of the enterprise”.  
1365 We reached the same conclusion back in Section 5.2.1.2 when assessing the BEPS proposals on transfer pricing 
rules. Gadzo suggests a change of the OECD TPG so as to “ensure usage of profit split method to cases where the 
enterprise has newly defined revenue-based nexus in a country” (GADZO, S. (2016), p. 296). 
1366 As a matter of principle, taxpayers and tax administrations should be allowed to split the combined profits pursuant 
to any set of economically valid criteria that approximates the division of profits that would have been anticipated and 
reflect in an agreement made at arm´s length. See OECD TPG, par. 2.108. 
1367 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 34 and GADZO, S. (2016), p. 296. 
1368 SCHOUERI, L.E.; GALENDI, R.A. (2017). 
1369 GRAETZ, M.J. (2001), p. 264 and 270. 
1370 They were designed for a rule that demanded a physical and stable presence in the territory concerned (section 
3.3.6.2.2) with the ability to perform relevant value-adding functions on behalf of its enterprise. Both the clause and 
the methodology to attribute profits have traditionally followed the “supply approach” and are thus unable to allocate 
any profits to a type of PE that does not carry out any value-adding activities and merely reflects the presence of a 
market (see also section 5.2.3.1).  
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In view of all this, we now intend to put forward a proposal that effectively overcomes the 
aforementioned risks and problems. We believe the automatic allocation of a fixed percentage of 
the profits to the remote-sales PE is a reasonable solution, in line with what was suggested by 
Hongler/Pistone. States would need to negotiate the exact proportion, although that proposed 
by Hongler/Pistone (i.e. one third for the remote-sales PE and two thirds to be attributed 
according to the methodology in force) appears to be a sensible option1371. Nonetheless, this 
cannot be disguised as a sort of specification of the ALS for the reasons explained above. On the 
contrary, article 7.2 of the MCs should be amended in order to ensure the upfront allocation of 
the relevant fraction of the profits wherever a remote-sales PE is deemed to arise1372, thus leaving 
the remaining fraction at the mercy of preexisting attribution rules. This implies the implicit 
recognition of the inherent limits of the ALS, in particular wherever States wish to ensure the 
attribution of profits to a type of PE that, by its very nature, is inherently unable to perform 
functions that would give rise to a compensation in an arm´s length scenario1373. 
Lastly, in case States choose to adopt a fixed ratio of presumed expenses (so as to calculate the 
taxpayer´s deemed net profits) along with an equally fixed percentage of profit to be 
automatically attributed to the remote-sales PE, the easiest solution would be to impose 
withholding taxes -whose rate reflects the aforementioned proportions1374- on the transactions 
covered by the clause1375 and further grant the refund of the withheld amounts or else make them 
final depending on whether the taxpayer reaches the annual quantitative threshold or not. This 
provision should ideally include an escape clause so as to prevent loss-making taxpayers from 
being subject to tax in the PE-State. 
Role within the treaty 
 
The new proposed PE proviso could be introduced in a new paragraph at the end of article 5 of 
the OECD MC (i.e. as paragraph number 8). In principle, it will coexist with the preexisting 
modalities of PEs, although its interaction should be a matter of further study1376.  
The clause should make it clear that this PE fiction would only be relevant for the purposes of the 
taxation of the business profits governed by article 7 of the MCs. This is key because PEs play a 
wide role within tax treaties that go beyond enabling the jurisdiction where the PE is located to 
tax the business profits that arise from it by virtue of article 71377. On one hand, the PE-State is 
                                                          
1371 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 34-35. Furthermore, this proportion is consistent with that proposed in the 
framework of the EU CCCTB proposal. See EU Commission (2011): Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, p. 49: “Article 38. The consolidated tax base shall be shared between the group 
members in each tax year on the basis of a formula for apportionment. In determining the apportioned share of a group 
member A, the formula shall take the following form, giving equal weight to the factors of sales, labour and assets”. 
1372 The OECD itself has assessed this possibility in the context the proposed “significant economic presence test” in 
OECD (2015): Final Report on BEPS Action 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, p. 112.  
1373 Indeed, Musgrave came to recognize back in 1984 that the supply-demand approach (see sections 3.3.3 and 5.2.3.1) 
could only be pursued by means of formulary measures. See MUSGRAVE, P.B. (1984), p. 231 and 240-241. 
1374 Let us assume that States agree to apply a fixed ratio of 10% as deemed expenses and attribute an equally fixed 
percentage of 33% to the remote-sales PE. This being the case, they may agree to impose a withholding tax of 29,7% 
on the gross amount of transactions covered by the clause. 
1375 In line with the procedure depicted in the subsection “compliance and enforcement”. 
1376 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 38-39. 
1377 Section 3.3.4.  
 
296 
 
entitled to tax other types of income (covered by articles of the MC other than 7) as long as they 
are attributable to the PE by virtue of article 7.4 of the OECD MC. This is the case of income dealt 
with in articles 10.4, 11.4, 12.3, 13.2 and 21.2 which may be found attributable to the PE to the 
extent the underlying right, asset or property giving rise to such income is “effectively connected” 
to it1378. While this was a plausible scenario in the context of the traditional PEs, it seems difficult 
to imagine a dividend or interest having a close connection to a remote-sales PE1379. This being so, 
it seems preferable to automatically exclude the new PE proviso from the objective scope of all 
these articles so as to avoid unnecessary confusion. On the other hand, article 24.3 of the OECD 
MC seeks to ensure that a PE is not treated by the PE-State less favorably than enterprises resident 
in such State and carrying on the same activities. The nature of the new proposed PE fiction 
severely hampers the applicability of the non-discrimination principle in this context, reason why 
we prefer to rely solely on the aforementioned ratio of presumed expenses (in the form of a 
rebuttable presumption) so as to ensure taxation on a net basis just as enterprises resident 
therein1380. 
Preliminary conclusions 
Along the present section, we have endeavored to strike a balance between equity (here 
understood in terms of benefit) and practicability in the form of a new PE-fiction.  
The most balanced (and least bad) solution we could reach is the remote-sales PE based on a 
quantitative threshold explored in this section. Despite its consistency with the benefit 
principle1381, it poses a considerable amount of risks and challenges (some of which have already 
been noted above) from a number of perspectives.  
As regards its legal configuration, the rule must identify accurately both parties of the remote 
transaction, contrary to the majority of the evaluated proposals. For example, it must specify the 
scope of the definition of group of companies for the purposes of the clause so as to prevent tax-
motivated fragmentations of selling activities with customers in a given State among a number of 
related parties that are resident in different States. Likewise, the clause must define a connection 
point between the customer and a State by means of straightforward and manageable rules, as 
we sought to do.  
The effective enforceability of the rule raises significant challenges we tried to overcome by 
means of two alternative strategies: an ad-hoc collection system based on the imposition of 
refundable withholding taxes and a registration-based system for remote sellers. Nonetheless, 
the implementation of both approaches entails considerable costs that first need to be estimated 
and evaluated. For example, governments would need to put into place and start issuing a digital 
certificate of residence so that vendors and customers can adequately identify themselves at the 
time of conclusion of the remote transaction. In parallel, adjustments to the functionalities of 
remote payment platforms would need to be introduced to ensure that the information relevant 
                                                          
1378 Section 3.3.4 and HALLER, B. (2003), p. 227-250. Furthermore, article 15.2 of the OECD MC treats PEs and residents 
as interchangeable categories for the purposes of this allocation rule. 
1379 HONGLER, P.; PISTONE, P. (2015), p. 39. Dissenting opinion in WAGH, S. (2013), p. 20. 
1380 However, it is clear that a remote-sales PE would never be granted a tax treatment similar that to that conferred to 
a traditional PE located therein or a taxpayer residing for tax purposes in the same State. 
1381 Explained in the above subsection “justification under the benefit principle”. 
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for the purposes of the application of the rule is submitted therein1382. For its part, the practice of 
refundable withholding taxes in this context is not only costly but may also pose further problems 
of their own, as we noted above. For example, a solution must be sought for remote transactions 
that occur outside the radar of the proposed withholding agents (i.e. the financial institutions), as 
those whose payment is made through gift cards, virtual currency or cash at delivery (6% of 
worldwide remote transactions according to table 40). Secondly, it must be ensured that 
withholding agents are in a position to properly identify the transactions that fall within the scope 
of the clause so that they can set into motion the corresponding procedure. And lastly, positive 
incentives and/or penalties should be put in place so that financial institutions cooperate in the 
collection process, especially in cases where they are tax resident in States other than the market 
State.  
Furthermore, the proposed rules may potentially conflict with preexisting legal and/or 
constitutional rules. For example, the suggested ratio of presumed expenses, if not accompanied 
by an effective escape clause, may infringe the ability to pay principle as set out in the domestic 
constitution or legislation.   
However, the most important risk to be considered when exploring the possibility to adopt the 
proposed set of rules lies in the apparent ease with which they can be circumvented unless they 
are widely and homogeneously adopted. We will illustrate these risks by means of the following 
example. 
Let us assume that company S (tax resident in State SS), dedicated to the development, 
manufacture and sales of smartphone batteries, earns a gross amount of $ 1.050.000 in State MM 
throughout the year 2016 as a result of the sales conducted through its website. States SS and 
MM have a remote-sales PE clause in their treaty in place along with the corresponding domestic 
tax regulation on the matter. Further, they agree to implement one of the two proposed strategies 
to ensure the enforcement of the clause. This being so, State MM would be entitled to tax –and 
effectively collect – the tax due arising from such PE.  
However, let us imagine that company S decides to constitute a wholly-owned subsidiary 
(company X) that qualifies as tax resident in State XX by virtue of its domestic tax legislation1383. 
For its part, State XX has never expressed any interest in adopting a remote-sales PE neither in its 
treaty network nor its domestic legislation, reason why the government has never taken the steps 
necessary to track the remote sales concluded by its residents.  
As of 2017, company X begins to sell on its own an entire range of batteries by means of a website 
(using a local domain) to which company S´s website automatically redirects once the user clicks 
on any of the displayed products pertaining to this group. Companies S and X obtain $ 1.200.000 
                                                          
1382 Most importantly, information concerning the identification of both parties. In case States choose to adopt the 
collection system based on the imposition of withholding taxes, the purchase platform would need to be prepared to 
apply automatically the relevant withholding tax rate according to the domestic legislation of the market jurisdiction 
and further transfer the amount to its tax Administration. 
1383 This is extremely easy to achieve to the extent the most widespread corporate residence tests (most notably those 
covered in sections 3.2.1.1.1 and 3.2.1.1.2) are kept in place. We made reference to the “residence electivity” 
phenomenon both throughout Chapter 3 and in Section 5.2.2.2. 
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as a result of the online sales conducted with customers located in State MM, $ 800.000 and 
400.000 respectively.  
Theoretically, State MM would continue to be entitled to tax the profits arising from these 
transactions in the year 2017 as long as the requirements set out in the remote-sales provision 
envisaged in the treaty SS-MM and its domestic legislation are met. However, the advent of 
company X on the scene gives rise to a number of risks that could however thwart the legitimate 
tax claims of this State.  
Firstly, the question arises as to whether the actions of State MM may entail the infringement of 
article 7 of the treaty XX-MM, as they may be regarded as the imposition of a tax on the profits of 
a non-resident company (X) in the absence of a PE in the territory of State MM1384. In this respect, 
it could be argued that MM would be technically taxing the profits of company S according to the 
treaty SS-MM, while merely quantifying the revenues derived from the sales carried out by 
company XX for the purposes of applying the PE proviso of the aforementioned treaty.  
But, even assuming that the tax claim of MM is consistent with the legal framework in place, the 
question remains as to whether it is enforceable or not. We should recall at this time that State 
XX lacks any kind of registration for remote sellers, does not require them to have an ad-hoc bank 
account for their remote sales, does not issue any sort of digital certificate of residence to identify 
and locate the seller and does not ensure either that purchase platforms are conveniently 
adjusted to track the information relevant for the purposes of the proposed clause and eventually 
enable the practice of a withholding tax. In this context, State MM would hardly be in a position 
to track the remote sales made by company X so as to challenge the tax return submitted by 
company S, which may well limit itself to report its own sales, not having any incentive to do the 
same with company X´s untraceable transactions. What is more, even if State MM had the means 
to check whether the requirements of the proviso are fulfilled and further quantify the amount of 
tax due, its collection would be an ordeal to the extent withholding taxes are not imposed at the 
time of the payment and no cooperation on the collection of taxes is agreed between States XX 
and MM.  
As noted above, only a widespread and consistent implementation of this regime can contribute 
to mitigate the risks illustrated in the aforementioned example. For example, by including the 
remote-sales PE proviso along with all the necessary procedural rules to support it in the 
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax treaty related measures to prevent BEPS1385. 
Nonetheless, as long as there is a single non-cooperative State using corporate residence tests 
which are in turn vulnerable to manipulations and remote vendors continue to be able to establish 
a subsidiary in that State so as to conduct its sales through it, these risks will inexorably remain.  
In view of all the challenges, costs and risks that the adoption of the proposed proviso is expected 
to give rise to, we believe more thought should be given to the proposal before considering its 
                                                          
1384 We assume the relevant treaty follows article 7 of the MCs: “profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be 
taxable only in that Sate unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent 
establishment situated therein”.  
1385 http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-
beps.htm  
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implementation. In particular, future studies should endeavor to provide a response to the 
challenges here identified, conceive measures that serve to mitigate the anticipated risks 
(particularly those related to the use of a subsidiary resident in a non-cooperative State) and 
ultimately carry out a cost-benefit analysis to assess whether the expected outcomes can arguably 
offset all the costs and efforts.   
States may instead opt for a rule whose implementation is less troublesome. Of all the proposals 
on the table, the withholding tax system put forward by Brauner/Báez1386 stands out for its 
technical feasibility, pragmatism and apparent simplicity. It involves the practice of withholding 
taxes on every business-deductible payment made by residents or PEs of a contracting State to a 
person resident in the other Contracting State to the extent it falls under the scope of article 7 (as 
a business profit) and does not qualify for any of the proposed exemptions. The ultimate goal of 
its proponents is to capture solely the payments connected with the digital economy, although 
they prefer to achieve this by means of a long list of exemptions rather than by a positive 
definition of digital transactions1387.  
Nonetheless, practicability comes at a high price: equity. For example, the proposal can be 
questioned from the perspective of the ability to pay principle, as the proposed withholding taxes 
are imposed on a gross basis and are not refundable1388. But, most importantly, it would be 
inconsistent with the benefit principle. We reached the conclusion that the benefit principle 
justifies the imposition of taxes by the State providing the market regardless of any further 
considerations1389. However, this rule fails to ensure this to the extent it solely captures deductible 
payments made by businesses, thereby giving rise to asymmetries between BC2/B2B transactions 
and deductible/non-deductible payments that cannot be sustained from a benefit perspective1390. 
Furthermore, the taxpayer would become subject to tax in the market jurisdiction from the very 
first transaction, irrespective of its overall level of integration in the State1391. 
All in all, States should evaluate all the options on the table assuming that the perfect balance 
between practicability and equity (here understood in terms of benefit) is probably a utopia, or 
at the very least, hard to achieve.  
 
                                                          
1386 BRAUNER, Y.; BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2015). 
1387 For example, they suggest to provide exemptions for, inter alia: i) low-risk payments to identifiable taxpayers that 
are already taxed on a net basis (e.g. wages and deductible payments made to PEs); ii) dividends/interests (already 
dealt with in other articles of the MC), iii) capital gains from the sale of shares and d) payments made in consideration 
for non-digital goods or services (e.g. rental or purchase of equipment, land or business; payments for material and 
services entailing individuals present on-site), etc. For its part, royalty payments would be subject to this regime (in fact, 
they recommend the elimination of article 12 of the OECD MC). See BRAUNER, Y.; BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2015), p. 20-21 
and 23. 
1388 BRAUNER, Y.; BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2015), p. 21-22.  
1389 Section 4.2.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.2.3. 
1390 GADZO, S. (2016), p. 283-284. Indeed, the proposal is in turn theoretically justified on the grounds of the base-
erosion principle (BRAUNER, Y.; BÁEZ MORENO, A. (2015), p. 8-10). 
1391 Indeed, we explained above that a de minimis threshold is more coherent with benefit considerations (see 
subsection “justification under the benefit principle”). In the same vein, see GADZO, S. (2016), p. 283. This approach 
would be however welcomed by Schön, who advocates for a limited tax liability in the market jurisdiction “starting from 
the first market contact, gradually moving up with intensified market penetration” as opposed to the distorting “all-of-
nothing” effect commonly triggered by the traditional PE (SCHÖN, W. (2009), p. 100). 
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5.2.3.4. Preliminary conclusions 
 
Firstly, we noted that the BEPS project intended to bring the taxable profits to wherever the 
market is by means of the PE (section 5.2.3.1). While the objective can be perceived as legitimate 
from the perspective of the benefit principle, we concluded that it is inconsistent with the current 
wording of the PE clause as well as the methodology to attribute profits to it, as the PE was never 
conceived to ensure taxation at the level of the market jurisdiction but rather to ensure taxation 
in territories where non-residents were carrying out a significant value-adding economic 
activities.  
Secondly, we analyzed the proposed amendments to the PE clause resulting from Action 7 of the 
BEPS project and further reached a few conclusions (section 5.2.3.2). In general, we welcomed all 
the proposals due to the fact that they contribute to make the threshold less vulnerable to tax 
planning and further put an end to a long history of unfortunate interpretations of the clause that 
seriously compromised the principle of legal certainty, as very well illustrated by the so-called “PE 
Spanish approach”. Nonetheless, we equally noted the expected inconveniences that their 
adoption would entail, and anticipated that they will not result in a significant increment of tax 
revenues in the PE-States as a result of the current rules guiding the methodology to attribute 
profits to PEs. Last but not least, we concluded that the proposed amendments do not contribute 
to effectively accomplish the objective of BEPS as regards the PE (i.e. ensuring taxation at the level 
of the market jurisdiction) and, by extension, meet the demands required by the benefit principle. 
In view of the fact that the new mission assigned to the PE is not inherent at all in the current 
clause, the only way forward was to reevaluate its overall scope and explore the possibility of 
introducing a significant amendment to its wording (section 5.2.3.3). In this context, we 
considered the option of adopting a new PE fiction so as to ensure that the market State can 
exercise its tax jurisdiction under certain circumstances, in line with what the benefit principle 
demands. Thus, we brought forward and defined the key characteristics of the “remote-sales PE” 
with regard to its subjective/objective scope, methodology to attribute profits as well as two 
alternative strategies intended to ensure its enforceability. All in all, we warned against certain 
risks that the proposal would give rise to along with a few challenges that still remain unsolved, 
thereby calling for further research on the matter before considering the adopting of the 
proposed clause.  
 
5.3. THE DEPARTURE FROM CURRENT PARADIGMS 
 
We choose not to explore in depth more disruptive measures that involve the departure of these 
paradigms considering that they require a degree of international coordination and political 
agreement that is today unattainable. We do so in the knowledge that some of these measures 
may be precisely the most adequate and straightforward way to achieve the policy objective set 
out in Chapter 4 and, incidentally, overcome some of the long-standing structural problems of 
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CITs (some of which have been noted in Chapter 3). However, we wish to make a very brief 
reference to two of them1392.  
The first proposal is the CCCTB, an EU project that suggests group consolidation for tax purposes 
and a subsequent distribution of the profits according to a formula based on sales, labor and 
assets1393. The second proposal is the destination-based corporate tax (hereinafter DBCT)1394, 
which advocates for the replacement of current CITs for an entirely new model. The tax would 
depart from the company’s cash flow (thereby including net financial inflows and allowing the 
immediate expensing of all investment expenditure) and would secure that the State of 
destination (wherever the final customer is resident) is ultimately entitled to exercise its taxing 
rights.  
Both proposals entail a substantial departure from the paradigms that have been called into 
question here. This is because taxation would no longer arise wherever a company is deemed to 
be located for tax purposes (i.e. the State in which it is tax resident or where its PE is located) and 
these factors would cease to determine which State would be entitled to tax its profits. This should 
be welcomed as good news, considering the increasing irrelevance and inappropriateness of the 
notions of corporate tax residence and PE (Chapter 3) and the subsequent disadvantages of 
making taxation heavily dependent on them. 
Finally, and most importantly, both regimes would contribute to accomplish both the so-called 
“BEPS mantra” (section 5.1.1) and the benefit principle (section 4.2). Taxation would arise 
wherever assets are kept, employees work, sales are conducted (CCCTB) or where the final 
customer resides (DBCT). And, to the extent we understand these are valid indicators of where 
value is generated (the “BEPS mantra”) or where the company is presumably using/enjoying the 
State´s public benefits (the benefit principle), it can be concluded that their outcomes would be 
aligned with both policy objectives.  
In view of the above, we nonetheless believe that the CCCTB would be a much more balanced 
option from the perspective of both policy guidelines, as it does not neglect the legitimate taxing 
rights of the State(s) where economic activities are presumably occurring, as the DBCT would do. 
With regard to the BEPS mantra, value can be deemed to be added wherever economic activities 
take place (being assets and employees adequate indicators of them) and consumers are1395. As 
for the benefit principle, we already concluded in section 4.2.2 that both carrying out a physical 
                                                          
1392 The present section is based on the conclusions reached in a previous publication, see ESCRIBANO, E. (2017), p. 
257-258. 
1393 EU Commission (2011): Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). 
The European Commission has recently revived this project after its initial failure in 2011, although with two important 
novelties noted in MAGUIRE, T. (2015). Firstly, the new project is not conceived any more as an elective regime, at least 
not for MNCs whose global turnover exceeds 750 million euros a year. Secondly, the Commission has proposed a 
progressively phased implementation, thereby putting into motion the first two steps (common tax base and 
consolidation) and postponing the negotiation of the formula apportionment. One of the most outstanding academic 
contributions in the topic is WILDE, M.F. de (2017). 
1394 AUERBACH, A.J.; DEVERAUX, M.P.; KEEN, M.; VELLA, J. (2017), although originally suggested in AVI-YONAH, R. 
(2000). In June 2016 the House Republicans of the United States submitted a comprehensive tax reform plan proposing 
the implementation of a DBCT. See https://taxfoundation.org/understanding-house-gop-border-adjustment/ (last 
accessed June 10th 2017).  
1395 This is so if we believe the demand is as essential as the supply in the value-creation process, as argued by 
SCHOUERI, L.E.; GALENDI, R.A. (2017). 
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economic activity within a territory and the access to customers located therein allow us to 
assume that the corporate taxpayers finds itself in a position to use/enjoy the public benefits 
defrayed by such State1396. Indeed, the proportion of the allocation (i.e. two thirds to indicators 
of physical economic activity and one third to indicators of market) would be consistent with the 
view that the number of benefits within the reach of the company is expected to be greater when 
the company physically performs an economic activity in the State concerned than in cases in 
which it reaches its market through remote means1397. 
 
5.4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We will now briefly summarize the main conclusions of the present Chapter.  
First of all, we concluded that the primary goal of the BEPS project (i.e. to provide domestic and 
international instruments aiming at better aligning rights to tax with real or actual economic 
activity) appears to be consistent with our understanding of the benefit principle (section 5.1.1) 
but the scope of its Action Plan is unduly limited to be able to achieve the aforementioned goal 
satisfactorily (section 5.1.2) 
Secondly, we welcomed the “value-creation” approach promoted by BEPS in the framework of 
transfer pricing rules along with the corresponding changes to the OECD TPG, considering they 
are likely to prompt outcomes more aligned with the benefit principle (section 5.2.1.1). However, 
we noted that such approach is hard to reconcile with provisions following the ALS and further 
provided a number of arguments and examples to prove our point (section 5.2.1.2). Accordingly, 
we finally concluded that this approach requires the adoption of domestic special measures in the 
context of transfer pricing rules that go beyond the ALS and a possible amendment of article 9 of 
tax treaties (section 5.2.1.2). 
Thirdly, we put forward a number of suggestions concerning the definition of the corporate tax 
residence in view of the conclusions reached in Chapters 3 and 4. We first called for the 
reconsideration of the corporate tax residence tests in place in the light of the policy objectives 
the States pretend to achieve by means of their respective CITs, whatever they are (section 
5.2.2.1). Later, we advocated for the abandonment of “weak” residence tests (most notably the 
formal ones) on the grounds that they tend to be troublesome from the perspective of both Public 
International Law (in particular, the so-called “minimum standard for foreigners) and the benefit 
                                                          
1396 Brown equally argues that formulary apportionment is by far the most suitable alternative from the perspective of 
the benefit principle (BROWN, F.B. (2011), p. 612-615). This is so because there may be various States providing benefits 
to the corporation and the option to merely indicate one (the “single-source approach”) as the “greatest contributor” 
may lead to disproportionate or arbitrary outcomes. He suggests the implementation of a formula that allocates the 
taxable profits among: i) the destination of services/property, ii) the location of the activities giving rise to the income 
and iii) the residence of the person receiving the income due to the fact that all these States “has the potential for 
contributing significantly to the earning and enjoyment of income”. We cannot fully agree with his proposal insofar we 
believe the State where the company is tax resident may not necessarily be in the position to provide benefits to it 
(sections 3.2.1 and most notably, 4.2.4.2). In the same vein, Kaufman links formulary apportionment with the principles 
of inter-nation equity (section 4.2.1), economic allegiance and benefit (see KAUFMAN, N.H. (1988), p. 200-201).  
1397 Section 4.2.2.2.3. 
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principle (section 5.2.2.2). Furthermore, we explored the possibility of formulating a new type of 
corporate tax residence test that was aligned with the benefit principle (section 5.2.2.3), just as 
the vast majority of the residence tests in place in PITs are (section 5.2.2.3.1). We argued that the 
only type of tests that can arguably meet this standard are those demanding the presence of a 
significant economic activity in the territory concerned, just as those in place in Italy and Australia. 
To this end, we assessed their advantages and disadvantages and further posed a number of 
suggestions, although we finally recognized that the matter undoubtedly deserves a more 
thorough study before considering the widespread adoption of this type of tests. Additionally, we 
formulated a few recommendations aimed at neutralizing treaty shopping risks in scenarios 
where States choose to keep their “weak” residence tests (section 5.2.2.4). To this effect, we 
suggested a specific interpretation of article 4.1 of treaties following the OECD MC (section 
5.2.2.4.1), the direct amendment of this article (section 5.2.2.4.2) or the adoption of a LOB clause 
(section 5.2.2.4.3). Lastly, we suggested the adoption of a new tie-breaker rule in article 4.3 of tax 
treaties that would tip the balance in favor of the residence State where the corporate taxpayer 
has strongest economic bounds (section 5.2.2.5). 
Fourthly, we put forward a number of proposals related to the definition of the PE concept in view 
of the conclusions reached in Chapters 3 and 4. First of all, we welcomed the objective of the BEPS 
project as regards the PE threshold (i.e. to ensure taxation at the level of the market jurisdiction) 
from the perspective of the benefit principle, although we noted its inconsistency with the current 
wording of the PE clause as well as the methodology to attribute profits to it (section 5.2.3.1). 
Subsequently, we evaluated the proposals concerning the PE put forward by Action 7 of the 
Project (section 5.2.3.2) to finally conclude that they should be welcomed insofar they are 
expected to put an end to unfortunate interpretations of the clause, as illustrated by the “PE-
Spanish approach”. However, we also noted the risks that their adoption might entail and the fact 
that they are unlikely to result in a significant increment of tax revenues in the PE-States due to 
current rules guiding the methodology to attribute profits to PEs. Also, we concluded that the 
proposed amendments do not contribute to effectively accomplish the objective of BEPS as 
regards the PE and, by extension, the benefit principle. Finally, we chose to reevaluate the current 
scope of the clause, considering this was the only way to ensure its consistency with both the 
objective of BEPS and the benefit principle (section 5.2.3.3). In this context, we explored the 
possibility of introducing a new PE fiction (a “remote-sales PE) aimed at targeting remote sales 
made by a business supplier resident in one of the contracting States to customers presumably 
located in the other contracting State in scenarios provided that the gross annual receipts derived 
from such sales exceeded a certain quantitative threshold (section 5.2.3.3.3). However, we 
concluded that more thought should be given to the proposal before considering its 
implementation in view of the expected costs and challenges (some of which were identified in 
the text) it entails.  
Finally, we explained the reasons why we decided not to examine in detail the policy and academic 
proposals that entail the departure for the three paradigms under review in the present thesis 
(section 5.3). Nonetheless, we concluded that the CCCTB made by the European Commission, 
which entails group consolidation and a subsequent distribution of the profits according to a 
formula based on sales/labor/assets, contributes to overcome some of the structural problems of 
 
304 
 
these paradigms and is expected to give rise to outcomes that are better aligned with the benefit 
principle.  
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6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
We committed ourselves to pursue the following three objectives by means of the present thesis: 
o Demonstrate the phenomenon of profit shifting (i.e. the ability of companies to shift their 
taxable profits out of the jurisdictions where economic activities take place and instead 
book them in the jurisdictions of their choice) through the example of a real multinational 
company (Apple), understand the real extent of the problem and identify the main rules 
that have presumably contributed to the final outcome in this specific case (Chapter 2) 
o Examine the origins and rationale behind three paradigms commonly underlying 
corporate income taxation (the separate-entity approach along with the ALS, corporate 
tax residence and the PE threshold) and further demonstrate the essential role they play 
in the existence of the aforementioned phenomenon (Chapter 3) 
o Explore the possibility of either abandoning these paradigms or altering their content 
bearing in mind the current economic, business and technological context; the 
implications of Public international law and a set of policy principles we intend to use as 
guidelines (Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
In view of the discoveries made during the research, the following conclusions may be drawn. 
Please note that arguments supporting each statement may be found in the indicated section. 
 
I. The profit shifting phenomenon is severe in the case of Apple (section 2.1) 
1. Throughout section 2.1 we endeavored to collect relevant data on the economic, corporate and 
tax presence of Apple across the globe. We chose to focus on nine indicators we deemed to be 
particularly illustrative of the essential aspects of the company: its direction, value creation 
process and markets. Subsequently, we superimposed in a single graphic the economic and tax 
data concerning the same fiscal period (2011) and broken down by geographical operating 
segments (see section 2.1.4 and table 17, depicted below). The graphic evidences a clear lack of 
correlation between the location of the tax bases and the location of the indicators revealing the 
presence of a significant (either managerial, business or sales) activity in the region concerned. 
This ultimately demonstrates, both from a qualitative and quantitative perspective, a severe 
breach between the economic and the tax presence of this MNC across the globe.  
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2. A more exhaustive examination of the data disaggregated by States brings to light the particular 
role played by two jurisdictions: the US and Ireland (see sections 2.1 and 2.1.4 and table 18, 
depicted below). For its part, the US did not only witness the birth of Apple in 1976 but continue 
to play a decisive role in terms of shareholding ownership, direction and management, 
contribution to R&D activities, number of employees and stores and market share. In this 
scenario, an approximate 30% of the group´s global EBITDA ended up within its territory, a 
percentage that is, in turn, proportionate to its market share (39%). On the other hand, Ireland 
does not contribute whatsoever to the management of the group nor its R&D activities and barely 
contributes to the production process with a small manufacturing facility in Cork and a couple of 
component providers. The insertion of Apple products in the Irish market is very modest, since 
there are no Apple stores in its territory and its market share scarcely represents 1%. Despite the 
foregoing, Ireland surprisingly captured 64% of the group´s global EBITDA in 2011. The data 
concerning Ireland constitutes the clearest evidence of the profit shifting phenomenon. 
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II. The profit shifting phenomenon in Apple is primarily due to US domestic tax rules but also to 
certain structural problems related to corporate income taxation (section 2.2). 
3. The analysis of the tax planning strategy followed by Apple along with the most relevant 
applicable rules allowed us to conclude that Apple managed to book their profits in jurisdictions 
where economic activities are virtually nonexistent by fully and scrupulously complying with the 
tax laws of the States involved, without traces of any sort of abusive behavior (section 2.2 and 
2.2.5). This suggests that the profit shifting phenomenon is not a problem of tax compliance but 
rather a problem of rules. 
4. We demonstrated that certain American domestic tax rules were largely responsible for the 
outcome, most notably those concerning CSAs and CFCs. In the first case, the regime on CSAs 
allowed the Irish subsidiaries to become entitled to substantial profits derived by the exploitation 
of Apple´s intangibles in exchange for an extremely low price (for bearing part of the costs of its 
development) and without requiring the transfer of any sort of activities to Ireland (section 2.2.2). 
As for the second set of rules, the so-called “check-the-box” rules together with the exceptions 
provided by the CFC regime bear the greatest responsibility for rendering the CFC regime virtually 
ineffective and thus thwarting the possibility of imposing US taxation on the offshore income 
perceived by the Irish subsidiaries (section 2.2.3). 
5. We did however observe that principles of a more structural nature equally contributed to this 
phenomenon to a certain extent. We are referring to paradigms that have been underlying 
corporate income taxation from the time of its inception and have an undeniable impact in the 
determination of which State is ultimately entitled to tax the profits of which company. This is the 
case of the separate-entity approach along with the ALS (section 2.2.2) and the definitions of 
corporate tax residence (section 2.2.1) and the PE threshold (section 2.2.4). For example, Apple 
successfully exploited the mismatch in the definition of corporate tax residence in the US and 
Ireland. While Ireland amended its domestic test so as to prevent this type of tax planning 
schemes, the question remains as to whether residence tests tend to be inherently troublesome 
in this regard. As for the latter problem, Apple employed commissionaire structures aimed at 
keeping functions, assets and risks in Ireland and thus narrowing the market jurisdictions´ options 
to tax. We concluded that the clause shows clear signs of weakness and is per se unable to cover 
some of the commercial activities carried out by Apple in the market jurisdictions. These 
revelations led us to study the origins and rationale behind each of these paradigms, along with 
the profit shifting risks they tend to pose (chapter 3). 
 
III. The separate-entity approach gives rise to certain profit shifting risks that the arm´s length 
standard is inherently unable to impede (section 3.1) 
6. States have mostly followed the tendency to impose CITs and further regard companies as 
opaque tax subjects, separate and autonomous from both their own shareholders (section 3.1.1) 
and the related parties belonging to its group (section 3.1.2). This approach gives rise to what 
might be considered the simplest strategy to shift profits: related parties can easily manipulate 
the conditions of its intra-group transactions in a way that results in the transfer of profits to 
subsidiaries resident in low-tax jurisdictions. To counteract this risk, States have commonly relied 
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on the ALS, thus adjusting the conditions of intra-group transactions so that the tax base of the 
entity concerned includes the profits it would have obtained if the transaction had occurred with 
an unrelated entity (section 3.1.3). 
7. Although the ALS should be theoretically capable of fully preventing profit shifting derived from 
transfer pricing manipulation, the truth is that it has proven to be far from infallible in the 
accomplishment of this task (section 3.1.3). Its fundamental flaw lies precisely in its eminently 
subjective nature. It enables taxpayers to equally advocate for the compatibility of two different 
transfer prices -significantly distant from each other- with the ALS, thus admitting a broad range 
of acceptable transfer prices within which taxpayers and administrations are entitled to move 
freely and legitimately. We demonstrated that taxpayers can exploit this feature to shift profits 
out the jurisdictions where economic activities take place, for example by simply choosing the 
transfer pricing method that best suits their interests in each case. This is particularly troublesome 
in transactions involving intangible assets. 
 
IV. Corporate tax residence tests are not the fruit of a thorough reflection in policy terms and 
also give rise to severe profit shifting and treaty shopping risks (section 3.2) 
8. After the analysis of the most common types of corporate tax residence tests (section 3.2.1.1) 
used by a sample of jurisdictions, we realized that some of them were inherited from private 
international law (section 3.2.1.2.1). At this point, we warned against the risks derived by a mere 
extrapolation of terms from a legal order whose function and purpose had little to do with those 
of tax law, noting that this ultimately revealed that the gestation process of current tax residence 
tests lacked a serious policy assessment. In addition, we demonstrated that, historically, the 
implementation of new residence tests was primarily driven by the desire of closing the loopholes 
of the preexisting tests rather than by clear policy purposes (section 3.2.1.2.2).  
9. The main purpose of Section 3.2 was however to discern whether the way corporate tax 
residence is defined triggers profit shifting risks. The vast majority of States (96%) make use of 
corporate residence tests that rely on factors that bear no relation whatsoever to the presence of 
an economic activity in the territory concerned with the sole exception of Italy and Australia 
(section 3.2.1.1.5). This means that most States grant the tax residence status (and further subject 
them to tax on their worldwide income) to companies which may well not be carrying out any sort 
of economic activity in their territories (section 3.2.1.1). This being so, residence tests may be 
instrumental in tax planning schemes intended to shift profits to selected jurisdictions where no 
business activities take place. 
10. The fact that jurisdictions have adopted residence tests without really knowing, understanding 
and accepting their supposed rationale and meaning (sections 3.2.1.2.1 and 3.2.1.2.2) results in 
their unwillingness to accept the logical outcomes of their own residence tests (section 3.2.1.2.3). 
Particularly when the tests lead to consider a State in which the company does not have 
“economic substance” as its residence State, a situation that is in turn the natural consequence 
of applying the vast majority of residence tests in place (as noted above). When this is the case, 
States tend to reject the outcome of their tests and resort to anti-avoidance rules (section 
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3.2.1.2.3). We critized this approach for giving rise to an unacceptable level of legal uncertainty 
and advocated instead for considering alternative residence tests.  
11. The lack of coordination in the definition of the respective domestic corporate tax residence 
tests along with the manipulability of the majority of them results in an additional (and severe) 
opportunity for profit shifting (section 3.2.2). We are referring to the “stateless companies”, i.e. 
companies that are not regarded as tax resident by any jurisdiction and thus may enable the 
taxpayer to make taxable profits disappear from the face of the Earth for tax purposes (illustrated 
in the case of Apple in section 2.2.1). The same asymmetry observed in the case of Apple between 
the US and Ireland is present in a total sum of 45 combinations of States (within a sample of solely 
53) and are thus equally vulnerable to exploitation by taxpayers.  
12. We concluded that treaty shopping opportunities are a direct consequence of the weakness 
of corporate tax residence tests (section 3.2.3). In this context, anti-treaty shopping measures 
(e.g. LOBs) become necessary to compensate such deficiencies and further require a sufficient 
and substantive connection between the corporate taxpayer and the relevant State, as most 
residence tests are inherently unable to do so. LOB clauses often rely on two main groups of 
indicators (similar to those used by the SAARs analyzed in section 3.2.1.2.3): those related to the 
location of the company´s owners (publicly-traded companies, ownership, base-erosion and 
derivative benefits tests) and those related to the location of the company´s business (active trade 
or business test). This confirms once again the tendency of States to cope with the dissatisfaction 
associated with traditional residence tests with a layer of anti-avoidance rules. Naturally, a greater 
use of residence tests relying on the residence of the corporate shareholders (section 3.2.1.1.3) 
or the location of the business activity of the company (section 3.2.1.1.4), which per se demand 
this sort of connection to the State concerned, would in practice render unnecessary LOB 
provisions (section 3.2.3.2.3). 
13. We believe the proliferation of dual residence cases equally signals the malfunction of 
corporate tax residence tests (section 3.2.4). The reason being that most tests do not demand a 
genuine and strong connection between the corporate taxpayer and the jurisdiction concerned 
and are thus prone to cause overlapping attributions of residence (section 3.2.4.5). As for the 
treaty tie-breaker rules intended to resolve dual residence issues, we reached two additional 
conclusions (section 3.2.4.5). Firstly, these clauses merely tip the balance in favor of one the 
contracting States that regard the taxpayer as resident therein but are inherently unable to deal 
with stateless companies. Secondly, the choice of the relevant tie-breaker criteria does not seem 
to follow any sort of thoughtful logic.  
 
V. The permanent establishment concept is unable to cover all situations in which a non-
resident company conducts a significant economic activity in the territory and thus pose profit 
shifting risks (section 3.3) 
14. We began by recognizing that there is not a self-defining and unambiguous concept of source 
we may infer from the nature of things (section 3.3.1). This being so, rules defining source for tax 
purposes cannot aspire to become more than legal conventions. Yet, States tend to draft their 
respective source rules in a quite homogeneous way, the probable reason being that they 
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generally rely on the same theoretical justifications, e.g. economic allegiance, capital import 
neutrality or base erosion (section 3.3.2). In this context, we focused on one of the most 
widespread legal conventions in this respect: the PE. 
15. We concluded that the PE evidenced a clear preference for the so-called supply-based 
approach -as opposed to the supply-demand approach- insofar it intends to lead us to wherever 
the production factors are located irrespective of the location of the market (section 3.3.3). 
Secondly, we argued that the PE is undoubtedly the result of the economic context where it 
originally arose, where physical presence was critical to perform any kind of business activity. 
Thirdly, we believe it responded to the particular needs and wishes of the capital exporting 
jurisdictions, whose fiscal interests were ultimately preserved by the adoption of a high source 
threshold capable of minimizing the chances of taxation at source. 
16. We stated that the PE has ultimately become a sort of “functional” resident, as there is an 
increasing tendency to equate the tax treatment of PEs to those of resident subsidiaries (sections 
3.3.4 and 3.3.6.1), the primary reason being that the PE-State is a priori entitled to tax the 
worldwide income attributable to the PE a non-resident enterprise has within its territory. 
Further, tax treaties give precedence to the taxing rights of the PE-State over those of the 
Residence State, thus emptying the tax base of the latter in favor of the former. A preference that 
may be justified on the grounds that residence tests rarely guarantee a substantive connection 
between the taxpayer and the territory, while the PE concept does (section 3.3.6.1). 
17. The primary purpose of section 3.3 was however to ascertain whether the definition of PE was 
similarly a source of profit shifting opportunities. In this respect, we departed from the general 
assumption that, as a matter of principle, the PE concept should lead us to the territory where the 
income-producing activities take place (section 3.3.5). A closer look at the clause allowed us to 
conclude that this assumption has ceased to be entirely true, as a literal and strict interpretation 
of article 5 of the OECD MC often leaves behind certain significant economic activities (sections 
3.3.5.1 to 3.3.5.4 and 3.3.6.2).  
18. In view of the above, and particularly before the advent of the BEPS project, States have 
reacted by perpetuating the unfortunate habit of trying to counteract the weaknesses of rules by 
resorting to either eccentric interpretations, substance-over-form approaches and anti-avoidance 
rules (section 3.3.6.2.1). The so-called “PE-Spanish approach” serves as a paradigmatic example 
in this regard, as it very well illustrates all these tendencies. Although we may sympathize with 
some of the outcomes resulting from these approaches, we concluded that the means were not 
acceptable, as they lead to compromise the principle of legal certainty and, more generally, the 
respect for the rule of law (section 3.3.6.2.1). In this context, we advocated for the direct 
amendment of the clause as a way to counteract its deficiencies, an option that was explored in 
Chapter 5. 
19. At the end, we reached the conclusion that the PE clause inherently produce the effect of 
segregating taxable income from activities that generate it due to a structural issue: the PE 
equates physical and stable presence with taxable presence, a common pattern that is obvious 
and visible in all the four modalities of PEs set out in the MCs (sections 3.3.5.1 to 3.3.5.4). This fact 
alone leads to leave untaxed all other significant business activities that do not meet these 
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requirements, most notably those conducted by remote means (section 3.3.6.2.2). Advances in 
communications and technology make it increasingly possible to either sell goods or provide 
services remotely (as noted in Section 2.2.4 in the case of Apple), activities that are per se doomed 
to by excluded from the clause. The option to broaden its scope was equally explored in Chapter 
5. 
20. The confirmation of our hypothesis throughout Chapter 3 led us to consider the amendment 
of these three paradigms so as to counteract the profit shifting risks they tend to pose. However, 
we believed this task ought to be preceded by a profound reflection on: i) the very existence of 
CITs (section 4.1) and ii) the principle(s) that should theoretically underlie them (section 4.2). Once 
this was done, we would be in a better position to conceive the proposals of Chapter 5. 
 
VI. Corporate income taxation is hardly justifiable but its abolition is not an option in the short-
term (section 4.1) 
21. As taxing the income in the hands of the companies has proven to be so troublesome, the first 
question that arises is whether it is justifiable to maintain CITs or rather tax the income in the 
hands of the individuals behind the company instead. We departed from the assumption that CITs 
are inefficient, lead to distortions and discourage economic activity. Subsequently we argued that 
these disadvantages were not compensated by the supposed benefit that CITs entail -their wealth 
redistribution role- inasmuch they do not necessarily help to redistribute wealth the way we 
expect them to do. This being so, we concluded that the existence of CITs is unfounded and 
unjustified and thus share the position that the abolishment of the tax and its replacement for a 
mechanism that would turn the company into a mere withholding agent may be desirable (section 
4.1). As its abolishment is currently an unattainable chimera, we chose to lay dawn the basis for 
its reform by first identifying the principles that should ideally inspire its content. 
 
VII. The benefit principle as a useful and equitable standard to identify the taxpayers that ought 
to pay CITs in a jurisdiction (section 4.2) 
22. We concluded that the benefit principle should help to identify the members of the 
community that ought to contribute to the financial support of the government while the function 
of the ability to pay principle is confined to the measurement of the tax liability in the context of 
income taxes (section 4.2.1). 
23. The fact that the benefit principle should ideally guide the determination of a State´s 
community of taxpayers implies that is ought to somehow inspire the tax rules that ultimately 
identify the taxpayers that would become subject to a State´s tax jurisdiction (i.e. the paradigms 
here under review) (section 4.2.1). These rules should not however demand a case-by-case 
empirical demonstration of the effective use and enjoyment of the State´s public services by the 
taxpayer and a correlation to his subsequent realization of profits, as such exercise would be 
unrealistic. On the contrary, they should merely rely on certain indicia or factors whose presence 
in the territory concerned is visible and easily ascertainable and further allows us to assume that 
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the taxpayer is in a position to (effectively or potentially) use and enjoy the State´s services and 
infrastructures (section 4.2.1).  
24. Subsequently, we sought to define the role that the benefit principle should play in the 
framework of corporate income taxation (section 4.2.2). Assuming that companies are treated as 
separate legal persons for all purposes, if the identification of the taxpayers of CITs was to be 
guided by the benefit principle, the relevant benefits to be considered would be those used/ 
enjoyed by the company itself irrespective of those used/enjoyed by its shareholders. In this 
context, we enumerated a considerable number of public benefits that are susceptible to be 
used/enjoyed by legal entities (section 4.2.2.1) and further endeavored to identify a number of 
indicia whose presence in the territory of a State allowed us to assume that the company finds 
itself in a position to use/enjoy such public benefits (section 4.2.2.2). We concluded that the 
performance of both a physical economic activity (section 4.2.2.2.1) and a remote (non-physical) 
economic activity (section 4.2.2.2.2) by the relevant company in the territory concerned equally 
allow us to make this assumption, although to a lesser extent in the latter case (section 4.2.2.2.3). 
25. Finally, we wondered whether the benefit principle is in fact present in the three paradigms 
under review in the present thesis (section 4.2.3). In a way, the question is similar to that posed 
in Chapter 3, where we concluded that these paradigms have sometimes become instrumental in 
detaching taxable profits from the territories where economic activities take place. As for the ALS, 
we argued that it is inherently unable to ensure that its outcomes are invariably consistent with 
the benefit principle, so we cannot say it is generally driven by this principle (section 4.2.3.1). For 
its part, corporate tax residence is not at all inspired by the benefit principle either (indeed, we 
doubt it follows any principle at all) with the sole exception of the tests in place in Italy and 
Australia (section 4.2.3.2). With respect to the permanent establishment concept, it is not as 
consistent with the benefit principle as it may be expected to be, at least if we understand that a 
company carrying on business activities that do not meet the requirements demanded by the PE 
proviso could still be in a position to use and enjoy the benefits provided by the State (section 
4.2.3.3). Consequently, we finally pleaded for the amendment of these paradigms so as to ensure 
their consistency with the benefit principle (section 4.2.4). 
 
VIII. The benefit principle is also consistent with Public International Law (section 4.3) 
26. In this section we posed the question as to whether Public International Law places any 
constraints or conditions that may affect the proposals we intend to suggest in Chapter 5. In this 
context, we departed from the assumption that tax jurisdiction derives from (and is justified by) 
the principle of sovereignty (Section 4.3.1), which is not absolute but constrained by Public 
International Law, which marks out the time, space, people and matters over which the power of 
each State is supreme, thus making the coexistence of sovereign States sustainable (Section 
4.3.2). To better address the question as to whether Public International Law places any 
substantive limits to the way States exercise their tax jurisdiction, we presented and critically 
analyzed three well-known doctrines: the “international tax regime”, the “genuine link” and the 
“minimum standard for foreigners” (Section 4.3.3). 
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27. As for the “international tax regime” doctrine, we dismantled the theory according to which 
there are certain widely accepted principles (the single tax and the benefit principles) that have 
become international customs pursuant to article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ (section 4.3.3.1). 
Secondly, we concluded that the “genuine link” doctrine may find its legal basis in the very notion 
of sovereignty and the so-called “juristic inevitabilities” (section 4.3.3.2). As for its content, 
however, we arrived at the conclusion that it only has a relatively clear content from a negative 
perspective, thus impeding States from exercising their tax jurisdiction over matters, persons or 
things which bear no relation whatsoever to them. On the contrary, we noted the difficulties that 
a positive delimitation of the doctrine would entail, particularly in cases in which there is indeed 
a certain connection with the State concerned but it is weak or remote. Finally, we argued that 
the “minimum standard for foreigners” doctrine, a generally recognized international customary 
rule, prevents States from taxing temporary visitors who do not become sufficiently attached to 
the State for their worldwide income on the grounds that the extent of the tax liability (not the 
connection as such) can be regarded as disproportionate and unreasonable (section 4.3.3.2).  
28. The considerations exposed as regards the objective and subjective elements required for an 
international custom to arise (section 4.3.3.1) also allowed us to conclude that neither the ALS 
(part of the alleged set of international customs according to the “international tax regime” 
doctrine), domestic corporate residence tests nor the definition of PE have reached this status, as 
they do not comply with the requirements demanded by article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. This 
being so, States would be free to introduce the amendments we suggest in Chapter 5 without any 
concerns from the perspective of Public International Law. 
29. Considering that the constraints allegedly posed by Public International Law to the way a 
sovereign State may exercise its tax jurisdiction often lack a clear legal basis and the content of its 
mandate is –to say the least- certainly imprecise, we endeavored to identify a general principle 
that could contribute to ensure that the exercise of taxing rights is better aligned with the content 
and objectives of Public International Law (Section 4.3.4). We tried to infer such principle from 
the ICJ case law and various other principles underlying Public International Law (e.g. “sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non laedas” or “good neighborliness”, non-intervention, territoriality, 
reasonableness and mandate against arbitrariness) and finally came up with the notion of 
“sufficient connection”. We then discovered that the discussions around the notion of 
“sufficiency” in the context of income taxation tended to revolve around the benefit principle, 
which brings back to the conclusion reached in Section 4.2. In other words, it could be argued that 
States imposing taxes solely on taxpayers that are “sufficiently” connected to them (to the extent 
they are in a position to enjoy the benefits provided by such State) are exercising their tax 
jurisdiction in a way that may be regarded as consistent and aligned with the principles underlying 
Public International Law and the ICJ case law and, as a consequence, such States are less likely to 
generate situations of concurrence of jurisdictions (e.g. in the form of double taxation) and 
arbitrariness which, while not being technically contrary to Public International Law, are certainly 
undesirable from its perspective.  
IX. The objective of BEPS project is compatible with the benefit principle but its scope is 
inadequate to reach its alleged goals (section 5.1) 
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30. The primary goal of the BEPS project is to provide domestic and international instruments 
aiming at better aligning rights to tax with real or actual economic activity (the “BEPS mantra”). 
We noted that this objective appears to be aligned with the benefit principle, since the State 
where the company carries out its economic activities is very likely to be the State whose services 
and infrastructures have contributed to the profitability of the activity and thus the generation of 
income (section 5.1.1). The fact that the BEPS inclusive framework already integrates 94 States 
(to this day) reveals that a great international consensus has been reached on how the tax reform 
should look like and how the benefit principle should play a significant role in it. 
31. Despite the aforementioned, we soon realized that the scope of the project was unduly 
narrow and thus inherently limited to reach its alleged goals satisfactorily. In particular, we 
critized the fact that the Action Plan had renounced to open a discussion on the pertinence of 
keeping the separate-entity approach, the ALS or the traditional configuration of residence and 
source (most notably the PE threshold), despite their very probable contribution to the problems 
observed by the Project, most notably the profit shifting phenomenon (section 5.1.2). As such 
contribution was demonstrated in Chapter 3, we chose to put forward a number of amendments 
to these paradigms that sought to ensure a greater consistency with the benefit principle and 
further overcome some of the problem perceived in Chapter 3. In doing so, we also evaluated 
some of the proposals derived from the BEPS project. 
 
IX. The BEPS “value-creation” approach as regards the ALS is consistent with the benefit 
principle but does not accord with transfer pricing rules following the ALS (section 5.2.1).  
32. The main objective the BEPS project wishes to pursue in the framework of transfer pricing 
rules is to ensure that their outcomes are aligned with value creation, i.e. that the taxable bases 
ultimately end up wherever the value creating activities occur. This objective is compatible with 
the benefit principle, insofar the performance of value-adding activities in the State concerned 
generally allow us to assume that the company carrying out such activities may be in the position 
to effectively or potentially use the benefits provided by such State (section 5.2.1.1). However, 
we also observed that BEPS neglected the role that the market may arguably be considered to 
play in the process of value creation, thus preventing the market States from getting a portion of 
the taxable profits, contrary to what the benefit principle would suggest.  
33. Subsequently, we reached the conclusion that such approach is not entirely consistent with 
the current legal configuration of transfer pricing rules following the ALS (section 5.2.1.2). Firstly, 
we demonstrated that the ALS lacks a specific objective, as it is a mere legal convention that serves 
to assign profits between related parties and should be applied in an aseptic way following the 
literal wording of the rule. In this context, conferring an artificial brand-new objective (the “value-
creation” approach) to the ALS entails a clear risk: it could eventually give rise to interpretations 
of the rule that substantially deviate from its literal scope and the possible meaning of its words, 
just as it has historically happened in the past with the other alleged objectives of the standard 
(i.e. the ability to pay and the anti-avoidance objectives). In fact, we demonstrated that this risk 
is prone to materialize if the proposals put forward by BEPS are finally implemented. For example, 
we realized that this new approach effectively limits the inherent subjectivity of the ALS by 
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narrowing the range of acceptable prices on the grounds of the “profits must follow value 
creation” principle (by, for example, predetermining ex-ante the transfer pricing method to be 
used in certain scenarios, as the post-BEPS OECD TPG do). Additionally, we noted three examples 
to demonstrate that the post-BEPS OECD TPG may well give rise to outcomes that differ from 
those that may have presumably occurred in the market. 
34. Departing from the fact that the value-creation approach is desirable but, at the same time, 
hard to reconcile with provisions following the ALS, we finally concluded that the possibility to 
adopt domestic special measures in the context of transfer pricing rules that go beyond the ALS 
should be explored, along with the possible amendment of article 9 of tax treaties (section 
5.2.1.2). 
 
X. Proposals concerning the definition of corporate tax residence test (section 5.2.2).  
35. As it became apparent in Chapter 3 that residence-based taxation of companies was not 
designed having regard to any policy analysis, we first called for the reconsideration of the 
corporate tax residence tests in place in the light of the policy objectives the States pretend to 
achieve by means of their respective CITs, whatever they are (section 5.2.2.1). This way, corporate 
tax residence would be appropriately aligned to the objective of the CIT concerned and would 
thus contribute to serve its purposes. To this end, we briefly reviewed the policy objectives that 
preexisting residence tests can contribute to achieve.  
36. Later, we concluded that the abandonment of weak residence tests (i.e. those requiring a 
weak connection between the company and the State concerned) is desirable (section 5.2.2.2). 
By weak tests we are mostly referring to formal tests (e.g. POI tests) but also, to a certain extent, 
to those based on the place where the company is run. The reasons are manifold. Firstly, this 
policy approach would be more consistent with Public International Law (section 5.2.2.2.1). 
Indeed, we concluded that States subjecting to tax the worldwide income obtained by companies 
on the sole grounds that they are incorporated in accordance with their laws may arguably 
infringe the “minimum standard for foreigners” (i.e. the alleged international custom according 
to which a State would not be allowed to tax the worldwide income of aliens who are mere 
tourists or temporary visitors), as these companies are only temporarily and occasionally linked 
to them. Beyond this observation, we concluded that weak residence tests are more troublesome 
from the perspective of this legal order, as their use increases the chances of an overlap in the 
exercise of the tax jurisdictions of two or more States resulting in multiple residence issues and 
the consequent double taxation they entail. Secondly, the proposed stance is equally advisable 
from the perspective of the benefit principle, as weak tests rely on factors that are within the 
direct control of the corporate taxpayer, thus allowing it to basically select the jurisdiction in 
which it wishes to be tax resident irrespective of the place(s) where economic activities take place 
(section 5.2.2.2.2). Last but not least, the abandonment of this sort of domestic tests would 
equally mitigate treaty shopping risks (section 5.2.2.2.3) 
37. We advocated for the adoption of corporate tax residence tests that, by contrast, ensure a 
substantive, genuine and sufficient connection between the corporate taxpayer and the State 
concerned (section 5.2.2.3). In order to define such connection for the purposes of CITs, we chose 
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to review the most common residence tests used in PITs and further identify the principle(s) 
supposedly underlying them (section 5.2.2.3.1). This study allowed us to conclude that all States, 
without exception, have personal residence tests in place whose fulfillment allows us to assume 
that the tax resident finds himself in a practical position to effectively benefit from the relevant 
public goods and services provided by the State, either directly (as a result of his actual physical 
presence or frequent visits) or remotely. In other words, we observed that the common principle 
underlying the vast majority of residence tests in PITs is the benefit principle. However, we noted 
that, while 100% of the States make use of personal residence tests according to which the 
(resulting) resident may find himself in the position to use and enjoy the services provided by the 
State, only 4% of the States do likewise in the context of corporate income taxation. 
38. We argued that the only sort of corporate tax residence tests that can be deemed to be 
consistent with the benefit principle are those that demand the presence of a significant economic 
activity in the territory concerned (section 5.2.2.3.2). In this section, we analyzed the experience 
of Italy and Australia with these tests and explored the advantages and disadvantages that the 
implementation of such tests in the domestic tax legislations may entail to further make a few 
suggestions for a proposal de lege ferenda. However, we finally recognized that were are not yet 
in the position to provide a definitive legislative proposal, as it is clear that the matter deserves a 
more thorough study due to the enormous impact that a change of the residence paradigm might 
have and the significant risks and challenges it poses.  
39. Considering that treaty shopping risks arise as a direct consequence of the weakness of 
residence tests, the most straightforward and optimal solution would undoubtedly be to abandon 
weak residence tests. However, States may choose to keep their weak tests and instead neutralize 
such risks at the level of the treaty itself (section 5.2.2.4). To this end, we identified three possible 
approaches. The first one consists in interpreting article 4.1 of tax treaties following the OECD MC 
as meaning that the expression “or any other criterion of a similar nature” excludes the 
admissibility of certain weak residence tests for the purposes of granting access to treaty benefits 
(section 5.2.2.4.1). Secondly, such exclusion could be made explicit in article 4.1 for a greater 
clarity (section 5.2.2.4.2). Thirdly, States can rely on anti-treaty shopping clauses (e.g. the LOB 
provision) (section 5.2.2.4.3). For example, if the Contracting States wish to grant treaty benefits 
solely to companies that are sufficiently linked to them (in the sense that they conduct a business 
activity within any of their territories), they may adopt a LOB provision including an “activity 
clause”.  
40. Finally, we suggested the adoption of a new tie-breaker rule in article 4.3 of tax treaties that 
would tip the balance in favor of the residence State to which the corporate taxpayer is more 
closely connected in terms of economic presence (section 5.2.2.5), as we have defended countless 
times that the most appropriate way to define a sufficient connection between a company and a 
State is to demonstrate the presence of an economic activity carried out by the company in the 
territory concerned. 
XI. Proposals concerning the definition of the permanent establishment concept (section 5.2.3) 
41. We first evaluated the specific objectives that the BEPS project intended to accomplish as 
regards the PE concept (section 5.2.3.1). Although it was not made explicit, we learned that BEPS 
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sought to ensure taxation at the level of the market jurisdiction by means of the PE and its 
corresponding Actions (1 and 7). While the objective can be perceived as legitimate from the 
perspective of the benefit principle, we concluded that it is inconsistent with the current wording 
of the PE clause as well as the methodology to attribute profits to it, as the PE was never conceived 
to ensure taxation at the level of the market jurisdiction (although this may have incidentally 
occurred sometimes) but rather to ensure taxation in territories where non-residents were 
carrying out a significant value-adding economic activities.  
42. Subsequently, we assessed the advantages and disadvantages of the amendments to the PE 
clause recommended by Action 7 of the BEPS Project (section 5.2.3.2). In general, we welcomed 
all the proposals, as they contribute to make the threshold less vulnerable to tax planning and 
further put an end to a long history of unfortunate interpretations of the clause and overuse of 
anti-avoidances rules which seriously compromised the principle of legal certainty, as very well 
illustrated by the so-called “PE Spanish approach”. However, we also warned against the expected 
inconveniences and risks that their adoption would entail. For example, the fact that the rule is 
now comprised by broader and more subjective criteria gives rise to a wider scope of discretion 
and a decreased degree of clarity and legal certainty. Additionally, we anticipated that the 
amendments are not expected to result in a significant increment of tax revenues in the PE-States 
due to current rules guiding the methodology to attribute profits to PEs. Last but not least, we 
concluded that the proposed amendments do not contribute to effectively accomplish the 
objective of BEPS as regards the PE (i.e. ensuring taxation at the level of the market jurisdiction) 
and, by extension, meet the demands required by the benefit principle. 
43. In view of the fact that the PE clause as it currently stands does not seem to be perfectly 
consistent with the benefit principle and the proposals of Action 7 do not have any true impact in 
this regard, we chose to reevaluate its scope in the light of such principle (section 5.2.3.3). Firstly, 
we raised the question as to whether all situations comprised within the current clause indeed 
allow us to assume the potential access to the benefits provided by the PE-State by the corporate 
taxpayer (section 5.2.3.3.1). We then reached two conclusions. Firstly, we noted that the 
automatic exclusion of the activities listed in article 5.4 of the MCs is untenable from the 
perspective of the benefit principle, as all the listed activities involve the use of a physical POB in 
the host jurisdiction, a fact that per se allow us to assume the potential access to public benefits 
irrespective of the nature of the activities that the non-resident company carries out through it. 
Secondly, we argued that the situations in which a PE arises behind a person or group of persons 
(natural/legal, related/unrelated) that are resident in the host jurisdiction (e.g. DAPEs derived by 
article 5.5 of the MCs) are not justified either under the benefit principle, insofar such person 
(presumably in the position to access the benefits provided by its Residence State) is already 
subject to tax therein on its worldwide income due to its status of resident. Although both 
considerations are consistent with our understanding of the benefit principle, amendments to the 
PE clause in this direction would only be desirable insofar States regard this rule as an instrument 
at the exclusive service of the benefit principle. 
44. Secondly, we wondered whether there are situations beyond those explicitly covered by the 
clause in which we could assume the potential accessibility to benefits (section 5.2.3.3.2). We 
observed that the clause (and this is visible in the four modalities) largely equates stable and 
physical presence with taxable presence, thus excluding activities that do not entail a physical 
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presence in the territory concerned. At the same time, we concluded in Chapter 4 that the access 
to the customers located in a certain State (albeit remotely) reveals that the company is in a 
position to use/ indirectly benefit from the State´s services and infrastructures. Accordingly, we 
concluded that the scope of the PE should be redefined so as to accommodate these situations. 
45. In the light of the aforementioned, we chose to explore the possibility of introducing a new 
PE fiction (a “remote-sales PE) that would coexist with the other preexisting provisos (Section 
5.2.3.3.3). In essence, we intended to target by the proposed new clause all remote sales (i.e. 
transactions for the sale of goods or services conducted by any sort of remote means) made by a 
business supplier resident in one of the contracting States (although the clause would ultimately 
be applied on a related-group basis) to customers presumably located in the other contracting 
State (three indicators are suggested for these purposes) provided that the gross annual receipts 
derived from such sales exceeded a certain quantitative threshold (e.g. $ 1.000.000). In view of 
the significant obstacles concerning the access to the relevant information for the purposes of 
applying the rule and its effective enforcement, we concluded that the adoption of the new clause 
would necessarily need to be accompanied by a set of treaty and domestic rules aimed at 
overcoming such obstacles. In this context, we suggest two alternative courses of action: the first 
one entails the establishment of an ad-hoc collection system based on the practice of (refundable) 
withholding taxes while the second one relies on a registration-based system that requires a 
greater level of cooperation among States adopting the new PE proviso. Finally, we ascertained 
the manner in which the rule could apply on a net basis and further determined the rules that 
would guide the attribution of profits to the new PE fiction.   
46. We endeavored to strike a balance between equity here understood in terms of benefit) and 
practicability in the form of a new PE-fiction, but we were aware that its implementation poses a 
considerable amount of costs risks and challenges (some of which were identified). In this context, 
we concluded that more thought should be given to the proposal before considering its 
implementation. In particular, future studies should endeavor to provide a response to the 
challenges here identified, conceive measures that serve to mitigate the anticipated risks and 
ultimately carry out a cost-benefit analysis to assess whether the expected outcomes can arguably 
offset all the costs and efforts. 
 
XII. Formulary apportionment is the most optimal solution from the perspective of the benefit 
principle but is today a political utopia (section 5.3) 
47. We chose not to examine in depth disruptive measures that involve the departure of the 
paradigms here under review (i.e. the separate-entity approach, the ALS, corporate tax residence 
and the PE) considering that they require a degree of international coordination and political 
agreement that is today unattainable (section 5.3). 
48. However, we concluded that the proposal on the CCCTB made by the European Commission, 
which entails group consolidation and a subsequent distribution of the profits according to a 
formula based on sales/labor/assets, contributes to overcome some of the structural problems of 
these paradigms and is likely to give rise to outcomes that are better aligned with the benefit 
principle. This is so because the formula would ensure that taxation arise wherever physical 
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economic activates take place (being assets and employees adequate indicators of them) and 
customers are located (sales). Indeed, the proportion of the allocation (i.e. two thirds to indicators 
of physical economic activity and one third to indicators of market) would be consistent with the 
view that the number of benefits within the reach of the company is expected to be greater when 
the company physically performs an economic activity in the State concerned than in cases in 
which it reaches its market through remote means (section 4.2.2.2.3). 
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